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SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


BY 


FLOYD HENRY ALLPORT 


Professor of Social and Political Psychology 
School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University 










che Riversive Press: 


HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY 
BOSTON - NEW YORK - CHICAGO - DALLAS - SAN FRANCISCO 


The Riverside Press Cambridge 


COPYRIGHT, 1924 


BY FLOYD HENRY ALLPORT 


ALL RIGHTS RESERVED INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO REPRODUCE 
THIS BOOK OR PARTS THEREOF IN ANY FORM 


The Riverside Press 
CAMBRIDGE - MASSACHUSETTS 
PRINTED IN THE U.S.A. 


TO THE MEMORY OF 
JOHN EDWARD ALLPORT 
BELOVED FATHER, WISE COUNSELOR, 
GREAT AND TRUE FRIEND 





PREFACE 


ONLY within recent years have the psychologists of this country 
turned their attention seriously toward the social field. With one 
or two exceptions, the earlier works upon this subject, as well as a 
number of recent ones, have been written by sociologists. To these 
writers psychologists owe a debt of gratitude for revealing new and 
promising opportunities for applying psychological science. Socio- 
logical writers, however, have given their attention mainly to the 
larger aspects, the laws of behavior and consciousness as operative 
in social groups. In so doing they have naturally adopted as ma- 
terials the concepts of human nature provided by the older psychol- 
ogists of good standing. With the recent expansion of psychology 
and growth of psychological insight, it has become necessary to 
modify many of these earlier conceptions and to add not a few new 
ones. Social science has not yet profited by taking account of this 
advancement, but has lagged behind in its fundamental assump- 
tions regarding human nature. A need has therefore arisen of 
bringing to the service of those interested in social relationships the 
most recent psychological investigation and theory. I have written 
this book as an attempt in the direction of supplying this need. 
More specifically, there are two main lines of scientific achieve- 
ment which I have tried to bring within the scope of this volume. 
These are the behavior viewpoint and the experimental method. A 
considerable number of psychologists are now regarding their 
science as one fundamentally, though not exclusively, of behavior. 
This approach has revealed a wealth of principles for the under- 
standing of human beings — understanding, that is, in the truest 
sense, namely, the explanation of their acts. Like every funda- 
mental viewpoint in a science, behaviorism is simply a convenient 
way of conceiving the facts. Many of its hypotheses are still un- 
proved. Yet, on the whole, it fits the facts so well, and is so re- 
plete with possibilities for gaining further knowledge, that it should 
be of basic value to students of social science. | 


v1 PREFACE 


While the behavior viewpoint has been developing a richer inter- 
pretation of the facts, the method of experimentation has been 
yielding the facts themselves. Psychologists have recently con- 
ducted many investigations either social in their setting or sugges- 
tive of important social applications. The bearing of these experi- 
ments upon social psychology has in some cases been noted; but, 
so far as I am aware, no attempt has been made to collect them in a 
systematic way. My second purpose, therefore, has been to fit 
these experimental findings into their broader setting in social 
psychology, and to draw from them certain conclusions of value to 
that science. 

In addition to these two main fields of progress, there is a third 
which deserves especial recognition. I refer to the Freudian con- 
tributions to psychology. Notwithstanding its investment in a 
dogmatism which is repellent to many, psychoanalysis has un- 
earthed facts which are valuable for the understanding of human 
nature. The bearing of these facts upon social conflict I have dis- 
cussed in various places throughout the book, and particularly in 
Chapter XIV. 

There are certain innovations in the treatment of the subject for 
which it may be well to prepare the reader. To one interested 
primarily in social relations it may seem that I give an unusual 
amount of space to purely individual behavior. This is in accord- 
ance with my purpose, explained in Chapter I, to adhere to the psy- 
chological (that is, the individual) viewpoint. For I believe that 
only within the indwidual can we find the behavior mechanisms and 
the consciousness which are fundamental in the interactions be- 
tween individuals. I have, therefore, postponed until the last 
chapter almost all the material treated in books which have been 
written from the sociological viewpoint. If the reader finds that 
not until the final chapter has he arrived upon familiar ground, I 
shall venture to hope that his understanding may have been in- 
creased through treading the less familiar pathways. 

Another deviation will be found in the treatment of instincts. 
The instinct theory has fulfilled an important mission in diseredit- 
ing the earlier, mechanical theories of motivation. The notion, 
however, of complex inherited patterns of behavior is in turn suc- 


PREFACE Vil 


cumbing to the process of analysis and closer observation. Some 
psychologists have, indeed, gone too far in their rejection of in- 
stincts, in that they have denied the existence of any definite in- 
born modes of response. The instinct theory was right in asserting 
that there is an hereditary basis for behavior; its error lay in its 
failure to analyze behavior into its elementary components of in- 
heritance and acquisition. The theory of prepotent reactions, 
developed in Chapter III, aims to combine the virtues and omit the 
defects of both sides of éhie controversy. 

The book is intended to be used as a text in courses in social psy- 
chology and in courses in the various social sciences which give a 
part of their time to the psychological foundations. I hope also 
that it may prove of service, not only to college students, but to all 
who are interested in the social adjustments of individuals and the 
broader problems of society. For the benefit of those to whom psy- 
chology is a new subject, a chapter upon the physiological basis of 
behavior has been included. Teachers will find it advisable to 
assign the chapters in the order in which they occur. The closing 
chapter is to be regarded merely as an outline. It was written 
primarily to guide the student in his application of the principles of 
social psychology to sociological questions. It is suggested that, 
where the book is used for a full year’s course, a large portion of the 
second semester be given to expanding this last chapter with the aid 
of the references appended. ‘Throughout the course the student 
should be directed in collecting illustrations and incidents from 
contemporary social life for the purpose of testing or applying the 
principles discussed. 


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 


For the origin of my interest in social psychology I am indebted to 
the memory of Hugo Miinsterberg. It was he who suggested the 
setting for my first experiments and who foresaw many of the pos- 
sibilities which have been developed in this book. To my former 
teacher and colleague, Professor H. 8. Langfeld, my sincere thanks 
are due for a careful reading of the manuscript and for many val- 
uable criticisms and constructive suggestions. I wish to express 
equal gratitude to my present colleague, Professor J. F. Dashiell, 


vill PREFACE 


for reading the manuscript and offering effective suggestions con- 
cerning the theories advanced. I owe much to my association with 
Professor W. F. Dearborn and Dr. E. B. Holt, and have used sev- 
eral illustrations derived directly or indirectly from their teaching. 
In particular, I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to my 
brother, Dr. G. W. Allport, both for assistance with the manuscript 
and for stimulating discussions of some of the problems raised. He 
also kindly furnished me with a number of facts from his own re- 
search, of which mention has been made in the text. My thanks 
are due also to Professor J. F. Steiner for advice regarding the 
sociological aspects of the last chapter. Valuable comments upon 
several chapters were given by Miss Ada L. Gould whose kindness I 
desire gratefully to acknowledge. To our departmental secretary, 
Mrs. G. Wallace Smith, I am indebted for effective work in prepara- 
tion of the manuscript, as well as for helpful suggestions in regard 
to style. The theory of emotion developed in Chapter IV appeared 
in substantially the same form in the Psychological Review for 
March, 1922. My thanks are due to the editor of that journal for 
permission to republish it here. Finally, I wish to thank the vari- 
ous publishers who have given their permission to reproduce cer- 
tain of the illustrations. 


Fioyp H. ALuport 
CHAPEL Hitt, NortH CAROLINA ; 
December, 1923 


CONTENTS 
PR Rr ACH eee tie bee OUR Seigler ean MPT tae ee 


CHAPTER I 


SoctaL PsycHOLOGY AS A SCIENCE OF INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR AND 
CONSCIOUSNESS om einee tia 0) s+ Veen ay iss 
The present standpoint in psychology The province of social 
psychology Social psychology as a science of the individual. 
The group fallacy Psychological forms of the group fallacy. > 
1. The ‘crowd mind’ 2. The ‘collective, or class, mind’ 
3. The ‘group mind’ Conclusions regarding the social mind 
Biological forms of the group faliacy Social psychology and soci- 
ology Behavior and consciousness in social psychology Ao 
working definition of social psychology. Plan of its treatment in 
this book. 
































PART I. THE INDIVIDUAL IN HIS SOCIAL ASPECTS 
CHAPTER II 


Tuer PHYSIOLOGICAL Basis oF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 


The adaptive function of behavior 
The neuron 





The receptors and effectors 
Reflex are conduction: properties of the syn- 


























apse The main subdivisions of the nervous system The 
spinal cord and spinal nerves The parts of the brain The 
medulla The cerebellum, pons, and mid-brain The cere- 
bral hemispheres The thalamus and corpus striatum The 














functions of the cortex Cortical activity in social behavior 
The autonomic portion of the nervous system The relation of 
the autonomic to the cerebrospinal system Compound reflexes 
in behavior The use of the term ‘reflex.’ 











CHAPTER III 


FUNDAMENTAL ACTIVITIES — INHERITED AND LEARNED 


InsTINcT, MATURATION, AND HABIT The origin of fundamen- 

















tal activities The criteria of instinct Post-natal development 
of structure Maturation versus learning in the analysis of an ac- 
tivity Conclusions: the need of genetic study in the determina- 


tion of instinct. 

THE PREPOTENT REFLEXES AND LEARNING 
in fundamental activities I. Starting and withdrawing The 
afferent modifications The efferent modifications Learning 
and thought in the efferent modification of the withdrawing reflex 


Reflexes involved 

















x CONTENTS 











Conclusions regarding modification II. Rejecting 
III. Struggling Afferent development: extension of the stimuli 
of the fighting reactions The social influence upon the struggle 
reflex The yielding response — habits of activity and passivity 
IV. Hunger reactions. The approaching responses The 
learning process in hunger reactions Autonomic interests as 
drives in learning The human hunger reflexes and their develop- 
ment Prepotency in habit —— Social and affective aspects of 
stimulus transfer V. Sensitive zone reactions. Response of 
the infant to tickling Relation of the sensitive zones to hunger 












































and sex Pleasurable habits based upon the sensitive zone reflexes 
VI. Sex reactions. The original sexual reflexes The affer- 
ent modification of sexual reflexes. Sex attraction The prob- 





lem of sex training Sex and sensitive aone reactions in familial 
behavior The sex reactions and learning ‘Sublimation.’ 
SocraL Factors IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF FUNDAMENTAL ACTIVI- 
TIES Imitation Gregariousness. 
CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE FUNDAMENTAL ACTIVITIES. 














CHAPTER IV 


FEELING AND EMOTION ee Crone ee Ws Ca mA CO neh 





The nature of emotion The classification of emotions 
The physiology of feeling and emotion A theory of feeling and 
emotion Evidence from introspection and latent period 
How are the emotional reactions further differentiated? 
dence from genetic development 
of unpleasant emotions 














Evi- 
Conditions favoring the arousal 
Complex emotional states in social be- 

















havior The social conditioning of emotional response The 
control and direction of emotion as a social problem. 
CHAPTER V 
PERSONALITY — THE SoctaAL MAN aes ; Rv prea ese: 


The individual basis of per- 





Personality is largely a social fact 



































sonality The selection of traits INTELLIGENCE Mo- 
TILITY TEMPERAMENT SELF-EXPRESSION Drive 
Compensation Extrovercion — Introversion Insight —— 
Ascendance — Submission Expansion — Reclusion So- 
CIALITY. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE MEASUREMENT OF PERSONALITY .. cw Toe eG 





1. Methods of judgment by associ- 
ates A. Systematic questionnaire methods B. Rating 
methods 2. Testing methods Types of personality. 

GENERAL SuMMARY — Tue Inpivipuat As A Unit In SoctAt Br- 
HAVIOR. 


Introductory statement 














CONTENTS xl 


PART II. SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 
CHAPTER VII 


Ture NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF SoctAL BEHAVIOR : . 147 

Definition and classification —— Linear and circular social Reheat 
ior Direct and contributory social stimuli Controlling and 
self-adapting social behavior. 

SoctiAL BEHAVIOR IN ANIMALS The lower forms of life. Ad- 
justments based on difference of structure Insects and allied 
forms Vertebrates The social behavior of pigeons 
The social behavior of apes and monkeys Sociological aspects of 
animal behavior Conclusions. 





























CHAPTER VIII 


SocrAL STIMULATION — LANGUAGE AND GESTURE . . . . . 169 
Forms of social stimulation. 




















THE PHysIoLoGIcAL Basis of VocaAL EXPRESSION The organs 
of speech — General view The larynx Laryngeal tone pro- 
duction Pitch and intensity of laryngeal tones The forma- 
tion of vowels Articulate speech. Consonants. 

THE GENETIC DEVELOPMENT OF VOCAL EXPRESSION Gesture 








Pre-linguistic or laryngeal stage of vocal ex- 
pression The development of language: Stage 1. — Random ar- 
ticulation with fixation of circular responses Stage 2. — Evoking 
of the articulate elements by the speech of others (so-called ‘Imita- 
tion’) Discussion of the theory involved in stages 1 and 2 
Stage 3. — Conditioning of the articulate elements (evoked by oth- 
ers) by objects and situations Development of response to lan- 
guage. 

GESTURE AND VocAL EXPRESSION IN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
Infantile and primitive language Theories of the origin of lan- 
guage. Gesture Graphic gesture in relation to infantile and 
primitive language - The interjectional and onomatopoetic theo- 
ries A social behavior account of the origin of language 
Written language. 

ConcLusion — THE Soctat BAsIs AND VALUE OF LANGUAGE. 


language in infants 



































CHAPTER Ix 


SocraAL STIMULATION — FACIAL AND BopILy EXPRESSION . .. . 200 


Introductory statement. 

EXPRESSION IN EMOTION AND ALLIED STATES The facial mus- 
cles and their expressive function The language of the face 
I. The pain-grief group II. The surprise-fear group Ti 
The anger group IV. The disgust group V. The pleasure 























xii CONTENTS 





group VI. The attitudinal group —— Dynamic and _ bodily 
components of expression. 

THE THEORY oF FactAL EXPRESSION 
ples A reinterpretation of Darwin’s theory The mimetic 
responses Theory of mimetic expression Summary. 

EXPRESSION THROUGH POSTURE AND PHYSIOGNOMY 
tonus and posture as social stimuli Physiognomy. 

THE STIMULUS VALUE OF FaAcIAL AND Bopity EXPRESSION 
Genetic aspects and extremes of sensitivity Experiments in 
reading facial expression General aspects of expressional stimu- 
lation. 

Minor Forms oF SociAL STIMULATION. 





Darwin’s three princi- 














Muscle 

















CHAPTER X 


RESPONSE TO SOCIAL STIMULATION: ELEMENTARY Forms . .. . 233 


Types of reaction to social objects. 
SYMPATHY The mechanism of sympathy 
favoring the sympathetic response 








Conditions 
The social significance of 











sympathy Summary. 

IMITATION An analysis of acts to which the term ‘imitation’ 
is applied. 

SUGGESTION Various definitions of suggestion The po- 











tency of spoken language in bodily control 
as a control of attitude 1. Suggestion in the formation of atti- 
tudes 2. Suggestion in the release of attitudes 3. Sugges- 
tion in the increase of responses already released Conditioned 
response in suggestion The conditions of suggestibility 
Final definition of suggestion. 

LAUGHTER Genetic origin of laughter. The incongruous 
Laughter as a release of inhibited emotion. Freudian wit —— 
Laughter is a social phenomenon. 


Suggestion defined 


























CHAPTER XI 


RESPONSE TO SocIAL STIMULATION IN THE GROUP... . . 4 ,. 260 


The more complex social situations. 

INFLUENCE OF THE Co-AcTING GROUP Social facilitation: the 
influence of the group upon the individual’s movements —— The 
influence of the group upon attention-and mental work The in- 
fluence of the group upon association The influence of the group 
upon thought The influence of the group upon judgments of 
comparison Individual differences in social facilitation So- 
cial consciousness in the co-working group Rivalry —— Auto- 
rivalry, ‘team-work,’ and esprit de corps The physiological 
basis of social facilitation and rivalry Summary of the experi- 
mental study of the group influence. 

INFLUENCE OF THE Face-To-F'ack Group —— The nature of face- 





























. CONTENTS xill 


I 





Social control, participation, and sex as prepotent 
Conversation and discussion. 


to-face groups 
drives in primary groups 





CHAPTER XII 


RESPONSE TO SOCIAL STIMULATION INTHE CRowb . . . .. .. 292 


The crowd situation. 

PrepoTeNntT InpiIvipuAL Reactions As THE Basis oF CRowpD. 
PHENOMENA Prepotent drives in various crowds Crowds 
as struggle groups Individual factors are often neglected in 
crowd theories. 

RELEASE AND HEIGHTENING oF INDIVIDUAL REACTIONS IN 
CROWDS ‘Contagion.’ The induced emotion theory Social 
facilitation in crowds The origin and spread of social facilita- 
tion. Special devices Spatial factors and circularity in crowds. 
The social behavior of the audience Suggestion and the sugges- 
tion consciousness in crowds The conservatism of the crowd 
man. 

ATTITUDINAL AND IMAGINAL FAcTORS IN THE CROWD BEHAVIOR 
OF THE INDIVIDUAL The impression of universality Social 
projection The crowd attitudes and public opinion. 

SprcrAL MECHANISMS FOR THE RELEASE OF PREPOTENT REACTIONS 

_ IN Crowpbs Allied and antagonistic responses. Resolution of 
individual conflicts in the crowd The moral consciousness of 
the crowd man —— Crowd ethics in vocational and fraternal groups 

Martin’s principles of crowd behavior Summary. 


















































CHAPTER XIII 


SocrAL ATTITUDES AND SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS ee Darcie Ol) 


General social attitudes Attitudes toward specific groups 
—— Self-expressive social attitudes Attitudes toward specific 
persons Attitudes based upon the behavior of others toward us: 
the social self Building up attitudes in others toward us —— 
Maintaining the attitudes of others toward us Social conscious- © 
ness The genetic development of social consciousness and the 
social self Some general aspects of social consciousness. 























vp eere 


CHAPTER XIV 


SOCH TMA DIUSTMENTS te cu) cyl dcohl oe UE mem nies If gees Uinteeie . 336 


° 

Conflict and adjustment in social behavior Clues to inhibited 
unsocialized reactions The major conflicts and their social ad- 
justment. 

1. StRuGGLE ConFruicT: ADJUSTMENTS IN ANGER 
version of the struggle response 
Rationalized anger. 

- 2. Spx ConFLIcrT AND ADJUSTMENTS IN Famity Lire 








The intro- 
Types of struggle inhibition 











Sex 





XIV ~ CONTENTS 





differences. Attitudes toward women Adjustments between 
husband and wife Causes of marital disharmony —-— Adjust- 
ments between parents and children. Introductory statement 
The Freudian conception Restatement of the Freudian theory: 
1. The love of the child for the parent 2. The love of the parent 
for the child Personal and social significance of the child-parent 























fixation Further problems in the parent-child relation. The 
evil of neglect Brothers and sisters, and other adjustments of 
consanguinity The selection of friends and associates. 





3. INFERIORITY CoNnFLicT: ADJUSTMENTS OF PERSONALITY TRAITS 
The nature of inferiority conflict Types of inferiority con- 
a. The intellectual_ sphere b. The economic sphere: 
radicalism and conservatism c. The moral sphere: reformism. 

SocroLoGicaL ASPECTS OF CONFLICT ADJUSTMENT Conflicts 
between egoistic drives and social standards: group aspects 
Conflicts between egoistic drives and group traditions Covert 
conflicts in hostility between groups Is conflict a symptom of 
socialization or degeneracy? 











flict 




















- CHAPTER XV 


SocIAL BEHAVIOR IN RELATION TO SOCIETY ets Fe At eal A ole RS 


The place of social behavior in the social sciences. 

SoctaL AGGREGATES: UNITY Social behavior in relation to 
population —— Primary group and community Caste and social 
class Race and racial adjustments Nationality. 

Tur THEORY oF SocIetry The origin of human aggregation 
The nature of society: theories of the ‘ego-alter’ type Imi- 
tation and sympathy theories. 

SocraAL ORDER: ORGANIZATION AND ControL —— The nature of so- 
celal control Unorganized controls: fashion Fad and craze 
Convention Custom Rumor Public opinion 
Mob rule Control through institutions: a. Government 
Education c. Religion. 

SocraL BEHAVIOR AND ConTROL IN THE Economic SPHERE —— 
Social behavior in commercial attitudes. Credit and panic 
Social control and exploitation in business Industrial phases: 
behavior in co-working groups Industrial conflict. 

SocrIAL CONTINUITY AND CHANGE The concept of social hered- 
ity The social character of the individual’s thinking Social 
behavior in discovery and invention Leadership ——— The per- 
sonality of the leader Popular movements. 

Lines or Future DEVELOPMENT Social progress as the well- 
being of the individual Summary: Social behavior in relation to 
progress. 












































bag 









































INDEX e e e 6 ° e ° ° e e e e e e e 435 


SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


CHAPTER I 


SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AS A SCIENCE OF 
INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR AND CONSCIOUSNESS | 


The Present Standpoint in Psychology. Psychology is the sci- 
ence wnich studies behavior and consciousness. Of these two 
terms behavior is placed first because it is an explanatory principle, 
and therefore more fundamental. The essential formula for be- | 
havior is as follows: (1) Some need is present in the organism, such 
as the necessity of withdrawing from weapons injuring the body, or 
the need to obtain food or to secure a mate. The need may also be 
of a derived and complex order; for example, the necessity of solv- 
ing some problem upon which the satisfaction of the more elemen- 
tary wants depends. (2) The organism acts: it behaves in such Bae 
manner as to satisfy the need. 

Need, in the sense here employed, signifies a biological maladjust- 
ment. The relation existing between the organism and its sur- 
roundings is injurious rather than beneficial to life, and must be 
changed if the individual is to survive. More specifically, a need 
arises when certain objects excite the external sense organs, as in an 
injury to the skin; or when muscular changes in the internal organs, 
as in hunger, excite sense organs inside the body. These excitations, 
or stxmulations, set up a current of nervous energy which is prop- 
agated inward to the central nervous system and outward again to 
the muscles controlling bodily movement, causing them to act in 
such a way as to fulfill the need through which the chain of events 
originated; that is, in the examples used, to withdraw from harm 
and to obtain food. The making of these adaptive movements is 
called the reaction. 

But the word ‘need’ may be used in another sense beside that or 


2 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


biological requirement. It may denote a felt, or conscious, lack, as 
when we say we feel hunger or feel the need of companionship. 
Need in this sense is a part of the immediate and private experience 
of each individual. We can never be directly aware of the felt needs 
of others; they can only be inferred by observing their behavior 
when they are biologically maladjusted to their surroundings (need 
in the former sense). This personal awareness which accompanies 
behavior extends to other facts beside need or desire. We are 
aware of the stimulating object, aware of fear or anger when these 
emotions are a part of our adjustment to it, aware of our purpose in 
making the reaction, and of our thinking and acting toward that 
end. These conscious states likewise are known in others only by 
inference from appropriate reactions. 

It is clear that consciousness stands In some intimate relation to 
the biological need and the behavior which satisfies it. Just what 
this relation is still constitutes an unsolved and perplexing problem. 
One negative conclusion, however, seems both justified and neces- 
sary as a working principle: namely, that consciousness is in no 
way a cause of the bodily reactions through which the needs are 
fulfilled. Explanation is not derived from desire, feeling, will, 
or purpose, however compelling these may seem to our immediate 
awareness, but from the sequence of stimulation — neural trans- 
mission — and reaction. Consciousness often accompanies this 
chain of events; but it never forms a link in the chain itself.} 

To present detailed evidence for the stand we have just taken 
would lead us too far afield. If the reader is inclined to challenge 
this hypothesis, this book should be weighed as an argument for its 
validity. Any hypothesis must rest its case upon its capacity for 
explaining the phenomena with which it deals, in this case the 
phenomena of human action. If it fails in this, it must be rejected. 


1 To illustrate, let us consider the act of satisfying hunger. When a man goes to 
dinner the combined stimulation from the sound of the bell and his restless stomach 
enters his nervous system and goes out to the muscles of walking to the dining- 
room, sitting, and eating. The man himself experiences hunger pangs, and consid- 
ers these sufficient reason for his eating. Actually, however, “hunger sensations”’ 
are only a description of the consciousness accompanying the behavior. The cause 
of going to the table lies in the sequence stomach-stimulation — nerve transmission 
— reaction. The act could be equally well explained if the subject had no con- 
sclousness whatsoever. 


AS A SCIENCE OF INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR 3 


While there remain many problems yet to be solved, a material 
advance has been made in psychology since the adoption of the 
mechanistic and behavior viewpoint. Much of the confusion 
resulting from including conscious or ‘mental’ entities in the 
sequence of cause and effect has been dispelled; and there is 
promise of wide future development under the guidance of the 
behavior hypothesis. 

There are a few psychologists who maintain that, since conscious- 
ness does not explain events, it has no place in the science which 
studies behavior. This is a serious mistake. No scientist can 
afford to ignore the circumstances attendant upon the events he is 
observing. Introspection on conscious states is both interesting in 
itself and necessary for a complete account. The consciousness ac- 
companying reactions which are not readily observable also fur- 
nishes us with valuable evidence and information of these reactions, 
and thus aids us in our selection of explanatory principles within 
the mechanistic field. ‘The phenomena we shall study in this book 
comprise both behavior and consciousness, with emphasis upon the 
former because it holds the key to explanation. The introspective 
account will aid in our interpretations and will supplement them 
upon the descriptive side. Having outlined the position of present- 
day psychology as a whole, we may now approach the special 
branch which is our present interest. 

The Province of Social Psychology. Behavior in general may be ,- 
regarded as the interplay of stimulation and reaction between the 
individual and his environment. {Social behavior comprises the ~ 
stimulations and reactions arising between an individual and the 
social portion of his environment; that is, between the indiyidual 
and his fellows. Examples of such behavior would be the reactions 
to language, gestures, and other movements of our fellow men, in 
contrast with our reactions toward non-social objects, such as 
plants, minerals, tools, and inclement weather. The significance 
of social behavior is exactly the same as that of non-social, namely, 
the correction of the individual’s biological maladjustment to his 
environment. In and through others many of our most urgent 
wants are fulfilled; and our behavior toward them is based on the 
same fundamental needs as our reactions toward all objects, social 


\ 


4 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


or non-social.! It is the satisfaction of these needs and the adapta- 
tion of the individual to his whole environment which constitute 
the guiding principles of his interactions with his fellow men. 

Social Psychology as a Science of the Individual. The Group 
Fallacy. Impressed by the closely knit and reciprocal nature of 
sucial behavior, some writers have been led to postulate a kind of 
‘collective mind’ or ‘group consciousness’ as separate fromthe 
minds of the individuals of whom the group is composed. No 
fallacy is more subtle and misleading than this. It has appeared 
in the literature under numerous guises; but has everywhere left 
the reader in a state of mystical confusion. Several forms of this 
theory will be examined presently. The standpoint of this book 
may be concisely stated as follows. ¢ There is no psychology of 
groups which is not essentially and entirely a psychology of individ- 
uals. Social psychology must not be placed in contradistinction 
to the psychology of the individual; zt 7s a part of the psychology of 
the individual, whose behavior it studies in relation to that sector of 
his environment comprised by his fellows. ) His biological needs are 
the ends toward which his social behavior is a developed means. 
Within his organism are provided all the mechanisms by which. 
social behavior is explained. There is likewise no consciousness 
except that belonging to individuals. Psychology in all its 
branches is a science of the individual. To extend its principles to 
larger units is to destroy their meaning. 

Psychological Forms of the Group Fallacy. 1. The ‘Crowd 
Mind.’ The most flagrant form of the group fallacy is the notion of 
‘crowd consciousness.’ It has long been observed that persons in 
an excited mob seem to lose control of themselves, and to be swept 
along by tempestuous emotions and impelling ideas. It is there- 
fore alleged that there is a lapse of personal consciousness and 
a rise of a common or ‘crowd’ consciousness. The objections to 
this view are fairly obvious. Psychologists agree in regarding 





1 An interesting point of difference, however, exists in the social as distinguished 
from other environmental relations. In the social sphere the environment not only 
stimulates the individual, but is stimulated by him. Other persons not only cause 
us to react; they also react in turn to stimulations produced by us. A circular 
character is thus present in social behavior which is wanting in the simpler non- 
social adjustments. 


AS A SCIENCE OF INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR 5 


consciousness as dependent upon the functioning of neural struc- 
ture. / Nervous systems are possessed by individuals; but there is 
no nervous system of the crowd.4-Secondly, the passing emotion or 
impulse common to the members of a crowd is not to be isolated 
introspectively from the sensations and feelings peculiar to the 
individual himself. 

Another argument for crowd mind proceeds as follows. The 
turbulent and riotous deeds of a mob point to the existence of a 
‘mob consciousness,’ for such behavior would be quite unthinkable 
for men in their right minds taken separately and in isolation. 
There is an element of absurdity in this argument: we are asked to 
explain the nature of crowd action by considering the individuals 
in isolation; that is, when there is no crowd at all. The mere 
adding up of the reactions of isolated individuals has no meaning 
whatsoever beyond mere enumeration. But given the situation of 
the crowd — that is, of a number of persons within stimulating 
distance of one another — we shall find that the actions of all are 
nothing more than the sum of the actions of each taken separately. 
When we say that the crowd is excited, impulsive, and irrational, 
we mean that the individuals in it are excited, impulsive, and 
irrational. It is true that they would probably not be in this state 
if they were in isolation from one another; but that means that only 
in the close group each is so stimulated by the emotional behavior 
of others that he becomes excited to an unusual degree. The 
failure to take note of these interstimulations and reactions between 
individuals has given rise to the illusion that a ‘crowd mind’ sud- 
denly descends upon the individuals and takes possession of them. 
The crowd as a whole has been attended to rather than the individ- 
ual members. Spectacular mob action has thus combined with 
loose terminology to draw attention away from the true source of 
crowd explanation, namely, the individual. 

N 2. The ‘Collective, or Class, Mind.’ Another sense in which the 
group is sometimes said to possess a consciousness and behavior of 
its own is in the sameness of thought and action among the members 
of such a body as an army, a political party, ora trade union. In 
these groupings the uniformities of mind are considered as elevated 
to the position of a separate entity participated in by all. One 


vv 


LAs 


6 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


hears, for instance, such phrases as ‘‘the spirit of the meeting,” ab 


“the community of opinion,” ‘‘the army personality,” and ‘esprit 
de corps.” If these terms are used in a literal, rather than a 
metaphoric, sense, they partake of the group fallacy. A particular 
segment of the individual’s life is picked out because of its similarity 
-with the corresponding segments in other individuals, and is set up 
as a separate psychological entity. The question, of course, arises 
as to what becomes of the spirit of the meeting when it is broken up 
and the minds of its members are concerned with other matters; 
or what becomes of the army personality when the soldier is off on 
furlough. The answer to the latter question is that the so-called 
‘army personality’ is merely a set of military habits belonging to 
the individual. \ He retains these as neurological patterns when off 
on leave, and employs them in action when under military duty. 
He does not suddenly acquire the ‘mind of the army’ upon coming 
into the presence of his fellow soldiers, any more than a man at- 
tains skill upon the violin by coming into an assembly of accom- 
plished violinists. Un both cases we are dealing with individually 
acquired habits.| 

Collective consciousness and behavior are simply the aggrega- 
tion of those states and reactions of individuals which, owing to 
similarities of constitution, training, and common stimulations, are 
possessed of a similar character. Many social applications follow 
from this homogeneity. All men in political life try to “keep their 
finger on the pulse of the public,” and neglecting minor dissensions 
strike the high peak of the curve of “public opinion.” In this 
sense the collective mind is not an entity in itself, but a practical 
working concept. It is a convenient designation for certain uni- 
versal types of reaction which interest political leaders because they 
represent points of contact with thousands of separate individuals 
and therefore serve as means of acquiring widespread control. 
Thus ‘collective opinion’ exists only in the form of a class concept 
or symbol of thought. . 

Similarly, the General issues an order and all the men of the 
division or army obey as one man. Owing to disciplined and uni- 
form response, he is able to handle this body of men as if it were one 
individual, but with a result a thousand-fold more potent. It 1s 


AS A SCIENCE OF INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR 7 


expedient, therefore, to speak of the entire body as a unit, and call 
it an army, a corps, or a division. We must not forget, however, 
that the ‘one-ness’ lies not in the army as an entity, but solely in 
the ability of its members to act uniformly and to be controlled as 
one man. It is in the General’s attitude toward the aggregation 
rather than in the aggregation itself. ‘The General issues his orders: 
to the army; but it is always individual men who obey the orders. 

Language makes it possible for us to speak conveniently about 
the collective exploits of a body of this sort. We say “the army 
captured the city” and are as correctly understood as though we 
had said “the individuals of the army captured the city.” Simi- 
larly, we state that the ‘crowd’ stoned the martyr or stormed the 
Bastille. But language also has its disadvantages. So long as we 
speak of overt action there is no possibility of confusion — we 
obviously mean that individuals performed the acts in all cases. 
When, however, we read in the words of the older social writers that 
the crowd ‘feels’ and ‘wills,’ or ‘is emotional,’ ‘intolerant,’ ‘im- 
moral,’ and the like, we come perilously near to regarding the 
crowd as possessing a mind of its own, apart from the minds of its 
individual members. The very intangibility of these states, com- 
bined with the striking vehemence of their manifestation, aids 
language in establishing this illusion. 

In cases, therefore, where psychological factors are involved, it is 
better to use the less facile but more exact phrase, “the individuals 
in the crowd are’emotional, intolerant, immoral,’ and soon. This 
is no mere pedantry; for it lays the emphasis upon the true source 
to which we must look for an explanation of crowd phenomena. If 
we believe that it is the crowd mind rather than the individual’s 
which exhibits the altered phases of consciousness, all explanation 
fades into mere description. LCrowds, for example, are alleged to be 
irrational or suggestible merely because that is the nature of crowd’ 
mentality. ( Thus crowd behavior is explained in terms of what 
crowds generally do — a circular explanation, indeed! There is, 
moreover, according to this view no reason for one crowd to exhibit 
different mental characteristics from another; all are subject to the 
same laws of emotionality, irrationality, simple-mindedness, and 
the like. Against these inadequacies and fallacies we must again 


8 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


urge the importance of going below group phenomena to a deeper 
level, the individual in the group. It is only through social psy- 
chology as a science of the individual that we can avoid the super- 
ficialities of the crowd mind and collective mind theories. 

3. The ‘Group Mind.’ A third form of the group fallacy re- 
_ mains to be considered. This is the notion that a social mind exists, 
not in crowd consciousness nor mental collectivity, but in the sense 
of permanent organization. “People are said to be closely united 
through attitudes of mutual respect and codperation, and through 
adherence to a culture, a tradition, or a symbol of national life. 
Institutions fix these various forms of human association, and carry 
them into the very center of the individual’s life/ A university, for 
example, consists essentially, not of buildings, equipment, or even 
specific professors, but of a system of ideals and interrelations 
among human beings expressed in intangible, and, as some con- 
sider, mental form. ; The mind of this sort of group is therefore a 
kind of ‘mental structure’ of organization, distinguishable from the 
minds of the individual members. Individuals may come and go; 
but this organized mental life goes on indefinitely. The age-old 
solidarity of the Catholic Church, the Jewish race, or the English 
nation illustrates this form of social entity to which a mental exis- 
tence is ascribed separate from the existence of the individuals 
composing it. 

When closely examined this hypothesis appears to be a subtle 
variety of the collectivity and crowd theories. “The organization 
of a university exists really in the attitudes which individual 
teachers and students have toward one another and toward the 
body of recorded and transmitted rules and traditions of the in- 
stitution. We have here a collection of similar response tendencies. 
Hach member also knows that the others respect and obey the 
' standards which they all hold in common in the same way that he 
respects and obeys them; and this awareness seems to knit the 
group more firmly together. This again is simply a set of common 
ideals and feelings rendered more uniform by the conscious effects 
of one individual upon another. It is a type of uniformity differing 
only in complexity from the unified responses of the callectivity 
theory. 


AS A SCIENCE OF INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR 9 


In order to answer the question where this mental structure of 
the group exists, we must refer again to the individual. Nation- 
ality, Free-Masonry, Catholicism, and the like are not group 
minds expressed in the individual members of these bodies; they 
are sets of ideals, thoughts, and habits repeated in each individual 
mind and existing only in those minds.!. They are not absorbed 
in some mysterious way from the group life, nor are they in- 
herited. They are learned by each individual from the specific 
language and behavior of other individuals. Where such con- 
tinuity of social contact ceases the organized life of the group 
disappears. Were all the individuals in a group to perish at one 
time, the so-called ‘group mind’ would be abolished forever. It 
is not necessary to have the same personnel for continuity of group 
structure; but there must be some personnel. 

Conclusions regarding the Social Mind. At every point we are 
thus led back to the individual as the locus of all that we may call 
‘mind.’ Alike in crowd excitements, collective uniformities, and 
organized groups, the only psychological elements discoverable are 
in the behavior and consciousness of the specific persons involved. 
All theories which partake of the group fallacy have the unfortunate 
consequence of diverting attention from the true locus of cause and 
effect, namely, the behavior mechanism of the individual. They 
place the group prior to this mechanism in order of study, and sub- 
stitute description of social effects in place of true explanation. On 
the other hand, if we take care of the individuals, psychologically 
speaking, the groups will be found to take care of themselves. The 
reasons for our repeated insistence upon regarding social psychol- 
ogy as a phase of the psychology of the individual should now be 
fairly evident. 

Biological Forms of the Group Fallacy. The psychological 
varieties of the social entity hypothesis have a curious parallel 
upon the biological side. Many analogies have been pointed out 
between the human organism and the organized group or society. 

1 Many of the supporters of the belief in a mind of the group independent of the 
nervous systems of individuals belong to the philosophical school known as objective 
idealists. Mind, in the larger and impersonal sense, is for them the true reality; 


hence they find no difficulty in conceiving of an objective group mind over and 
above the minds of the individuals, or comprising the minds of the individuals. 


10 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


Plato likened the three portions of the ideal state, the rulers, the 
warriors, and the workers, to the three corresponding portions of 
the body, the head, the breast, and the abdomen respectively. 
Spencer found the ‘body politic’ to resemble the human body in its 
distributing agencies (arteries) and its controlling and communicat- 
ing functions (nerves), etc. \Another theory assigns separate minds 
to (1) individual cells in the organism itself, (2) the organism as a 
collection of these cells, and hence (8) society as an aggregation of 
conscious organisms.! This last theory combines the notion of the 
social organism with that of the’sccial mind. Where these biologi- 
cal formulations are advanced only as metaphors (as in the case 
of Plato and Spencer), they can scarcely be called fallacies. As 
analogies they are picturesque but exaggeratedY Although we can 
readily agree that there is organization within social groups, it is 
difficult to speak seriously of these groups as organisms. In the 
first place, there is no continuity of tissue between the units of the 
group as there is between cells and organs of the body. Secondly, 
the organization of the individual’s body is based upon integration, 
or the welfare of the entire individual; whereas, in the social body, 
the controlling principle of organization and function is the interest 
of the parts; that is, the separate individuals.? 

The individual, then, is the true organism, as he is the psycho- 
logical unit of society. The group merely furnishes him with a social 
environment in which he may react. And organized society is 
essentially a set of rules for guiding his reactions so that they do 
not trespass upon the life processes of his fellow organisms. 

Social Psychology and Sociology. Behavior, consciousness, and 
organic life belong strictly to individuals; but there is surely oc- 
casion for speaking of the group as a whole so long as we do not 
regard it as an organism or a mental entity. The study of groups 
is, in fact, the province of the special science of sociology. While 
the social psychologist studies the individual in the group, the 
sociologist deals with the group as a whole. He discusses its forma- 
tion, solidarity, continuity, and change. Psychological data, such 


1 Espinas: Les Soctétés animales. Paris, 1877. 
2 For an elaborate and ingenious social organism metaphor see Miinsterberg’s 
Psychology, General and Applied, pp. 265-69. 


AS A SCIENCE OF INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR 11 


as innate reactions and habitual and emotional tendencies of in- 
dividuals, are explanatory principles upon which sociology builds 
in interpreting the life of groups. Other sciences also contribute to 
the same end. Certain sociologists speak of these universal human 
reactions as ‘‘social forces.”’ For example, hatred of a common 
enemy may be designated as a social force in a country at war. 
The social psychologist’s task is in this case the explanation of the 
causes and conditions of hatred in the individual, and the part 
played by his behavior in arousing this emotion in others. The 
sociologist is interested rather in the widespread effects of this 
reaction in unifying the group and producing concerted responses 
of great power in struggles between opposing groups. 

Psychology in general, and social psychology in particular, are 
thus foundation sciences of sociology. Social psychology has in 
fact grown up largely through the labors of the sociologists. It is 
a mistake, however, to suppose, as some have done, that it is a 
branch of sociology rather than of psychology. Professor Ellwood, 
for example, prefers for social psychology the designation ‘psycho- 
logical sociology.’ This seems to the present writer to minimize 
unjustly the claims of the psychologist. It is surely a legitimate 
interest to consider social behavior and consciousness merely as a 
phase of the psychology of the individual, in relation to a certain 
portion of his environment, without being concerned about the 
formation or character of groups resulting from these reactions. 
In spite of the good offices and interests of the sociologists the two a 
sciences must remain separate branches of inquiry. *~ 

Behavior and Consciousness in Social Psychology. The influ- 
ence of one individual upon another is always a matter of behavior. 
One person stimulates and the other reacts: in this process we have 
the essence of social psychology. {The means, however, by which 
one person stimulates another is always some outward sign or 
action; 7t 7s never consciousness. ‘Both the stimulating and the 
reacting behavior may be at times accompanied by a social type of 
consciousness in the respective individuals; but there is, so far as 
we know, no immediate action of the consciousness of one individ#~ 
ual upon the consciousness or behavior of another.! An attempt 


1 The hypothesis of telepathy is not sufficiently established to be admitted as a 
possibility in the present issue. 


12 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


is current in certain quarters to limit the conception of society and 
the field of social psychology to types of social interaction where 
consciousness of others and of social relations exists. From the 
standpoint of the present work this limitation is both non-essen- 
tial and narrow. Consciousness, as we have just intimated, exerts 
no influence, and therefore explains nothing in mutual reactions of 
human beings. In social psychology, as in non-social branches of 
the science, its réle is descriptive rather than explanatory. Even 
in the most socialized and conscious of groups there are no forces 
holding the group together, and no means of arriving at community 
of thought or organized life except through the interstimulation of 
one individual by the behavior of another. CIt is, moreover, not a 
‘mental’ interstimulation, if by this term is meant a type of stimu- 
lation different from the physiological, for no type of stimulation 
other than physiological exists. It would seem more suitable, 
therefore, to admit to the field we are considering all forms of 
animal life in which we find definite social behavior; that is, reac- 
tions of individuals to one another. The question whether social 
consciousness accompanies such social behavior in the lower forms 
of life, though of speculative interest, may be waived as non-essen- 
tial in our present definition of social psychology. 

The element of social consciousness, however, will be by no 
means neglected in the following chapters. It will be recognized 
wherever it is significant in the whole situation or helpful in evaluat- 
ing the principles of behavior. A special chapter also will deal with 
social consciousness as an interest in itself. We shall seek a just pro- 
portion between the two phases of the social life of the individual. 

A Working Definition of Social Psychology. Plan of its Treat- 
ment in this Book. Defining a science is of value only for the 
purpose of concentrating attention upon a group of allied problems. 
With this practical rather than dogmatic aim in view, the following 
definition of our field is proposed {Social psychology 1s the science 
which studies the behavior of the individual in so far as his behavior 
stimulates other individuals, or is itself a reaction to their behavior; 
and which describes the consciousness of the individual in so far as it is 
a consciousness of social objects and social reactions. More briefly 


stated Gocial psychology is the study of the social behavior and the 
social consciousness of the indivic uals 


AS A SCIENCE OF INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR = 13 


Inasmuch as we have found the explanatory principles of social 
psychology to center in the individual himself, our first concern will 
be with the individual in his social aspects. It is largely through 
the profound effects of social influences in infancy, childhood, and 
youth that the habits, abilities, and personality of the adult are 
developed. The individual must be considered both as a product 
of social influences and as a potential unit in social interaction. 
The second portion of the book will proceed with the actual process 
of interstimulation and reaction between individuals as units of 
society. Our main theme, the social behavior of the individual, 
will be here developed. In particular, behavior will be discussed 
both as affording stimulation to others and as reaction to such 
stimulation from others. Finally, some attempt will be made to 
bring the laws of social behavior into the province of the sociologist, 
and to apply them to the theoretical and practical problems of 
modern society. 


REFERENCES 


Ellwood, C. A., Introduction to Social Psychology, ch. 1. 

Cooley, C. H., Human Nature and the Social Order, ch. 1. 

Miinsterberg, H., Psychology, General and Applied, chs. 2-4, 16 (pp. 224-27), 19. 

Ross, E. A., Social Psychology, ch. 1. 

Perry, R. B., “Is there a Social Mind?” American Journal of Sociology, 1922, 
XXVII, 561-72; 721-36. 

Ginsberg, M., The Psychology of Society, chs. 4, 5. 

McDougall, Wm., The Group Mind, chs. 1, 2 (pp. 41-55). 

Bentley, M., “A Preface to Social Psychology,” Psychological Monographs, 
1916, xxi, 1-25. 

Maciver, R. M., Community. 

Boodin, J. E., “The Existence of Social Minds,”’ American Journal of Sociol- 
ogy, 1913, xIX, 1-47. 

Leuba, J. IL, “Methods and Penile in Social Psychology” (a review), 
Psychological Bulletin, 1917, xiv, 367-78. 

Allport, F. H., “Social iSydndterar® (a review), Psychological Bulletin, 1920, 
XVII, 85-94. 

Watson, J. B., Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist, chs. 1, 2. 

Sageret, J., ‘“Remarques sur la psychologie collective,’ Revue Philosophique, 
1919, Lxxxvn, 455-74. 

Mead, G. H. Social Psychology as Counterpart to Physiological Psychology 
Psychological Bulletin, 1909, v1, 401-08. 

Williams, J. M., The Foundations of Social Science, Books m1, Iv. 

Gault, R. rie Soave Psychologu: The Bases of Behavior Called Social, ch. 1. 

Dunlap, K., “The Foundations of Social Psychology,” Psychological Review, 
1923, xxx, 81-102. 


















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PART I 
THE INDIVIDUAL IN HIS SOCIAL ASPECTS 





PART I 
THE INDIVIDUAL IN HIS SOCIAL ASPECTS | 


CHAPTER II 
THE PHYSIOLOGICAL BASIS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 


The Adaptive Function of Behavior. Behavior may be defined 
as the process of responding to some form of energy in the environ- 
ment by an activity generally useful to life. The energy, or less 
exactly the object from which it is derived, is known as the 
‘stimulus,’ while the resulting activity is called the ‘response.’y 
The response usually has some characteristic relation to the stimu- 
lus which evokes it, such as approaching, attacking, answering, 
consuming, caressing, or fleeing. The bodily structures and func- 
tions operating in behavior are of the same general sort whether the 
stimulus is furnished by a social or a non-social object. The first 
step, therefore, in the approach to social behavior is the under- 
standing of those physiological processes involved in behavior in 
general. 

The first stage in the adaptive process is the stimulation of the 
sense organ, or receptor; the final stage is the response-activity of 
the muscle or gland, commonly called the ‘effector.’ The excita- 
tion aroused in the receptor proceeds in the form of a nervous im- 
pulse along a chain of fiber-shaped nerve cells, called ‘neurons,’ to 
the effector. Conduction is therefore the most elementary function 
of nervous tissue. The chain of neurons traversed by the impulse 
consists of three portions: (1) the afferent (or sensory) branch con- 
veying the excitation from the receptor in toward the central nerv- 
ous system (brain and spinal cord); (2) the central portion lying 
within the brain or cord and directing the impulse toward the 
proper outlets; and (3) the efferent (or motor) branch transmitting 


1 These terms are interchangeable with the previously used ‘stimulation’ and 
‘reaction,’ though somewhat more specific. 


18 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


the impulse outward to the effector.) The entire sequence is 
termed a feflex arc, and is to be considere¢ :.s the functional unit.of 
behavior. Especial significance attaches to the central region of 
the reflex arc, because it serves not only to connect the afferent and 
efferent portions of a single arc, but a'so to codrdinate various arcs 
one with another. The brain and spinal cord have essentially the 
function of a switchboard. A complex network of millions of cen- 
tral neurons connects functionally each afferent pathway with 
every efferent and each efferent with every afferent. We receive 
thousands of different stimuli daily, and are capable of an enormous 
variety of responses. Yet so remarkable are the central adjust- 
ments between our receptors and effectors that, except in un- 
familiar situations, a given stimulus almost invariably evokes the 
biologically correct response. The central adjustments involved 
in these specific responses are in some cases hereditary, and in 
others the result of learning through experience. In the former 
case they are termed reflexes, and in the latter, habits. 

The Receptors and Effectors. In order to obtain a closer view of 
the behavior mechanism we shall discuss under separate headings 
the components and properties of the reflex are and the functions 
of the central nervous organs. The receptors form the most 
natural point of departure. To do more than briefly enumerate 
them would, however, take us too far afield. The most important 
group of receptors has to do with sensations received from objects 
at a distance or at least external to the body. They are called the 
exteroceptors. ‘The group includes the senses of vision, hearing, 
smell, pressure (touch), and external cold, warmth, and pain. The 
behavior of other persons stimulates us exclusively through the 
exteroceptive senses. The walls of the internal organs possess 
sense organs, termed interoceptors, whose stimulation gives rise 
to diffuse, organic, sensory experiences. Interoceptive sensations 
form the basis of feeling and emotion. A third group of sense 
organs, called proprioceptors, are embedded inthe muscles, tendons, 
joints, and other movable parts of the body, and are stimulated by 
the movements of those parts. The proprioceptive (also called 


1 The student should memorize these terms, since they will be used continually 
in the chapters following. 


PHYSIOLOGICAL BASIS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 19 


‘kineesthetic’) sense 1s necessary for learning habits and acts _of 
skill. In this group is i##ehided the labyrinthine sense, whose recep- 
tor lies in the semicircular canals of the inner ear. Its appropriate 
stimulus is the rotation, movement, or change of equilibrium of the 
body as a whole. Propridcejtive stimulations evoke responses of 
movement and posture which are themselves of considerable im- 
portance as stimuli to others in social behavior. 

The effectors, or organs of response, in which efferent neurons 
terminate, consist of muscles and glands. The two general func- 
tions of muscles are the production of movement and maintenance 
of posture. Muscles are attached by tendons to bones which they 
move on the lever principle, with joints as fulcrums, by means of 
contracting, that is, by shortening, the muscle fibers. The jointed 
parts of the body have two types of muscle, the flexor and the 
extensor, the former serving to bend the member at the joint, the 
latter to straighten it. These two types are said to be antagonistic, 
since in order to move the member one must be relaxed, that is, 
elongated, while the other is contracted. Other opposed muscle 
groups exist, such as the muscle lifting the eyelid and the muscle 
closing it, the muscles opening and closing the mouth, the circular 
muscles constricting (and lengthening) the intestine and the longi- 
tudinal muscle shortening it, and many others. Visceral muscles 
produce waves of constriction and other movements which carry on 
the vital processes of circulation, respiration, and digestion. Move- 
ments significant in the production of social stimuli are made 
chiefly by the muscles controlling the organs of speech and by those 
of facial expression, gesture, and bodily posture. 

Glands are small, saccular, secreting organs existing either singly, 
as sweat and gastric glands, or grouped into complex structures, 
such as the thyroid, pancreas, and liver. Their secretions aid in 
the process of digestion and in the elimination of waste matter 
from the body. The so-called ‘ductless glands’ provide internal 
secretions which are absorbed directly into the blood stream. 
They contain substances (hormones or autacoids) which have a 
direct, energizing influence upon vital organs and upon bodily 
growth and development. Internal secretions play an important 

part in the emotions. The products of the sex glands are powerful 


20 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


internal stimulants both of sexual development and sex behavior. 
The secretion of tears is one of the few glandular responses of direct 


value as a social stimulus. 


The Neuron. The nerve cells, or neurons, of which the nervous 
—— 





™ 


FIGURE 1. DIAGRAM OF 
A NEURON 


d, dendrites; c, cell body contain- 
ing cytoplasm with chromophilic 
bodies; n, nucleus; az, axone; m, 
medullary sheath; col, collateral 
branches of the axone; ¢, terminal 
arborizations of the axone. 


system is mainly composed, are by 
their structure adapted to the collec- 
tion, conduction, and distribution of 
nervous impulses. Figure 1 shows in 
diagrammatic form the main features 
of a neuron. The cell body (c), with 
its nucleus (vn) and flake-like masses 
called chromophilic bodies, is the cen- 
ter of the growth and nutrition of the 
cell. From it a group of branched 
fibrils, the dendrites, extend in many 
directions (d), and also a single fiber, 
usually fairly long and straight in its 
course, called the axone (az). Minute 
thread-like structures, the neurofibrils, 
run freely throughout the cell body 
and its processes. The axones of most 
neurons are surrounded by a white 
membrane, the medullary sheath (m), 
which has probably an insulating and 
a nutritive function. Axones lying 
outside the brain and cord have as a 
further outside covering a thin sheath, 
the neurilemma. : 

Excitation in the neuron takes place 
at the ends of the dendrites, the im- 
pulse being received either from the 
specialized cells of a receptor organ, 
for example, the retina, or from the 
branched terminations of the axone 


of another neuron in functional connection with the first. From 
the dendrites the impulse is conducted through the cell body and 
out into the axone. The axone terminates in branched form (¢ in 


PHYSIOLOGICAL BASIS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 21 


Figure 1), in connection either with the dendrites of another neuron 
or with a muscle or gland. In afferent neurons leading from a 
receptor to the spinal cord the dendrite resembles an axone in its 
length and medullation, the cell body lying near the entrance of 
the fiber into the cord. In its function of receiving the impulse 
it is, however, essentially a dendrite. In the brain and spinal cord 
there are many special types of neurons, varying in the length of 
their axones, and in the richness of their arborization, according 
to the function they fulfill. 

The nature of the nerve impulse is not fully understood. It will 
probably be found eventually to be the propagation either of a 
wave of chemical reaction or of local electrical effects involving 
changes in the polarization of the cell membrane. The impulse 
does not flow as a steady stream, but as a rapid and regular suc- 
cession of separate impulses forming waves of excitation along the 
fiber. This rhythm may be interpreted to mean that after a given 
impulse a certain time must elapse for the recuperation of the 
region of the fiber involved before it is able to transmit another 
impulse. The failure to respond again without an intervening 
period for recovery can be demonstrated by giving exceedingly 
rapid artificial stimulations. The interval necessary for the re- 
covery is called the refractory period. Its length does not exceed 
002 of a second. As the nerve cell recovers from the diminished 
excitability of the refractory period, it very shortly reaches a brief 
phase of hyper-excitability. If a subsequent stimuluation occurs 
during this phase, the amplitude of the excitation will be increased 
above normal. Such variations in excitability partially explain 
why stimuli having a certain frequency, or occurring at a certain 
moment, are more effective than others in producing a response, 
when no outward reason for such inequality of effect can be dis- 
covered. The belief is gaining ground that the strength of the 
nerve impulse does not vary with the intensity of the stimulus, but 
is constant for a given neuron. The energy of the excitation is 
latent in the neuron itself, and is expended in its full force or not 
at all. If this theory is correct, gradations in the vigor of the 
response must be explained by variations in the number of nerve 
and muscle fibers brought into play. 


22 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY _ 


Reflex Arc Conduction: Properties of the Synapse. Since all 
reflex arcs comprise two, and most of them more than two neurons, 
reflex arc conduction involves the passage of the impulse from one 
cell to another. ‘The finely branched terminations of an axone do 
not come into actual contact with the dendritic branches of the 
neuron next in the sequence. A minute space, filled probably by a 
non-neural membrane, exists between the fibrils of the two neurons. 
This space is called the synapse. ‘The introduction of synapses into 
neural ares has a number of important consequences which may be 
summarized as follows: 

1. Resistance. The lengthened time required for reflex arc 
conduction, as compared with simple nerve fiber conduction, in- 

-dicates that the synaptic gap is a region of increased resistance. 
2. Polarity. ‘The synapse serves as a kind of valve, allowing the 
impulse to pass only in one direction; tnat is, from the axone of 
one neuron to the dendrites of another. 3. Correlation. Synapses, 
being points of connection, make possible the integration of afferent 
neurons with a vast number of central and efferent neurons. They 
also permit the distribution of an impulse to a complex group of 
efferent pathways, such as those required in keeping one’s balance 
on a bicycle and other acts of skill. 4. Swmmation. By means of 
the multiplicity of afferent connections afforded, synapses give op- 
portunity for the summing up of minute and individually ineffec- 
tive impulses from many neurons into an intensity of excitation 
sufficient to cross the threshold and be drained off into an efferent 
pathway. Impulses thus supplement and reinforce one another. 
Minute, successive, as well as simultaneous, stimuli are summed up 
until their total strength is sufficient to bring about a discharge 
across the synapse. 5. Variability of Resistance. The resistance 
of the synapse is altered by various conditions. Fatigue and sleep 
seem to increase it. It is also affected in various ways by drugs, 
and by changes in circulation and oxygen supply. Concurrent 
stimuli of a powerful character and general nervous excitement 
appear to lower synaptic resistance. 6. Facilitation and Habitua- 
tion. If a subject squeezes a hand-grip apparatus (dynamometer) 
at the time when the knee-jerk reflex is being produced by tapping 
the tendon below the knee, the extent of the knee-jerk will be in-. 


PHYSIOLOGICAL BASIS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 23 


creased. This temporary effect may be interpreted either as a 
summation of impulses or a lowering of synaptic resistance in the 
knee-jerk reflex owing to an accompanying stimulus. The result, 
however brought about, may be regarded as the facilitation of a 
response by the agency of the synapse. Synaptic resistance may 
be decreased in a more permanent fashion by repetition. Each 
time a certain response is made the resistance to the impulse en- 
countered at the synapse becomes slightly less until a complete 
habit isformed. 7. Inhibition.¢ This is a necessary supplement to 
facilitation. Antagonistic and irrelevant responses are believed to 
be inhibited by an increase in their synaptic resistance, so that the 
response of the moment is given a ‘free field.’ 8. Temporal Aspects. 
There occur at the synapse in increased form the various phases of 
excitability, such as refractory phase and hyper-excitability, which 
occur in the single nerve fiber. Professor Sherrington found that 
in a dog with the spinal cord severed from the brain, leaving a pure 
spinal reflex mechanism, the rhythmic movements of scratching 
could not be elicited at a more rapid rate than four per second, no 
matter in what rapid succession the stimuli were given. A fourth 
of a second, in other words, was necessary as a recuperative interval 
before the reflex arc was capable of functioning again. We may 
conclude that at their maximum rate reflexes operate in rhythms 
peculiar to their own refractory periods. The stage of hyper-excita- 
bility following recovery no doubt facilitates and emphasizes 
responses to stimuli given at the most favorable rate. 

The Main Subdivisions of the Nervous System. The nervous 
system as a whole comprises the following subdivisions: (1) the/ 
brain; (2) the twelve pairs of cranial nerves arising from the brain, ” 
and supplying the sense organs and muscles of the head, face, and 
internal organs with afferent and efferent fibers; (8) the spinal cord 
projecting downward from the base of the brain, and protected by 
the bony vertebral column; (4) the spinal nerves which leave the 
cord in pairs at regular intervals, and furnish afferent and efferent 
fibers to the body wall and limbs on either side of the body; and (5) 
the autonomic system, an extension of the central nervous system 
which supplies the viscera. The first four of these parts are together 
called the cerebro-spinal system in distinction to the autonomic. 


24 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


A brief sketch of these subdivisions must suffice for our present 
purpose. 

The Spinal Cord and Spinal Nerves. The spinal cord and brain 
are formed by the development and folding together of the neural 
groove, a depression extending lengthwise along the back of the 


td! 
, <i R 
| i 





Figure 2. DIAGRAM OF A CROSS-SECTION THROUGH THE SPINAL Corp, 
SHOWING THE ELEMENTS OF A REFLEX ARC INVOLVED IN A SPINAL NERVE 


(After Watson.) W, white matter; G, gray matter; dr, dorsal (posterior) root; vr, ven- 
| tral (anterior) root; 1, afferent neuron; 2, central or association neuron; 8, efferent neuron; © 
sg, spinal ganglion of the dorsal root containing cell body of the afferent neuron; R, re- 
ceptor — sense organs in the skin; H, effector — a striped muscle fiber. 


embryo. The closure of the sides of the groove results in a tubular 
structure, the hollow of which remains as the small central canal of 
the cord and the ventricles, or cavities, of the brain. A cross-section 
of the cord, as shown in Figure 2, reveals an H-shaped gray portion 
(G) consisting of cell bodies, dendrites, and unmedullated axone 
terminations; and a surrounding portion of white matter (W) made 
up of medullated fibers which convey impulses up or down the 
cord. Each spinal nerve has two roots, a dorsal root (dr), through 
which the afferent neurons (1) convey impulses into the posterior 
horn of the gray matter, and a ventral root (vr) from which emerge 
the axones of the efferent neurons (3), their dendrites and cell 
bodies lying in the anterior or lateral horn of the gray matter. 
The spinal cord has two important functions. The first is the 
conduction of afferent impulses to the brain and other levels of the 
central nervous system, and of efferent (motor) impulses from the 
brain downward to control the musculature of the limbs and trunk 
at various levels. The ‘ascending’ tracts convey afferent impulses 
from the end organs of touch, temperature, pain, and the proprio- 
ceptive and organic senses to the higher levels of the cord and to 
the brain. The ‘descending’ tracts conduct impulses downward 


PHYSIOLOGICAL BASIS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 25 


from the brain to various spinal levels. The most important of 
these, the crossed and uncrossed pyramidal tracts, are composed of 
axones of neurons whose dendrites lie in the cerebral cortex of the 
brain (vide infra). These fibers all cross eventually to the side op- 
posite to that of their cortical origin, so that the bodily movements 
on the left side are controlled by the right side of the brain, and 
those on the right side by the left side of the brain. 

The second function of the cord is the correlation within itself of 
afferent and efferent neural pathways. A nerve impulse may come 
in from a receptor, for example, in the skin, and pass by one or 
more association (central) neurons to any efferent neuron at the 
same level of the cord or at a higher or lower level, and thence out 
to an effector. The central neuron shown in Figure 2 (2) illustrates 
a simple form of spinal connective. An afferent neuron, moreover, 
may be connected with a number of efferent neurons producing a 
group of serviceable codrdinated movements without the aid of the 
higher centers. Spinal reflexes, however, are subject to consider- 
able control and inhibition by impulses from the brain. 

The Parts of the Brain. The brain is formed by a develop- 
ment of the cephalic portion of the embryonic neural tube. Be- 
ginning at the entrance of the spinal cord the main structures are 
the medulla, cerebellum, pons, mid-brain, and cerebral hemispheres 
with their basal structures the thalamus and_cerpus striatum. In 
the human brain the cerebral hemispheres are relatively very large. 
They overlie most of the other portions which are compactly folded 
beneath them and directed downward. Figure 3 represents the 
view of the brain which would be seen if it were divided length- 
wise between the two hemispheres. It should be studied in con- 
nection with the text. 

The Medulla. In the short, tapering stem by which the brain 
passes into the cord, known as the ‘medulla oblongata,’ the ascend- 
ing and descending tracts continue to and from the higher brain 
levels. The main portion of the pyramidal tracts cross in this 
region. Fibers of certain ascending (sensory) tracts terminate in 
the medulla making synaptic connections with fibers leading to the 
cerebellum and the cerebral hemispheres. ‘The lower half of the 
series of cranial nerves rise from the medulla which thus both re- 


26 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


ceives impulses from sensory surfaces of the mouth, face, and vis- 
cera, and sends motor impulses to these parts. In the medulla these 
regions are also brought under the control of the higher functions of 
the brain. 

The Cerebellum, Pons, and Mid-brain. The cerebellum is a 
complex paired structure lying posterior to the upper part of the 
medulla. Its chief afferent impulses are received from the proprio- 
ceptive and labyrinthine sensory endings, and are correlated with 
efferent impulses which, by controlling the skeletal and trunk 
muscles, keep the body in equilibrium, and aid movement and 
coérdination by maintaining a slight contraction (tonus) of the 
muscles. Tonus is observable in a bodily posture alert and pre- 
pared for action, which contrasts strongly with the weakness and 
incodrdination resulting from an injury to the cerebellum. The 
mild afferent flow of proprioceptive impulses is released by special 
cerebellar, reflex mechanisms in a vigorous efferent discharge. The 
cerebellum is also in connection with the higher brain centers. 

The pons is a transverse band of fibers passing below the medulla 
and connecting the right and left lobes of the cerebellum. It pro- 
vides another region for conduction and for the correlation of 
afferent and efferent fibers in cranial nerves. The mid-brain, which 
serves as a stalk for the hemispheres, contains important tracts 
passing to and from the latter. It is also a center for reflexes con- 
trolling the eye movements, and for other visual and auditory 
reflexes. 

The Cerebral Hemispheres. The general appearance of the 
mesial and external surfaces of the cerebral hemispheres is sug- 
gested by Figures 3 and 4. Their surface consists of a layer of gray 
matter about four millimetres thick, called the ‘cortex.’ The 
human cortex weighs only about thirteen grams, yet it contains 
over nine billions of nerve cells. It affords a mechanism for the 
correlation of impulses of almost inconceivable complexity. The 
cortex is greatly increased in area by being raised into folds, called 
‘convolutions,’ between which lie fissures, the two most important 
of which, the fissures of Rolando and Sylvius, are indicated in 
Figure 4 by the letters R and S. These fissures aid in dividing the 
cortex for purely descriptive purposes into regions called ‘lobes,’ 


PHYSIOLOGICAL BASIS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 27 


the most conspicuous of which (indicated in Figure 4) are the frontal, 
parietal, occipital, and temporal. 

In the interior of the hemispheres tracts of medullated fibers, the 
white matter, run in various directions. They may be classified 










DQ 


‘S \ N 





Ficure 3. VERTICAL MEDIAN SECTION OF THE BRAIN 


1, medulla; 2, cerebellum, one part shown in section; 3, pons; 4, mid-brain; 5, dotted line shows 
the approximate position of the left portion of the thalamus at the base of the left hemisphere 
and touching upon the side wall of the third ventricle; 6, mesial surface of left cerebral hemi- 
sphere; 7, corpus callosum; 8, foramen of Monroe, leading into the lateral ventricle within the 
hemisphere; 9, middle commissure, joining the right and left thalami; V3, third ventricle; V4, 
fourth ventricle; FL, frontal lobe; OL, occipital lobe; TL, temporal lobe. 


under three heads: (1) the association fibers connecting different 
areas of the cortex of the same hemisphere, thus serving to correlate 
their respective functions; (2) the commissural fibers connecting 
the cortices of the two hemispheres, and comprised mainly in the 
corpus callosum, a broad band of fibers shown in cross-section in 
Figure 3 (7); and (3) the projection fibers, which extend from the 
cortex to lower parts of the brain, or down the spinal cord. Projec- 
tion fibers are termed ‘ascending’ or ‘descending’ according to their 
function. The first pair of cranial nerves (olfactory) enters at the 
base of the hemispheres. 


28 : SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


The Thalamus and Corpus Striatum. The thalamus is a group 
of nerve centers of paired structure lying at the base of the cerebral 
hemispheres. Its position is suggested by the dotted line (4) in 
Figure 3. It serves as a way station for all sensory impulses 
(except the olfactory) arriving through the spinal and cranial 
nerves. Synaptic connections are here made with ascending pro- 
jection fibers which spread out to all the lobes of the cortex. The 
thalamus serves the cortex and is subordinate to it in the following 
functions: (1) conduction; (2) elaboration of sensory impulses by 
bringing them together from various afferent channels so that they 
may affect the cortex in combination; (3) inhibition or blocking of 
irrelevant sensory stimuli (for example, pain of wounds in the 
emergency of battle); and (4) providing (in all probability) the 
neural accompaniment of states of pleasure and displeasure. The 
corpus striatum is a group of centers similar to the thalamus 
In possessing functions of sensory elaboration and sub-cortical 
reflexes. Its neural connection, however, with the cortex is very 
meager. 

The Functions of the Cortex. The cortex is the chief integrating \ 
structure of the nervous system. In it areas may be distinguished 
having microscopical differences of cell structure which seem to 
signify differences of function. These areas may be grouped under 
the three headings — motor, sensory, and association. Figure 4 
indicates their localization on the external aspect of the left hemi- 
sphere. ‘The motor area, which lies in the oblique convolution just 
in front of the fissure of Rolando, contains the dendrites and cell 
bodies of some eighty thousand pyramidal neurons whose long 
axones (descending projection fibers) afford an uninterrupted con- 
duction down the spinal cord to various levels of the trunk and 
limbs. The origin of the fibers controlling the various bodily 
regions has been localized with some exactness. The sensory 
areas situated in the various lobes, as indicated in Figure 4, contain 
the axone terminations of the neurons constituting the final stage 
in the conduction of afferent impulses from the receptors. Im- 
pulses from the auditory and optic nerves, as well as from the 
nerves of smell, taste, and the diffused end organs of touch, temper- 
ature, pain, and movement, are thus received in fairly distinct 


PHYSIOLOGICAL BASIS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 29 


portions of the cortex. Each sensory area has a focalized region 
of pure afferent nerve endings, surrounded by a marginal area in 
which association fibers, communicating with other parts of the 
cortex, connect synaptically with the afferent terminations. The 





Fieurs 4. LocauizaTion or SENSORY AND Motor FuNcTIONAL AREAS 
IN THE LEFT CEREBRAL HEMISPHERE 


R is above the fissure of Rolando, in front of which, under M, are the motor areas or the 
various parts of the body. C is above thesensory area for kinesthetic and skin sensibility 
which extends downward behind the fissure of Rolando. The areas for smell and taste are 
probably located on the mesial surface of the hemisphere. The areas concerned in audi- 
tion and vision are named. . The part marked ‘‘ motor speech” is Broca’s convolution. S 
is opposite the fissure of Sylvius. FL, frontal lobe. PL, parietal lobe. OL, occipital lobe. 
TL, temporal lobe. 

(Modified from Starr’s Nervous Diseases, by permission of the publishers, Messrs. Lea 
and Febiger, Philadelphia.) 


association areas comprise extensive and complex regions of neurons 
lying between the areas of localized function, particularly in the 
anterior frontal, parietal, and lower temporal lobes. Tc these areas 
are usually ascribed the associative processes involved in learning 
and thought.. Developing late both in the evolutionary scale and in 
the development of the baby, they contain correlation mechanisms 
of a highly plastic and modifiable character. 

The areas of the cortex must not be considered either as the seat 
of some special power or faculty, such as vision, speech, or locomo- 


30 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


tion; or as the locus of the characteristic consciousness which ac- 
companies their excitation. They are merely crucial points in the 
reflex arcs in which they lie. ‘Thus the so-called ‘visual area’ is 
important solely because it mediates between optical stimulations 
from all sorts of objects and the variety of responses by which 
we adjust ourselves to those objects. Our notion of mind will be 
clearest if we regard it neither as faculties nor states of conscious- 
ness, but as an organized system of reflex activities. Recent in- 
vestigation shows that the localization of cortical functions, as sug- 
gested in Figure 4, must be accepted with strict qualifications. 
The cortex probably acts as a whole rather than by specific por- 
tions. Reéducation of habits, moreover, in cases of paralysis 
through brain lesion proves that one part of the cortex is capable of 
acquiring the functions formerly possessed by another portion. 

The function of cortical areas as the central portion of reflex arcs 
is illustrated by the defect known as aphasia. Damage to the 
neurons in the association areas bordering on the visual area, while 
it would leave the patient capable of seeing words, would render 
him unable to understand or to respond to them in an intelligent 
way. This condition is known as ‘word-blindness.’ Word deaf- 
ness is a similar defect resulting from a severance of the auditory 
centers from associational connections. Motor aphasia, the in- 
ability to write or speak words, though they can be perceived and 
understood, is due to the cutting off of the motor areas used in 
speaking and writing from communication with the associative 
functions. 

Cortical Activity in Social Behavior. We may regard those parts 
of the central nervous system which lie below the cortex as the 
centers of the primitive reflex activities characteristic of all animals + 
endowed with a nervous system. Such reflexes include respiration, 
digestive and excretory processes, crying, and simple movements of 
the appendages in defense and escape. Such reflexes are generally 
innate, and for their functioning the spinal cord, medulla, cere- 
bellum, mid-brain, and thalamus suffice. The human being, how- 
ever, has added to this simple repertory a formidable array of ac- 
tivities whose arcs involve and necessitate a cerebral cortex. He 
has acquired language, spoken and written, and other habits of 


~PHYSIOLOGICAL BASIS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 31 


skill. He has learned the use of tools, and has acquired sagacity 
through storing up the effects of past experiences. He has, in short, 
through the adaptive capacities of the cortex, attained the levels 
of intelligence and the power of inhibition and control which are 
requisite for civilized society. The chief contributions of the cortex 
to social behavior may be summarized as follows: (1) It underlies \ 
all solutions of human problems, which are also social problems, and 
makes possible their preservation in language, customs, institu- / 
tions, and inventions. (2) It enables each new generation to profit 
by the experience of others in learning this: transmitted lore of 
civilization. (8) It establishes habits of response in the individual 
for social as well as for individual ends, inhibiting and modifying 
primitive self-seeking reflexes into activities which adjust the in- 
dividual to the social as well as to the non-social environment. 
Socialized behavior is thus the supreme achievement of the cortex. 
The Autonomic Portion of the Nervous System. In considering 
the general nerve supply it is convenient to divide the body into 
two regions. These are the somatic, which consists of the head, 
trunk, limbs, and body wall, and the visceral, which includes the 
mouth cavity, oesophagus, stomach, intestines, lungs, heart, blood 
vessels, bladder, internal sex organs, and glands. The portion of 
the nervous system which supplies the somatic region is the cerebro- 
spinal; the portion innervating the visceral is known as the auto- 
nomic. The autonomic is not, as its name implies, an independent 
system. There are no true reflexes which do not have their central 
portion in the cerebro-spinal axis. The autonomic system is essen- 
tially a visceral extension of the peripheral (outlying) portions of 
the are. A clearer notion of the cerebro-spinal and autonomic 
systems may be gained if we compare their respective structure and 
functions. The cerebro-spinal system in the stricter sense receives 
its stimulations from the receptors on the surface. of the body and 
from the proprioceptive nerve endings. It controls skeletal and 
trunk muscles composed of bundles of fibers exhibiting under the 
miscroscope a cross-striped appearance. Its peripheral nerve fibers 
are medullated; and their chief function is to produce a response of 
movement in some part of the body, a type of muscular activity 
known as a ‘phasic contraction.’ The autonomic system has its 


32 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


4 


receptors chiefly in the muscular and mucous lining of the internal 
organs where they are stimulated by the positions, movements, and 
other changes accompanying the function of these organs. The 
efferent autonomic fibers innervate the layers of smooth, or un- 
striped, muscle cells in the viscera. They control also the secretory 
activities of glands, including the sweat glands, as well as changes 
in diameter of the blood vessels and the erection of the hairs. 
Many autonomic fibers are unmedullated. The type of response 
they make in the smooth muscle is one largely of change or main- 
tenance of muscular tension (tonus) in an organ. ‘The pressure 
which an internal organ, for example, the bladder, exerts upon its 
contents is controlled by autonomic fibers. It is a reaction of 
posture rather than of movement, and is known as a tonic contrac- 
tion. The central portions of the autonomic reflexes lie, as pre- 
viously stated, in the brain and spinal cord. 

There are three divisions of the autonomic which should be care- 
fully distinguished. The first is the cranial division. It arises 
from five of the paired cranial nerves, and supplies not only certain 
portions of the head, such as the lens muscles and iris of the eye, 
and the salivary glands, but also the digestive system, bronchial 
tubes, and heart (see vagus nerve, Figure 5, X). In general there 
are interposed in the course of the efferent autonomic fibers, be- 
tween their emergence from the cerebro-spinal axis and the organs 
they supply, certain masses of nerve centers (ganglia) lying either 
somewhat centrally, or (as in the case of the cranial and sacral 
divisions) in proximity to the organs themselves. The cranial divi- 
sion protects and preserves the organism by such functions as 
pupillary contraction and the augmenting of the glandular and 
muscular activities of digestion. 

The second division is the sympathetic, whose distribution is 
illustrated in Figure 5. Its fibers emerge from the spinal nerves in 
the thoracic and lumbar regions (7s—T'xu, L1—Lyv), and pro- 
ceed to small segmentally arranged ganglion bodies which are 
vertically connected into ganglionic chains, one on either side and 
in front of the vertebral column. In some cases, for example, in the 
splanchnic nerves, the fibers run to large ‘collateral’ ganglia of the 
sympathetic, not lying in the ganglionie chain itself. From these 





Maxillary nerve 
Ciliary ganglion 
Sphenopalatine ganglion NG 
Superior cervical ganglion of sympathetic 











Cervica] plexus 


==, Pharyngeal plexus 


Middle cervical ganglion of 
sympathetic 

Inferior cervical g. of sympathetic 

Recurrent nerve 


if 
Jed | 


Brachial plexus 
Bronchial plexus 


Cardiac plexus 







Esophageal plexus 


i 


KI 
atl ntti = “wav, 
ae AA ETA: 


at 







N \ Coronary plexus 
We 
Left vagus nerve 


Greater splanchnic nerve Gastric plexus 


eliac plexus 


wesser splanchnic nerve uperior mesenteric plexus 


Aortic plexus 


Lumbar plexus nferior mesenteric plexus 






4 
Y 


iyatite i the Hypogastric plexus 
Y, h , 

ih ZA W/ / | 

Mee, - , 

“4 Wiggum : Pelvic plexus 

Pott | OH GY 

Gassss= (Z| | 
Ns Bladder 
SLE 5 

me Lo 


Sacral plexus 


Vesical plexus 


Figure 5. Tue SYMPATHETIC DIVISION OF THE AUTONOMIC NERVOUS 
SYSTEM, SHOWING THE RIGHT SYMPATHETIC GANGLION CHAIN AND ITS 
CONNECTIONS WITH THE SPINAL NERVES AND THE VISCERAL PLEXUSES 


For names of the various spinal nerves, see text. X, the vagus nerve, is a part of the 
eranial division of the autonomic. The three divisions of the autonomic are not clearly 
distinguished in this figure. ; 

(From Herrick, after Schwalbe’s Neurology, by permission of the publishers, Messrs. W. — 
B. Saunders Company, Philadelphia ) : 


84 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


ganglia new fibers arise and run to the viscera, being distrib 
uted there in a very diffuse manner by plexuses (see Figure 5). 
Other fibers originating in the ganglionic chain return to the spinal 
nerves and are distributed to the hairs, sweat glands, and blood 
vessels of the outer surface of the body. The sympathetic division 
also supplies fibers, through ganglia in the head region, to the 
structures innervated by the cranial division. The sympathetic 





Fiqure 6. RELATIONS or NEURONS IN THE CEREBRO-SPINAL AND 
ts AUTONOMIC SYSTEMS 


Somatic (cerebro-spinal) neurons shown in heavy lines, visceral (autonomic) neurons in light 
lines. 1, afferent somatic neuron, 2, efferent somatic neuron, 3, spinal ganglion; 4, afferent vis- 
ceral neuron of the sympathetic; 5, efferent visceral neuron (pre-ganglionic); 6, efferent visceral 
neuron (post-ganglionic); 7, ganglion of the sympathetic; SR, somatic receptor (sense organs in 
skin); VR, visceral receptor (sense organs in viscera); SH, somatic effector (striped muscle fiber) ; 
VE, m, visceral effector (smooth muscle fiber), VE, g, visceral effector (gland). 


fibers accelerate the heartbeat, constrict the blood vessels, check 
the contraction of the smooth muscle involved in digestion, and 
stop the secretion of digestive juices. Their functions are of con- 
siderable importance in emotional excitement. 


PHYSIOLOGICAL BASIS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 35 


The general scheme for all autonomic innervation is as follows: 
An efferent autonomic, or ‘visceral,’ fiber leaves the cord in the 
ventral root of a spinal nerve, or leaves the brain in a cranial nerve, 
and proceeds to a ganglion. ‘This fiber is called a pre-ganglionic 
neuron. Within the ganglion synaptic connection is made with a 
non-medullated, post-ganglionic fiber which relays the impulse to 
the visceral muscle or gland. The afferent visceral fiber is not 
broken by synapses in the ganglion body, but proceeds directly 
from the receptors through the dorsal root of the spinal nerve into 
the gray matter of the cord (through a cranial nerve to the brain in 
case of the cranial division). Figure 6 illustrates these connec- 
tions. 

The third division, the sacral, arises like the cranial directly from 
the cerebro-spinal axis, but at the lower end of that axis. Fibers 
from the sacral nerves (Figure 5, Su, mz, and rv) go directly to 
ganglia which supply the organs of emission — the bladder, rectum, 
and sexual organs. ‘Those organs are also supplied with fibers 
from the sympathetic. ‘The relations of the three divisions of the 
autonomic are shown diagrammatically in Figure 10 (Chapter IV). 

The cranial and sacral divisions of the autonomic are often 
_ spoken of together as the cranio-sacral division. Between the 
functions of the sympathetic and the cranio-sacral there exists a 
distinct antagonism. They operate in the same organs, but with 
opposing reactions. For example, the sympathetic dilates the 
pupil, the cranial constricts it; the sympathetic inhibits digestive 
and sexual activities, the cranio-sacral augments them; the sympa- 
thetic accelerates the heartbeat, the cranial retards it, and so on. 
In addition to the three divisions of the autonomic already described 
there lie embedded in the walls of the heart and alimentary canal 
net-like plexuses of nervous tissue. These ‘local plexuses’ are 
truly autonomous. They actuate the rhythmic contractions of the 
viscera independently of the cerebro-spinal system which, through 
the three divisions of the autonomic, serves merely to regulate 
these functions. 

The Relation of the Autonomic to the Cerebro-Spinal System. 
If we examine Figure 6, we shall see that the central nervous 
system affords a common ground for interconnection between the 


36 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


cerebro-spinal reflexes of the somatic region and the autonomic 
reflexes of the visceral region. ‘Thus if we imagine a central 
neuron connecting the various neuron endings in the cord (Figure 6), 
the four following possibilities arise: 

1) The connection of a and 6 establishes a somatic-sensory, 

somatic-motor are. 

2) The connection of a and d establishes a somatic-sensory, 

visceral-motor arc. 

3) The connection of c and 6 establishes a visceral-sensory, 

somatic-motor arc. 

4) The connection of c and d establishes a visceral-sensory, 

visceral-motor arc. 
The receptor and afferent process, in other words, may be either 
somatic or visceral, and the efferent process and effector may be 
either somatic or visceral. Figure 7 illustrates the four possibilities 
in schematic form, and will be convenient to keep in mind as a brief 
summary of the behavior mechanism. 

There is a tendency among those who write about the physiology 
of human behavior to slight the autonomic functions. From the 
standpoint of evolu- 
tion the autonomic 
system is older and 
more — fundamental 
than the _ cerebro- 
spinal. The popular 
notion that the func- 
Ficure 7. Scupmn ro Suacesr tue Ivrerrera- on of the stomach 
TIONS OF THE CEREBRO-SPINAL AND AUTONOMIC and other viscera is to 

' eee sustain the activities 

SR, somatic receptor; SE, somatic effector; VR, visceral 
receptor; VE, visceral effector. The circle indicates the brain OL the limbs and the 
or spinal cord. SR may be connected with either SE or VE. : : 

VR may be connected with either SH or VE. esthetic and intellect- 

3 ual life of the ‘higher 
senses,’ substitutes man’s conception for Nature’s. In the light of 
both racial and individual development it is more correct to say 
that the distance receptors, the responses of locomotion, and the 
intellectual processes of the cortex themselves acquire their primary 
significance as servants of the ‘inner man.’ Later they reach a 





VR VE 


PHYSIOLOGICAL BASIS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 37 


degree of complexity which leads us to regard them as more funda- 
mental than the visceral activities. As one writer humorously 
remarks, they become “the tail that wags the dog.”’ But the auto- 
nomic functions, like still waters, run deep through life. Hunger 
and sexual desire, the two supreme drives of the human race, 
originate in autonomic receptors; while the effector side of auto- 
nomic behavior is at the base of feeling, emotion, and personality. 

Compound Reflexes in Behavior. Adaptive behavior involves 
the extensive modification of simple innate reflexes by joining them 
at the synapse with other reflexes, a process which we have pre- 
viously designated as correlation. A number of possibilities in the 
correlation of reflexes were mentioned in connection with the prop- 
erties of the synapse. We have now to consider more specifically 
the important types of combined reflexes. 

Allied and Antagonistic Reflexes. Let us suppose that one 
afferent neuron is in functional connection with more than one 
efferent, as indicated in Figure 8 (1). (Although only two efferent 
fibers are shown in the drawing, there may actually be many.) 
There are the two following possibilities: (1) The two or more 
effector activities may be such that they can go on simultaneously. 
This will be true if they do not involve antagonistic muscle groups 
(see p. 19). As the runner becomes ‘set’ on the mark in response 
to the stimulus’ ‘ready,’ all his muscles are being prepared for one 
concerted movement. When we greet a friend after long absence, 
not only the muscles employed in the handshake, but our entire 
effector system, takes part to some degree in the cordial response. 
This type of reaction is called an allied reflex. (2) The other possi- 
bility is that the effector processes may be opposed to one another. 
The arm cannot be both flexed and extended at the same time. A 
timid child pursued and tormented by an older one will sometimes 
turn and fight desperately, thus substituting for flight the opposed 
responses of attack. In this case there appears to be an inhibition 
at the synapse of one of the efferent pathways while the other is 
being employed. Reflexes of this sort are said to be mutually 
antagonistic. 

Allied and antagonistic reflexes occur in the reverse situation; 
that is, where two or more afferent neurons connect with one effer- 


38 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


ent, as indicated in Figure 8 (2). If the two sensory elements are 
habitually associated with the same response, they will readily dis- 
charge into the common effector. An allied reflex of this sort, 
which is really a kind of synaptic summation, is illustrated by one’s 
behavior in a congregation where doubt exists as to the propriety 


BE Rb te 


FOR 
€, k: pete 
1 e 
R ER, e Pr ES 
. A 
a v 
f : £ LAD Ze E 
R, 
¢ SI 


Figure 8. Types or COMPOUND REFLEXES 


1, allied or antagonistic reflex; 2, the same; 3, chain reflex; 4, circular reflex; 5, conditioned 
reflex; R, receptor; EL, effector; FCP, final common path; a, association neuron. Cell bodies of 
afferent neurons are shown in outline, those of efferent neurons in black. For the sake of sim- 
plicity the central neurons of the ares are omitted. 

1, 2, and 3 are adapted from Herrick, after Schwalbe’s Neurology, by permission of the pub- 
lishers, Messrs. W. B. Saunders Company, Philadelphia.) 


of rising on a certain occasion. The first of those to rise about one 
have little effect upon him, but as the numbers increase, rising 
becomes irresistible and automatic. When, on the other hand, the 
two afferent processes have paths of lowered resistance into differ- 
ent effectors whose responses are opposed, there will result a period 
of indecision and delay until one reflex gains the ascendancy and 
the other is inhibited. The efferent outlet finally chosen is called 
the final common path. The behavior of two rustic characters in a 
well-known play illustrates this sort of antagonistic reflex in the 


PHYSIOLOGICAL BASIS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 39 


social sphere. One had only to mention “checkers,” a game in 


which the two were bitter rivals, and hostilities would ensue. 
Again, if one suggested their long comradeship and mutual sharing 
of joys and sorrows, they would fall into each other’s arms. When 
the two stimuli were presented in close succession, their faces 
depicted a period of struggle, as precarious as it was amusing, before 
the final common path was determined. 


The Chain Reflex. Reflexes may be joined into functional pat- /~ 


terns at the end as well as in the middle of their course. It often 
happens in a series of responses that one movement affords a 
kinsesthetic or cutaneous stimulation which evokes the next move- 
ment. In walking, the pressure on the foot and the strain on 
muscles, tendons, and joints resulting from one step become the 
stimuli for the response of taking the next step. Swallowing is a ~ 
series of constrictions of the cesophagus proceeding downward by 
the principle of the chain reflex. Figure 8 (8) illustrates this type 
of reflex connection. 

The Circular Reflex. The circular reflex is a special type of 
chain reflex in which the afferent impulse, originating from the 
effector response (Figure 8, 4, R:), passes back to the brain or 
cord and out again through the same efferent pathway previously 
used. The effect of this circuit is to maintain and reinforce, or to 
repeat, the muscular response. The holding of an object in the 
closed hand, and the repetition of syllables in the ‘talk’ of the 
infant, probably involve this type of compound reflex. Since the 
response takes a rhythmic form, such synaptic conditions as 
length of refractory phase, hyper-excitability, and the like, are no 
doubt significant in its operation. The circular reflex is an indis- 
pensable aid in the infant’s acquisition of speech. 

The Conditioned Reflex. The most important of all the modifica- 
tions of reflexes is the process by which an afferent neural pathway 
acquires new efferent outlets. A simple laboratory experiment will 
illustrate. The subject is seated in front of a small electrically 
released hammer which, by dropping close to the eye, causes him to 
wink. This is an original, infantile, and unconditioned reflex. A 
buzzer is now sounded just as, or just before, the hammer drops. 
The subject, of course, winks as formerly. After a number of such 


40 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


trials with combined stimuli, the buzzer is sounded without the 
release of the hammer. ‘The subject now responds by winking to 
the sound of the buzzer alone. The response has been transferred 
or rather extended, from the biologically adequate stimulus of an 
object threatening the eye, to a previously indifferent auditory 
stimulus. The wink reflex may thus be said to be conditioned by 
the sound of the buzzer. The scheme of the conditioned reflex is 
shown in Figure 8 (5). #: represents the stimulation by the 
original stimulus, the hammer, #2 the stimulation by the ‘condi- 
tioning stimulus,’ the buzzer, and HE the eye-wink response. 
Through repeated joint presentation of the stimuli a path of 
lowered resistance is formed in some association fiber or fibers (a) 
already existing as a potential connection between the two reflexes. 
No single law of human or animal behavior is of more far- 
reaching significance than that of the conditioned reflex. Half of 
the process of education consists of transferring appropriate re- 
sponses to new and more finely discriminated stimuli. In the 
diagram the original response to the conditioning stimulus (for ex-_ 
ample, the buzzer) is shown in dotted lines because it is not relevant 
to the illustration used. In certain cases, however, the responses 
both to the original and conditioning stimuli are important because 
antagonistic; the transfer of the response from the first stimulus to 
the second must inhibit the original response to the latter. If, for 
example, a child is whipped for stealing apples, the subsequent 
sight of the fruit over the garden wall will of itself evoke the response 
of fear and avoidance aroused by the whipping with which it (the 
fruit) was recently associated. The original approaching response 
to the sight of the fruit, being antagonistic to the conditioned re- 
sponse, will be inhibited. We shall later observe other instances of 
the conditioning of original reactions through social stimuli and 
for the purposes of society. Recent experiments have shown that 
under conditions of emotional excitement, produced by autonomic 
responses to the stimuli employed, conditioned reflexes are formed 
with unusual facility. This fact is commonly recognized in the 
importance ascribed to such autonomically controlled factors as 
incentive, interest, instinctive desire, and attention. They are 
rightly regarded as indispensable conditions of the learning process. 


PHYSIOLOGICAL BASIS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 41 


The Use of the Term ‘Reflex.’ It should be understood that 
in each of the examples given above, the reaction involves not 
one reflex, but many. The mechanisms have been described and 
represented in the figures as single reflex arcs solely for the sake of 
clearness. Moreover, in many instances the complexities of corre- 
lation, the number of neurons involved, and the time required for 
the reaction, are so great that the term ‘reflex,’ which denotes 
strictly only simple innate coérdinations, is not applicable. This 
is particularly true of conditioned reactions. It would be more 
exact in some cases to avoid using the word ‘reflex,’ and speak of 
antagonistic, allied, chain, and conditioned responses. ‘This ter- 
minology will be employed wherever appropriate in the following 
chapters. 


REFERENCES 


Herrick, C. J., An Introduction to Neurology, chs. 2-6, 12, 16, 17, 19-21. (All 
references are inclusive.) 

Sherrington, C. 8., The Integrative Action of the Nervous System, lectures 2, 4, 
6, 9. 

Bayliss, Wm., Principles of General Physiology (2d ed.), chs. 13, 15, 16. 

Watson, J. B., Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist, chs. 2, 8, 4, 5. 

Lickley, J. D., The Nervous System, chs. 2-4, 7, 9. 

Dunlap, K., An Outline of Psychobiology, chs. 3, 7, 8. 

Warren, H. C., Human Psychology, chs. 2-6. 

Cannon, W. B., Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage, ch. 2. 

Kempf, E. J., ‘The Autonomic Functions and the Personality,” Nervous and 
Mental Disease Monograph Series, no. 28, pp. 1-16. 


CHAPTER III 
FUNDAMENTAL ACTIVITIES — INHERITED AND LEARNED 
InsTincT, MATURATION, AND HABIT 


The Origin of Fundamental Activities. Having traced in outline 
the mechanism employed in human behavior, there now lies before 
us the problem of describing and explaining, in the terms of that 
mechanism, the characteristic activities of life. There are certain 
broad and unvarying types of response, serving as imperative , 
forces in the individual and social life of man, with which the~ 
analysis must begin. We must seek, for example, to understand 
why the young man learns a trade, marries, and settles down to - 
Comestic life; why the scholar and the statesman toil unceasingly ’ 
for fame; why we become angry at a man who insults us or who 
abuscs his horse; why we shrink from the sight of blood and hurry 
breathlessly through strange, dark places; why the boy loves to 
chase a squirrel; why the magnate by a shrewd deal ‘corners’ an 
industry; why the laborer participates in a strike riot; and why a 
mother will drudge and slave that her son may go to college. Ac- 
tions of this sort challenge our neurological formule. They not 
only lead back to something original and fundamental in human 
nature, but also point to a superstructure of attainment by hand 
and brain. They measure both the height and the depth of man. 

In behavior of this type two classes of activities can be recognized, 
those which have been inherited and those which have been 
learned by the individual. It is difficult in a given case clearly 
to distinguish between these two; and there is a wide difference 
of opinion as to their relative importance. Those who believe 
strongly in the inherited factors maintain that the mother has an 
inborn tendency to love and protect her offspring, or at least to 
protect small, defenseless creatures; that through certain neural 
dispositions, or co6rdinations of reflex arcs, laid down by heredity, 
we respond to strange and dangerous situations by avoidance, to 
small moving objects such as game by pursuit, to a chosen member 


FUNDAMENTAL ACTIVITIES 43 


of the opposite sex by lover-like behavior, to the sight of suffering 
by sympathy, to the thwarting of our endeavors by fighting, and to 
the sight of valued objects by seizing, ‘cornering,’ and hoarding. 
Such innate neural coérdinations are termed instincts. ‘They are 
more highly integrated than simple innate reflexes such as yawning, 
breathing, and crying; and they serve the purpose, implanted in the 
race through evolution, of adapting the individual to the more 
complex and significant features of the environment. 

The explanation advanced by those who favor the hypothesis of 
learning restricts the rdle of inheritance to far simpler terms, and 
interprets these complex and purposeful integrations of reflexes as 
habits. Maternal behavior, for example, may be ascribed to an 
association formed between the child as a stimulus and the pleasant 
organic responses and sentiments connected with the husband, the 
home life, the plans for the future, the fondling and nursing of the 
infant, and the attitude of society toward the maternal relation. 
Again, our avoidance of a dangerous object may be due to a reac- 
tion of withdrawing from injury which has become associated by 
experience with the sight of the object which inflicts such injury. 
Learning would be, according to this view, a more acceptable ex- 
planation than that of an ‘instinct of flight.’ Flight, moreover, is 
possible only after the acquisition of the habits of walking and 
running, just as the shrewd deal of the financier is possible only 
because of his acquired knowledge of the market and the laws of 
exchange. 

Instinct and habit are therefore clearly reciprocal in explanatory 
value. That which is ascribed to one must be denied the other; 
hence it is necessary to establish, in general terms at least, some 
tentative demarcation. Our aim in the present chapter will be to 
determine: (1) what instinctive codrdinations of reflexes really 
exist; (2) how, using these codrdinations as a basis, the individual 
builds up systems of habit and intelligent behavior; and (3) the 
significance of the social environment in this process of modifica- 
tion. 

The Criteria of Instinct. We must first examine the grounds 
upon which fundamental activities are alleged to be instinctive. 
One of these is universality of occurrence among the members of 


4A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


the species. This criterion is open to serious objection inasmuch as 
the young of the species are universally submitted to the same class 
of environmental influences. Even among birds certain traits 
formerly thought to be instinctive have been discovered to arise 
from the ‘social tradition’ taught by the behavior of the parents to 
each generation. In order to prove a reaction to be innate, we 
must establish the fact that in the process of attaining its present 
development no necessary part has been played by learning 
through experience. If the response appeared at the moment of 
birth, its innate character (barring a limited amount of intra- 
uterine habit formation) would be incontestable. Birth, however, 
is but one event in a long period of development which begins at 
conception and extends far into active life. It is therefore theoreti- 
cally admissible that traits of behavior which make their first ap- 
pearance during infancy, childhood, or youth may result from the 
‘ripening’ or maturing of truly innate codrdinations of reflexes, 
and not from experience. We may call this view the maturation 
hypothesis. An experiment has been performed in which several 
swallows were placed, as soon as hatched, in a cage so small as to 
prevent attempts at flight. At the age at which swallows are usu- 
ally able to fly, they were liberated. Some of them at once flew off 
quite successfully. Although not altogether convincing in certain 
respects, this experiment illustrates the possibilities invelved in 
maturation without the aid of use. Since practically all the as- 
serted instincts (such as flight, attack, parental and sex behavior, 
hunting, hoarding, constructing, and the like) first appear long 
after birth, it is obvious that the instinct theory rests its case upon 
the hypothesis of maturation. We are led, therefore, to a consider- 
ation of the evidence for and against this hypothesis. 

Post-Natal Development of Structure. No one would consider \ 
the structures which underlie behavior to be fully formed in the 
newborn infant. There is no response to sound for the first few 
days. Color vision is still longer deferred. The protective wink | 
reflex, laughing, and other facial expressions require weeks for 
development. Voluntary control of the bladder is not attained 
until after the first year. Development of this nature, however, 

1 Spalding, D. A. (See references cited at the end of this chapter.) 


FUNDAMENTAL ACTIVITIES 45 


pertains largely to the terminal organs, the receptors and effectors, 
such as the eye, the ear, and the facial and sphincter muscles. In 
themselves these tardily appearing reactions afford little definite 
evidence regarding maturation at the synapses. The receptors and 
effectors operating in sexual activities provide a striking example 
of late development in terminal structures. 

There is, however, an unquestioned developmental growth in 
the central nervous system, subsequent to birth. Considerable 
areas of the brain (for example, the association centers) are in the 
newborn infant histologically incomplete. The rich arborizations 
of axone and dendrite are undeveloped; and a vast number of 
synaptic connections of the future are not yet structurally possible. 
The progress which follows this infantile condition is to be regarded, 
however, as a general, rather than a specific, ripening of neuronic 
connections. There is nothing to indicate a maturing of special 
paths of lowered synaptic resistance between receptor and effector. 
It is a process of growth which makes all types of reaction structur- 
ally possible, but favors the establishment of none more than 
others. 

Experimental evidence bearing on this point is provided by a 
study of the pecking response of chicks.1. The attempts of newly 
hatched chicks to seize grains of wheat are, on the first day after 
hatching, very awkward and ineffective, an average of only fifteen 
per cent of ‘perfect trials’ (that is, attempts consummated by 
swallowing) being achieved. On the fifth day of practice, however, 
the perfect trials were found to average seventy-two per cent, and 
on the fifteenth day, eighty-four per cent. It was decided to in- 
vestigate whether this rapid increase in efficiency was due to the 
maturation of a ‘pecking instinct’ or to the perfection of a habit 
through practice. The method used was to start the pecking ex- 
periments with groups of chicks of later ages and compare the 
results with those obtained from the group beginning their attempts 
on the second day of active life. One group was given its first 
trials on the fourth day, one group on the fifth day, and one on the 
sixth day. Between their hatching and the day their pecking trials 
began the chicks were kept in a dark place and given no opportunity 

1 Shepard, J. F., and Breed, F, 8S. (See reference cited at the end of this chapter.) 


46 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


to peck. The average accomplishments of the groups for each day’s 
trials are shown by the curves in Figure 9. The horizontal axis 
indicates the day of life, and the vertical axis the number of perfect 
trials made out of the total of fifty trials given each day. It will be 
seen that the improvement curves of the three groups of delayed 
chicks have two significant features. (1) In the first fifty trials 


TRIALS 















me 27 1 | a a fata 
AE it 00297 1 Re 
Re [8 7 eT | a a 
Ba 


OAYS + 2 10 2 8 WH I 6 lO lB (9 


seer 
i Ears 
S(SiSie eH 





FIGURE 9. ae snail THE Errect oF ARTIFICIAL DELAY UPON 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PECKING RESPONSE OF CHICKS 


S, standard curve showing average daily improvement of chicks beginning their prac- 
tice on the second day of life. I, III, IV, V, curves of average improvement of groups of 
chicks beginning their practice on the fourth, fifth, and sixth days, respectively (I and III 
beginning on the same day). The height of the curve indicates the number of successful 
peckings out of 50 attempted for each day. 

(After Breed and Shepard in The Journal of Animal Behavior, vol. 111, page 278, by per- 
mission of the publishers, Messrs. Henry Holt and Company, New York.) 


(first day’s practice) the older birds were unable to score a greater 
number of perfect responses than were the birds who began to peck 
the day after hatching. In some cases the delayed groups were 
actually less effective in the first trials than the undelayed. (2) 
There was a much more rapid improvement among the delayed 
‘groups, so that in a few days they overiook and even surpassed the 
progress made by the chicks who had practiced from the start. 

On the one hand, the results of this experiment discredit, for the 
activity concerned, the theory of the specific maturation of an 
instinct, and show the necessity of practice as in all habit formation. 
The low beginning and improvement of the delayed groups show 


FUNDAMENTAL ACTIVITIES 47 


that in their case, as in the case of the undelayed, the response of 
pecking had to be learned. On the other hand, the capacity of the 
more mature chicks for more rapid learning indicates that they 
were able to profit in forming the pecking habit by a greater 
general development of neurones, synapses, receptors, and effectors 
than existed in the birds one day of age.!. The conclusions drawn 
from this experiment are no doubt pertinent to the development of 
the human being. It is generally futile to attempt instructing a 
child to talk or to walk before the age of twelve months. Not long 
after that time, however, there begins a surprising progress in the 
acquisition not only of locomotion and speech, but also of a more 
dextrous manipulation (for example, self-feeding), of control of the 
emissive functions, and of general comprehension of objects and 
situations. Curves of learning could be plotted for these activities 
quite comparable to the rapidly rising curves of the ‘matured’ 
chicks. Synchronous development along these many lines is cer- 
tainly more intelligible if conceived as a diversity of habits made 
possible of acquisition by general neuronic development, than if 
regarded as a number of specific, innate, neural codrdinations which 
all happen to mature at about the same time. ¥ 
Maturation versus Learning in the Analysis of an Activity. 
General assumptions aside, if we observe the progress of the infant 
in any particular activity, we shall probably find that it develops by 
a codrdination of simpler part movements in a way that suggests 
learning. Such partial activities, for example, in walking (which is 
often alleged to be an instinct) include kicking, pushing with the 
feet, holding the back erect, crawling, acquiring tonus of trunk and 
limbs in standing, stepping with support, and standing alone. These 
part responses are themselves made up of crude innate reflexes per- 
fected and rendered serviceable by practice, and they appear in 
sequence throughout the first twelve to fifteen months. Suddenly 
one day the baby affords its parents a delightful surprise by taking 
a half-dozen steps all alone. In some way an integration of the 
component movements is accomplished, Far from being an un- 


1 This interpretation differs from that offered by Breed and Shepard. A good 
descriptive and critical discussion may be found in Watson’s Behavior, an Introduc- 
tion to Comparative Psychology, pp. 138-41 and footnote, 


48 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


usual process, however, this sudden integration is a familiar experi- 
ence in all complex forms of learning. In learning to swim, pole- 
vault, ride a bicycle, and play the jew’s-harp, we spend considerable 
time in practicing the stroke, the position of the hands and feet, 
and other details, without being able to do the thing itself. Then 
we suddeniy succeed in integrating these components and mastering 
the whole act in one or two trials; and the rest is merely a matter of 
perfecting the performance. ‘This process is popularly known as 
“setting the knack” of a thing. Learning to walk seems to be 
closely analogous to learning these other feats of skill. In such a 
case we should no more speak of the maturation of the instinct to 
walk than of the maturation of a bicycling or a jew’s-harping 
instinct. 

Conclusions: The Need of Genetic Study in the Determination 
of Instinct. Although the foregoing observations by no means 
prove that no genuine case of maturation of inherited reflex patterns 
exists, they show that such an assumption rests upon a speculative 
basis. Post-natal development may be interpreted as a general 
growth process facilitating the formation of habits, rather than a 
process of maturation of instincts. Fundamental and early re- 
sponses of a complex type, moreover, lend themselves to plausible 
explanation by the laws of learning. In order to merit substitution 
for learning and habit as an explanation of the tardy appearance of 
alleged instinctive activities, the maturation hypothesis should be 
at least as well founded on fact as the process of habit formation. 
This it clearly is not.! | 

Our efforts thus far to establish a reliable criterion of the innate 
and acquired factors have been without avail. The reason is not 
far to seek. We have begun by considering the activities in ques- 
tion in their fully fledged state. This is the wrong end of the proc- 


1 This assertion refers only to man. The lower animals, particularly the insects, 
have well-defined’ maturations of innate responses. The functions of the effectors 
are, however, far more limited and specific in the lower animals than in man. When 
we consider the simple and unvarying uses to which the jaws of the ant, the claws 
of the beetle, the fin of the fish, and wing of the bird are put in comparison with the 
complex and thousand-fold activities of the human hand, it becomes clear that the 
notion of innate responses is more appropriate to sub-human forms than to man- 
kind. The more highly variable action system of man and the higher vertebrates 
has its neural basis in the cortex, whose pathways are determined by Jearning 
rather than by inheritance. 


FUNDAMENTAL ACTIVITIES 49 


ess. By the very intent to study that which we call an ‘instinct,’ 
we immediately cut off from our view the life history which lies 
behind that activity, and which affords the only means of disen- 
tangling the component strands of heredity and environmental 
influence.-- We must begin our study at the threshold of life, with 
only the equipment possessed by the newborn infant, and seek in 
this beginning and the events which follow the origin of the funda- 
mental activities. 


THE PREPOTENT REFLEXES AND LEARNING 


Reflexes involved in Fundamental Activities. The behavior 
repertory of the newborn infant seems at first acquaintance a 
random, poorly codrdinated, and unadapted affair. Yet under 
careful observation there will be recognized certain adaptive re- 
sponses of profound significance in directing future development. 
In order to appreciate these reactions we may recall the experi- 
ments of Professor Sherrington upon the ‘spinal dog,’ an animal 
whose nervous mechanism had been reduced to spinal reflexes by 
severing the cord at the base of the brain.!. Toa pin-prick upon 
the bottom of the foot this simple nervous system responded by 
jerking the foot upward away from the stimulus. This adaptive 
reaction, moreover, prevailed when other stimuli were competing 
with the injury to the foot for the determination of the final com- 
mon path. Both the scratch reflex, elicited ordinarily by tickling 
the shoulder, and the reflexes maintaining the posture of the limbs, 
were inhibited in favor of the withdrawing response. Nocuous, or 
harmful objects, therefore, coming into contact with the receptors 
(‘noci-ceptive’ or pain end organs) of the body, evoke reflexes 
which are imperative in their action, protective or adaptive in their 
effect, and prepotent in their ascendance over other stimuli in con- 
trolling the final common path. ‘There are also prepotent reflexes, 
such as sex responses, which are accompanied by conscious pleasure 
rather than pain. In the male frog during the breeding season the 
response of clasping the female is so powerful that the transection 
of his spinal cord above and below the shoulders fails to loosen his 
embrace. 

1 The Integrative Action of the Nervous System, pp. 226-34. 


50 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


The human being has inherited a number of prepotent reflexes 
which are fundamental not only in their original potency, but in the 
control which they exert over habit formation throughout life. 
Ultimately, as well as genetically, they are prepotent. Most of 
these reflexes are functional at birth; one, the sensitive zone reflex, 
appears in early infancy; while the sex activities alone require a 
considerable period for the development of the structures concerned. 
We may recognize six important classes of human prepotent re- 
flexes: 

Starting and Withdrawing 

Rejecting 

Struggling 

Hunger Reactions 

Sensitive Zone Reactions 

Sex Reactions 
VA It should be emphasized that each of these activities comprises, 
not a single reflex, but a large group of effector movements occur- 
ring upon the application of the appropriate stimulus. In the 
following discussion the singular form will be used solely for con- 
venience. ‘The reflexes of any prepotent group include responses 
in the visceral as well as the somatic, or skeletal, effectors. We 
shall be concerned at present only with the somatic portion of the 
response, that which deals with the external, environmental situa- 
tion. The visceral effects, which are the basis of emotion, will be 
discussed in the next chapter. In some of the prepotent reflexes 
the afferent (sensory) terminals are somatic, as in the case of with- 
drawing; in some they are visceral, as in the hunger and sex re- 
actions. 

I. StarTING AND WiTHDRAwiING. The response of starting may 
be produced in the newborn infant by removal of support, loud 
sounds, a sudden tug or push when drowsy, and immersion in 
water. Jerking movements of the head, arms, and legs, changes in 
respiration, puckering of the mouth, and crying result from these 
stimulations.!. There is some doubt as to the time of appearance 


1 Tor these facts of infant behavior and others discussed in this chapter the 
writer is indebted to the researches of Dr. J. B. Watson. See his Psychology from 
the Standpoint of a Behaviorist, pp. 199-236, 236-49; also his article, ‘Studies in 
Infant Psychology,’ Scientific Monihly, December, 1921. 


FUNDAMENTAL ACTIVITIES 51 


of the withdrawing reflex, such as that of retracting the hand or foot 
from a harmful stimulus. It probably exists in a crude form at a 
very early age if not, in fact, at birth. In parts less readily with- 
drawn a nocuous stimulus produces a restless random movement 
which is kept up until the body is removed from the harmful con- 
tact. With practice these simple mechanisms soon develop into 
complex and effective habits (sometimes called ‘instincts’) of 
flight and escape. Turning the head so that the nostrils will not be 
buried in the pillow, and blinking at objects threatening the face (at 
about one hundred days of age) are examples of special withdrawing 
responses. The latter is connected in older children with retreating 
movements of the head and body. 

The withdrawing reflex as congenitally exhibited is, like all pre- 
potent reflexes, remarkable in two ways: (1) It is evoked only by 
stimulation of an extremely simple type. (2) It is crude in the 
manner in which it is carried out. Subsequent development then 
must proceed along these two lines, the afferent and the efferent. 
We shall discuss them in order. 

1. The Afferent Modifications. ‘The baby under a year of age 
does not withdraw from the sight of fire or the dark, or from animals 
which would arouse fear in an older child.t| Complex stimuli, or 
situations requiring experience in order to convey a meaning of 
danger to the individual, have no congenital stimulating value, but 
only simple stimuli of unusual intensity (for example, loud sounds), 
and suddenness, or piercing, burning, and other destructive agents. 
Thus the degree of energy of the stimulus and the powerful effect of 
nocuous stimulation upon neuron and synapse are the hereditary 
determiners of the withdrawing reaction — not the awareness of 
danger nor the inborn cognition of an hereditary peril.2. The first 

1 Watson: loc. cit., pp. 199-206. Similar observations have been made regarding 
the young of certain birds and mammals. 

2 This statement is in opposition to the older doctrine of instincts as formulated 
by Professor McDougall and others. To substantiate the inheritance of adaptive 
responses to complex and meaningful stimuli would require the acceptance of a 
central process, or ‘cognitive disposition,’ corresponding to a realization of danger, 
which is transmitted by heredity. Two improbable assumptions are involved in 
this. On the conscious side the discarded doctrine of innate ideas would have to be 
reinstated as valid; and on the neural side there would be required an exceedingly 


complex cortical maturation. We have already found reason to doubt the existence 
of maturation in far simpler neural correlations than these. Professor McDougall 


52 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


problem, therefore, in the development of the reflex is to understand 
the process by which other stimuli, and stimuli more complex than 
the original, acquire the power of evoking the response. The 
theory of maturation we have found to be insufficiently established; 
environmental factors and learning through experience must there- 
fore be called into account. 

An explanation fortunately is at hand in the law of the condi- 
tioned response (p. 39). An originally inadequate stimulus, if 
given at the same time as the biologically adequate stimulus, will, 
after sufficient repetitions, suffice of itself to call forth the character- 
istic response. An illustration will show the operation of this law 
in the development of the withdrawing reflexes. The writer’s son 
at the age of fourteen months was pursuing his ball which had 
rolled under a radiator. In reaching for it he burned his fingers 
and quickly withdrew his hand. A few days later he started again 
to reach for a toy which he had lost in the same manner when he 
suddenly looked at the radiator and drew back. His mother watch- 
ing the process repeated the word ‘hot’ emphatically several times. 
After a few similar experiences the child learned to withdraw from 
any object at the sound of the spoken word. The response had been 
transferred, first, from the primitive pain receptors stimulated by 
heat to the sight (visual stimulus) of the radiator, and, secondly, 
to the auditory stimulus of the word ‘hot.’ 

In the same manner the withdrawing reactions of the child come 
through his experience and the social influence to be transferred to 
a considerable range of objects. In many cases the conditioned 
response is established by using language (verbally represented 
situations, accounts of dangers fancied or real) in order to evoke 
the original reaction. The name of the dangerous place or object 
would then, as the conditioning stimulus, be responded to by the 
withdrawing response which followed the original, verbally pre- 
sented, situation. Through this substitution of language for the 


has faced the first objection by asserting his belief in innate ideas. (An Introduc- 
tion to Social Psychology, 8th ed., p. 399.) The evidence, however, is not forth- 
coming. 

Within recent years there has been an increasing tendency among psychologists 
to deny the existence of instincts as maturations of complex cognitive or preceptual 
patterns. See references cited at the end of this chapter. 


FUNDAMENTAL ACTIVITIES 53 


actual stimuli in behavior, the social influence is able to extend the 
principle of conditioning to a far-reaching education and control of 
the individual. The withdrawing tendencies evoked may be at- 
tached foolishly, and by arbitrary conduct of the elders, to such 
benign situations as the dark, ‘haunted houses,’ and special articles 
of food; or wisely to the real perils of life, such as fire, high places, 
sharp instruments, and wild animals. 

The withdrawing and avoiding responses are subject to condi- 
tioning for the social as well as for the individual good. There is 
profound psvchology in the proper administration of punishment. 
If the year-old baby has its fingers rapped each time it scratches 
at its parent’s face, the response of withdrawing the hand from 
the painful chastisement will soon become attached to the sight of 
that erstwhile interesting countenance. And so at a later'age with 
the correction of trespassing, stealing, and other anti-social acts. 
Susceptibility to scorn and the tendency to shun social disfavor 
have even greater force as determiners of the withdrawing re- 
sponses. Deprivation of pleasure serves a similar purpose. On 
the whole the part played by the social influence in modifying the 
afferent side of the withdrawing and other prepotent reflexes is one 
of the most important chapters of social psychology. 

2. The Efferent Modifications. The training of the individual 
must provide not only for conditioning of the withdrawal reflex by 
appropriate stimuli, but also for a refinement and specialization of 
the act of withdrawing itself. The prepotent reflexes, as previously 
stated, consist of large groups of allied reactions, somatic and vis- 
ceral. Efferent development is a process of selecting from among 
the group those movements which are most effective in carrying out 
the function of the reflex; that is, in this case, removing the body 
from the offending stimulus. Whenever a new type of withdrawal 
act is learned, the original stock of movements from which the 
selection is made includes not only original reflexes, but also pre- 
viously acquired habits representing more complex codrdinations. 
Thus flight is a motor development of the withdrawing reflex which 
involves successively higher integrations of habits, such as averting 
the body, creeping, walking, and running. Concealment, considered 
an instinct by some writers, is also a habit based upon trial-and- 


54 ~ SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


error learning. When the little girl puts her head under the bed- 
clothing, the flash of lightning is no longer seen; that is, her visual 
receptors have been withdrawn from a stimulus which, either 
through its intensity or through information received about it, is an 
adequate producer of the withdrawing reaction. True concealment 
is a similar forestalling of possible contact with the avoided object. 
It is a withdrawal in advance. In the history of mankind with- 
drawal from the cold and other inclemencies of nature has led to the 
extensive acquisition of habits of providing clothing and shelter, 
habits which have been learned through social continuity by suc- 
ceeding generations. Behavior which we term modesty is clearly 
the result of training and not of instinct. It arises from the forma- 
tion of specialized habits of withdrawal from the gaze or presence 
of others‘ when nude or under other special conditions. Language 
and the disapproving behavior of parents and others upon occa- 
sions of improper exposure are the primary withdrawal stimuli 
whose response soon becomes conditioned by the exposure itself. 
Through a wider and subtler process of language-conditioning the 
retirement reaction of modesty becomes linked with the ‘exposure’ 
of one’s personal qualities and merits. The emotional component 
of modest behavior resulting from exposure in situations demanding 
privacy is shame. It is significant that this word attaches also to 
emotional reactions which constitute the sense of moral ignominy. 
The identity of designation may be attributed to the common ele- 
ment of social disapprobation to which both are specialized efferent 
responses. Their common origin is further suggested by the fact 
that the revealing of turpitude, such as graft and adultery, like the 
discovery of physical nakedness, is frequently termed an ‘exposure.’ 

Learning and Thought in the Efferent Modification of the With- 
drawing Reflex. ‘The specific process by which efferent modifica- 
tion is effected may be outlined as follows. In response to a novel 
nocuous situation there occurs a large number of random move- 
ments including both original reflexes and previously formed 
habits. For example, a rat imprisoned in a burning building would 
probably run wildly about, biting, clawing, squealing, and entering 
every possible nook and cranny. As soon as an exit is found, the 
withdrawing is successfully completed and the random responses 


FUNDAMENTAL ACTIVITIES 55 


cease. If placed in the same situation again the rat would probably 
find the way of escape in a shorter time than before. In still further 
trials the time required and number of useless movements made 
would continually decrease until the physiological maximum in the 
efficiency of escape was attained. This is known as learning by 
trial-and-error, or better, by trial-and-chance success. Just why 
the reflex arcs which produce the successful movements are thus 
selected and ‘fixated’ in this process, while the useless reflexes do 
not persist, is not clearly known. A partial explanation may 
perhaps be found in the fact that the successful response, since it 
occurs in each trial, is in the end the reaction most frequent in 
occurrence. It is also the most recent (that is, the last used) at the 
beginning of each trial, because its occurrence marked the termina- 
tion of the preceding trial. These factors, combined with the rein- 
forcing effects of visceral (emotional) reactions, are no doubt opera- 
tive in lowerin;, the synaptic resistance and fixating the arcs of the 
successful movements. 

In their highest development the prepotent reflexes in man 
involve as their central portion the intimate correlating mechanisms 
of the cortex. By cortical activity — that is, by reasoning — the 
selection of the successful responses is greatly facilitated. Let us 
consider, for example, the behavior of a man caught in his room in a 
burning hotel. Unless he becomes confused, he will not rush about 
as did the rat trying every possible exit. He will think. That is, 
he will represent to himself the various exits. In terms of behavior 
the process involves two components: (1) the use of symbols, and 
(2) habitual attitudes (knowledge and experience) attaching to 
them. A symbol is a brief and labile response usually undetected 
in outward behavior, but capable of being substituted for overt 
responses. Incipient, subvocal, and inaudible word responses are 
particularly suitable material for symbols. By reacting with the 
production of the symbol for ‘stairway,’ the man in our illustra- 
tion is able to call into play the neural processes representing habits 
which were formed by previous experience or information about 
stairways under such conditions. He may recall that the stairway 
would be likely to be choked by smoke and flames. His attitude 
(response) in this situation would be clearly antagonistic to the 


56 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


impulse to escape by the stairs. This exit being thus blocked (by 
thought), he continues with a random series of symbol responses 
representing avenues of possible escape (the elevator, the fire 
escape, the rope of bedclothes, and so on) until one is found whose 
train of associated, habitual attitudes presents no check to its use 
in the withdrawing reaction. This symbol is followed by its overt 
action, and the problem is solved. Symbols are thus reactions 
which are used as abridged and ‘internal’ trials in the process of 
trial and error. They require but an instant to execute, and in- 
volve neither the delay nor the danger of overt trials. They serve 
to reinstate one’s past experience regarding the proposed movement 
and so predict the outcome. ‘Thought, therefore, is an abridged 
and highly efficient form of trial-and-chance success in the consum- 
mation of the prepotent reflexes.” 

Conclusions regarding Modification. From these introductory 
illustrations of the withdrawing responses we may now deduce 
somewhat more precisely the laws according to which the funda- 
mental activities are developed. The prepotent reflexes are subject to 
modification by synaptic changes in their central portions. The effects 
of such changes are (1) to extend the range and complexity of the stimult 
capable of exciting the response, and (2) to refine and specialize the 
response itself. The first effect, which may be called an afferent 
modification, 1s brought about by the principle of the conditioned 
response; the second, resulting in an efferent modrfication, 1s due to 
the selection and fixation of successfui random movements in the 
processes of habit formation and thought. 

II. Rejectinc. By the third day of life the use of the hands and 
feet in pushing away noxious stimuli from the body is clearly seen. 
There has been observed in the infant four days of age a response of 
pushing at the hand of the experimenter who was pinching the 
nose of the infant. When the newborn baby is lying on its back 
with legs extended, a slight pinch on the inner surface of one knee 


1 Tt will be noted that the term ‘symbol’ is here used to denote primarily an 
actual response which is used in place of other responses, rather than a ‘conscious 
idea’ standing for other ideas. 

2 It is impossible in this place to do full justice to the process of thinking. For 
a more complete account the reader must be referred to the behavioristic PLN: 
tations of thought included in recent textbooks on general psychology. 


FUNDAMENTAL ACTIVITIES 57 


will cause the opposite foot to be drawn up, somewhat awkwardly 
at first, until the sole finds and presses against the hand that is 
pinching. This reflex, although slow and crude at the start, has a 
deep evolutionary foundation. It is precisely the reaction evoked 
by stimulating with acid one leg of a frog whose spinal cord has been 
separated from the brain. If the stimulus is intense and difficult 
of removal, there develops a greater force in the rejecting response, 
together with random movements of other parts of the body and 
crying. <A primitive discomfort closely resembling anger is the 
visceral component of the reaction. Indomitable restlessness of 
movement in carrying out prepotent activities in the face of difficul- 
ties is universal in the animal kingdom. The imperativeness of the 
prepotent reflex is Nature’s provision that adaptation and survival 
will be achieved. 

The afferent modifications of the rejection reflex involve its pro- 
duction by all kinds of potentially dangerous or irritating objects 
which are best escaped by pushing them away. If a caterpillar ora 
hornet walks across the hand, since the visual and tactual stimuli 
have been associated in experience or through teaching with pain 
‘and revulsion, the child will react to the sight and touch of the 
object and quickly remove it before the actual hurt is experienced. 
A still more effective and ‘forehanded’ conditioning is accomplished 
when the response occurs to the visual stimulus alone, and un- 


desirable objects are rejected before they even reach the body. | 


Well before the age of a year the infant pushes out toward the ap- 
proaching nursing bottle, when in no mood for its contents. A 
little later the same response is shown toward bitter medicine and 
toward toys which are proffered in an attempt to beguile his stormy 
moods. ‘These are reactions of ‘rejection in advance,’ just as we 
found concealment to be a ‘withdrawal in advance.’ In the 
writer’s son the repulsive movement was early combined with a 
downward striking movement of destructive effect. Such behav- 
ior tends to convince one that the use of the hands in self-defense 
or attack is attributable rather to an efferent development of pro- 
tective reflexes than to a ‘fighting instinct.’ 

One of the most important modifications of the rejecting reflex is 
the habit of cleanliness. The part which social agents must play in 


58 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


influencing the child to regard dirt with the aversion necessary for 
its remova! is well known to all. In the cortical and verbal proc- 
esses of later life we find still more extensive afferent modifications. 
Disagreeable or debasing proposals, offensive personalities, and 
attempts to hamper us or to lower our self-esteem become adequate 
stimuli for producing the rejecting response. ‘The efferent aspect 
in such cases often involves the language effectors and the attitudes 
and facial expressions of scorn and aversion. ‘The frank response 
of disgust employs, at least incipiently, a primitive reflex of rejec- 
tion of nocuous internal stimuli, namely, vomiting. Its condition- 
ing by social objects is apparent. We acquire the afferent modi- 
fication of reacting toward certain types of individuals or situations 
as uf they were nauseating to us.! 

III. Strucciinc. If the limbs or the head of a newborn child are 
held so that the usual random motions are impossible, a struggle 
ensues which grows move violent as the restraint continues, involv- 
ing more and more of the bodily musculature, and accentuated by 
crying and later screaming. The restraint of movement is no 
doubt to be considered biologically as a nocuous stimulus. The 
struggle response is a compound of the two more elementary . 
reflexes of rejection and withdrawal. Attempts are made both to 
push away the restraining agent, and to escape its force by with- 
drawal. The accompanying emotion is therefore often a mixture 
of anger and fear. The two reactions are readily seen in certain 
wild animals when captured and held in the hands. Many crea- 
tures, pursued and brought to bay, quickly substitute for the with- 
drawing response of flight the rejecting or repelling response of 
fighting. It is probable that the habit of pugnacity arises geneti- 
cally from the rejection employed in self-defense. _When the effer- 
ent development is complete — that is, when one has learned how 
to fight — the use of the ability for offensive purposes is likely to 
follow.? A response which appears to be a purely offensive attack is 


1 This extension of physiological disgust is characterized by Professor McDougall 
as the “‘intellectualizing of an instinct.’’ We shall return to it in the chapter dealing 
with. facial expression. 

2 Offensive fighting, however, since it is practically always for the purpose of 
protecting one’s interests, is at least partially defensive. In a suggestive article 
Professor Wallace Craig has shown that fighting throughout the animal kingdom is 
defensory and protective in character. The animals have no inborn desire to fight. 


FUNDAMENTAL ACTIVITIES 59 


often correctly interpretable as ‘rejection in advance.’ Experience 
teaches that the best way to repel injury through the attack of 
another is to attack and disable him first. The irreconcilable atti- 
tude which attends this kind of situation 1s one of the chief menaces 
to civilization. The threat of hostility implied in large protective 
armaments is an example. The espousal by the German people of 
the Kaiser’s policy of invasion and devastation in order to protect 
themselves in advance from supposed annihilation is also a case in 
point. 

Afferent Development: Extension of the Stimuli of the Fighting 
Reactions. At the beginning of life the human infant struggles in- 
discriminately against any restraining force, whether it be another 
human being or a blanket which confines his movements. There is 
no inherited susceptibility to social stimuli, as distinct from other 
stimulations, inanger. Ata later date the child learns that certain 
actions, such as striking, scolding, and screaming, are effective 
toward persons, but not toward things. In adults, although the 
infantile response is still sometimes seen, the fighting reaction be- 
comes fairly well limited to stimuli whose hurting or restraining 
influence can be thrown off by physical violence. 

The various prepotent reflexes are prominent among the move- 
ments whose blocking leads to an angry struggle. Interference 
with the nursing activity (hunger reflexes) is an invariable stimulus 
for this response. There is an extension to an ever-widening circle 
of stimuli as the child develops, so that the restriction, not only of 
the innate mechanisms, but of all kinds of acquired habits based 
upon them (for example, blocking of the habits of manipulation 
through withholding a desired plaything) is certain to evoke the 
struggle. At a later age an insult, which thwarts one’s habitual 
_ bearing of self-esteem, has often a more potent effect than direct 
bodily attack. Finally, our readiness to struggle against the 
thwarting or restraint of others, under conditions which we term 
‘injustice,’ is the final development in the transfer of the fighting 
response to situations of a social character. 


(International Journal of Ethics, 1921, XX XI, 264-78.) Considerations of this sort 
discredit the militarist’s argument that war is inevitable because of an ‘“‘instinct to 
fight.’’ There is an innate reflex basis for self-defense; but there is none for fighting 
in itself, 


60 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


The activities of sexual and family love are particularly liable 
when opposed to lead to struggle. The ferocity of sexual jealousy 
and the blood feuds of the mountaineers are well-known instances. 
The hunger reactions are equally potent in the fierceness of the 
struggle to which they Jead when blocked. Aggression, unsatisfied 
hunger, crowded conditions, and limitations which hamper both 
the economic and the sex life, are, when they evoke struggle re- 
sponses on a large scale, the cause both of industrial conflict and 
war. 

The Social Influence upon the Struggle Reflex. Under the con- 
ditions of survival of the fittest the original and unaltered operation 
of the responses of economic struggle would lead one creature com- 
pletely to annihilate, if possible, all the others with whom he must 
compete for the limited subsistence. But society has grafted upon 
these reflexes a number of remarkable modifications. Man through 
the docility of his period of infancy has developed habits of regard 
for others and submission to social control, so that his struggle 
against beings who by competition tend to check his own autonomic 
activities has been greatly altered. The youth must learn to treat 
the struggles of life as a game which he must play according to the 
rules. Aggressive physical combat is discouraged and self-control 
inculeated.. The fiery Scotsman in Mr. J. M. Barrie’s The Little 
Minister had been trained, when incited to wrath, to repeat furi- 
ously the books of the Old Testament before acting upon his anger. 
After this performance his reaction was more likely to be one of 
righteous remonstrance than of homicide. 

It is clear that the mechanism of self-control is based upon an- 
tagonistic reflexes. Two opposing impulses compete for mastery. 
They are (1) the prepotent response of crushing the agent who 
thwarts our activities, and (2) the habit of submission to control 
by social sanction. Under normal conditions the result of this 
antagonism is the selection of a new and highly discriminated 
response. A final common path is chosen which serves both the 
prepotent needs of the individual and the interests of society. A 
resolution, for example, is afforded by fair competition and 
rivalry, which provide a successful outlet for the response of 
struggling against limitation of the viial processes, while at the 


FUNDAMENTAL ACTIVITIES 61 


same time fostering that regard for the rights of others upon which 
every social group depends. 

The Yielding Response — Habits of Activity and Passivity. 
There exists in many species of animals a curious antithesis of the 
struggling reflex. Creatures of such widely different orders as 
insects, reptiles, birds, and mammals, when surprised or over- 
powered by a strong foe, will sometimes become limp as if paralyzed 
or else assume a catatonic rigidity. It has been said (though the 
writer knows of no verification) that the struggles of a baby held 
very firmly will soon subside, and he will become passive in a way 
that does not suggest fatigue. When drowsy the struggling of an 
infant may be readily quelled by this method combined with rock- 
ing. Neither the mechanism nor the significance of this reaction is 
known.' There may be some biological end to be attained by 
complete submission in cases where being conquered would be the 
inevitable issue of combat. The reflexes employed are the direct 
antagonists of those in the active, victorious state. Flexor con- 
tractions give way to extensor, and the body becomes limp and 
yielding. A complete polarity occurs between the attitudes of the 
victor and the vanquished. In infancy and childhood there are 
built up definite habits in the form of attitudes of activity and of 
passivity toward persons who are respectively weaker or stronger 
than the child himself. These habits, persisting as they do through- 
out life, are the true basis of those traits which are sometimes al- 
leged to be instincts of ‘self-assertion’ and ‘self-abasement.’ We 
shall find that ascendance and submission are important in the 
study of the personality and the social contacts which it makes. 

IV. Huncer Reactions, The Approaching Responses. The 
behavior which we have been thus far discussing might be con- 
veniently classed under the general heading of avoiding responses. 
The biological function of these activities is protection; and their 
stimuli arise from contacts which the organism makes with external 
objects. The responses also are mainly in the somatic group of 

1 For a possible explanation on the basis of thyroid secretion, see J. P. MecGon- 
igal: ‘“‘Immobility: An Inquiry into the Mechanism of the Fear Reaction,’’ Psy- 
chological Review, 1920, xxvu1, 73-80. 


Another theory explains the ‘death-feigning’ reaction as due to an excess of 
adrenin, a substance secreted in intense emotional excitement. . 


62 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


effectors. There is in many such reactions, however, a visceral 
emotional component having an unpleasant conscious quality, as in 
fear and anger. These reflex mechanisms may be shown schemati- 
cally in Figure 7, page 36, by connecting SR with SE and VE 
respectively. The activities now to be considered arise from 
internal stimulation of the interoceptors, and are somewhat periodic 
in function. The recurrent hunger of all creatures is an example, 
and also the internal stimulation of sex. While the receptor end of 
the arc is visceral, the effector organs, as before, are chiefly somatic, 
with certain visceral responses, pleasant in quality, accompanying 
the final or ‘consummatory’ stage of the action, as in feeding or 
sex behavior. In Figure 7 these reflexes may be represented by 
connecting VR respectively with SE and VE. By the familiar 
method of the conditioned response a number of external stimuli of 
food and sex, which have been present at the same time as the 
original visceral stimulation (VR), become adequate to arouse a 
complex group of approaching responses. ‘These reactions in their 
full development comprise the bulk of human behavior, having the 
function biologically of sustaining the individual and the race. 
There is a general formula applicable to the approaching reac- 
tions. In terms of consciousness it may be stated as follows. An 
internal need or desire — for example, for food or for a mate — is 
experienced, called in the older terminology an ‘appetition.’ 
Thereupon a restless procedure serving the purpose of a search is 
entered upon and continued until the needed object is obtained. 
After the hunger or lust is satisfied, the creature lapses into its 
former quiescence. For the explanation of this cycle we must turn 
to the mechanisms of behavior. A condition of internal maladjust- 
ment — for example, lack of nutriment — sets up internal stimula- 
tions, such as those caused by the contraction of the stomach 
muscles in hunger. These stimuli produce responses in the somatic 
effectors consisting of wandering and searching movements of the 
whole organism. ‘These movements serve sooner or later to bring 
the receptors of the creature into contact with an edible cbject. 
The prey is devoured, and the presence of the food in the stomach 
promptly abolishes the stimuli of hunger contractions and with 
them the overt seeking activities. There follows a period of repose 


FUNDAMENTAL ACTIVITIES 63 


until a recurrence of the hunger stimulus, or perhaps another type 
of internal stimulation, again sets the somatic effectors into opera- 
tion. 

The Learning Process in Hunger Reactions. The approaching 
responses become modified in the process of learning in the same 
manner as the avoiding responses... We have already given an 
example of the latter in the escape of an animal from a dangerous 
situation. If we place a hungry cat in a puzzle box or cage with a 
simple latch mechanism on the inside for opening, and if we place 
food where the animal will observe it through the bars, we shall be 
able to witness in its primitive form the hunger response. As in 
our former illustration the prepotent stimulus (this time internal) 
leads to the performance of the complete repertory of movements, 
both instinctive and habitual. Climbing the bars, clawing, biting, 
mewing, and many other responses are made in purely random 
fashion. Finally one of these movements chances to release the 
mechanism. The door opens, and the prisoner escapes and obtains 
food. When placed in the same apparatus for another trial the 
animal strikes the correct (that is, the releasing) movement more 
quickly and precisely than before; and in succeeding trials the 
selection and fixation of the useful reflexes, and the dropping out of 
the useless ones, proceed in the usual fashion. 

Autonomic Interests as Drives in Learning. Although the exact 
nature of the fixation process is still obscure, the important: réle of 
the viscerally stimulated prepotent reflexes in the maintaining of 
restless movements, the transfer of stimuli, and the selection of the 
most efficient responses in habit formation is very clear. Hunger is 
the supreme drive of the learning process. Sex is a close rival. 
Other important factors, such as rivalry, desire for social approval, 
and the like, are incentives derived from these two. The baby’s 
earliest and most facile learning is exhibited in turning his head to 
find the mother’s breast, and later in holding the nursing bottle, 
and also in the transfer of the eager responses, originally made in 
tasting food, to the sight of it, and later to the parents and the 
sound of their footsteps. ‘n these exciting moments the synaptic 
resistances of the useful afferent and efferent pathways are lowered, 
and the acquisition of the habit rendered speedy and certain. 


64. ~ SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


All teachers testify to the readiness with which any fact which 
relates to an ‘interest’ of the child is assimilated. It is probable 
that interest can always be traced genetically to an autonomic 
foundation. The promise of a stick of candy causes the child to 
‘set himself’ to memorize the twenty-third Psalm with alacrity, a 
task which the tedious dogma of piety could scarcely accomplish 
in an entire day. Ultimately, if not immediately, the ‘setting to 
learn’ is generally reducible to the approaching reflexes whose af- 
ferent side lies in the viscera. The outworn pedagogical view that 
man is a creature controlled essentially by Reason divorced from 
the lower ‘appetites,’ is rapidly being displaced by this deeper 
truth. Intelligence is the servant, not the master, of autonomic 
activities. | 
. The Human Hunger Reflexes and their Development. Our 
study of the learning process shows the necessity of regarding the 
prepotent reflexes not as unitary pathways, but as large groups of 
reflexes, often diffuse in character, and involving the unspecialized 
play of numerous effectors. Out of this chaotic mass-response the 
learning process selects and fixes those movements which, in re- 
moving the source of prepotent stimulation, satisfy the demands of 
life. In thenewborn infant the hunger contractions of the stomach / 
give rise to crying, thrashing about with arms and legs, and turning 
the head from side to side. If an object touches the cheek the head 
is quickly turned so as to bring it into contact with the mouth. 
Sucking, in many cases at least, is not perfected at. birth, but re- 
quires a certain amount of practice often with artificial induction. 
This response together with swallowing is, however, made service- _ 
able by use almost upon the threshold of life. Movements of the 
head and body toward the source of food are aiso selected very 
early from among the random activities and fixated by the learning 
process. The hands and arms develop their earliest codrdinations 
in connection with the mouth. | Finger-sucking is followed by the 
holding of the bottle of food, and later by eating with the knife and 
fork. It is interesting that the original component response of cry- 
ing persists because of ‘its effect in producing nourishment through 
social agencies. In the second year the innate random vocal 
reflexes begin to take the form of language which, by a more 


FUNDAMENTAL ACTIVITIES 65 


precise integration with the mechanism of various bodily needs, 
replaces crying as a method of controlling the social environ- 
ment. 

In the broader spheres of adult behavior the hunger responses 
join with those of sex to form the powerful undercurrent of prac- 
tically every human life. The acquisition of a trade or profession 
may ke looked upon as the supreme achievement in the efferent 
modification of the prepotent reflexes of hunger and sex.!. The 
social and intellectual tradition in vocational training, involving 
the use of language and thought, gives incalculable aid in preparing 
for the economic and domestic future of the youth. In the trial- 
and-error procedure, by responding to the social instruction, he 
rules out in advance many of the major errors. His energies are 
thus saved for the more intricate and progressive adjustments to 
his particular problem. 

Prepotency in Habit. A question naturally arises whether in the 
higher intellectual and artistic vocations the autonomic drives are 
really of fundamental significance. The artist and poet work, it is 
believed, for sheer love of their work. ‘They eat only to keep alive 
so that they can work. The miser lives for his gold; the food in- 
terest is reduced to a minimum in favor of the mercenary motive. 
These exceptional cases are probably to be explained as a transfer 
of emphasis from the original prepotent stimulus to the mechanism 
by which it has been habitually gratified. Through a restriction of 
the field of response to a certain line (such as music, art, entomol- 
ogy, etc.) in which the individual possesses aptitude, the mecha- 
nism employed appears to have become a drive in itself. It is 
probable, however, that such ‘derived drives’ are more dependent 


1 The reader may think it far-fetched to say that these complex acts of acquired 
skill are modifications of certain simple, original reflexes. They seem rather to be 
integrations of habits which can be put to the service of any bodily need. Genet- 
ically considered, however, the presence of some powerful (prepotent) stimulus was 
necessary in order to evoke the crude or random activity through which they were, 
by trial and error, acquired. This early stage is that of the infantile prepotent re- 
flexes which we have described. Integration of the nervous system makes it pos- 
sible for the skilled acts, once learned, to belong to the general action repertory, and 
to be called out by any appropriate prepotent stimulus (as final common path) in 
the same manner that the original, unskilled movements were evoked. In this 
sense, therefore, the skilled performances of life may be regarded as modifications 
and enlargements of scope of the original prepotent reflexes. 


G6 '- SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


than we commonly recognize upon the original approaching re- 
flexes which we have classified as prepotent. The spur of economic 
success and comfort and the desire for connubial happiness are 
both the origin and the mainstay of many an original and produc- 
tive career. Genetically considered, autonomic sources are usually 
discoverable, as in the case of a rich young lady who, having been 
disinherited by her parents for marrying a poor man against their 
wishes, developed a tremendous energy for work, saved, and grew 
thrifty to the point of miserliness. 

One may interpret the habit of manzpulation as a response which 
has acquired a kind of potency through its connection with prepo- 
tent reflexes. It appears so early and is so vigorously pursued that 
it is considered by many able writers to be an instinct. Since it 
clearly arises from simpler, non-manipulative origins, its assign- 
ment to the category of a habit seems, however, to be at least 
equally sound. The genetic components of manipulation are the 
newborn activities of grasping and of getting the hand into the 
mouth, and the later developing response of reaching. As soon as 
objects are seized they are taken to the mouth, since that is one of 
the most frequent terminations of all infantile hand movements. 
This reaction is a part of the complex group of reflexes in the hunger 
response. At a later date the infant inspects the object before 
mouthing it; and finally all the interest becomes centered in the 
examination of the object and its manipulation in random motor 
play. If we regard the hunger (mouthing) reflex as the origin of 
this habit, we have here a remarkable case of an efferent develop- 
ment acquiring the function of a prepotent reaction in itself. The 
tendency to manipulate is far-reaching in its importance. In con- 
junction with certain prepotent reflex groups it probably forms the 
basis of the early trait of curiosity, and the later habits of hunting, 
hoarding, and constructiveness. 

Social and Affective Aspects of Stimulus Transfer. The sight 
and taste of food arouse in the hungry individual salivary secretions 
and pleasurable movements of feeding. Pleasant feelings and 
anticipatory movements come soon to be attached by the law of 
conditioned response to situations accompanying the feeding or 
to persons through whom the food is obtained. This transferred 


FUNDAMENTAL ACTIVITIES 67 


reaction of pleasure is the basis of the earliest attachment of the 
child to its parent. 

With the gourmand the pleasure accompanying the act of eat- 
ing, rather than the cessation of the gastric hunger stimuli, be- 
comes the prime consideration. This was the case with the Roman 
voluptuaries who were said to have disgorged their food between 
courses in order to prolong their alimentary pleasures. Through 
socially approved custom the original and biological function of 
prepotent reflexes is thus subject to alteration. An opposite 
tendency exists to-day in regarding a dinner party primarily as a 
means for social contact, many persons affecting a superior aversion 
to the nutrient part of the ceremony.! 

V. SensitivE Zone Reactions. Response of the Infant to 
Tickling. At about the age of six weeks a light stroking of the 
baby’s lips or pressure upon the cheek will evoke a smile. Soon 
other regions of the body, such as the orbits, neck, axille, lower 
ribs, thigh (just above the knee), and soles of the feet, become 
sensitive to pressure or light touch. The responses elicited are 
mild squirming movements, ‘pseudo-withdrawing’ in type, arching 
of the back, thrashing of arms and legs, giggling, and finally laugh- 
ing. Why these zones are sensitive, and why their cutaneous 
receptors should be connected with the spasmodic responses of 
ticklishness, we can only conjecture. Little is known of their 
physiological or biological significance. The affective state under 
mild sensitive zone stimulation is pleasant. The random tossing 
and squirming responses become refined with motor develop- 
ment into movements which bring about a continuance of the 
agreeable attack and a surrender to it. Witness a child holding up 
its foot to be tickled again. For this reason we may classify these 
reactions with those of hunger under approaching responses, in 
spite of the fact that the stimulus seems to be external rather than 
visceral. 

Relation of the Sensitive Zones to Hunger and Sex. Thereisan 
early association of the sensitive zone reactions with those of hunger 
in that the mouth is concerned in both. Nursing combines the 


1 The social alteration of the biological purpose of instincts is well discussed in an 
article by Professor W. 8S. Hunter cited at the end of this chapter. 


68 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


stimulation of this region and the consummation of the hunger 
cycle in one series of acts.1. Freudian psychology, on the other 
hand, assumes that the sensitive zones of the child have a 
sexual significance, and applies to them the term ‘erogenous zones.’ 
While this interpretation cannot be fully credited, there are certain 
significant resemblances between ticklishness and sex reactions. 
(1) Both give rise to approaching responses having the effect of en- 
hancing the tactual stimulation. (2) Both are pleasurable in the 
affective quality of their sensations, and there is a strong introspec- 
tive resemblance between the experiences of itch, tickle, and lust. 
(3) In the mating of adults the stimulation of both (sensitive and 
sexual zones) are combined in a series of love-making events cul- 
minating in copulation. On such occasions — for example, in the 
embrace of lovers — the sensitive zones become particularly potent 
In producing responses. These regions may be said to represent the 
infantile stage of development in a complex system which, in the 
adult, includes the sex zones proper. Their chief interest for social 
psychology lies in their importance in the problems of adjustment 
within the family. 

Pleasurable Habits based upon the Sensitive Zone Reflexes. 
The caressing which children commonly receive and solicit is inti- 
mately associated with sensitive zone stimulation. Their cuddling 
of dolls and toys, and expressions of love toward these objects, have 
their root in the same source. There are many afferent modifica- 
tions of the reflexes arising from the stimulation of these zones. The 
earliest is the transfer of the stimulus from the tickling itself to the 
person who does it. After a few such titillations the baby will 
laugh in a most ‘tickled’ fashion upon the mere approach or sudden 
movement of the parent. It is not improbable that the effort to 
obtain praise and the avoidance of censure (sometimes spoken of as 
social instincts) are partially derived in a similar manner. Words 
and tones of approval are connected with caresses, playful behavior, 


1 In pigeons there is a curious combining of these two mechanisms. In billing the 
sensitive zones of the beak are involved in a series of amorous activities. It is, 
however, by similar movements that the young thrust their beaks into the parent’s 
mouth in order to obtain food. The latter action has, in fact, been observed under 
certain conditions to evoke in the parent the characteristic sexual response. (C.O. 
Whitman: The Behavior of Pigeons, pp. 64, 65-67, 107-08.) 


FUNDAMENTAL ACTIVITIES 69 


and other stimulations of sensitive zones by the parent; and they 
come to evoke the same responses as the latter, namely, actions 
inducing their continuance and repetition. This process is the 
basis not only of a large amount of filial childhood affection, but 
also of the susceptibility of the individual to control and develop- 
ment through social influences. 

VI. Sex Reactions. The Original Sexual Reflexes. During 
the age of puberty there occurs in both sexes a rapid development 
of the receptors and effectors employed in sex behavior. Hormone 
secretions from the cells of Leydig stimulate the growth of the 
secondary sexual characteristics, the genital organs mature, the 
erogenous zones upon contact yield pleasurable sensations, while 
the secretions of the reproductive, and possibly other glands afford 
an internal stimulation for sexual activities. There is meanwhile 
the familiar adolescent awakening of tender feeling and the various 
forms of love. 

The original stimulus for sex responses is not, as is popularly sup- 
posed, an individual of the opposite sex. It is rather an internal 
excitant. In the male it is the gradual distention of the seminal 
vesicles, a condition requiring a fairly periodic discharge of their 
contents. The distention produces an increase of tonicity in the 
wall of the vesicle, and this internal activity, combined, no doubt, 
with similar glandular effects in other parts of the pelvic viscera, 
stimulates the interoceptive end organs in these parts. In the 
female the excitatory visceral changes are probably caused, not by 
distention, but by some hormonic (glandular) process occurring 
about the time of menstruation. The response which follows this 
stimulus consists of random and restless activity quite analogous 
to that in the case of hunger. The tumescence of the sex organs sets 
up further stimulations in these parts, which provide allied afferent 
processes having the same outlet (that is, through random seeking 
movements) as the visceral stimulus. The movements are suffi- 
ciently directed to bring the erogenous areas already yielding lust 
sensations into contact with some object, thereby adding external 
tactual stimulations to the original and purely internal stimulus. 
In the human species (and in some animals) stimulations from the 
contact of the sensitive as well as erogenous zones are added to the 


70 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


excitations during the sexual embrace. In the male copulation 
thus raises the tonic contraction of the muscle of the genital appara- 
tus to such a pitch that it breaks over into the phasic contractions 
by which the accumulated sexual secretions are discharged. The 
complete sexual reaction, therefore, involves a chain of prepotent 
reflexes. It begins with an internal stimulus caused by glandular 
activity and distention, followed by crudely directed reflex re- 
sponses which bring the highly sensitized and tumescing organs 
into contact with some object in the environment. Contact with 
this object contributes sufficient stimulation to evoke a second group 
of reflexes, those of emptying the contents of glands and vesicles 
whose distention was the original cause of the activities described. 
After sexual satisfaction, therefore, as after the satisfaction of 
hunger, the organism lapses for a time into quiescence.! 

The internal character of the original sex stimulus is clearly 
shown in those animals which have well-marked breeding seasons. 
Such seasons depend directly upon the periodic activities of the 
sexual glands and smooth muscle. A pigeon which is not ‘in 
season’ will evade or repel any approach made by the opposite sex. 
On the other hand, a male bird in the period of sex excitement will 
begin the usual courtship antics at once, and, in the absence of the 
female, will make advances to individuals of its own sex.2, Among 
human beings, although the relations of the sexes are greatly com- 
plicated by recognition, imagination, and other cortical processes, 
the original sexual stimulus is also unquestionably internal in its 
location. Stimulation from the physiological activities of the inter- 
nal sex organs, rather than the sight of a member of the opposite 
sex, is the drive to action. The normal sex life of adults, while it is 
not so clearly cyclical as that of lower animals, is nevertheless 
timed according to the occurrence of a true organic need. 

The Afferent Modification of Sexual Reflexes. Sex Attraction. 
The long period of childhood and youth preceding sexual maturity 
affords an extensive opportunity for training, through social tradi- 
tion and example, in the lore of sex and the significance of male and 


1 For certain portions of this account the writer is indebted to a theory of sex 
reactions (as yet unpublished) developed by Mr. F. T. Hunter. 
2 Whitman: loc. cit. 


FUNDAMENTAL ACTIVITIES 71 


female. The boy and girl know about family life and, in a general 
way at least, the procreative function of marriage. They learn 
from their elders the part played in life by courtship and love- 
making, as well as the habits and attitudes of chivalry, modesty in 
regard to one’s person, and reticence upon sex topics. Habits which 
must inevitably control and modify the prepotent reflexes of sex 
are thus established well before the appearance of the reflexes them- 
selves. When the first awakening of the internal sexual urge is felt, 
the boy, if he has been properly instructed, knows that the female 
is the proper object of his searching movements. He is further 
aided in this new adjustment and in understanding the contact 
which it involves by the experience of the sensitive zone stimula- 
tions. These he has known from infancy, and they have already 
given a meaning, as yet non-sexual, however, to caresses and other 
expressions of affection. The realization that a member of the 
opposite sex is the most satisfactory object of the sex desire thus 
represents a stimulus transfer, or allied conditioned response, by 
which the sight of a possible mate augments, or of itself directly 
evokes, the seeking responses which originally were produced only 
by the organic stimulus. As in the afferent modification of other 
prepotent reflexes which we have studied, language and other social 
influences are of the highest value in the conditioning process. 

A striking instance of the afferent modification of the sex reaction 
by social agencies among pigeons has been recorded by Whitman. ! 
If a male ring dove is reared from infancy among carrier pigeons, 
and then placed at maturity among birds of his own species, he can- 
not be induced to mate with them. The breeding activities, how- 
ever, speedily commence as soon as he is brought into the presence 
of a carrier female. The sexual drive —that is, the internal 
stimulating secretions — and the random activities to which they 
lead, are truly innate and hereditarily determined. The act of 
pairing between male and female, however, seems to be the result 
not of instinct but of learning. 

To the average adult the opposite sex appears so obviously fitted 
for the mating process that he is likely to assume the apprehension 
of this fact to be instinctive. He has forgotten, however, that tur- 

1 Loc. cit., p. 68. 


72 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


bulent adolescent period before his sexual adjustment was perfected. 
Children pass through various stages in the comprehension and use 
of sex objects. In the absence either of enlightenment or of oppor- 
tunity for coition the adolescent youth associates his sex feelings 
with those fortuitous objects or situations (for example, pressure of 
clothes, climbing trees, etc.) which afford contacts with the genitals 
during random movements, thus providing pleasurable erotic ex- 
periences. Masturbation, homosexuality, and other ready means 
for attaining the same end follow more or less inevitably. In the 
mature individual sex gratifications of this sort are termed perver- 
sions, because they indicate the persistence of a false or inadequate 
training in these matters. In childhood, however, they are only to 
be expected, in the absence of social control and direction, as natural 
stages in the process of learning by trial and error. Here again 
learning, rather than instinct, must be the guide in the search which 
is finally to end with mating in the normal heterosexual manner. 
Many perverts and neurotic adults are now known to be persons 
who have never advanced beyond the childhood stage in the educa- 
tion of the prepotent reflexes of sex. 

The Problem of Sex Training. ‘The moral of the preceding dis- 
cussion is not far to seek. It is as pernicious to withhold informa- 
tion necessary for the development of the prepotent sexual re- 
sponses as it would be to allow the child to grow up in ignorance of 
the objects upon which he should condition his reactions of avoid- 
ance, rejection, and food-seeking. If direction through social 
agencies is neglected, the youth must fall a victim to the more crude 
and often disastrous mistakes of trial and error in the process of 
learning sex behavior. To wait for puberty to arrive before begin- 
ning sex instruction is not only to throw away the priceless years of 
childhood which should be used in building up the proper attitudes 
for sexual maturity, but also to run the risk of allowing habits to be 
formed which are antagonistic to the normal sex reactions of the 
adult. One important caution, however, must be borne in mind. 
The mere informing of the child in sexual matters, if not combined 
with the formation of attitudes, principles, and habits proper to 
persons possessing such knowledge, is as likely to produce harmful 
as it is beneficial results. The mere desire to ‘“‘tell the child the 


FUNDAMENTAL ACTIVITIES 73 


truth ”’ is in itself no adequate justification for imparting the physio- 
logical facts. The aim should be not merely sex enlightenment, 
but sex training.! 

The efferent side of the sexual reflexes is as much in need of 
modification through learning and social guidance as is the afferent. 
Breeders of animals are fully aware of the crudity and clumsiness of 
random movements made in efforts for sexual union. In the human 
race the untaught youth is equally devoid of the knowledge and 
slall necessary for conjugal love-making and a wholesome sex life. 
A large proportion of marital discord and unhappiness results from 
the lack of knowledge and training whereby the random move- 
ments arising from the sex stimulations may be developed into 
responses nicely adjusted to the needs of both husband and wife. 
As for the broader aspects, such as the wise choice of a mate, the 
regulation of the reproductive function, and the application of the 
laws of heredity, we are but on the threshold of progress. 

Sex and Sensitive Zone Reactions in Familial Behavior. There 
is a general agreement among psychologists that the family re- 
sponses, such as parental and filial behavior and feeling, are inti- 
mately connected with the sex reactions. Among both human and 
sub-human creatures the birth and rearing of offspring is an intrin- 
sic part of a cycle which begins with courtship and selection of a 
mate. There extend throughout this cycle a continual internal 
excitation and a series of reactions to stimulations of the sensitive 
and erogenous zones. The incubation of eggs by birds and the 
suckling by mammals (including man) fall within this class of 
pleasurable and approaching reactions. Parental as well as con- 
jugal behavior is largely conditioned by internal stimulation. 
The distention of the crop in certain birds and the rapid secre- 
1 Reports of social workers reveal the importance of the pre-adolescent years for 
establishing wholesome attitudes toward sex adjustments. A psychologist in charge 
of work with delinquent girls divided her prostitute cases into two classes: those 
who were reformable, and those for whom nothing could be done. The latter class 
consisted almost entirely of girls who had been brought up in immoral home sur- 
roundings or who had been the victim of an assault (usually by a male relative) 
before the age of puberty. (EK. R. Wembridge: ‘“ Work with Socially Maladjusted 
Girls,”’ Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology, 1922, xv11, 79-87.) 
The sex drive is so powerful that, if the proper inhibitions have not been established 


before adolescence, the chances of building them up after that period are very 
slight.. 


4 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


tion of milk in mammals are the immediate stimuli for feeding 
the young.! 

The love life of a human being is lived through contact, not only 
with the spouse, but also with the children. For most adults, to 
see a baby is to desire to fondle it in a very lover-like fashion. The 
love reactions toward children are similar to those which the child 
manifests toward its parents or other relatives. That is, they are 
responses mainly to stimulations of the sensitive zones, and are 
productive of caressing and fondling movements. The stimulation 
of sexual zones and true responses of sex are forbidden by custom 
and social standards. It seems probable, however, when we recall 
the fusion of sensitive zone and sexual reactions in the adult, that 
the internal sex drive allies its stimulation with that of the sensitive 
zones to bring about the reaction of fondling (final common path). 
Periods of sex excitement, moreover, are associated both in man 
and the lower animals with periods of unusual fondness for offspring. 

The law of conditioned response is also operative. If a woman 
loves her husband and her home, her lover-like responses will be 
extended to a new stimulus, the child, which through its origin as 
well as through its immediate presence is closely connected with 
the beloved objects. The reverse side of the picture is sometimes 
seen in hospitals where illegitimate children are born whose mothers 
are in the throes of shame and fear, and perhaps of hatred of the 
men who caused their maternity. The absence of the usual mater- 
nal feelings is often conspicuous in such cases.?. Social standards 
and early training are likewise very important in determining the 
attitude which the parents adopt toward their offspring. Another 
evidence that parental love depends upon contact and experience 
is the fact that it grows with the child. Parental and maternal 
pride develop, and attractive plans are laid for the child’s future. 
The fondling, nursing, protecting, and planning grow into definite 

1 Absence or abnormalities of this internal excitement probably account for such 
parental anomalies as defective cycles, abandoning of nests, and devouring of litters 
of young. See Whitman: loc. cit. For some valuable observations on the physiol- 
ogy of the ‘maternal instinct,’ consult Rabaud, E., ‘L’Instinct Maternel chez les 
mammiféres,”’ Journal de Psychologie, 1921, xv1t1, 487-95. 

2 See J. B. Watson: Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist, pp. 257-58. 


Also Ruth Reed: ‘‘Changing Conceptions of the Maternal Instinct,’ Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology, 1923, xv111, 78-87. 


FUNDAMENTAL ACTIVITIES 75 


maternal and paternal habits. These habits, sometimes loosely 
spoken of as instincts, rest upon the instinctive prepotent reactions 
of sensitive zones and sex; but their real development is brought 
about by the interplay between these innate mechanisms and the 
environment of the family. 

The Sex Reactions and Learning. Considered in this broad 
manner the sex reactions are close rivals of hunger as drives in the 
learning process. In order to obtain access to the female the male 
dog or cat, through the trial-and-chance success method, will 
rapidly learn the use of the release mechanism of a puzzle box. 
The struggles of a mother bird in similar experiments to gain access 
to her nest and young result in effective learning by the same 
method. In human society the efferent modifications by which 
custom requires that: the sex reactions shall be consummated lead 
into many productive fields. The lover must conform to the 
standards set for courtship, desirability of character, and economic 
standing. He must give up the irresponsible vagaries of youth for 
the sober achievement of the man. A vocation must be learned if © 
he is to support the wife and children which are necessary to his 
love-life. Here, as in the case of the other instinctive bases of 
learning, we find that the social inheritance through schools and 
elders, and the use of language and thought processes, are of para- 
mount importance. The nature of the vocation chosen in many 
cases depends upon fundamental individual interests or abilities; 
but the zeal with which it is studied and practiced is directly pro- 
portional to the inciting effect of the combined stimulations of 
hunger, sex, and the sensitive zones —in short, to the demands 
of economic and domestic life. 

‘Sublimation.’ A great deal of speculative writing has been 
done on the so-called process of ‘sex sublimation.’ It is believed 
by some that the sexual drive represents a kind of free-floating 
energy which can be transformed by suppression and redirection 
into some ‘nobler’ pursuit, such as science, art, religion, or charity. 
In the present writer’s opinion, it is nearer to the truth to say 
that the intellectual and cultural achievements of man represent 
things done 1n the interest of sex, and as a means to a more satisfac- 
tory adjustment of the sexual life, than to assume them to be a 


76 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


substitution for or transformation of the sex drive. Many a young 
man whose passions led him into devious and profligate ways has 
been converted through marriage into an efficient producer. Sex 
is the spur which keeps native ability and talent always at their 
maximum effort. The operation of the sex drive under the stabi- 
lizing influence of family life is a factor of progress second to none in 
human society. One of the most serious probiems of our higher 
and professional education is the restlessness and distracting in- 
fluence produced by enforced celibacy long after the sexual matu- 
rity of the student. Much time and energy is diverted from study 
into seeking such sex excitements as chance and a conflict with the 
sense of propriety may allow. If this sexual effort could be allied 
with the goal of scholastic and professional attainment, as it might 
be in some cases by early marriages with child-bearing deferred, 
instead of being allowed to detract from serious study, the gain 
both in work and happiness would be enormous. 


SocriAL FACTORS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
FUNDAMENTAL ACTIVITIES 


At a very early age a child shows susceptibility to the influence 
of the social environment, and a ready response to approval and dis- 
approval. 'The reason is fairly obvious. During the first two or three 
years every event of importance to his well-being occurs through 
the ministration of other persons. Features, facial expressions, and 
vocal sounds are the regular accompaniments of these events. It is 
obvious, therefore, that, through the law of conditioned response, 
these social stimuli must acquire an early and universal significance 
in child life. Attitudes of approval, disapproval, command, and 
prohibition acquire a value as forms of social control which persist 
through life and compel our obedience to law and other social 
sanctions. There is little ground for believing that this subser- 
vience to the attitudes of others is inborn, or that the child is 
instinctively responsive to what Mr. Trotter mystically calls the 
“voice of the herd.” 

Imitation. It has been asserted that the child possesses an 
instinct to imitate, and that this inborn tendency is one of the chief 
aids to learning. Probably both of these statements are incorrect. 


FUNDAMENTAL ACTIVITIES ory (a 


The evidence for the innate neural disposition to imitate, though 
conflicting, is preponderantly negative. Such instances of apparent 
early imitation as have been reported are insufficient to establish 
the existence of an instinct of imitation. As for the réle ascribed 
to imitation in learning, there is equal reason for doubt. In the 
vast array of habits acquired during the first eighteen months there 
is no bona-fide case of learning by imitation. A more complete 
analysis of alleged imitative behavior will be undertaken in 
Chapter X. 

Gregariousness. Man is a society-forming animal. The con- 
gregation of human beings in groups of all sizes, and for all purposes, 
is one of the most universal of ethnic phenonema. That this con- 
gregating denotes a ‘gregarious instinct’ is a purely gratuitous 
assumption. The usual argument for this instinct is to ascribe to it 
a necessary role in large-scale aggregations such as football crowds 
and growing cities. Two fallacies are evident in this reasoning. 
The first is the ignoring of the powerful interests appealed to, which, 
although common to great numbers of individuals, are nevertheless 
individual rather than social in their driving power. Almost every 
one is interested in contests and exhibitions of power and skill. 
Cities draw youths from the country by a variety of excitements 
and opportunities having a universal appeal, and based upon the 
prepotent demands of each individual. Desire for flirtation and 
the sexual interest constitute the greatest single cause of the 
thronging of public parks and cafés. There is always some definite 
aim or interest, other than merely ‘getting together,’ in every con- 
gregation of people. This is true even for the purpose of recreation 
and social festivities. Emulation, exercise, dancing, exchanging 
news, and ‘kissing games’ are only a few of the more common 
incentives. There is no question but that the pleasure derived 
from these gatherings is greatly increased by the contact with 
others. This pleasure, however, is readily explained without the 
need of assuming an instinct to congregate. 

The second fallacy lies in assuming that, in cases where the need 
of companionship 7s the actual motive, the seeking of human com- 
pany merely for itself is necessarily an innate reaction. The stimu- 
lus usually asserted for the ‘gregarious instinct’ is the condition of 


78 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


‘loneness’ or separation from the herd, which induces a restless 
searching until the creature is able to resume contact with his 
fellow beings. If the inheritance of reactions to specific objects or 
classes of objects is difficult to conceive of independently of experi- 
ence with those objects, how much more incomprehensible is the 
‘notion of inherited reactions to the absence of specific objects. 
When a man loses his favorite pipe, he is restless and even lonely 
until he finds it. His restlessness, however, is more acceptably 
explained as the result of his having been long accustomed to the 
pipe than as the operation ofan inherited reaction stimulated by 
the absence of the desired object. During a day hundreds of our 
habitual responses are directed toward or conditioned by our 
fellow beings. When we are removed from human society, these 
habits are in a measure thwarted. The effect is therefore un- 
pleasant, and searching movements begin. Habit, then, is a better 
explanation than instinct for the uneasiness and misery of enforced 
solitary life. It should be remembered that there are many re- 
clusive persons whose pleasurable habits have been conditioned by 
a solitary rather than a social setting. Large gatherings of people 
are shunned by such individuals. Or, if they attend the theater 
or ball game, they do so in spite of the crowd. Habituation to 
the group is the necessary condition of loneliness upon separation 
from it. 

We may summarize our discussion of the social factors in the 
development of prepotent responses by the following observations. 

It has been previously noted that the rage of an infant is at first 
directed as fully toward a blanket which confines his movements as 
toward a person. The appropriate reactions to stimuli of a social 
sort must be differentiated-by the learning process from the reactions 
to non-social objects. Whatever instinctive equipment man may 
possess, it is individual in its nature. It is only the subsequently 
learned reactions that may be termed ‘social.’ It will therefore 
clarify our discussion if we avoid the conception of ‘social instincts’ 
and speak instead of the development of social habits. Among the 
latter the responses to approval, scorn, and other forms of social 
control are among the most significant. Submission, self-assertion, 
leadership, and other traits which are largely inculcated by training 


FUNDAMENTAL ACTIVITIES 79 


are vital in determining the mutual adjustments of human beings. 
The importance of gregariousness, which is an effect rather than a 
cause, has been much overrated. 


CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE FUNDAMENTAL ACTIVITIES 


It is now possible to return with fuller understanding to the 
problem stated at the beginning of this chapter. Our aim was to 
give an account of the innate sources of behavior, and to show how 
the complexity of human activities is constructed upon these inborn 
foundations. A certain group of reflexes, either present at birth 
or involving a later ripening of receptors and effectors, were 
selected as the origins for which we were searching. These reflexes 
are classified as (1) the avoiding reactions, such as infantile with- 
drawing, rejecting, and struggling, and (2) the approaching re- 
sponses to the stimulations of hunger and of the sensitive and erog- 
enous zones. In the competition with other reflexes for the final 
common path, these reflexes are prepotent. They are of the highest 
importance for the welfare of both the individual and the species. 
And finally, they determine the subsequent acquisition of knowl- 
edge and skill by every human being. ‘The intricacies of human 
conduct arise as modifications of these simple prepotent responses. 

Upon the afferent side of the arc the modification proceeds by a 
process of conditioning, a vast array of objects and situations be- 
coming the adequate stimuli for evoking both avoiding and ap- 
proaching responses. Upon the efferent side progress is made by 
learning to solve efficiently more and more complex problems, such 
as those of escape, mate-securing, and food-getting — problems 
which must be solved for the satisfaction of the prepotent demands. 
Solutions of this sort proceed by trial-and-chance success, with 
fixation of the arcs involved in the successful movements. As 
infancy is left behind, that marvelously effective refinement of trial 
and error, known as thought, is increasingly employed. 

If we seek to arrange under the various prepotent reflexes the 
neural organizations of habit and thought to which they have given 
rise, we are faced with a bewildering complexity. In many charac- 
teristic habits, such as walking, manipulation, talking, and con- 
structing, an indeterminate number of reflexes have been geneti- 


80 ~ SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


cally prepotent. Itisalso clearly possible that the reflexes in which 
the development of a given habit originated may differ under 
different environmental circumstances. Variations in the social 
influence likewise produce diverse trends of modification. Without, 
therefore, attempting to classify the fundamental habit systems, 
we may enumerate the more important ones in the following 
list: flight, escape, concealment, modesty, shyness, providing and 
wearing clothes, habitation, fighting, resentment, repulsion, clean- 
liness, rivalry, yielding, eating, drinking, food-getting activities, 
responses to tickling and amusement, esthetic and play attitudes, 
chivalry, courtship, coyness, mating, caressing and fondling, 
maternal and paternal behavior, filial behavior and other family 
responses, manipulation, locomotion, developed vocalization, 
talking, reading, writing, curiosity, hunting, hoarding, constructing, 
imitating, domineering, self-assertion, submission, sympathetic 
behavior, response to approval and disapproval, learning of a trade 
or profession. These include the activities which are of major 
importance for the existence both of the individual and the social 
group. Being rooted in mechanisms which originally dominated in 
competition for final common paths, they retain as habits the 
domination of mature behavior. We may call them prepotent 
habits. 

Because of their early and universal occurrence as well as their 
importance to life, some writers have considered many of the pre- 
potent habits to be instincts. And indeed it may be urged that it 
makes little difference whether we call an action a prepotent habit 
or an instinct so long as we mean a certain definite response of a 
universal and fundamental character. The distinction, however, 
is a necessary one, because the unwarranted use of the term 
‘instinct’ obscures, by implicitly denying, the influence of the 
social environment in the reactions concerned. The social psychol- 
ogist ought to regard childhood, not as a blank period for the 
internal ripening of systems of conduct, but as an opportunity 
which must be used in learning such useful behavior through social 
contact. The sex reactions may lead a woman to a career of 
honored maternity or to prostitution, according to the social forces 
brought to bear in her early training. Instruction rather than a 


FUNDAMENTAL ACTIVITIES 81 


‘maternal instinct’ must be the guide. The responsibility lies 
with us, not with our ancestors, to see that our children develop 
modesty, rivalry, wholesome and properly expressed resentment, 
avoidance of physical and moral dangers, regard for family, suscep- 
tibility to social control, constructiveness, self-assertion, and wis- 
dom in sex matters. 

From a theoretical standpoint also the instinct theory is an 
impediment to the scientific observation of behavior. It is a kind 
of ‘blanket theory,’ which having been used for certain reactions is 
likely to be extended without discrimination to others. The ex- 
planation that a certain tendency is ‘inborn’ is furthermore so final 
a statement that all actual observation and analysis of its formation 
is discouraged. ‘The theory begins at the wrong end of the develop- 
mental process in making itsassumptions. It seizes upon the com- 
pleted activity, and reads back into the life of the child an inherited 
purposive development in the direction of that activity and deter- 
mined wholly from within. In view of the uncertainty regarding 
the maturation hypothesis it seems better to adopt the genetic 
viewpoint, and beginning at birth with the simple reflexes, which 
are demonstrably innate, progress with no further assumptions 
than the well-known facts of the learning process. 

In mankind, considered as individuals, there are certain inalien- 
able qualities and tendencies of a social nature. Our reluctance to 
expiain these characteristics as instinctive in no way diminishes 
their importance. The shaping of the fundamental activities by 
social factors renders the individual as truly socialized as he would 
be with inborn reactions of the same sort. To summarize briefly 
this shaping process: Social objects such as perscns, attitudes, ex- 
pressions, and language serve as the stimuli to which the various 
prepotent activities may be transferred. Approval and disap- 
proval become the conditions of response. Through contact with 
others an enormous part of the learning takes place by which the 
original reflexes are converted into useful habits. The child and 
youth being docile and responsive to language, many prepotent 
stimuli need be represented only indirectly; that is, through ad- 
monition and instruction. Hence many of the cruder errors of the 
learning process are eliminated in advance. The more drastic ex- 


82 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


periences in satisfying the need for protection, and for food and 
sexual adjustment, are worked out in the history of the race. The 
individual begins the modification of his prepotent reflexes where 
unnumbered generations of his forbears have left off. Thought 
itself, in its inseparable connection with language, traditional 
knowledge and custom, is largely a part of the general social influ- 
ence. By the direction through society of the learning process the 
efferent side of the prepotent reflex arcs are modified from purely 
individualistic to highly socialized responses. And finally, the 
common sanction may so far control the habits formed upon the 
inborn activities as to substitute for the original biological end a 
somewhat modified purpose of social origin. 


REFERENCES 


General Discusstons of Instinct and Learning: 
James, Wm., Principles of Psychology, vol. 11, ch. 24. 
McDougall, Wm., An Introduction to Social Psychology, 8th ed., chs. 2-4, 

10-14, supplementary ch. 2. 

Thorndike, E. L., Educational Psychology (Briefer Course), part 1. 
Watson, J. B., Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist, ch. 8. 
Edman, Irwin, Human Traits and Their Social Significance, chs. 1-7. 
Drever, James, Instinct in Man. 
Pillsbury, W. B., The Psychology of Nationality and Internationalism, ch. 2. 
Trotter, W., Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War, pp. 11-41. 


Special Viewpoints: 
Woodworth, R.S8., Psychology, a Study of Mental Life, chs. 5, 6, 8. Dynamic 
Psychology, chs. 3-5. 
Smith, Stevenson, and Guthrie, Edwin, General Psychology in Terms of Be- 
havior, chs. 2-4. 
Hunter, W.S., General Psychology, part 11, ch. 3. 
“The Modification of Instincts from the Standpoint of Social Psychol- 
ogy,’ Psychological Review, 1920, xxvu, 247-69. 
“The Modification of Instincts,” Journal of Philosophy, 1922, xrx, 
98-101. 
Craig, Wallace, “Appetites and Aversions as Constituents of Instincts,” 
Biological Bulletin, 1918, xxx1v, 91-107. 
Tolman, E. C., “Instinct and Purpose,’ Psychological Review, 1920, 
XxviI, 217-33. 
Gault, R. H., Social Psychology: The Bases of Behavior called Social, ch. 3. 








Genetic Observations and Experiments: 
Watson, J. B., Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist, ch. 7. 
Shepard, J. R., and Breed, F. S., “Maturation and Use in the Development 
of an Instinct,” Journal of Animal Behavior, 1918, 111, 274-85. 


FUNDAMENTAL ACTIVITIES 83 


Breed, F. S., ‘The Development of Certain Instincts and Habits in Chicks,” 
Behavior Monographs, 1911, 1, no. 1. 

Whitman, C. O., Orthogenic Evolution in Pigeons, vol. 3, “The Behavior of 
Pigeons.” (Ed. Harvey Carr.) Carnegie Institute, Washington, Pub- 
lications, no. 257, 1919. 

Yerkes, R. M., and Bloomfield, Daniel, ‘“Do Kittens Instinctively Kill 
Mice?” Psychological Bulletin, 1910, vir, 253-63. 

Spalding, D. A., ‘Instinct and Acquisition,” Nature, 1875, xm, 507. 

Stone, C. P., ‘‘The Congenital Sexual Behavior of the Young Male Albino 
Rat,” Journal of Comparative Psychology, 1922, 11, 95-153. 


Critical Discussions: 

Dunlap, Knight, ‘Are there any Instincts?” Journal of Abnormal Psychol- 
ogy, 1919-20, x1v, 307-11. 

Kuo, Zing Yang, ‘‘ Giving up Instincts in Psychology,” Journal of Philos- 
ophy, 1921, xvi, 645-64. 

Bernard, L. L., ‘The Misuse of Instinct in the Social Sciences,” Psycho- 
logical Review, 1921, xxvitt, 96-119. 

Geiger, J. R., ‘‘Must We Give up Instincts in Psychology?” Journal of 
Philosophy, 1922, x1x, 94-98. 

Faris. Ellsworth, ‘ Are Instincts Data or Hypotheses?”’ American Journal 
of Sociology, 1921, xxvu1, 184-96. 

Ayers, C. E., “Instinct and Capacity,” Journal of Philosophy, 1921, xv1tt, 
561-66; 600-06. 

McDougall, Wm., ‘The Use and Abuse of Instinct in Social Psychology,” 
Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology, 1921-22, xv1, 
285-333. 

Tolman, E. C., ‘Can Instincts be Given up in Psychology,” Journal of Ab- 
normal Psychology and Social Psychology, 1922, xvu1, 139-52. 

— “The Nature of Instinct” (a review), Psychological Bulletin, 1923, xx, 
200-18. 

Kantor, J. R., “ The Problem of Instincts and Its Relation to Social Psy- 
chology,” Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology, 1923, 
XVI, 50-77. 


CHAPTER IV 
FEELING AND EMOTION 


The Nature of Emotion. Let us imagine a man crossing a busy 
thoroughfare with the consciousness of moderate safety, when, 
from an unexpected quarter, an automobile horn sounds loudly at 
his elbow. He dodges in a réflex manner away from the source of 
danger, and makes for a place of safety. This is the outward, or 
somatic, portion of the response, belonging to the class of prepotent 
reflexes discussed in the preceding chapter, and brought about by 
the cerebrospinal nervous system. There is another component, 
however, a visceral, or internal, response produced by efferent im- 
pulses through the autonomic system to the smooth muscle of the 
internal organs. Referring to Figure 7 (p. 36), we may illustrate 
this component by connecting the afferent neuron from SR with 
the efferent VE. The visceral response includes changes in rate of 
the heartbeat, stopping of digestive activities, and liberation into 
the blood of energizing products of ductless glands. There may 
also be effects of the sympathetic nervous system on the outer 
surface of the body, such as pallor and erection of the hairs. The 
face likewise assumes an expression of alarm, a response inner- 
vated, perhaps, by the cerebrospinal and the autonomic fibers 
together. 

A diffuse pattern of response, invading both the somatic and the 
visceral regions of the body, is thus the immediate result of a sud- 
den, unexpected, prepotent stimulus. But this is only half the 
story. We are equipped with receptors which are capable of being 
stimulated by these movements of the body and by changes within 
the body (see p. 18). Afferent neurons carry these excitations to 
the appropriate sensory areas of the cortex, a process accompanied 
by sensory awareness of the bodily movements and changes in- 
volved. There enter consciousness: (1) kinesthetic sensations 
from the movements of the arms, legs, and trunk; (2) kinesthetic 
isensations from the movements of facial expression; (3) organte 


FEELING AND EMOTION 85 


sensations from the visceral responses; and (4) cutaneous sensations 
from the effects of sympathetic control in the blood vessels and 
other structures of the skin. These sensory qualities fuse into a 
mass of vaguely discriminated organic and bodily experiences, 
which, having its focus in the interior of the body, seems to spread 
out and pervade our whole being. This fused complex of sensory 
experience is what we call an emotion. In the illustration used it is 
the emotion of fear. 

The emotion does not come directly upon the perception of the 
danger signal, nor with the realization of its meaning. It is con- 
nected rather with the response (visceral and somatic) to the signal, 
and is not felt until the response is made. The emotion of fear is 
the way the body feels upon reacting to a terrifying situation. It 
depends upon this reaction, but it in no way initiates nor directs it. 
This statement of the case is called the James-Lange theory. 
Theory it is, to be sure; but it contains so much truth that it has 
been able to hold its ground against eminent critics. Its main 
defect is one of omission, in that it fails to differentiate the patterns 
of visceral and somatic response giving rise to the different emo- 
tions of common experience. It does not distinguish, for example, 
between the patterns of response capable of arousing the con- 
sciously distinct emotions of anger and fear. We shall presently 
suggest a theory which will remedy this defect. First, however, it 
will be necessary to ascertain what distinct types of emotion exist, 
and then take account. of the physiological mechanisms at their 
service. 

The Classification of Emotions. Introspection upon emotional 
consciousness reveals two characteristic facts: (1) Every emotion 
has an affective element; that is, it may be classed as either pleasant 
or unpleasant. (2) Every emotion has some distinctive quality by 
which it may be recognized apart from its affective aspect. Dis- 
gust and rage, for example, are both unpleasantly toned states; but 
they can be clearly distinguished in consciousness. There is, in 
other words, some differentiating factor which serves to distinguish 
between emotions which are alike in respect to the affective com- 
ponent. The principal emotions having an unpleasant feeling 
element are disgust, fear, rage, grief, and the somewhat emotional 


86 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


quality of intense bodily pain. Pain and disgust are relatively 
simple conditions, involving little specialized somatic activity. 
The chief emotions characterized by pleasant affectivity are elation, 
mirth, and love both of the conjugal and consanguineal sort. The 
unpleasantly toned emotions, such as fear and rage, represent the 
return afferent impulses from prepotent activities of the avoiding 
type; while the pleasant states attend the preparatory or consum- 
matory phases of the approaching activities. 

The Physiology of Feeling and Emotion. If we search for some 
physiological mechanism suitably correlated with the antagonistic 
poles of pleasantness and unpleasantness, upon which our emo- 
tional classification is based, we shall find it in the autonomic ner- 
vous system and the viscera. The physiological antagonism be- 
tween the cranio-sacral and the sympathetic portions of the auto- 
nomic is admirably suited to be the correlate of this antithesis of 
affective quality. It was stated on page 35 that these two divi- 
sions innervate the same organs, and produce in them exactly op- 
posite types of reactions. It may now be further stated that it is 
the sympathetic portion which functions during the intense and 
unpleasant emotional excitements of anger, fear, and bodily pain. 
During the pleasantly toned activities of digestion and sex behavior, 
it is the cranto-sacral division which holds sway. It is worth while 
to describe these antagonistic visceral effects somewhat more in 
detail. They are summarized diagrammatically in Figure 10. 

During the process of digestion a state of tonus is maintained in 
the smooth muscle which facilitates the movements required for 
this work. Fibers from the cranial nerves bear to the viscera the 
nervous impulses which produce this tonicity. The salivary and 
gastric glandular secretions necessary for eating and digesting are 
also augmented by the cranial division. Suppose now the individ- 
ual sees a mortal enemy, or is faced with the fear of imminent 
destruction. The visual stimulus will arouse impulses which, 
entering the central nervous system, will be discharged through the 
efferent sympathetic fibers to the smooth visceral muscle. These 
impulses are inhibitory in character. They reduce the muscle tone 
of the digestive organs and bring their processes to an end. A 
similar inhibitory effect is produced upon the salivary and digestive 


Tear gland 
Dilator of pupil 


Artery of salivary gland 


Hair 

Surface artery 

Sweat gland 
Heart 

Hair 

Surface artery” 


Sweat gland 
(x Liver 


Stomach 


Visceral artery” 
Spleen 


Cranial 


lvision 


Intestine 


Adrenal gland 


Hair 


a Surface artery’ 


— Q Sweat gland 
sf | 
oN a ae iN 








Thoracico-Lumbar or “Sympathetic”? D 


amr TET 
| fain’: 
7] \ 
4 < 


i 


Colon 
r Bladder 
a Rectum 


Artery of external 
genitals 





Figure 10. DiacrRam oF THE More Important DISTRIBUTIONS 
OF THE AUTONOMIC NERVOUS SYSTEM 


The brain and spinal cord are represented at the left. The preganglionic fibers 
of the autonomic system are in solid lines, the postganglionic in dash lines. The 
nerves of the cranial and sacral divisions are distinguished from those of the thora- 
cico-lumbar or ‘‘sympathetic’’ division by broader lines. A + mark indicates an 
augmenting effect on the activity of the organ; a— mark, a depressive or inhibitory 
effect. 

(From Cannon’s Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear, and Rage, by permission 
of the publishers, Messrs. D. Appleton and Company, New York.) 


88 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


glands. The parched condition of the mouth in fear, which results 
from the suppression of the salivary secretions, is well known. 

The cranio-sacral division dilates the muscular walls of the 
blood vessels, thus facilitating the absorption of food materials, or 
allowing the external genital organs to be engorged with blood in 
the erectile condition necessary for copulation. In fear, anger, and 
acute pain, on the other hand, the sympathetic impulses dominate 
and drive the cranio-sacral responses from the field. The blood 
vessels are constricted, and the blood is driven from the interior of 
the body to the limbs where it is needed for violent exertion. It is 
commonly known that fear (for example, fear of the consequences 
or fear of impotence) prevents the free flow of blood to the sex 
organs, and thus inhibits the tumescence necessary for the sex act. 
Fear has likewise an inhibitory effect upon micturition, a process 
normally brought about by the sacral efferent fibers. Constriction 
of the blood vessels is accompanied by increase in blood pressure. 
By the use of an instrument for reading these fluctuations of blood 
pressure, one can often detect in a witness the presence of a fear 
emotion, otherwise concealed, a state usually indicative of guilty 
knowledge which the subject is afraid of disclosing. 

The heart is retarded by the vagus nerve (cranial), and acceler- 
ated by the sympathetic, the latter effect forcing a liberal supply of 
blood to the arms and limbs where it is needed in the bodily strug- 
gles likely to be involved in conditions of violent emotion. The 
sympathetic fibers also convey impulses to the liver, releasing 
stored sugar so that it can be distributed by the blood to the peri- 
pheral organs engaged in combat or flight. These functions have 
already been described in Chapter II (pp. 32-35). One of the 
most important effects of the sympathetic impulses is the exciting 
of the adrenal glands, small bodies lying near the kidneys, causing 
them to pour their secretion, adrenin, into the blood stream. 
Professor Cannon found that adrenin acts directly upon the heart, 
arteries, digestive organs, and other tissues, in precisely the same 
manner as the impulses of the sympathetic fibers. It serves, there- 
fore, in the strong unpleasant emotions as an aid to the sympathetic 
by augmenting and prolonging its effects. It helps to maintain the 
body “upon a war footing.” 


FEELING AND EMOTION 89 


A Theory of Feeling and Emotion. It is evident that the 
two antagonistic mechanisms which we have been considering, the 
cranio-sacral and sympathetic divisions, are allied with two groups 
of emotions having opposed qualities of feeling, pleasant and un- 
pleasant respectively. The unpleasant group, exemplified by pain, 
fear, and rage, results from bodily changes which serve the ends 
of withdrawing and defense, and which are brought about by the 
sympathetic division. There is no difficulty theoretically in con- 
cluding that all conscious states tinged with unpleasant feeling 
derive that feeling from the invasion of the various bodily organs 
by impulses from the sympathetic. 

~~ The chief pleasures of mankind, on the other hand, center about 
the cranio-sacral functions of nutrition and sex. The digestive 
operations induced by the cranial division are probably the re- 
actions whose return afferent impulses convey much of the feeling 
of pleasure in eating. Salivary and other digestive reactions come 
by conditioned reflex to be attached to stimuli which accompany 
the taste of the food, such as the szght of the food or surrounding 
objects. The pleasure reaction is therefore transferred to these 
attendant stimuli, and our preparatory as well as our consumma- 
tory approaching reactions become fraught with pleasant feeling. 
The same extension applies to the pleasures of the sex life, con- 
trolled by the sacral division. The facilitating sacral discharge into 
the pelvic organs becomes conditioned by the szght of the loved one, 
or even by a token or remembrance, so that the pleasure reaction is 
habitually experienced as the affective core of the emotion of love. 
It is not improbable that consanguineal as well as true sexual love 
derives its pleasantness component in a similar fashion. 

A certain exception must be made to the statement that cranio- 
sacral impulses underlie pleasant emotional states generally. 
There are several sources of pleasant affectivity, such as bodily 
exercise and habit, excitement of games, elation, and mirth, which 
possess no discoverable relation to the cranio-sacral functions, nor 
(with the exception of excitement and mirth) to autonomic activi- 
ties of any sort. These pleasant states appear to be due to afferent 
impulses from reactions carried out by unimpeded cerebrospinal 

| impulses. They are somatic rather than visceral in origin. 


90 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


To recapitulate: Emotions are fundamentally distinguishakle as 
pleasant and unpleasant. The first part of our theory undertakes 
to explain this affective basis. Finding a certain physiological 
process to be present in the entire group of unpleasant emotions, 
and an antagonistic process common to pleasant emotions, we infer 
that these processes form the basis of conscious unpleasantness and 
pleasantness respectively. The cranio-sacral division of the auto- 
nomic, supplemented under certain conditions by the cerebrospinal 
system, innervates those responses whose return afferent tmpulses 
are associated with the conscious quality of pleasantness. The sympa- 
thetic division produces visceral responses which are represented in 
consciousness as unpleasantness. Before proceeding to the second 
portion of the theory, we shall review a few additional lines of 
evidence confirming the hypothesis just stated. 

Evidence from introspection and Latent Period. In conscious 
experience unpleasantness is usually a more definite, identifiable, 
and imperative quality than pleasantness. The unpleasant emo- 
tions are more numerous and characteristically emotional than the 
pleasant. We shall observe later that they are also represented by 
a far greater variety of facial expressions than are pleasant states. 
On the physiological side there are analogous conditions. The 
sympathetic motor impulses are necessarily stronger than the 
cranio-sacral, and are prepotent over the latter. They are more 
widely diffused through the viscera, and they reinforce somatic 
motor activities of a more violent, varied, and characteristic sort. 

The length of time required for arousal (latent period) is another 
point in the evidence. We should expect, according to the theory, 
that unpleasantness would be slower of arousal than pleasantness. 
The synapses of the sympathetic ganglia have a higher resistance 
than those of the cranio-sacral division. If this were not so, our 
digestive and other vital functions would be subject to continual 
interruption through minor emotional excitements. Dr. Cannon 
regards the sympathetic ganglia as protective barriers, which can 
be crossed by invading impulses only in case of unusual need for 
defense or escape. They are thus a protection against harmful 
excess of emotion. There are also longer stretches of unmedullated 
post-ganglionic fibers (see Fig. 10) in the sympathetic than in the 


FEELING AND EMOTION 91 


cranio-sacral division; and conduction is slower in non-medullated 
than in medullated neurons. These conditions — namely, greater 
synaptic resistance and slower rate of transmission — both indicate 
that the effects produced by the sympathetic fibers must be slower 
to appear than those of the cranio-sacral. 

Common experience justifies this inference. Compare, for ex- 
ample, the latency of unpleasant feelings with the quick thrill of 
pleasure derived from pleasant tastes or erotic sensations. ‘The 
case of stumbling on the stairs is a good example. In the writer’s 
experience there is a sudden reflex recovery of balance; and then, 
when several steps have been descended, there wells up gradually a 
mass of unpleasant organic sensations. Annoyance and anger also 
have a long latent time. A characteristic non-emotive ‘fore- 
period’ has been found in extensive collections of introspection 
upon anger.! In babies a good anger cry may take as long as a 
half-minute, or longer, to develop. The laughter response to the 
pleasant stimulus of tickling is, on the other hand, immediate. 

The sharp antagonism which exists between the two divisions of 
the autonomic, when considered in connection with the introspec- 
tive oppositeness of pleasantness and unpleasantness, offers further 
support for the theory we are discussing. Fear inhibits pleasant 
emotions. And on the pleasant side the drive of sexual love is 
one of the strongest agencies in dispelling the unpleasant anger in 
family quarrels. 

To sum up, we find the first part of our theory supported from 
both the introspective and behavioristic viewpoints by definiteness, 
imperativeness, latent period, and antagonistic character of the 
emotional responses. 

How are the. Emotional Reactions further Differentiated? 
There remains to be explained the differentiating factor, through 
which the emotions within a single affective class — for example, 
fear and anger — may be physiologically distinguished. Since the 
autonomic functions for all the unpleasant emotions are of the 
same type, we must look elsewhere for our distinguishing mecha- 
nism. We propose that the differentiating factor arises from the stimu- 


1 Richardson, R. F.: ‘‘The Psychology and Pedagogy of Anger,” Educational 
Monographs, no. 19. 


92 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


lation of the proprioceptors in the muscles, tendons, and joints of the 
somatic part of the organism; and that afferent impulses from these 
somatic patterns of response add to the autonomic core of affectivity the 
characteristic sensory complexes by which one emotion rs distinguished 
from another of the same affective class. Somatic postures and 
attitudes are generally taken, or overt responses made, in nearly 
all emotional situations. Different, and somewhat antagonistic, 
somatic effector groups are brought into play according to whether 
the individual attacks or flees. The facial expressions as well as 
bodily movements are strongly differential. Return afferent im- 
pulses from these responses add in consciousness the distinguishing 
qualities which serve to differentiate the emotion of anger from that 
of fear. Without these impulses the two states would be simply 
unpleasant, and indistinguishable. As to the pleasant emotions, 
we may ascribe the differentiating factors — for example, in the 
various types of love — to the habits of adjustment toward the 
loved object. To love a baby is to fondle it, or at least to assume 
the attitude of fondling it, in a lover-like fashion. This is an 
abridgment of the complete set of responses which affords the full 
emotion of sexual love. In friendship the somatic component may 
be reduced to a touch of the hand or a half-embrace. Some facili- 
tation of the sacral and allied mechanisms probably forms the 
pleasant affective core of all these experiences. 

The temporal relations of the two components in the proposed 
theory offer some corroboration. When the objective situation 
arousing anger or embarrassment has been removed, the visceral 
component, being more sluggish than the somatic, outlasts the 
latter in the form of a purely unpleasant affective (not emotional) 
state which delays the recovery of composure. In the case of 
stumbling on the stair, the starting (somatic) response was com- 
pleted before the sympathetic affective component was felt. The 
emotion, therefore, was not true fear, but simply an intense un- 
pleasantness. When an animal or a child is pursued and brought 
to bay, the shift from intense fear (in flight) to intense rage (in 
attack) is too sudden to admit of a complete change in the visceral 
pattern. We may plausibly attribute it to the quicker change in 
the response pattern of the striped muscle, superimposed upon the 


FEELING AND EMOTION 93 
/ 
constant visceral undercurrent of unpleasant affectivity. Bodily 
pain and grief also pass quickly into anger through a change in the 
nature of the somatic responses. 

Evidence from Genetic Development. The emotional states of 
the newborn baby appear to be undifferentiated. Judging from 
behavior alone, they have no further character than pure un- 
pleasant affectivity. The first prepotent stimuli which act upon 
the infant are usually those for which the somatic responses are 
diffuse and undifferentiated. Internal pains of hunger and colic, 
and unfavorable temperatures, are among such stimulations. The 
somatic responses, crying, kicking, etc., are the same for all of 
them. At the beginning, therefore, of the life of feeling there is 
little to differentiate the emotional states beyond the mere qualities 
of pleasantness and unpleasantness. The child has feelings of un- 
pleasantness, but not yet definite unpleasant emotions. We may 
call this simple, unpleasant experience of the newborn the ‘proto- 
pathetic’ state. The affective component, then, is not only the 
fundamental basis of classification, but also the most primitive 
ingredient of human emotion. Before long (probably as soon as 
the appropriate stimuli are brought to bear) the child brings into 
play the various prepotent somatic responses, such as struggling, 
rejecting, and withdrawing. ‘Thus the differentiating factors are 
added to the sympathetic pattern, and anger and fear emerge as 
distinct emotions. 

Conditions Favoring the Arousal of Unpleasant Emotions. A 
fuller comprehension of the subject may be obtained by stating the 
neural conditions necessary for the arousal of the unpleasant emo- 
tions. The discussion will, at the same time, be brought more 
definitely into the social field. ‘The conditions referred to are those 
which help in breaking through the high resistance of the sympa- 
thetic synapses and sending inhibitory impulses to the smooth 
muscle. (1) The first condition is that of the intensity of the stimulus. - 
Almost any sensation becomes unpleasant if it is made sufficiently 
intense for the energy of the impulse to cross the sympathetic 
threshold. The peal of thunder continues to arouse fear through- 
out adult life. Our theory at this point offers a good basis for dis- 
tinguishing physiologically between pains which are unpleasant 


94 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


and those which are not. It is well known that light pains on the 
skin are far from unpleasant. Unpleasant pains are severe ones: 
their efferent impulses are powerful enough to break through into 
the sympathetic. The same consideration explains the pseudo- 
emotional quality often ascribed to intense bodily pain. (2) Repe- 
tition or insistence, such as repeatedly touching on a ‘sore point,’ 
or the neural summation of petty annoyances in producing anger, is 
another condition favoring the arousal of unpleasant emotion. (3) 
Suddenness of the stimulus, or lack of proper somatic adjustment 
of the cerebrospinal system, often causes the impulse to be dis- 
charged through the sympathetic efferents. The fear aroused by 
the strange, the uncanny, or the extraordinarily large (that is, 
objects toward which we have no developed habits of response) 
belongs in this class. (4) Blocking of the usual somatic responses 
to the powerful drives, such as those of food and sex, usually 
through social agencies, is a potent factor in bringing about an 
invasion of the sympathetic. Thwarting of the vital needs, as in 
industrial conflicts, evokes not only overt struggle reactions, but 
also violent emotions of fear and anger. Grief results from 
blocked, or thwarted, love reactions in situations where overt 
responses, such as attacking others, would do no good. (5) 
Finally, the state of visceral tonus or preparation may be an im- 
portant factor in lowering the sympathetic threshold and increasing 
unpleasant emotionality. Irritability, and other emotional atti- 
tudes indicate a permanent lowering of the resistance. ‘Transitory 
effects, or moods, also increase susceptibility to fear or anger. 
When feeling fine, a baby will enjoy a vigorous roughing which at 
another time would throw him into a fit of rage. Petitions for 
money are tactfully withheld from the pater familias until the close 
of a good dinner. 

Complex Emotional States in Social Behavior. The foregoing 
account has dealt with the physiology of the more elementary 
emotional reactions. Our subjective lives, however, would be of a 
primitive sort if we were limited to these few basic types. There 
are many nuances of feeling which comprise a large number of 
combinations of the elementary emotions under varying conditions. 
‘There are, moreover, states in which both pleasant and unpleasant 


FEELING AND EMOTION 95 


elements may be identified. A simple object or situation acting 
upon a limited area of smooth muscle can, of course, produce but 
one type of affective response, either pleasant or unpleasant. If 
the control is assumed by the cranio-sacral, the antagonistic sympa- 
thetic effects are inhibited, and vice versa. If, however, the situa- 
tion is complex, that is, if we are apt to respond with varying re- 
actions to different aspects of it, we may expect that certain re- 
gions of the viscera may be under the control of the cranio-sacral, 
while other regions will have been invaded by the sympathetic 
impulses. The result will be a mixed emotion, containing rep- 
resentatives of both the pleasant and unpleasant divisions of our 
classification. Grief is an example of such an emotion. It con- 
tains (1) the pleasant feeling-tone of the love reaction, and (2) 
the unpleasant thwarted feeling of sadness because it is Impos- 
sible for the habitual love response to be fully carried out. This 
explanation of ‘mixed’ emotional states is, of course, purely 
tentative. Since it affords a possible manner in which to conceive 
the physiological factors, it may be useful in our present lack of 
more precise knowledge. 

There are many complex emotional states which are familiar in 
daily life. Varying degrees of the affective qualities combine with 
the major emotions of fear, anger, and love, and also with somatic 
attitudes for all possible reactions toward self and others. The 
main attitudes in which fear seems to be important are awe, rev- 
erence, bashfulness, surprise, wonder, suspicion, loathing, and 
anxiety. Anger is recognizable in resentment, remorse, jealousy, 
envy, reproach, scorn, and hatred. Love plays a part in gratitude, 
grief, pity, sorrow, fascination, and perhaps humility. A number 
of bodily attitudes, other than attacking, fleeing, and caressing, 
combine with pleasantness and unpleasantness to produce special 
emotional reactions. These states are represented by numerous 
varieties of approach and avoidance, as well as by joy, elation, pride, 
conceit, shame, domination, submission, and feelings of inferiority.! 

The range of human feelings is Indeed extensive. There are 


1 For a more complete subjective analysis of the complex emotions the reader 
should consult Professor McDougall’s Social Psychology, chs. 5 and 6. It is inter- 
esting also to try to analyze the components of these complex states in the corre- 
sponding facial expressions (cf. Chapter LX). 


96 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


probably hundreds of nuances of emotional attitude which contrib- 
ute to the richness as well as the delicacy of social intercourse, 
Modern fiction is primarily a play upon these attitudes. They are 
of interest for social psychology because they indicate the complex- 
ity of inter-individual adjustments in society. Almost every 
emotional nuance represents an attitude not only to feel but to 
react in a highly specific fashion toward some other human being. 

The Social Conditioning of Emotional Response. A certain 
college professor relates a story of an unaccountable liking which he 
took for a man in whom he could discover no qualities to merit such 
affection. Upon analyzing this feeling, he fancied that it was 
chiefly the peculiar chuckle of the man that attracted him. This 
clue led to the recall of a former roommate of college days with 
whom the professor had spent many a pleasant hour. The room- 
mate had possessed a chuckle almost identical with that of the new 
acquaintance. We find here the mechanism of the conditioned 
response in the emotional sphere. The pleasure responses experi- 
enced with the roommate had been attached (transferred) to a 
particular social stimulus which was present at the time, namely, 
the sound of the chuckle. This conditioned emotional reaction 
persisted for years and formed the basis of a new friendship upon 
purely emotional grounds. Many, if not most, of our likes and dis- 
likes in first impressions are due to similar transfers of feeling 
through identical elements of social stimulation. Our pleasure at 
seeing old classmates is like that which we experience in revisiting 
the haunts and byways of childhood. We are led back through the 
present stimulus to the old, but not obliterated, habits of emotional 
response. 

Fetishes and other tokens operate upon human feelings by the 
same principle of conditioning. The savage attaches to an effigy 
all the awe and mystery which he feels for the spirit it is supposed 
toembody. ‘Toa lover a lock of hair is sacred because it calls forth 
a wave of tender feeling of the same kind as that evoked by the 
entire person of the beloved. For the same reason wedding 
gowns are treasured, and attics are filled with trunks lined with 
keepsakes and similar hoarded treasures. 

Sentiments are another important class of conditioned emotions 


FEELING AND EMOTION o7 


and attitudes. The political orator has only to mention the 
‘orphan children’ or the ‘rights of the people’ to reduce his audi- 
ence to a state of tender compassion or righteous indignation. 
The names of national heroes, the standard of colors, slogans such 
as ‘Liberty’ and ‘Equality,’ and reiterated lofty ideals are great 
rallying points for the popular emotions. The spoken word 1s here 
used to evoke all the feeling associated with it through ages of 
tradition and custom. As a means of social control, whether for 
good or for ill, this arousing of sentiment through language 
stimuli is a process of inestimable significance. 

The Control and Direction of Emotion as a Social Problem. 
Professor Cannon has pointed out the energizing effects of emo- 
tion, if not too extreme, upon the bodily activity which the situa- 
tion demands. ‘Through the sympathetic impulses, and especially 
through adrenin, the effects of fatigue are removed, metabolism 
increased, and the whole body energized to a degree unknown in 
calmer moods. ‘These ‘unknown reservoirs of power’ are, how- 
ever, more of an asset to primitive than to civilized man. They 
are Nature’s provision for strength in the violent emotions attend- 
ing pursuit and flight and mortal combat. The needs of civilized 
society are of another order: physical struggles and the violent 
emotions which accompany them are a menace rather than a 
benefit to modern man. The anger emotion cannot be used to sup- 
port overt violence, because we must repress this form of reaction 
in favor of a more socialized ‘competition.’ We cannot even 
yield ourselves to fear and precipitate flight regardless of the con- 
sequences to others. On every hand we find that the needs of 
society have set up barriers to those exertions in which the visceral 
components of emotion raise the body to its highest level of attain- 
ment. It is only in such abnormal and destructive phenomena as 
wars and racial and industrial riots that the primitive fury of the 
emotional energy can fully expend itself. While endowed, there- 
fore, with a capacity for highest efficiency in war, civilized man is 
normally committed to a régime of peace. How can we reconcile 
these opposed requirements and utilize the emotional reservoirs of 
energy for constructive purposes? This is one of the greatest 
social problems. 


98 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


It is not only for the acquisition of power, the superman ideal, 
that the emotional problem is a socially important one. At many 
points the social pressure is so great as to threaten all activity 
through which the emotion may find its release. If somatic re- 
sponses are totally inhibited, the visceral energizing effects can be 
discharged only inwardly. There is produced an extended, intensi- 
fied, and lasting state of unpleasant internal feeling. If social and 
familial ties are too strong, there will result a complete blocking of 
overt anger release, leading to the development of an introverted, 
moody, and ineffective personality. Love emotions are often 
iniquitously repressed by austere social influences. In this case 
auto-eroticism, erotic day-dreaming, and symptoms of neurotic 
dissociation may appear. How shall we steer successfully between 
the evils of anti-social violence and libertinism on the one hand, and 
the suppression of the life processes of the individual on the other? 
This is a second great problem in the field of social adjustments. 


REFERENCES 


Cannon, W. B., Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear, and Rage. - 

Ribot, Th., The Psychology of the Emotions, part 1, chs. 6-9; part 11, chs. 2-4, 8. 

James, Wm., Principles of Psychology, vol. 11, ch. 25. 

Woodworth, R.8., Psychology, a Study of Mental Life, chs. 7, 9. 

Warren, H. C., Human Psychology, ch. 14 (sees. 1, 2), 17. 

Hunter, W.S., General Psychology, part 11, chs. 4, 5. 

McDougall, Wm., An Introduction to Social Psychology, chs. 5, 6. 

Watson, J. B., Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behavtorist, chs. 6, 7 (pp. 
249-52). | 

Watson, J. B., and Rayner, R., ‘‘Conditioned Emotional Reactions,” Journal - 
of Experimental Psychology, 1920, 11, 1-14. 

Allport, F. H., “A Physiological-Genetic Theory of Feeling and Emotion,” 
Psychological Review, 1922, xx1rx, 1382-39. 

Kempf, E. J., The Automatic Functions and the Personality, pp. 17-90. 

Crile, G. W., The Origin and Nature of the Emotions, pp. 55-90. 


CHAPTER V 
PERSONALITY — THE SOCIAL MAN 


Personality is largely a Social Fact. Our method in the preced- 
ing chapters has been mainly analytical. We have attempted to 
reduce human behavior to its fundamental terms, and have found 
these terms to include prepotent reflexes, habit formation, thought, 
and emotion. ‘These mechanisms furnish us with suitable princi- 
ples of explanation. It is now desirable to shift our emphasis from 
explanation to description, and to study, not the mechanisms 
themselves, but the character and efficacy of the adjustments which 
they produce in operation. We shall be concerned not so much 
with the manner in which emotion takes place as with its frequency, 
. trength, and manner of release in a given individual. Habit for- 
mation as a process will not interest us so much as what particular 
habits are formed in the service of the life adjustments, and what 
are the chief drives behind their formation. In a word we shall 
select certain fundamental aspects of behavior and describe them 
with a view to an evaluation of the person as a whole. These as- 
pects may be called traits of personality. Our approach will be 
synthetic in that it brings into relation the various traits and ca- 
pacities of the individual, and shows how they combine in the com- 
plete integration of his behavior. It will also be differential since 
personality traits may be considered as so many important dimen- 
sions in which people may be found to differ. 

Evaluation and measurement take us immediately into the 
social sphere. There is no accurate standard of measurement 
except that afforded by the individuals of one’s acquaintance. 
The individual must be evaluated by some one other than himself, 
for self-estimates have proved unreliable both in experiment and in 
daily life. Thus, although the physiological basis of personality 
traits lies wholly in the individual, the traits themselves can be 
described and measured only by a scale standardized within the 
social group and applied by social agencies. 

More than that, many of the characteristic reactions to be judged 


100 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


TABLE I. FOUNDATIONS OF PERSONALITY 


PHYSICAL BASIS IN THE ORGANISM ResuLtinG BEHAVIOR 


TRAITS 
1. Native ENDOWMENT 
a. Capacities (cortical factors, Intellectual Activities 
plasticity of nervous system) Skill in Special Activities 
b. Physiological Charatteristics 
Somatic (speed of reaction, | Traits of Movement 
threshold of action, co- 
ordination) 
Visceral (autonomic threshold,| Traits of Emotion and 
visceral tonus, glandular Mood 
activities) 


c. Morphological Characteristics | (See under Habit Systems) 
(Size, weight, and propor- . 
tions of body, texture of 
hair and skin, beauty, 
ugliness, strength, defect, 
deformity, etc.) 


2. ACQUISITION 


d. Habit Systems Drives and Trends of 
Habit 
Reactions toward Self 
and Others 


Compensations and Pro- 
visions for Peculiarities 
of Endowment (capac- 
ity, size, speed, energy, 
defect, ete.) 

Socialization and Char- 
acter 


PERSONALITY — THE SOCIAL MAN 101 


are evoked only through the social environment. A man’s self- 
assertion, submission, quickness of temper, suspicion, pride and 
inferiority are all dependent upon the existence of other human 
beings toward whom these attitudes may be displayed. His re- 
finement, tact, and morality could not have come into existence 
without sccial instruction and control. The hermit exhibits little 
personality, except in the sphere of pure intelligence. The social 
side of his nature, while latent as a physiological possibility, re- 
mains unexpressed because his solitary environment contains no 
stimuli adequate for evoking it. With the exception of a few 
traits, personality may be defined as the individual’s characteristic 
reactions to social stimuli, and the quality of his adaptation to the 
social features of his environment. 

In its genetic development, also, personality is dependent upon 
social contacts. Only recently have we realized the importance of 
the early influences of parents and other relatives in the formation 
of lifelong attitudes toward self and society. Personality is there- 
fore a result of social behavior. But itis alsoa cause. The leader 
controls human actions through the display of those traits which 
we subsume under the term ‘personality.’ At every point our 
peculiarities of mood and habit serve as stimulations significant for 
those about us, and determine the character of adjustments be- 
tween them and us. The problems also of personality and its dis- 
tortion and defect are essentially social problems. Mental defect 
and insanity may be partially defined as inability to adapt one’s 
self to the conditions of the society in which one lives. Criminality 
presents the same problem in an extreme form. Both diagnosis 
and treatment follow largely upon the lines indicated by the anom- 
aly in the field of social behavior. 

With the study of personality we therefore advance toward a 
distinctly social viewpoint in our consideration of the individual. 

The Individual Basis of Personality. Coming to a closer view 
of the subject, we must inquire concerning the organic foundations 
upon which the salient traits of the individual are built. Two main 
sources of personality may be mentioned. ‘The first is the native 
physical endowment_of.the-individual, which includes the qualities 
of nervous tissue underlying intelligence, physiological characteris- 


102 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


tics as exemplified by speed of function in nerve and muscle, levels 
of visceral and glandular response, and finally such simple anatomi- 
cal aspects as stature, beauty, deformity, and the like. While some 
of these qualities may be influenced by environmental conditions 
(use, accident, disease, etc.), they are for the most part ascribable 
directly to the native constitution of the individual and the laws of 
growth. The second group of personality-forming elements are 
the systems of habits developed in the process of adjusting an in- 
dividual of given physical endowment to his particular environ- 
ment. They are the result of capacities and physical characteris- 
tics operating under the laws of prepotent reflex modification and 
learning. An intimate connection between native endowment 
and habit formation probably exists in the developmental trends 
of every personality. Level of native capacity may determine 
whether one shall learn a profession or a skilled trade. Visceral 
factors may direct a lifelong interest in art or other emotional 
pursuits. Special bodily defects frequently give rise to strong 
habit trends in the direction of overcoming them or compensating 
in other ways. Height and strength may contribute decisively to 
traits of leadership, while submissive Habits commonly attend an 
inferior physique. Unconsciously Nature affirms in each person- 
ality her adaptive principle of making the most ef what the organ- 
ism has. A convenient summary of the elementary factors of 
personality is given in Table I. 

The Selection of Traits. We are to regard traits, then, not as 
elementary psychological mechanisms, but as groups of character- 
istic reactions based upon native constitution and systems of habit, 
and selected for observation as exhibiting the typical adjustments 
of the individual to his environment. Under what traits shall we 
classify human personality? The selection is largely a matter of 
expediency, governed by the theoretical or practical aim in view. 
The chief requirements are that the traits selected shall be both 
fundamental in importance and mutually exclusive in scope. An 
attempt has been made to conform to these principles in subsuming 
the traits of personality under the five categories of intelligence, 
motility, temperament, self-expression, and sociality. Table II 
presents the complete list. 


PERSONALITY — THE SOCIAL MAN 


TaBLE II. Traits or PERSONALITY 


1. INTELLIGENCE 


) 


Problem-solving Ability 
Memory and Learning Ability 
Perceptual Ability 
Constructive Imagination 
Special Abilities 

Soundness of Judgment 
General Adaptability 


2. MoriLiry 


Hyperkinesis — Hypokinesis 
Impulsion — Inhibition (Control) 
Tenacity 

Skill 

Style 


3. TEMPERAMENT 


Emotional Frequency and Change 
Emotional Breadth 

Emotional Strength 
Characteristic Mood 

Emotional Attitude 


4. SELF-EXPRESSION 


Drive 

Compensation 

Extroversion — Introversion 
Insight 

Ascendance — Submission 
Expansion — Reclusion 


5. SOCIALITY 


Susceptibility to Social Stimulation 


Socialization — Self-Seeking (Aggression) 


Social Participation 
Character 


103 


104 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


INTELLIGENCE. Given equal opportunity and training, two in- 
dividuals will often be found to differ considerably in the success 
which they achieve. There are two factors at work here, namely, 
native capacity (or intelligence) and drive, or habitual trends of 
effort in the direction of accomplishment. In almost every school- 
room one may find among the highest scholars both those of high 
intelligence, and those of mediocre gifts but maximum industry; 
and among the lowest both the intellectually dull and those lacking 
in drive toward scholarship. The nature of drive will be discussed 
in a later section. Intelligence may be broadly defined as the ca- 
pacity for solving the problems of life. Stated in less behavioristic 
terms, it is the capacity for reasoning. Problem-solving ability 
enables its possessor to advance beyond the stage of crude trial and 
error In overt manipulation of objects, to the use of symbol reac- 
tions. These symbol responses usually take the form of implicit 
sub-audible word reactions, the use of which is sometimes referred 
to as “conceptual thinking.’”’ The manner in which the symbol 
activities are substituted for outward bodily movements, and the 
resulting economy in the solution of problems, have been explained 
in Chapter III. The degree of facility in the use of this method is 
one of the best criteria of intelligence. 

But in order to think in terms of symbols, the symbols must 
acquire meaning. They must epitomize the entire past experience 
of the individual in regard to the situation in which they are em- 
ployed, and must have associated with them all the appropriate 
reactions of approach and withdrawal which have been learned in 
the past events which they symbolize. Problem-solving thus 
necessarily implies memory and learning ability. It is by the use 
of past experience that an intelligent person guides his reactions 
toward future contingencies. Ability to learn and to profit by 
what is learned is another way of stating the nature of intelligence. 

There are other capacities which are closely allied to the main 
function of problem-solving, and perhaps not clearly distinguish- 
able from it. We cannot react intelligently to a situation unless 
we have a clear grasp of all its details. Capacity for observation, 
or perceptual ability, is therefore important. Constructive imagina- 
tion denotes the ability to work out a plan or design an object or a 


PERSONALITY — THE SOCIAL MAN 105 


work of art apart from the immediate possibilities present to the 
more routine type of mind. To create something new involves 
more than ordinary facility in the imaginative play of implicit 
reactions. This capacity has its social significance in the work of 
the genius and the inventor. Finally we must include, on the side 
of capacity, the individual’s special abilities. These seem to lie 
apart from the general intelligence level, and form unique outlets 
through which vocational endeavors find expression. The mathe- 
matician, the artist, the engineer, the orator, and the business 
promoter all find unique ways of solving the problems of life 
adjustment through the special abilities which they possess. 

Two other traits may be distinguished within the broad adaptive 
field of intelligence. One of these is the capacity for making a 
mature decision in a crisis. We may call this soundness of judg- 
ment. Many a person who might be rated as ‘quick’ and ‘clever,’ 
according to the ‘pencil and paper’ intelligence tests in present 
vogue, fails in situations where a calm and mature outlook upon the 
real problems of life is required. Age and experience surely con- 
tribute to the original capacity for adaptation. The other trait 
referred to is general adaptability. Its field of application is broader 
than the problems of reasoning, imagination, and judgment already 
described. The latter qualities might all be exhibited in the soli- 
tary struggles of a shipwrecked mariner; but general adaptability 
includes adjustment to the social group, its persons, and its laws. 
Tact, susceptibility to social influences, codperation, congeniality, 
and enthusiasm are phases of this broader adjustment. General 
adaptability, then, means the combination of the narrower intel- 
lectual capacities with social traits in the problems of biological 
and social adaptation. 


Mottuty. In this category are included the readily observed 
motor characteristics such as speed, impulsiveness, control, steadi- 
ness, and skill. Our table includes only those traits which are 
prominent in the social contacts of an individual. The general 
activity level is the first consideration. Some individuals are 
always bustling, talking, romping, and rushing through their duties 
and pleasures at a great rate. The threshold for action is low. 


ZO) sh gat SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


Any stimulus is likely to set them off. Such a person may be 
termed hyperkinetic. ‘The opposite extreme is the taciturn, slow- 
moving, inert individual, whose threshold of adequate stimulation 
is high. This is the hypokinetic type. There are, of course, many 
intermediate grades of activity level. 

Impulsion and inhibition must be distinguished from the traits 
just described. Hyperkinesis is a condition of readiness for activ- 
ity. It is merely a state of absence of inertia. Impulsion implies 
a positive tendency to action of a vigorous sort, capable of over- 
coming resistance. Hypokinesis is a condition of inertia in which 
the threshold for all activities is raised. Inhibition, on the other 
hand, is a tendency to block the release of certain motor impulses. 
A person may thus be active either through absence of inertia 
(hyperkinesis) or through powerful impulsions. One may also be 
inactive either through presence of high inertia (hypokinesis) or 
through the restraint of inhibitions. The hyperkinetic inhibited 
type and the hypokinetic impulsive type are also known. Some 
writers — for example, Professor June Downey — regard inhibi- 
tion as a more constant trait of ability to control one’s movements. 
Whatever name we may assign, this ability is important in our 
survey of the personality. From another viewpoint inhibition of 
response is connected with repression and the emotional life. 

The remaining motility traits are more readily described. 
Tenacity is the persistence in a certain line of activity in the face of 
obstacles and discomfort. ‘Will power’ is the term popularly 
employed, especially when the tenacious behavior takes the form 
of resisting an evil habit. The conception involved is, however, 
superficial and unscientific, since the very same trait is labeled 
‘stubbornness’ when the line of conduct persisted in does not meet 
our full approval. Skzil should be qualitatively as well as quanti- 
tatively described. It is based upon some general native capacity 
highly specialized by habit formation, fineness of codrdination, and 
motor control. Individuality in the execution of one’s work may 
be termed style. The compositions of Chopin and the poems of 
Browning are unique expressions of the personalities of their crea- 
tors. So for that matter are the hats of our favorite milliner and 
the ‘delivery’ of a celebrated baseball pitcher. The trait of style 


PERSONALITY — THE SOCIAL MAN 107 


is probably one of the most complex in the entire personality. It 
often reaches back to earliest childhood. ‘The writer knew two 
brothers who when children were rivals in toy-making. One of 
them always made his toy tall and graceful, while his brother’s 
product generally turned out to be squat and stalwart. No occu- 
pation is so humble or so limited that it does not possess some 
opportunity for self-expression. Style may emerge as a kind of 
compensation for the drabness of routine existence. It is an em- 
bellishment of reality. The very narrowness of the gamut avail- 
able to the kettle-drummer in the orchestra may lead him to elab- 
orate each movement and flourish to the limit of their rhythmic 
possibilities. 


TEMPERAMENT. Feeling and emotion are the main constituents 
of personality on the subjective side. They have dynamic value 
for overt, behavior in the mechanisms of reinforcement and re- 
pression. Most individuals have a characteristic emotional level. 
The leading question concerning a particular person is, ‘‘ What 
part do emotions play in his daily life?”’ Is he choleric or phleg- 
matic? Are his fits of anger, excitement, and eroticism so great 
that they are either uncontrollable or else controlled with obvious 
effort of repression? Is his daily work enlivened and energized by 
imaginative feeling, or is he a humdrum plodder? With what 
equanimity does he face success and failure, praise and blame? 
There are three dimensions in which the emotional level may be 
estimated. The first is the time factor, emotional frequency and 
change. Is there a continuous high potential of emotion? If not, 
how frequent are the emotional upsets? How rapid is the succes- 
sion or alternation of moods? Changes from elation to depression 
and back again are cycles common to emotional individuals. 

The second dimension, emotional breadth, denotes the range and 
variety of objects which arouse one’s emotions. ‘There are many 
transferred emotional reactions (conditioned responses) which are 
released as substitutes for the original but repressed reaction. The 
cat or dog, the garden, and the sentimental novel afford outlets of 
the tender. emotions and sex interests of bachelors and spinsters. 
Objects of this sort are sometimes spoken of as ‘loaded’ stimuli. 


108 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


They are surcharged with affection for the individuals concerned. 
Unusual fears and aversions, caused by emotional conditioning, 
likewise have their significance as permanent traits of personality. 
Adolescents yield emotional responses to fellow beings, animals, 
flowers, stars, and in fact the whole universe. ‘The social environ- 
ment is one of the best fields for exhibiting the trait of emotional 
breadth. To some individuals every human being is either black 
or white, every acquaintance is a subject either for eulogy or for 
vituperation. Others regard the world and all its creatures as a 
placid matter of fact. The third dimension of emotionality is 
emotional strength. Great emotional frequency and spread may 
denote only a superficial affective reaction. ‘The undemonstrative 
man, on the other hand, sometimes has the most profound love for 
his children and the most vitter and vengeful hatred toward his 
enemies. 

Quality as well as quantity of emotion merits a place in the 
description of personality. Some individuals have a characteristic 
mood on the affective side. They are permanently of a gloomy or 
of a cheerful disposition. If we add to mood the differentiated 
emotions combined with habitual ‘settings’ for response to the 
social environment, we have the trait of emotional attitude. Sus- 
picious, timid, embarrassed, over-sensitive, and self-deprecatory 
persons are familiar examples of this class. Other instances are the 
irate parent, the pompous dignitary, the ‘masher,’ the cynic, and 
the snob. While mild emotional attitudes accompany the thought 
and action of nearly every one, these extreme forms are more un- 
usual. When they become permanent, they are marked traits of 
personality, and lend themselves readily to caricature. 


SELF-ExpreEssion. Intelligence, motility, and temperament rep- 
resent the innate capacities of an individual and his peculiar or- 
ganization and function of nerves, muscles, and glands. In order 
fully to understand personality it is necessary to inquire how these 
peculiarities influence the actual life adjustments. What trends of 
behavior result from the use of special talents? How are defects 
and limitations atoned for in the vital struggle? What is the funda- 
mental attitude toward self, toward the social sphere, and toward 


PERSONALITY — THE SOCIAL MAN 109 


reality? We enter here upon a field of traits at once dynamic and 
fundamental — they are the traits of self-expression.! 

Drive. Not infrequently one encounters a personality for 
which there is a definite key word. All trends of effort seem to be 
focalized upon a single goal. The personality of Columbus was 
integrated toward the achievement of circumnavigating the globe, 
that of Alexander the Great toward world conquest. Lincoln 
stood for the preservation of the Union. Evangeline Booth and 
John Wesley were actuated by the desire for the religious redemp- 
tion of mankind. Humbler and commoner examples are the com- 
munity leader, the garret poet, the miser, the local politician, the 
book collector, and the missionary. The passion for renown, for 
wealth, for power, for antiquity, or for souls makes up the theme of 
their lives’ histories. 

Such focalization of effort is, however, by no means universal. 
Probably the majority of people live lives of vegetative satisfaction. 
Their unelaborated prepotent trends of food, sex, and protection 
afford only the most rudimentary and unorganized drives. We 
might speak of them as ‘bread-and-butter’ drives. They form the 
opposite extreme of the scale from the great leaders and reformers. 

The physiology of drives is obscure. The fundamental activities, 
discussed in Chapter III, seem to be all-important. The original 
motive power arises from one or more of the prepotent reflex 
groups. Early in life a habit is built upon these. reflexes by the 
usual learning processes, which, because of its high adaptive value 
and affinity with the special talents of the individual, acquires a 
widespread and basic position in the action system. It takes on a 
seeming prepotency of response upon presentation of the stimulus.? 
Since it began to form in the individual at an early age and gradu- 
ally and unconsciously penetrated his whole life, it is considered by 
him to be an end in itself. He places it in the same category with 
food and sex interests, and mistakenly considers it to be an instine- 
tive part of his nature. It behaves like a prepotent reflex also in 
that anger is aroused if its operation is thwarted. A drive may 
therefore be defined as a prepotent habit, or group of habits, which 


1 Because of their importance these traits are printed in heavy type in Table II. 
2 Cf. the discussion of manipulation on p. 66. 


110 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


acquires a compelling power similar to that of the prepotent reflexes, 
and which controls the integration of other habit systems in the 
individual’s development.! 

The factor of special ability in the formation of drives must be 
given due recognition. The boy tries his hand at one occupation 
after another without making a permanent selection. Finally he 
chances upon some pursuit in which he shows marked capacity 
both in speed of learning and in perfection of the final performance. 
This activity is then chosen, often unconsciously, as the means of 
satisfying the demands made by the prepotent reflexes. The habits 
of that oécupation are strongly fixated because of their success in 
fulfilling these demands. On the conscious side there is pleasure 
and elation. The youth is happy in having found his work, and in 
the opportunities which it holds for advancement for one of his 
particular talents.2, Vocation and drive coincide in a case of this 
sort, and vocation may therefore be taken as one of the self- 
expressive traits of the personality. Individuals who are entirely 
lacking in special abilities, or who have not found the work for 
which their talents are adapted, will show little drive in connection 
with their daily occupation. Avocational drives, such as interest 
in sports or social life, may develop instead. 

Another source of drive at work early in life is the example of a 
favorite parent or older friend. The interest or vocation of the 
dearly loved parent frequently becomes the drive of the child. 
Questionnaire reports collected by the writer reveal a striking 
influence exerted through such childhood or adolescent rapport 
with elders. We shall return to an explanation of this process in 
Chapter xIv. 


1 A good example of drive in occupation is seen in George Eliot’s Silas Marner. 
The Weaver of Raveloe had three distinct periods in his life. He was successively 
the religious zealot, the miser, and the fond guardian of Eppie. In each period a 
distinct set of prepotent habits, or drives, predominated; and in each period his 
personality was unique. 

2 We are indebted to Professor R. S. Woodworth for pointing out the importance 
of special abilities, and their relation to interest. (Dynamic Psychology, pp. 66-76.) 
We can scarcely agree, however, with his statement that there are specialized innate 
capacities, each furnished with an instinctive ‘affect’ or interest which provides the 
drive for its use. Innate ability is probably much more general in character, and 
represents simply a facility in learning a particular set of habits. Interest as a driv- 
ing factor arises from the autonomic activities involved in the prepotent reflexes. 


PERSONALITY — THE SOCIAL MAN 111 


The major drives of human beings are too numerous for complete 
description. Personal ambition plays a part in most of them. 
Among the more common are wealth, social influence, power, 
literary, scientific, and artistic eminence, politics, machinery, 
marriage and family, home improvement, reform, charity, and 
religion. There are also minor drives such as the principles which 
one formulates to one’s self and tries to live by. Here belong neat- 
ness and punctuality as drives; also care for detail, sense of honor, 
chivalry, and cleanness of speech. Less consciously recognized, 
but important as minor drives, are methods and habits of work, and 
the balance afforded through diversified recreations and exercise. 
Integration of drives, and subservience of the minor ones to the 
major, are essential for human efficiency and happiness. To be a 
man of many interests does not necessarily mean to be a man ol 
scattered efforts. Habits of dissipation and indolence sometimes 
coexist with the keenest of personal ambitions. An individual so 
divided within himself spends in fighting his own insubordinate 
drives the energy which he should use in the pursuit of his primary 
interest. In other individuals we find a self-inculcation of excel- 
lent habits in the interest of the major drive, leading to a hierarchy 
of harmonious drives in the total integration of the personality. 

Compensation. The course of drives does not always run 
smoothly. Frequently they encounter obstacles and defects in the 
physical, intellectual, or social sphere. A young man ambitious 
for leadership may be handicapped by an inferior physique, or a 
social climber by an inconsequential genealogy. A maternally 
inclined young woman may be thwarted by marriage toanimpotent ~ 
husband. In this type of situation two general alternatives are 
possible, a successful and an unsuccessful one. To take the un- 
successful adjustment first. A solution may be sought in a retreat 
from reality, and by imagining within one’s self that the longed-for 
conditions truly exist. Thus the social aspirant may build up a 
fictitious ancestry by fooling himself into accepting a chance 
similarity in names as significant. The youth may imagine him- 
self swaying multitudes by his eloquence; and the childless woman 
may fancy herself going through all the stages of motherhood. A 
frail, neurotic student of the writer’s acquaintance has day and 


112 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY _ 


night dreams of physical prowess. He sees himself in a football 
game kicking field goals from any angle of the field, and ‘shooting 
fouls’ in basket-ball with his back toward the basket! 

This type of solution is tragically futile. It has another variety, 
almost as ineffective, in rationalizing an ideal out of the difficulty. 
The physical weakling affects a lofty, intellectual existence, and 
regards the life of the philosopher as infinitely above that of the 
common herd. A certain class of discontented people refer to 
themselves as ‘‘poor but honest,’’ implying, no doubt, that the 
possession of wealth necessarily brings with it the taint of dishonor. 
Defects of stature produce interesting rationalizations. H., an 
undersized young man, reported to the writer certain false attempts 
at adjustment which he had later ‘seen through.’ He expressed 
contempt for the ‘frivolity’ of modern dancing; his real, though at 
the time unconscious, reason being that he could not bear the 
thought of dancing with girls who were taller than himself. In 
addressing a taller person he would rise on his toes. He likes to 
walk with men who are shorter than himself, or else with abnor- 
mally tall persons. The comparison in either case is comforting to 
himself. The defect in these cases is rationalized and the real 
emotion repressed; but it still rankles because its cause is actual, 
and the individual has not faced the reality, but has evaded it. 
An allusion to the defect therefore touches a ‘sore point,’ and 
arouses the whole emotional complex of inferiority. The short 
person described had five fights while in the army over the use of 
the term “Shorty,” and was whipped in four of them. 

But Nature has provided a more hopeful solution, and this is the 
second alternative referred to. The individual may face his limi- 
tations squarely, and may develop a compensatory drive of surmount- 
ing them, not by falsification and defensory attitudes, but by some 
form of overt adjustment. There are two general forms of com- 
pensation, the direct overcoming of the obstacle, and, where this is 
impossible, the selection and pursuit of other methods of reaching 
the goal. The first form, which we may call compensation in kind, 
is illustrated by Demosthenes who struggled so hard to overcome 
his defect, stammering, that he not only succeeded but won en- 
during fame as an orator. A successful promoter of popular money- 


PERSONALITY — THE SOCIAL MAN 113 


raising campaigns was asked how he came by his unusual ability 
and tremendous energy in this field. He replied that as a child his 
only playmates were two brothers older and more robust than he. 
In order to share their fun he had to force himself, at the cost of 
severe effort, to keep their pace. Youth and frailty were thus 
compensated for by the development of a trait which persisted and 
determined the successful career of the adult. In a similar way 
poverty and responsibility are the limitations which develop the 
personality of the self-made man. 

The second form of compensation is vicarious in its function. If 
one road to happiness is blocked, it is possible to find another. 
Very plain women are often noted for adorable dispositions. This 
is due in many cases to the self-inculcation of desirable traits from 
early youth — traits which serve as an effective substitute for good 
looks in the competition with the fairer aspirants for matrimony. 
Defect in one sphere is compensated for by the development of 
serviceable habits in another. High standing in school, as we have 
already observed, is often achieved by perseverance substituted for 
intellectual capacity. Social contacts provide a usetul sphere for 
vicarious compensation. Many persons of mediocre intelligence 
hold enviable positions through the substituted traits of forceful- 
ness, congeniality, and tact. Every great loss or restriction brings 
about in the compensating personality a reorientation toward life, 
and a replacement of impossible methods of satisfaction by possible 
ones. The childless wife and the spinster may turn to some form 
of social service. In this they find an interest or point of attach- 
ment for the love emotion and the protective responses of the 
motherhood which was not to be. This class of vicarious compen- 
sations has been described by Dr. F. L. Wells under the name of 
“balancing factors.” ! 

Compensatory traits occur in probably one half at least of normal 
humanity. They are not always pure compensations, according to 
our definition, but are frequently combined with rationalization 
(‘sour grapes’ philosophy) and defensory attitudes against loss of 
self-esteem. The writer in collecting personality reports from a 
class found compensations recognized and described in one third of 


1 See reference cited at the end of this chapter, 


114 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


the students. There were probably many more instances below the 
conscious level. <A taunt, or slight, showing that others are aware 
of one’s defect, is sometimes a spur for the development of the 
behavior trend. One young man traced the origin of his present 
studious habits to the following episode: After floundering dis- 
mally through his high-school course, he was informed by his dis- 
gusted father that ‘he [the youth] was too dumb to go through 
college in five years, let alone four.” ‘The result was that during 
his entire college work he had totally reformed his habits of study, 
with the resolute purpose of getting through in three years. This 
tendency to over-correction is typical of the trait of compensation. 
An aggressive and dominant young woman who loves competition 
in any form reported that this trait was established in early child- 
hood owing to the taunting behavior of her elder sisters. They 
were continually remarking that “of course E could not be 
expected to do so and so, as they were doing, because she was too 
little.” 

One case, that of subject G., is especially instructive in that 
if combines vicarious compensation with rationalization and a 
paradoxical masklike trend of social behavior. Previous to the 
self-analysis and report, G. was an enigma to the writer. He was 
obviously superior in intelligence, but in the social virtues he was 
sadly deficient. He displayed a marked bravado and cock-sureness, 
caring nothing for the opinions of others; and he was blunt to the 
extent of ill manners in his criticism of both textbook and teacher. 
Though all respected his ability, he had no friends among his 
classmates. It is hard to believe that the origin of these traits was 
extreme shyness and sensitiveness. Yet such was the case. Asa 
child he could not bear to be laughed at; and his very sensitiveness 
and self-consciousness made him an object of playful ridicule among 
his playmates and elders. The result was that he withdrew within 
himself, and gradually built up a defensory wall of asocial behavior. 
Society was at first his tormentor and enemy. Then he developed 
a superior indifference to it, and took every occasion to show this 
attitude in his outspoken criticisms and eccentric ways. At college 
his life was that of an unpopular recluse. If his nature was bitter, 
however, it was also strong. His self-recognized compensation for 





PERSONALITY — THE SOCIAL MAN 115 


unpopularity was academic standing. He worked assiduously and 
obtained high grades so that he ‘‘could cram down the World’s 
throat that that poor stick whom nobody likes can get high marks 
if he cares to take the trouble.” (The inference being, no doubt, 
that he did not consider social graces worth the trouble, or he 
could acquire them also.) 

Extreme shyness in adults is often concealed by a defensory 
mask of reclusiveness. There is no warmth in their greetings, and 
they seem to shun rather than solicit contacts with their fellows. 
The mask is frequently misinterpreted by others as indicating 
brusqueness, coldness, or even snobbishness. Unpopularity is the 
result, and the subject, sensing the aversion of his fellows, draws 
more closely within himself, and increases his isolation from the 
social environment. The defensory trait is thus ingrained through 
a vicious circle. Such was the case with G., with the added 
complication that the asocial mask became in time a part of his 
true self. 

We thus find in individuals the most intricate blendings of com- 
pensation with rationalization and the erection of barriers which 
falsify reality. The criteria for true compensatory traits are four: 
(1) these traits originate from an obstacle, defect, or limitation; 
(2) they further the adjustment of the individual, not by trying to 
adapt reality to his own peculiarities, but by adapting his capacities 
and traits to reality; (3) they become not merely so many separate 
acts of adjustment, but prepotent habit trends, or drives, which in 
time appear as ends in themselves; (4) since they become control- 
ling forces in themselves, they tend to carry the individual past an 
adjustment which is simply ‘adequate’ to higher levels than he 
would have attained without the original defect. The relation of 
the personality to its social sphere cannot be fully understood 
without recognizing these dynamic forces of human nature. 

Extroversion — Introversion. We have discussed at some 
length the distinction between overt adjustment to reality and the 
internal assumption of defensory attitudes and imaginal solutions. 
Leaving out of account the question of compensation, there is 
justification for regarding the tendency to overt or to internal 
adjustments as a separate trait. The extremes of this trait are 


116 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


extroversion and introversion. The extremely introverted person 
obtains his satisfactions by mental imagery. Overt reactions are 
blocked because they employ reflexes antagonistic to other emo- 
tionally toned drives. The impulse therefore forces its way into 
the autonomic nervous system, setting up a highly pitched and 
pervasive emotion. Such repression renders the individual very 
‘touchy’ on any topic connected with the inhibited neural patterns. 
The breadth of emotion, or affective spread, is apt to be consider- 
able. Word association experiments, in which the subject is asked 
to respond to spoken words with the first word that enters his 
mind, are convincing tests for introversion. If the stimulus word — 
(spoken by the experimenter) arouses an associated word connected 
with the nexus or ‘complex’ of inhibited reactions, that word will 
often be inhibited and a more indifferent word substituted. There 
will be an accompanying emotional disturbance. Both of these 
effects will serve to delay far beyond the average the time required 
for giving the response word. All persons show this phenome- 
non occasionally; but it is far more pronounced in the case of the 
introvert. 

The introverted person has recourse to a wealth of day-dreaming 
and night-dreaming for the fulfillment of his repressed tendencies. 
The consequence is a severing of the connections with reality. 
Real conditions are fancifully distorted in such a way as to satisfy 
the cravings of the individual, and a bizarre set of values and 
entities are constructed. There is also an intense ‘personalization’ 
of all events that come within notice. Remarks intended to be 
impersonal are often taken in a personal sense, with resulting 
suspicion and resentment. In insanity this symptom occurs in 
an exaggerated form and is known as ‘ideas of reference.’ The 
heightened self-feeling is shown in the word association experiment 
by the giving of many responses peculiar to the internal imagery 
and past experiences of the subject (‘predicate responses’), or 
charged with an unusual emotional significance (‘complex indica- 
tors’). 

Although introversion in its extreme form borders on certain 
types of insanity, a moderate degree is by no means a serious dis- 
advantage. The high level of imagination and feeling with which 


PERSONALITY — THE SOCIAL MAN 117 


it is associated is necessary for the fullest participation in literature, 
religion, and art. Introverted self-tendencies are often a vehicle 
through which genius finds expression, as, for example, in the cases 
of Swift, Byron, Carlyle, De Quincey, Poe, and MacDowell. 

Extroversion, being the more normal condition, does not present 
so clear a picture as introversion. The extrovert simply lacks the 
symptoms of repression, conflict, over-sensitiveness, unreality and 
protracted day-dreaming. He is easier to make contacts with 
because he does not set up defensory attitudes nor respond with 
some unintelligible inhibition or burst of emotion. His poise is not 
disturbed by exaggerated self-feeling. Life for him is probably 
less rich in emotional and imaginal experience than for the intro- 
vert; but he is likely to be better adjusted to the actual world and 
the people in it.! 

Insight. Another trait having to do with the attitude toward 
reality is insight. In this case the reality concerned is the individ- 
ual himself. Does the individual adopt a fair and objective view- 
point toward his own driving forces, his motives, and his limita- 
tions? Is he willing to place the blame for his failure upon himself; 
or does he ‘project’ it, and ascribe it to the injustice of others, the 
hard times, or the presidential administration? Does he view 
himself as others would see him if his complete nature were exposed 
to public view? If he does, he possesses the maximum degree of 
insight. 

The greatest obstacle to clear insight is the tendency to act from 
one motive and to try to make ourselves (and others) believe that 
we are acting from another. The substituted, or rationalized, 
motive is one which ‘sounds better’ to the social environment as 
reflected in our own consciences. In this way we comfort ourselves 
for our past offenses, and delude ourselves as to the ethical bearing 
of those which we are panning to commit. How many car-riders 
persuade themselves when their fare is not collected that the trans- 
portation companies are always robbing the public anyway! 
Queer reversals of logic often result from rationalization. Whena 
man votes for a public assessment that will benefit chiefly his own 

1 The term ‘extroversion’ is here used in a sense different from the meaning of 


extroversion (sometimes spelled extraversion) in psychoanalysis (cf. p. 368 and foot- 
ncte). 


118 — SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


street and property, he is apt to argue for a liberal hand in allowing 
the local government to disburse its income for the ‘public good.’ 
The same man will later justify slight shortages in his income tax 
return by the argument that the Government will only waste the 
people’s money in red tape and foolish innovations. In cases also 
where moral principles are not involved, such as conflicts between 
antagonistic personal desires, rationalization helps us to remain 
oblivious of our true natures. A maiden smitten by love at first 
sight will leave no stone unturned to secure another meeting with 
her idol. But she will parry every self-accusation of unmaidenly 
conduct by elaborating ‘innocent’ reasons for her doing thus and 
so, reasons which she herself believes. ‘The hypocrisy is as uncon- 
scious as it is complete. 

An eloquent example of an attempt to delude one’s self with 
contrary motives, which, however, failed because insight was too 
strong, is seen in the soul-torment of Claudius in Shakespeare’s 
Hamlet: 


... But O, what form of prayer 

Can serve my turn? Forgive me my foul murder! — 
That cannot be; since I am still possess’d 

Of those effects for which I did the murder, — 

My crown, mine own ambition, and my queen. 


And later: 


My words fly up, my thoughts remain below; 
Words without thoughts never to heaven go. 


There are individuals who, like Claudius, are too firmly grounded 
in reality to be able to deceive themselves. 

Insight in the form of ability to see through one’s rationalizations 
and defense attitudes is one of the strongest of social assets. He 
who can judge his own traits for their true worth has no delusions 
of grandeur about himself. His self-evaluation is perfect. He has 
also the best start toward self-improvement, for he knows where his 
strength and his weakness lie. He can mingle with his fellow men 
upon a footing of candor and mutual understanding because they 
will not have to conceal their true opinions about him. And best 
of all, he can appreciate a joke upon himself. Humor personally 


PERSONALITY — THE SOCIAL MAN 119 


directed and caricature strike the man without insight like a purely 
hostile thrust. To the man with insight they are a refreshing jest, 
because he can see the point. To be able to laugh without malice 
at others one must first know how to laugh at himself. 

Ascendance — Submission. If two persons of equal status 
come into a face-to-face relation, and if the behavior of each is 
a response solely to the immediate behavior of the other, there 
generally results a conflict, genuine, though often unconscious. 
The reaction of each is centered in the drives of his own personality. 
Even where there is agreement as to the ends desired from the inter- 
view, there will be some ground for friction as to the choice of 
means. Social behavior is not a smoothly running machine, but 
a succession of conflicts and readjustments between individuals. 
Each one therefore strives to carry his point in the encounter. In 
the sequel there stands revealed one of the fundamental traits 
of personality. One is likely to become the master: his impulse 
dominates. The other yields and adjusts his behavior to the con- 
trol of the first. The former personality we may call ascendant — 
the latter, submissive. 

So swift and certain is this sorting of personalities that fre- 
quently the issue is decided in the first instant of the conflict, or 
indeed before it begins, by the glance and bearing of the dominant 
individual. A story told at our army training camps gives the 
Scotsman’s version in a situation where the stakes of the personal- 
ity struggle were high. “Yuh leap upon the parapet with yer 
bay’net, an’ pick oot yer Boche. Then yuh look ’im square in the 
e’e, an’ wan of ye isa dead mon.” Thus it is also throughout the 
less crucial issues of life. The outcome is more often decided by the 
adjustment of the two personalities in the pre-conflict period than 
by the blows of the conflict itself. It is true, of course, that we are 
ascendant toward some individuals and submissive toward others. 
But if we strike an average of the individual’s behavior in contact 
with his equals, we may place him with some assurance at some 
point on the scale between the two extremes of complete ascendance 
and complete submission. It is through this trait more than any 
other that personality becomes a factor in social control. 

‘Two of the leading conditions of ascendance are physical size and 


120 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


energy. Male and female, in contacts of equals, stand in the 
ascendant-submissive relation. Organizations in which a reverse 
relation is attempted are involved in continual friction. The trait 
may be independent of intellectual superiority. A naturally sub- 
missive individual of high ability may use his intellectual gifts by 
way of a vicarious compensation for social defects. From his study 
or laboratory he may control the thought of the intellectual world; 
yet in actual face-to-face contacts he can scarcely give crders to 
his butler. The personal relation is a unique field for exhibiting the 
personality. . 

The origin of a submissive attitude reaches far back into child- 
hood. Frailty, physical defect, or association with older children, 
if not relieved by compensation, are almost certain to lead to a 
non-resistive trend of behavior. The effect usually persists into 
adult life. Repression and cringing obedience to an austere parent, 
teacher, or elder brother may leave the personality with a perma- 
nent mark of submission. Reticent persons who are afraid to ex- 
press themselves in a company or to superiors often have a history 
of this sort. Almost every one, in fact, has met certain older persons 
by whom he felt ‘awed,’ ‘magnetized,’ or ‘subdued.’ Some 
scarcely remembered resemblance between such a person and the 
father or other hero of childhood days evokes the old-time habits of 
awe and submission. 

The ascendant personality, like the submissive, has its genetic 
phase. The eldest child, the strong and active child, the child 
thrown early upon his own resources, and the enfant terrible who 
controls his parents, all bid fair to retain their ascendance in adult 
relations. In an experimental contest of strength of grip individual 
differences in respect to this trait were evident. ‘Two boys, each 
with a dynamometer in his hand, stood facing each other ready to 
begin the contest. And at that very moment the contest was often 
decided. ‘The weaker, overwhelmed with the thought of the other’s 
actual or supposed strength, became submissive at the start. His 
attitude shifted from a desire to beat his opponent to an effort 
merely to make a respectable showing. The attitude of the ascend- 
ant boy was unwaveringly to conquer his opponent, and to stand 
at the head of the ust. The frank play of childhood soon reveals 


PERSONALITY — THE SOCIAL MAN 121 


the degrees of ascendance or submission present among playmates. 
Each is dominated by certain ones and in turn dominates others as 
unequivocally as rank asserts its privilege in an army. 

The trait of ascendance is well illustrated in a story told of 
Roosevelt on one of his Western speaking tours. Just before his 
address he was greeting the leading citizens when a huge cowboy 
approached with extended hand, and, taking the President off 
guard, gave him a powerful grip that made him wince. After he 
had finished speaking, Roosevelt happened to catch sight of the 
young Westerner again. Offering his hand a second time to the 
surprised youth, he seized the initiative and gave him in return a 
squeeze that almost made him cry out with pain. Here we see the 
conflict of two powerfully ascendant personalities, each struggling 
to thrust the other into the submissive rdle. 

Expansion — Reclusion. There is another trait through the 
possession of which an individual stands out among his fellows. 
This is the trait of expansion, its opposite being reclusion. The 
expansive person is one whose personal touch enters into all that he 
says or does. His private views, characteristics, and even defects 
are brought into light on all occasions. He is opinionated, though 
by no means always objectionably so. The reclusive individual, 
on the other hand, keeps his personality in the background. His 
light, as well as his defects, is hidden under a bushel. He fulfills his 
office in a perfunctory manner without putting a personal touch 
into his work. The expansive person answers a questionnaire, 
writes a letter, or files an application for a position in a manner 
charged with personal references and information, opinion and 
interests. We feel that we have made a genuine contact with the 
personality. The communications of the reclusive individual, 
however adequate objectively, are poor in self-expression. They 
leave us in the dark as to the sort of man or woman we are dealing 
with. We always wonder whether there is ‘more behind’ what is 
written or said, or whether that is really all there is of the person. 

References to self, the use of ‘I think,’ ‘my experience has been,’ 
etc., in a discussion of objective topics, may be used as a fair index 
of expansion. According to counts made of ego references in 
seminary reports given by expansive and reclusive graduate stu- 


122 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


dents, some individuals make as many as eighty or ninety refer- 
ences to self per one half-hour of speaking; others make as few as 
four or five. The higher numbers are extreme, for the median 
person (neither markedly expansive nor reclusive) makes about 
ten. It is to be understood that expansion does not necessarily 
imply aggressiveness or conceit. It often arises from a high level 
of energy and ability with full consciousness of one’s powers. The 
only social requirements are, first, that the individual shall have a 
personality worthy of expanding, and, secondly, that he shall stand 
sufficiently high in tact and other social traits to avoid giving 
offense in the process. With these qualities he may become a 
leader; without them he will probably be an insufferable bore. 
Reclusion, on the other hand, does not mean modesty or humility. 
Unpopular people are more likely to be reclusive than expansive. 
Expansion may be present with or without ascendance. It some- 
times appears as a kind of compensation for the absence of the 
latter as a means of influencing one’s fellow men. 


Socmuity. Ascendance, expansion, drive, compensation, and 
other self-expressive traits have brought us into close touch with 
the social life of the personality. ‘The emphasis, however, in these 
traits was placed upon the influence of the individual upon his 
fellows. ‘The reverse side of social contact remains to be described; 
namely, the susceptibility of the individual to the influences of 
society. This is the sphere of sociality. It is marked at one 
extreme by aggressive egoism, incapable of modification by social 
pressure; and at the other by high reactivity to stimulation from 
others and complete socialization of behavior in response to such 
stimuli! | 

The first trait to consider is a certain sensitivity, perhaps an 
original capacity, which we may call susceptibility to social stimula- 
tion. ‘There is a familiar difference between the callous person and 
the one who is quick to respond to social approval and disapproval. 

1It should be remembered that the careful distinctions drawn between the 
various traits under sociality, as well as in the field of personality generally, are made 
chiefly for convenience in analysis. In the actual observation of individuals such 


clear-cut distinctions are impossible; for behind almost every act there lies an in- 
extricable fusion of motivating and determining factors. 


PERSONALITY — THE SOCIAL MAN 123 


This susceptibility characterizes the man of tact, the diplomatist, 
and the ‘good mixer.’ Such a one is quick to ‘grasp the situation’ 
in a group into which he is thrown, responding intelligently to facial 
expressions, postures, and tones of voice. The opposite type finds 
himself at an utter loss. The subtle play of social stimulation is a 
language he can never learn. 

In order to be adapted to civilized society a man must not only 
be sensitive to the social objects about him; he must also develop 
permanent habits of response which are in accord with the necessi- 
ties of group life. Such development may be called the socializa- 
tion of the individual. It consists of a modification of the original 
and purely egoistic prepotent reflexes through instruction received 
in the social environment. The process has been discussed in 
detail in Chapter III. The socialized man is one who obeys the 
law as a matter of principle rather than through compulsion. 
Sharing his part of the responsibilities of social life and citizenship 
has through habit become second nature to him. In submitting 
himself to military discipline in war and taxation in peace, and in 
following regulations for the public good, such as ‘keep off the 
grass’ signs, rules concerning library books, and the like, he feels 
that he is developing rather than limiting his individuality and 
freedom. Like Socrates he believes in upholding the law even 
though he may consider the particular statute he obeys to be un- 
wise. 

Conduct the opposite from that of the socialized man springs 
from the original and unmodified self-seeking of human nature. 
Self-seeking may take the form of passive selfishness, in which the 
individual merely goes on his way deaf to any appeal for personal 
sacrifice or codperative enterprise. The training required to as- 
sociate satisfaction with effort expended for social rather than for 
personal ends has been lacking in the history of this personality. 
The counter-trait to primitive self-interest is the quality of simple 
unselfishness. Many, no doubt, believe that that spontaneous and 
naive unselfishness one occasionally meets is an inborn trait. 
Positive proof on this point is lacking. Certainly in many cases 
basic unselfishness has been inculcated early in childhood. 

Self-seeking may also assume an active or aggressive character- 


124 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


Ascendance combined with the primitive unsocialized drives over- 
rides the feelings and even the rights of others. Aggressive self- 
seeking is the central trait of the criminal personality. It is 
usually associated with an absence of sensitiveness to the influences 
of the social environment. ‘The recidivist offender is almost in- 
fantile in the unmodified egoism of his drives. Conditioning by 
means of social stimuli, and for social ends, has never been brought 
about. Social workers agree as to the basic selfishness of the delin- 
quent class. Defect of training in this respect, together with 
intellectual inadequacy and emotional unbalance, is the very root 
of the problem of crime. 

In the trait of social participation we make a further advance in 
the sphere of sociality. Socialization implies a somewhat abstract 
attitude toward law and custom. Does the individual go further in 
seeking actual contact with his fellows? Are they necessary for the 
fullest expression of his emotional and active life, or are they merely 
so many environmental objects to which he must adjust himself? 
The recluse and the introvert generally stand low in the scale of 
social participation. This trait signifies in its possessor a drive for 
social activity, for reacting to his associates and causing them to 
react to him. Individuals who thrive in an atmosphere of church 
sociables, card parties, and dances exhibit a certain degree of the 
trait. Personal excitements, sex interests, and the like are prob- 
ably, however, as significant causes for such behavior as the social 
drive in itself. Sociability would be a fitting name for this level of 
participation. A higher score in this trait would apply to those 
who bring charity into actual contact with the needy than to those 
who subscribe to it by participating in charity balls. The settle- 
ment worker, the Sunday-school teacher, and the boys’ club leader 
are true social participants in that their drives are centered in 
social influence and in the promotion of human welfare. 

In surveying personality with reference to socialization, self- 
seeking, and social participation, we are really canvassing the field 
of character. ‘This field comprises the personality as seen from the 
viewpoint of social justice, and as measured in the dimension of 
legal and moral standards. Honesty, fairness reliability, and 
candor are socialized drives relating to specific situations. The 


PERSONALITY — THE SOCIAL MAN 125 


social virtues are generally developed in combination, for they 
form a single integration of allied drives based upon social approval, 
and represented in consciousness as a personal ideal of the highest 
type of manhood and womanhood. 


REFERENCES 


Watson, J. B., Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist, ch. 11. 

Warren, H. C., Human Psychology, chs. 18, 19. 

Allport, F. H., and G. W., “Personality Traits: Their Classification and 
Measurement,” Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology, 
1921, xvi, 1-40. 

Allport, G. W., ‘“‘Personality and Character” (a review), Psychological Bul- 
letin, 1921, xvit1, 441-55. 

Edman, I., Human Traits and their Social Significance, ch. 8. 

Paton, S., Human Behavior. 

Myerson, A., The Foundations of Personality. 

Berman, L., The Glands Regulating Personality. 

Kantor, J. B., “Human Personality and its Pathology,” Journal of Philosophy, 
Psychology, and Scientific Methods, 1919, xv1, 236-46. 

Rosanoff, A. J., ‘“A Theory of Personality Based Mainly on Psychiatric Ex- 
perience,” Psychological Bulletin, 1920, xvii, 281-99. 

Adler, A., ‘The Study of Organic Inferiority and its Psychical Compensa- 
tion”’ (translated by Jeliffe), Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph 
Series, no. 24. 

Fernald, G. G., ‘““Character as an Integral Mentality Function,” Mental Hy- 
giene, 1918, 11, 448-62. 

“Character versus Intelligence in Personality Studies,” Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology, 1920, xv, 1-10. 

James, Wm., Principles of Psychology, vol. 11, ch. 26 (pp. 535-49). 

Jung, C. G., Analytical Psychology, ch. 11. 

Psychological Types. 

Wells, F. L., Mental Adjustments. 

Sands, I. J., and Blanchard, P., Abnormal Behavior, ch. 5. 

Hinkle, B. M., ““A Study of Psychological Types,’’ Psychoanalytic Review, 
1922, rx, 107-97. 

Prince, Morton, ‘The Structure and Dynamic Elements of Human Person- 
ality,” Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 1920-1921, xv, 403-18. 








CHAPTER VI 
THE MEASUREMENT OF PERSONALITY _ 


Introductory Statement. With the recent advance in knowledge 
of the dynamic principles of human nature there has developed a 
need for evaluating the traits of individuals in some definite form. 
From the point of view of both technique and application the 
methods of personality measurement are important for the social 
psychologist. Although their stage of development is still crude 
and tentative, it is worth while briefly to outline these methods. 


They may be divided into two general classes: (1) those depend--~ 


ent upon the estimates given by associates of the individual 


studied, and (2) special methods of objective testing. The first ~ | 


class is subdivided into (a) systematic questionnaire methods, 
and (b) rating methods. 

1. Methods of Judgment by Associates. A. Systematic Ques- 
tionnaire Methods. This type of method is merely an attempt to 
canvass the personality by questions concerning the characteristic 
reactions in various fields. Such questions should avoid generali- 
ties and seek detailed facts from which to draw conclusions. The 
following are examples: Is the individual talkative or taciturn? 
How punctual and how thorough is he? How many times have 
you seen him angry? For what causes? Upon what subjects is he 
‘touchy?’ Is his sex and family life normal and happy? Does he 
display aversion, affected indifference, or repressed emotion in 
regard to sex topics? Does he seek or shun society? How readily 
is he browbeaten by tradespeople and officials? How frequently 
does he dominate them? What defects has he that he is willing to 
acknowledge? Does he blame others as a rule for his own failures? 
Are his sports, recreations, and zsthetic or religious interests a 
proper balance for his vocational pursuits? Does he adapt himself 
readily to the moral standards of society? Various fields of adjust- 
ment — economic, social, sex and family, recreational, and moral 
— are covered, and inferences concerning specific traits drawn from 
the answers. | 


THE MEASUREMENT OF PERSONALITY —= 127 


Complete and useful questionnaires and trait lists have been 
developed for clinical and other purposes and rendered quantitative 
by the use of pluses, minuses, and marks denoting extreme degrees 
of the behavior in question (Wells, Spaulding),' so that the assets, 
liabilities, and compensations of the individual in the various 
spheres may be evaluated. The questions being suitably worded, 
a simple count of the ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ replies may be rendered 
diagnostic in value. (Woodworth.) Fields of inquiry, with quan- 
titative evaluation, have been adopted for studying the personali- 
ties of mental defectives. (W. E. Fernald, Porteus.) 

The questionnaire method may be made available for self-study, 
provided (1) the questions relate to actual overt acts, not feelings, 
motives, or intentions, and (2) the individual can adopt an objec- 
tive attitude toward himself and one free from rationalization. 
The basis of the replies must be what one does, not what traits 
one believes himself to have. 

B. Rating Methods. Although questionnaire methods are 
useful for general impressions, for quantitative and comparative 
treatment it is preferable to rate the individual in regard to certain 
selected traits. For accurate estimates it is essential to have a 
number of judges or raters because of the complex variables enter- 
ing into the judgment of one person by another. An average of the 
ratings of from five to ten competent judges is to be desired, though 
three separate ratings are far more satisfactory than one. There 
are two varieties of rating method, which we may term ‘scoring’ 
and ‘ranking.’ The scoring method is used where a single individ- 
ual is to be rated, or where, if ratings of a group are desired, each 
rater knows only a part of the individuals. A subjective scale is 
imagined, such as from 1 to 5, or a percentile basis, upon which to 
express the degree of each trait which the rater estimates the sub- 
ject to possess. Since the only standard available is that afforded 
by a representative group of the subject’s associates, the extremes 
and median of such a group are generally imagined in giving the 
score. The army rating method for commissioned personnel at- 
tempted to render the scale more stable and definite by asking the 


1 Full references for published work referred to by the names of the authors will 
be found in the list of references at the end of this chapter. 


128 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY; 


raters to call to mind actual officers who in their opinion stood at 
certain points along it, and then proceed to fit the subject to the 
‘personified’ scale. The ranking method, available only in rating 
an actual group all of whom are known to each rater, is more accu- 
rate. Here the subjects to be rated are arranged by each judge in 
their order of rank in respect to each trait, the one possessing the 
highest degree of the trait standing first, and the one with the lowest 
degree at the bottom. The rating of each subject is then expressed 
as his rank in the group. The standard here is truly objective 
(being the group itself) and ‘identical for all judges. Comparisons 
are more concrete and definite than in the scoring method. 

The question of the reliability of the judgments of associates in 
respect to different traits, and in general, has been investigated in a 
number of experiments. ‘The usual assumption is that the closer 
the agreement (that is, the less the variation) of the judges upon a 
given trait, the greater is the probability that the average of their 
ratings is an accurate measure of that trait. Variation is the neces- 
sary result of personal bias away from the truth; hence uniformity 
must mean that the truth is attained.1 A simple measure of the 
degree of variability is found in the average deviation (A.D.)? This 
is found by (1) taking the average of all the ratings given an in- 
dividual in a certain trait by the group of raters; (2) finding the de- 
viation of each rater from this average (that is, the difference be- 
tween his rating and the average, regardless of sign); and (38) tak- 
ing the average of these deviations of the several raters. This 
latter average is called the A.D. If it is large, the variability is 
great (that is, there is little uniformity of opinion); if it is small, the 
variability is slight. Averaging the A.D.’s of a certain trait for all 
subjects gives a final index of the reliability of judgment in that 
trait.’ 


1 Tt is conceivable, however, that the entire group of raters might err, and err 
uniformly: that is, variability may be due to a common bias. Thisis likely to be the 
case where a boy is rated by a homogeneous group of judges, such as teachers, 
preachers, etc., who all see him under a single and somewhat unnatural set of condi- 
tions. It would be true also with heterogeneous raters where the trait considered is 
misleading, as in the case of the shy person whose reclusion is interpreted as snob- 
bishness. Barring these exceptions, however, the rule is fairly sound. If the indi- 
vidual should differ strenuously in his own opinion from the average rating he gets 
from others, the raters are more likely to be correct than he is. 

2 Sometimes called mean variation (abbreviated m.v.). 

3 For a more detailed explanation see Hollingworth: Vocational Psychology, p. 42. 


THE MEASUREMENT OF PERSONALITY 129 


In a certain group of 25 subjects the A.D. of the various traits 
was found to range between 3 and 6 ranks (ranking method used) 
out of a possible 25. (Hollingworth.) This is a sufficiently small 
variability to allow us to attach at least a rough value to the 
average rating by associates. In regard to particular traits, the 
lowest A.D. (highest reliability) was found for vulgarity, intelli- 
gence, beauty, and conceit; the highest A.D. (least reliability) for 
snobbishness and refinement. (Hollingworth.) The rule is that 
qualities for which there is objective evidence —for example, in- 
telligence and vulgarity — are most reliably rated by the judges; 
while inner attitudes and feelings —for example, snobbishness 
—are less accurately evaluated. Similarly the socially manifest 
traits of quickness, originality, efficiency, ascendance-submission, 
expansion-reclusion, and social adaptability are reliably judged 
(low A.D.). The more subjective aspects, such as introversion, 
emotionality, disposition, and characterial traits, are judged with 
much less dependability (high A.D.). (Norsworthy, Cattell, 
G. W. Allport.) 

Another question of practical bearing concerns the reliability of 
one’s rating of one’s self in comparison with one’s rating by others. 
As a rule the deviation of the self-rating from the average of ratings 
by a group of judges is greater than the average deviation among 
the judges themselves. In other words self-rating is not so accurate 
as rating by others. (G. W. Allport, Hollingworth.) Low insight 
and rationalization distort self-estimates. Thus Professor Holling- 
worth found that subjects rate themselves too high in sociallv 
desirable traits, such as sociability, refinement, and humor, and 
too low in undesirable traits, as vulgarity, conceit, and snobbish- 
ness. 

Insight and self-evaluation are readily measurable by finding the 
difference between the self-ranking and the ranking given by others 
in the various traits, and prefixing a + or — sign to denote over- or 
under-self-evaluation. Repeated experiments in which rank in 
scores of an intelligence test were compared with self-rankings in 
intelligence previously taken yield the following interesting results. 
The most intelligent underrate their ability, while the least intelli- 
gent overrate their ability. The greater the superiority in intelli- 


130 ~ SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY — 


gence the greater is the degree of under-self-estimation; the greater 
the inferiority the higher the overestimation. The more intelligent 
half as a whole have better insight than the less intelligent, for they 
underrate themselves less than the inferior ones overrate them- 
selves. (F. H. and G. W. Allport.) The tendency toward under- 
self-evaluation by superior individuals and over-self-evaluation by 
the inferior may be due in part to the influence of uncertainty, in 
causing the self-rater to incline toward an average mark. But itis 
equally probable that factors cf insight, rationalization by the 
inferior of their failures, and the like play a true part. Hiolling- 
worth found similar tendencies in that those subjects who stood 
high in neatness, intelligence, humor, and refinement were better 
judges of these traits in themselves and others than were those lack- 
ing in these qualities. Individuals showing vulgarity, snobbish- 
ness, and conceit were poorer judges of these traits in self and 
others. This result can be interpreted to show the close relation of 
insight and drive in the improvement of personality. Recognition 
of a certain trait as a personal ideal leads to its acquisition. One 
acquires the characteristic because he is a good judge of it and of 
himself. On the other hand, in the lack of recognition of an unde- 
sirable trait in one’s self no drive is developed to eradicate it. 

The rating methods are capable of considerable refinement and 
utility if scientifically developed. The main requirements for 
accurate rating are the following: (1) the selection of traits that are 
genuine, fundamental, and distinct; (2) a sufficient number of 
raters, preferably individuals who see the subject from various 
viewpoints; (3) a thorough knowledge and mutual agreement 
among the raters as to the exact meaning of the various traits; 
(4) a sufficiently extended acquaintance with the subjects, an 
acquaintance during which the rater kas the scale of traits in 
mind; (5) basing of the ratings upon actual facts of behavior, 
not general impressions; (6) practice in the use of the scale; 
(7) avoidance of the tendency to allow a good or bad opinion of 
the subject in one trait to bias one’s judgment in regard to an- 
other trait. 

2. Testing Methods. Rating, though fundamental, is a time- 
consuming and somewhat cumbersome method of personality 


THE MEASUREMENT OF PERSONALITY 131 


study. In the fields of education, mental hygiene, vocational 
direction, personnel management, and social work there is urgent 
need for simple and practicable tests of special traits. In the 
sphere of intelligence and special capacities much progress has been 
achieved. This work lies outside the scope of the present discus- 
sion. Within the other fields of personality measurement is a far 
more complex and subtle problem. Two phases of technique are 


necessary for developing such measures. ' First, each special test <— 


must be standardized; that is, one must know from experience with 
it what scores in the trait in question to assign to various types of 
performance in the test. Secondly, results obtained by its use 
should be verified by comparison with some other criterion (as 
objective a criterion as possible) of personality. One method of 
verification is to plot graphs representing the individual’s personal- 
ity on ordinates standing for the values achieved in tests of the 
several traits. Persons who know a group tested then examine 
such ‘profiles’ and try to identify the individuals to whom they 
belong. The most satisfactory method, however, is the compari- 
son of the rank order of the subjects as determined by the scores 
they cbtained in the test of a trait (highest first, etc.) with the 
average rank order obtained from a number of ratings of the sub- 
jects upon that trait. If the two rank orders are identical — that is, 
if the same person occupies the first place in each, another person 
the second place in each, etc., or if the lists are closely similar — it 
is justifiable to infer that the test used is a fair measure of the trait 
as socially established by rating. This is known as the method of 
correlation. If the two rankings are identical there is said to be 
perfect positive correlation, and the ‘coefficient of correlation’ (7) is 
+ 1.00. If there is no similarity at all in the rankings, the coeffi- 
cient of correlation is said to be zero. Positive coefficients range 
between 0 and + 1.00 and are determinable by formulz.! Below 
40 not much significance is attached to r. Coefficients ranging 
between .40 and .60 are suggestive of correlation, with other factors 
entering to disturb the perfect agreement of the ranks. A coeffi- 
cient above .60 is fairly convincing, although for exact purposes one 


1 For a simple exposition of the correlation method, and the use of a convenient 
formula, consult Hollingworth: Vocational Psychology, pp. 44-46 (and footnote). 


132 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


of .75 or .80 is needed. In case one rank order is reversed, instead 
of identical, in relation to the other rank order — that is, if the 
first in one list is last in the other, and so on — there is said to 
be perfect negative (or inverse) correlation (r = — 1.00). Negative 
coefficients, ranging from 0 to — 1.00, indicate with increasing 
certainty that an individual low in one of the two correlated 
measurements may be predicted to be correspondingly high in the 
other. 

An important testing scale of traits centering chiefly in motility 
(‘will’) has been devised by Professor June Downey. The hand- 
writing reaction is used as a basis of exhibiting traits. Speed is 
measured by the rapidity of the writing movement; freedom from 
inertia (hyperkinesis) by the difference between the customary and 
the maximum speed of writing; flexibility and care for detail by 
success at disguise of writing and imitation of a model; assurance 
and resistance to opposition (ascendance) by resisting verbal sug- 
gestion and by assertiveness shown in writing with eyes closed when 
an obstruction is suddenly held in the way of the pen. Codrdina- 
tion is tested by the ability to write a long phrase rapidly in a very 
restricted space; and inhibition, in the sense of control and tenacity, 
by the extent to which writing may be retarded while still keeping 
the pen moving, a task disagreeable to explosive individuals. One 
of the most significant tests is that of impulsion. If the individual 
of high impulsion writes his name with eyes closed or while count- 
ing, the writing is likely to be hastened and increased in size. 
With an inhibited individual handwriting under these conditions 
is diminished in size and retarded. The fundamental movement 
trends thus reveal themselves when the normal conscious control 
of the cortex is blocked through distraction.! 

Graphs or profiles plotted on the basis of these tests indicate 
three general patterns of ‘will’ traits: (1) the willful and aggressive 


type, (2) the slow, accurate, and tenacious type, and (3) the ex- ~ 


plosive or ‘hair-trigger’ type. The significance of the traits meas- 
ured for life adjustments is shown in graphs of successful persons 
who compensate for mediocre ability by a high register in will 


1 Impulsion and inhibition are almost the only traits which can be reliably de- 
duced from samples of normal handwriting. 


THE MEASUREMENT OF PERSONALITY 133 


traits. High scores in these tests are achieved by leaders and 
eminent men, hence the social significance of the test scale. The 
limitation of the Downey scale is that it leaves the important 
sphere of self-expression almost, and the sphere of temperament 
entirely, untouched. The question also arises whether from simple 
writing movements one can draw conclusions which shall apply to 
personality traits in daily life. The author of the tests has done 
some verification by profile identification, but further proof is 
needed. 

A simple but suggestive test of capacity for achievement is con- 
ducted by using Dr. G. G. Fernald’s instrument for measuring the 
subject’s persistence in remaining with his heels raised off the 
floor as long as he is able (that is, as long as he can ‘will’ to do so). 
A low score is due rather to unwillingness to stand discomfort and 
monotony than to actual fatigue. A group of normal high-school 
students averaged three times as long a period of this ordeal as a 
group of prisoners at a reformatory. 

One of the few attempts to investigate the traits of temperament 
has been made by Dr. 8. L. Pressey. The subject is asked to cross 
out of separate lists words which denote things unpleasant to him, 
or about which he has worried, or which he considers immoral. By 
the number and quality of words crossed one seeks to determine 
the ‘emotional spread’ (breadth) and other aspects. Data col- 
lected under the present writer’s direction indicate that a test of 
this sort is equivocal because the introverted type reacts to it, not 
by crossing out, but by ignoring the words which are crucial in their 
emotional lives. This is a defense reaction against the invasion of 
complexes. ‘The same phenomenon invalidates any attempt to 
gauge emotions through reactions to stimuli which condition them, 
and renders the problem of emotional testing extremely difficult. 
Emotional attitude and general outlook on life have been tested by 
giving the subject partial sentences, for each of which cards bearing 
several possible completions are offered. Some of the completions 
are humorous in tone, some are serious, conventional, cynical, ete. 
The emotional attitude is shown by the constant choice of a certain 
type of completion. An example of one of the sentences is: ‘‘ A man 
who lives a pure life’? — [completions] (a) “will miss a lot of fun” 


134 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


(cynical, humorous), (b) “will gain the respect of all”? (conven« 
tional), (c) ‘‘will be cheated by rogues”’ (pessimistic), etc. (Myer- 
son.) 

The most symptomatic tests employed for zintroversion are in 
connection with the free word association method described on 
page 116. Jung and others have distinguished two broad types of 
response words. First, there are those of an objective, non-emo- 
tional sort (for example, the response ‘barn’ given to the stimulus 
word ‘house,’ ‘night’ given as a response to ‘day,’ and the like), 
which are characteristic of the extroverted personality. Secondly, 
there are those of an ego-centric type common to introverts. Two 
sub-classes of the latter are the complex type and the predicate 
type, both described on page 116. Examples of associations re- 
vealing emotional complexes are ‘father’ — ‘anxious’; ‘hair’ — 
‘falling out’; ‘love’ — ‘Donald.’ The predicate type may be 
illustrated by such personal associations as ‘water’ — ‘glorious’; 
‘ride’ —‘dangerous.’ Responses of the ego-centric type, together 
with increase in reaction time, hesitation, repetition of the stimulus 
wordor of reaction words (perseveration), giving of superficial words, 
rhymes, etc. (especially with increase of reaction time), confusion, 
correction of reaction word, stilted and nonsensical reaction words, 
are all indicators of the repressions of the introvert. <A list of one 
hundred words was given to one thousand normal persons and a 
count made of the frequency of occurrence of the various response 
words given. By reference to this frequency table itis possible to 
use this list on any subject and to ascertain the degree of “commu- 
nity’ of his responses (that is, how much the words he associates 
tend to be like or differ from those associated by the majority of 
people). (Kent and Rosanoff.) Individuals giving many predi- 
cate reactions (introverts) have a low index of community in the 
words they associate. (Wells.) Low community index has also 
been found to have a high correlation with the degree of introver- 
sion as determined by rating. (G. W. Allport.) 

The important trait of ascendance is difficult to measure, because 
to evoke it necessitates an actual personal contact. The writer, in 
collaboration with Dr. G. W. Allport, has attempted to develop an 
_“Active-Passive Reaction Study” upon the principle of imagined 


THE MEASUREMENT OF PERSONALITY 135 


or represented situations involving face-to-face social contacts.! 
These situations, drawn as closely as possible from life, are pre- 
sented in print, and the subject is asked to state the nature of his 
reaction as it would be if the situation were actual. A sample of one 
of the situations is as follows: 

You desire to board a boat or train to see a friend off. You feel it 

is important to do this; and the guard forbids you on obviously 


unnecessary technicalities. Do you obey silently, argue, or bluff 
your way past? 


The first correlation of ranks based upon scores in this test with 
ratings on the trait of ascendance-submission gave a coefficient 
of .40. After improvement and standardization, as high a correla- 
tion as .80 was obtained. In spite of the obvious demands made 
upon the insight and -codperation of the subjects, a test of this 
nature seems to have practical possibilities. Professor H. T. 
Moore has obtained significant correlations between ratings on 
aggressiveness and the ability to gaze unwaveringly into the ex- 
perimenter’s eyes while performing a mental calculation. HEzpan- 
sion, another trait requiring a social milieu, may be roughly esti- 
mated by the character of the ego-references, self-descriptions, and 
personal opinions included in a letter of application for a position 
written by the subject. 

The measurement of character and other sociality traits has been 
approached from the standpoint of ethical and social knowledge. 
Dilemmas involving moral principles to which the subject must 
think out the answer form one type of test procedure. The sub- 
ject, for example, might be asked whether a man is justified in 
keeping five dollars which he sees another man drop, provided the 
latter owes him the money and has refused in an insulting manner 
to pay it. (G. G. Fernald.) Other tests involve the definition of 
moral terms, the evaluation of punishments which ought to accom- 
pany certain offenses, and the proper selection of reasons against 
types of unethical conduct. ‘Ethical discrimination’ is the name 
given to the trait presupposed by these tasks. (Kohs.) It is open 
to question, however, whether success in such tests does not show 
intelligence rather than character. One would be greatly aided, of 

1 Not yet published. 


136 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


course, in solving the test if he had been brought up under moral 
instruction or had thought about the social obligations implied in 
the problems. To this extent we should expect one who receives a 
high score to be well grounded in moral habits; and to this extent, 
therefore, the test would be successful. One’s general attitude to- 
ward morality might also be reflected in the result. Dr. Myerson’s 
work, discussed under tests of emotional attitude, extends the 
completion method (described on page 133) to the detection of 
ethical tendencies. 

An interesting test devised by Dr. G. G. Fernald requires the 
arrangement of a shuffled series of crimes, of widely varied gravity, 
in the order of magnitude from the least to the most serious offense. 
In the performance of this test greater deviations from the norm 
established by a group of legal and scientific men were found among 
reformatory inmates than among law-abiding groups. In giving 
this test to normal persons the writer has found a considerable num- 
ber of thoroughly ethical individuals who had wide deviations from 
the norm. These are to be explained, not as defects of ‘moral 
vision,’ but as the result of a highly personal attitude toward the 
offenses, an attitude based on feeling rather than objective social 
and judicial policy. Probably most criminals have this sort of 
personal reaction to legal and moral problems; hence their tendency 
to deviation in the test. But the converse, that all who have such 
attitudes are criminalistic, is far from true. ‘True characterial 
defect requires the addition of other factors as described in Chap- 
ter V. 

Adequate tests of character must involve actual drives. The 
artificiality of any present testing situation seems to be a discour- 
aging hindrance in coping with the problem. Character is truly 
revealed only in the vital issues of real life. It will probably be 
some time before we shall have advanced beyond the methods of 
the business man who, desiring to employ an office boy, allowed 
each applicant to walk into a room where lay an unguarded pocket- 
book, while the prospective employer watched behind the crack of 
the door. 

To determine the trait of social participation further use has been 
made of the ‘social knowledge’ method. The subject is required to 


THE MEASUREMENT OF PERSONALITY 137 


answer questions and to define terms drawn from the technical 
jargon of sports and amusements, and from the vocabulary of 
church hymns, parliamentary procedure, and etiquette. (Ream.) 
The assumption here is that if a man has true social tendencies, he 
will have mingled with all sorts of groups and will have acquired 
the lingo of each. For measuring susceptibility to social stimulation 
the writer has used a test of interpreting facial expressions from 
photographs, which will be referred to in a later chapter. 

This completes, in the main, the roll of commendable but wholly 
tentative approaches to the measurement of personality. The 
problem of bringing human emotions, drives, and social attitudes 
to adequate expression in an artificial test situation is a perplexing: 
but perhaps not an impossible one. Workers in this field should 
remember that it is in theory as well as in application that progress 
is needed. The deeper our understanding of the fundamental 
driving forces of personality, the more certain will be our success in 
isolating and measuring their manifestations. 

Types of Personality. Thus far we have dealt with traits in- 
dependently of one another. The important question remains as 
to how far these qualities are associated in definite degrees, forming 
patterns or types into which a large proportion of humanity can be 
placed. Although every human face is distinct, we can recognize 
types of faces. And so with personality, in the midst of infinite 
variety in minor details a few common patterns may be found. 
The problem is one largely of correlation. If a group of people can 
be found in which high or low ranks in certain traits are associated, 
either positively or inversely, with high or low ranks in other traits, 
so that a fairly constant pattern or profile of traits results, these 
individuals may be said to constitute a type. 

A central problem in intercorrelation is the relation between 
intelligence and sociality. The correlation is seemingly positive, 
although the existence of highly intelligent criminals affords a 
striking exception. Dr. Webb, in collecting ratings of school and 
college students, found a correlative tendency, which he calls a 
‘general factor,’ underlying character. Its presence is shown by a | 
variety of virtues, and its absence by a variety of defects. Desir-_ 
able traits correlate highly with one another; while undesirable 


138 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


traits also intercorrelate highly, and correlate inversely with 
desirable ones. There is, moreover, a positive correlation between 
the admirable qualities and intelligence. It is probable that Dr. 
Webb’s concept of a general factor is to be explained in terms of the 
highly integrated organization of allied drives described in our 
discussion of character. The general factor is really a genetic one, 
and consists of the formation of many prepotent habit trends all 
developed in one direction by social approval and disapproval. 
The factor of intelligence merely increases the rapidity of fixation 
of these socially useful habits. Intelligence, being a capacity, is 
innate; whereas excellence of HEMUISS consisting essentially of 
habits, is acquired. 

Professor Terman has refuted the notion that the intellectually 
precocious child is one-sided. Ratings by teachers and elders in 
comparison with intelligence test scores show that the mentally 
superior child is usually superior also in personal and moral traits. 
Superior children generally come from superior homes — homes in 
which their high native learning capacity can be used to assimilate 
social and moral virtues from their environment. The high corre- 
lation of intelligence and character is to be expected under condi- 
tions like these. 

Significant conclusions regarding types have been derived from 
the correlation of ratings in the field of self-expression. Ascend- 
ance, expansion, extroversion, and high self-evaluation (expressing 
self-confidence) are all positively correlated. Their opposites, of 
course, also correlate with one another. The correlation between 
ascendance and extroversion in one group used was found to be .70; 
while that between ascendance and expansion was .86.! There 
are, of course, exceptions such as occasional introverts who develop 
expansion as a kind of compensation. There are also some extro- 
verted reclusive persons. On the whole, however, we may recog- 
nize two prominent types, one high in self-expression and the other 
low in that sphere. (G. W. Allport, F. H. Allport.)? Professor 


1 Lack of distinction in the raters’ minds between the various self-expressive traits 
may account for a part of this high correlation. Since striking exceptions to the cor- 
relation, however, were readily noted where the traits did not go together, the confu- 
sion of traits was probably not a serious source of error. 

2 Main results not yet published. 


—— se 


THE MEASUREMENT OF PERSONALITY 139 


Downey has found similar correlations, impulsion (of a somewhat 
expansive type) correlating with feeling of self-worth to the extent 
of .81, and with aggressiveness (ascendance) with a coefficient of 
82. The existence, therefore, of two types of self-expression seems 
fairly well established. Because of the dominant and subordinate 
roles they play in social contacts we may call them respectively the 
strong and the weak types. 

It seems probable that the most important general factors under- 
lying these two types are respectively the excellence and the defect 
of physique. Ascendance, impulsive energy, self-confidence, ex- 
pansion, and an extroverted view of life, all seemed in the indi- 
viduals studied to go with good physical development, and their 
opposites with illness and defect. Other factors, of course, and 
particularly compensatory ones, may operate to limit the applica- 
tion of this theory. Positive correlations are also indicated between 
strength of self-assertive traits and sociality factors. The strong 
personality, more regularly than the weak, is characterized by 
social adaptability, participation in social affairs, and sensitivity 
to social influences.! 


GENERAL SUMMARY — THE INDIVIDUAL AS A UNIT IN 
SocraAL BEHAVIOR 


Starting from the premise that social psychology is concerned 
with the behavior and consciousness of the individual in relation to 
his fellow beings, our first task has been to study those aspects of 
the individual which are destined to direct and control his behavior 
within the social sphere. In order to understand these aspects it 
has been necessary to delve into the very fiber of the organism, and 
to disclose the forces and the methods by which men feel, think, 
and act. To begin with the organism itself, man is essentially an 
enormously complex system of reflex arcs, whose central portions 
are so plastic, so modifiable, and so richly interconnected that all 
manner of codrdinations are possible between stimulations and 


1 Space unfortunately does not permit the exhibition of some of these types in the 
form of trait profiles. Good examples of such graphs may be found in the references 
to Professor Downey’s work and in the article on personality traits in the Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology for April, 1921. 


140 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


acts; and the most subtle integrations of habit and thought may be 
acquired and retained for future adaptation. 

A few inherited reflexes of prepotent character form a crude but 
vital basis for acquiring acts of defense, nutrition, and sex, in 
response to importunate stimuli from within or without the body. 
Conditioned response and motor learning develop these reflex 
movements into great systems of adaptive habits both universal 
among mankind and peculiar to individuals. The social environ- 
ment, chiefly through language, exerts a vast influence upon this 
process of modification. It directs the channels into which the 
prepotent demands shall flow, determines and gives instruction in 
the means for their satisfaction, and inculcates in the individual 
the drive toward adaptation and approval within the social sphere. ' 
Socialization is thus achieved by learning within the social environ- 
ment. 

Internal, or visceral, responses to stimuli combine with the overt 
behavior to produce an emotional reinforcement in the struggle for 
adjustment. Here again the forces of society enter into the prob- 
lems of individual life. The evoking and conditioning of love, 
sympathy, and aversion, as well as of the complex human senti- 
ments, proceed according to the social influences brought to bear. 
Avoidance of repression through society, and the use of the reinfore- 
ing effects of emotion for social ends, are problems encountered in 
this field. ' 

Finally, the laws of social contact cannot be understood without 
an appreciation of the capacities, driving forces, and habit trends 
which constitute personality. Intelligence, movements, emotions, . 
personal ascendancy, drive, compensation, grasp of reality, self- 
understanding, social capacities, and character are all subject to 
variation and combination among individuals in ways that pro- 
foundly affect their adjustments to one another. It is important 
to know how these traits may be recognized in social relations, 
how society has operated in their formation, and what expedients” 
of a social nature may be employed in evoking and measuring 
them. | 

Personality is preéminently the social aspect of the individual. 
With its study we complete the potentialities of the human being 


THE MEASUREMENT OF PERSONALITY 141 


for social life, and pass on ot consider those interactions with other 
human beings which constitute his social behavior. 


REFERENCES 


Questionnaires and Scoring Methods: 

Wells, F. L., “The Systematic Observation of the Personality in its Rela- 
tion to the Hygiene of Mind,”’ Psychological Review, 1914, xx1, 295-338. 

Partridge, G. E., An Outline of Individual Study. 

Yerkes, R. M., and LaRue, D. W., Outline of a Study of the Self. 

Heymans, G., and Wiersma, E., “‘Beitrige zur speziellen Psychologie auf 
Grund einer Massenuntersuchung,”’ Zeitschrift fiir Psychologie, 1906, x1, 
81-127; 258-301. 

Hoch, A., and Amsden, ‘‘A Guide to the Descriptive Study of the Personal- 
ity,” State Hospital Bulletin, New York, 1913. 

Watson, J. B., Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist, pp. 226-30; 
399-411. 

Allport, F. H., and G. W., “‘Personality Traits: Their Classification and 
Measurement,” Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology, 
1921, xvi, 1-40. 

The Personnel System of the United States Army: Vol. II, ‘‘The Personnel 
Manual,” Washington, C. C. P. 400, 1919, ch. 12. 

Davenport, C. B., ‘‘The Trait Book,” Eugenics Record Official Bulletin, no. 
6, 1912. 

Spaulding, E. R., ‘‘The Réle of Personality Development in the Reconstruc- 
tion of the Delinquent,’ Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social 
Psychology, 1921, xvi, 97-114. 

Woodworth, R. S., ‘‘Emotional Questionnaire” (in 8. I. Franz: Handbook of 
Mental Examination Methods, ch. 12). 

' Fernald, W. E., ‘‘The Diagnosis of the Higher Grades of Mental Defect,” 
American Journal of Insanity, 1914, Lxx, 253-64. 

“Standardized Fields of Inquiry for Studies of Defectives,”’ Mental 
Hygiene, 1917, 1, 211-34. 

Porteus, 8.D., ““A Study of Personality of Defectives with a Social Ratings 
Seale,’’ Publications of the Department of Research, Vineland Training 
School, New Jersey, 1919-20 series, no. 6. 

Kingsbury, F. A., ‘Analyzing Ratings and Training Raters,” Journal of Per- 
sonnel Research, 1922-23, 1, 377-83. 

Paterson, D. G., “‘The Graphic Rating Scale,” Journal of Personnel Research, 
1922-23, 1, 361-76. 

Knight, F. B., “The Effect of the ‘Acquaintance Factor’ upon Personal 
Judgments,” Journal of Educational Psychology, 1923, x1v, 129-42. 

Knight, F. B., and Franzen, R. H., ‘‘Pitfalls in Rating Schemes,” Journal 
of Educational Psychology, 1922, x111, 204-13. 





Ranking Methods: 
Norsworthy, N., “The Validity of Judgments of Character,’ Essays in 
Honor of William James, 1910 (2d ed.), 542-52. 


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PARAL 
SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 


CHAPTER VII 
THE NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 


Definition and Classification. In the first part of this book an 
account was given of the structures, reflexes, emotions, habits, and 
traits which are fundamental in the behavior of each individual as 
a unit of society. We have seen that in the formation and direc- 
tion of these behavior mechanisms the social environment has been 
one of the most essential conditions. We are now to turn from the 
genetic consideration of human nature to the process of interaction 
between individuals. Instead of the establishing of individual 
traits through the effects of stimulus and response, we shall study 
the stimuli and responses themselves in so far as they arise within 
the sphere of social contact. We may begin most appropriately 
with the social behavior observed among animals, for it is from the 
origin and development of social life among the lower orders that 
a fuller understanding of the human aspect may be gained. A 
logical procedure would then be to complete the developmental 
study with the social behavior of infants and children. For con- 
venience, however, and for better understanding of the adult phase, 
we shall divide this latter genetic material among subsequent 
chapters on language, facial expression, and social adjustments 
within the family. Before proceeding with the evolutional devel- 
opment, it will be profitable to define social behavior and to make 
some attempt at the classification of its various forms. 

Behavior, as defined in the second chapter, is the process of 
responding to a stimulus by an activity that is normally useful to 
life. Stimuli may be divided into two classes, social and non-socval. 
A social stimulus is any movement, expression, gesture, or sound — 
in short, any reaction, made by an animal (human or infra-human) 


y 


148 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


— which produces a response in another. We should perhaps 
extend this definition to allow for the fact that the mere presence 
of an individual under certain circumstances may serve as a social 
stimulus. As a rule the individual whose behavior affords the 
stimulus and the individual who responds belong to the same spe- 
cies. There are many exceptions, however, such as the cat which 
reacts to the movements of a mouse by crouching and stalking, or 
the man who understands and responds to the barking of his dog or 
the nervousness of his horse. Stimuli which are not produced by 
the presence or the actions of individuals are termed ‘non-social.’ | 

Social stimuli involve behavior in two ways. (1) They are in 
themselves usually responses to stimuli either social or non-social 
in character. (2) They produce responses in others. For example, 
a barefooted child steps on a nail and sets up a ery of pain which 
evokes tender emotion and acts of ministration in a parent. The 
cry of pain (the social stimulus), which produces a response in 
another person (the parent), is itself a response to a preceding 
non-social stimulus (the nail). Social behavior may, therefore, be 
defined as behavior in which the responses either serve as social stimult 
or are evoked by social stimuli. We shall discuss separately the 
nature of social stimuli and the responses to them in the etic 
which follow. 

The particular character of social behavior is determined by a 
number of circumstances. Among these are (1) the grouping or 
placing of the individuals, and the number and direction of the 
social stimuli; (2) the relative significance of social and non-social 
objects in the general field of stimulation; and (3) the degree of in- 
telligence and ability to communicate possessed by the individuals 
of the group. Upon the last-named condition depends the value of 
social behavior as a means of biological adjustment. These three 
aspects, to be discussed in order, will serve as a convenient classifi- 
cation. : 

Linear and Circular Social Behavior. When individuals respond 
to one another in a direct, face-to-face manner, a social stimulus, 
given, for example, by the behavior of individual A, is likely to 
~ evoke from individual B a response which serves in turn as a stimu- 
lus to A causing him to react further. The direction of the stimuli 


THE NATURE OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 149 


and of their effects is thus circular, the responses of each person 
being reévoked or increased by the reactions which his own re- 
sponses called forth from others. Ordinary conversation illustrates 
this form of contact, each party thereto being stimulated to utter- 
ance by the response which his former remark has aroused in his 
interlocutor. The genial optimist who finds human nature so 
desirable is responding principally to the pleasant expressions 
which his smile elicits from the faces about him. There is circu- 
larity also in hostile behavior. The provoking of either a dog 
fight or a human quarrel generally involves a mutual responsibility 
among its participants. Growls and threats are bandied back and 
forth, each one both a response to being growled at and a stimulus 
for a louder snarl from the other. This succession of reactions 
Professor Mead ! has aptly termed a ‘‘conversation of attitudes.” ? 
In situations which call for a mere transmission of stimuli, and 
where the effects are in one direction rather than back and forth, we 
find a simpler type of social behavior which we may describe as 
linear. The stalking of game illustrates a short linear series, the 
actions of the prey 
producing responses }_+—__{)— 
in the hunter. It is + Fee es We Fopl, 


the aim, however, of ts Ie 


the latter to prevent Figure 11. Diacram or LINEAR SocIAL 
} BEHAVIOR 
his J ee Onses from I1 and [2 are reflex arcs representing the stimulus-response 
acting 1n turn as stim- ‘mechanisms of two individuals. The response made to some 
. initial stimulus by Iz (Rsp. I1) serves as a stimulus to the re- 
uli upon the quarry. ceptors (r) of I2, causing the latter individual to react (Rsp. 
Stealth and conceal- I2). The arrow indicates the direction in which the social 


stimulus is operative. 

ment prevent the cir- 

cular reaction and diminish the likelihood of escape. The trans- 
mission of orders in an army is an instance of purely linear be- 
havior. Here the conditions of organization require that the social 
stimuli (that is, the language of the orders) pass always in the di- 
rection of General to Corporal, and never in the reverse direction. 
~The handing down of social tradition from generation to genera- 


1 Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods, 1912, rx, 402. 

2 The reader should distinguish clearly between circular social behavior and the 
circular reflex (p. 39). The former requires two or more individuals; the latter is 
~ completed in the nervous system of a single individual. 


150 


SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


tion may be regarded in a broad sense as a form of linear social 


behavior. 


These two types, the linear and circular, are illustrated in Figures 
11 and 12 respectively. The neuro-muscular apparatus of two 


r fsp..2 
Me Fisplr 7 ie 
Figure 12. D1aAGRAM OF CIRCULAR SOCIAL 
BEHAVIOR 


The response of the second individual (Rsp. I2) to stimula- 
tion afforded by the response of the first (Rsp. I1) becomes 
in turn a stimulus for continuing or increasing the response 


individuals, I, and Is, 
are represented simply 
by a receptor, afferent 
and efferent neurons, 
and an effector (the 
association neurons 
being omitted). The 
receptor of each indi- 
vidual is denoted by r. 
The muscle labeled 
Rsp. I, stands for the 


(Rsp. I1) of the first. r denotes a receptor. 
total overt response of 


Individual 1; Rsp. Iz denotes ‘he total overt response of Individual 
Zee eo 11 the response of the first individual serves as a 
stimulus to the second, as indicated by the arrow. In Figure 12 the 
response of each serves as a stimulus to the other. In Figure 11 
the number of individuals in the series might be extended indefi- 
nitely. 

Direct and Contributory Social Stimuli. The second question in 
the classification of social behavior concerns the part which social 
objects play in the total stimulation of the moment. If a social 
stimulus holds the focus of attention and maintains exclusive con- 
trol of the final common paths of response, we may speak of it as a 
direct stimulus. The reaction follows directly from the nature of 
the stimulating object. It is not modified by any other object. 
The advice of our lawyer or physician in matters important to our 
welfare is likely to have the value of a direct social stimulus. The 
concentration of the hypnotist’s subject upon the suggestions of 
the hypnotizer is an example par excellence of the direct relation. 
Direct social stimuli are very common in both linear and circular 
behavior. Of the examples cited in the preceding section the 
transmission of orders illustrates the first possibility, and conver- 
sation the second. Almost all of the more common and conscious 


THE NATURE OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 151 


social influences are exerted through direct stimulation dominating 
exclusively the response mechanism of the individual. 

There are many situations, however, in which the social environ- 
ment affords only a part of the group of objects which are acting as 
combined stimuli. The principle of allied and antagonistic re- 
flexes (p. 37) gives the neural foundation for this sort of reaction. 
The response is called forth and controlled mainly by a stimulus 
which may be non-social in character. The social stimuli present 
in the environment at that moment serve only to modify, redirect, 
augment, or diminish this response. They may be said to be 
contributory to the main, or direct, stimulus. When we satisfy 
our keen hunger by a meal in solitude, we are reacting to a simple 
non-social stimulus, the food. When eating at a dinner party, the 
presence and behavior of the other guests are contributory social 
stimuli which modify our somewhat primitive and hungry attack 
upon the meal. Observations of crowds afford the best examples 
of this situation. In the attack of a mob of revolutionists upon a 
flag, or the looting of a store by a crowd, the principal object (the 
flag or store) is non-social. Its stimulating effect upon each in- 
dividual is, however, greatly augmented by a large number of 
contributory social stimuli such as the cries, facial expressions, and 
movements of the 


other participants. == 

In many crowds | Oe ne Rp ly 
these social stimuli \ 

are contributory to ts i 7 


another social stimu- Figure 13. D1aGRAM OF CONTRIBUTORY SOCIAL 
lus of direct char- STIMULATION IN LINEAR SoctaL BEHAVIOR 


h Rsp. I1, the response of the first individual (11), constitutes a 
acter, namely ’ the social stimulus which contributes to the. effect of a non-social 


voice and gestures stimulus F in evoking the response, Rsp. I2, of the second indi- 


vidual (I2). 
of the crowd leader. 
Direct and contributory stimulation from human beings are con- 
joined in a similar manner in many situations of life. 

Direct social stimuli in both linear and circular behavior may be 
adequately represented by the diagrams of Figures 11 and 12. 
Contributory stimulation of the linear type is suggested in Figure 
13, in which the response of the second individual to the direct 


152 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


non-social stimulus, /’, is modified by contributory stimulation 
from the reponses of the first individual. 

Contributory stimulation in circular behavior is well illustrated 
by the crowd situation. Let us imagine a panic due to a fire in a 
theater. For simplicity we may consider only two individuals of 
the crowd, I, and I.. Both these persons run away from the fire; 
but I. sees I, running, and this increases his own running response. 
I,, in turn, sees I, run, a fact which has a similar effect in speeding 
up the running of I,. The increase in speed which J, received from 
seeing I, run (over that due solely to the fire) thus makes the run- 
ning of I, a stronger agent in restimulating I>. I, is thus stimulated: 
first, by the fire (direct and non-social stimulus); secondly, by. 
seeing I, run from the fire (contributory social stimulus); and, 
thirdly, by seeing I, run faster because he (Iz) also is running 
(circular operation of 
contributory stimula- 
tion). A similar effect 
is produced upon J,. 

Figure 14 suggests 
schematically this sit- 
uation. The direct, 
non-social stimulus, 
the fire, is denoted by 
F. Arrows, in un- 
broken lines, show that 
it directly stimulates 
Is Rpl 9 Lz the receptors (7) of I, 


Figure 14. DIAGRAM OF CONTRIBUTORY SOCIAL. and I,, evoking the 
STIMULATION IN CIRCULAR SOCIAL BEHAVIOR Haren Rs I 
Two individuals, Ii and Ig, are both responding to a direct POnes: fe 1 
non-social stimulus, F. The response of each is modified, and Rsp. Ih respec- 
however, by the response of the other, which serves as a con- F 
tributory social stimulus and increases the reaction by circular tively. These TC 
Wa es ae For further explanation see Figure 12, and sponses now act as 
contributory stimuli 
(see dotted-line arrows) by which I, and I, stimulate each other 
in conjunction with the direct stimulation Ff, and intensify each 
other’s responses in the manner described above. A fuller expo- 


sition of behavior in crowds will be given in a subsequent chapter. 


“ 





THE NATURE OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 153 


* Controlling and Self-Adapting Social Behavior. There remains 
the third point of view in our classification, namely, that of 
phylogenetic development. Among the invertebrates and many 
of the lower vertebrates the creatures who produce sounds or 
movements which serve as stimuli to other animals are not aware 
of the stimulating effect of these responses. Actions such as the 
gnashing of teeth, and the ejaculations accompanying the sight of 
food and sex objects, and other emotional situations are purely ° 
incidental. They belong to the total reaction which the creature 
would make to the same situation in solitude. By the process of 
conditioned response, other individuals learn to associate these » 
reactions with the important events which they accompany. They 
therefore acquire value as social stimuli for those that hear and see 
them long before they have any social significance for the individ- | 
uals who produce them. Intercommunication is thus in a ‘half- 
way’ stage of development. At this stage each individual limits - 
his social adjustment merely to adapting himself to the social : 
environment by learning how to respond to the various stimulations 
which that environment affords.! 

- But in the course of evolution a stage of adaptability is reached 
in which the organism is able to profit by the effects produced upon — 
others by his own behavior. Suppose, for example, that a certain 
monkey has food, and that another monkey in the same cage, who. 
is hungry, has none. A definite problem faces the second monkey : 
— how to satisfy the prepotent hunger reflexes. In accordance 
with trial and error he tries every method known to him. He may 
attempt to take the food either by force or by stealth; he may 
attack the monkey in possession of it; or he may threaten him with | 
loud chattering and a show of teeth. If the last method is the suc- 
cessful one — that is, if it causes the other to drop the food and 
run — it will be readily ‘fixated’ as the social stimulus to be pro- 
duced in situations demanding the control of the food and the 
behavior of others. The value of social stimuli for life adjustments 
is thus learned by the individual who makes them. ‘The control of 


1 The term ‘self-adapting,’ chosen to denote this type of social behavior, is not 
highly satisfactory because all social behavior has a value for adaptation. It may 
serve, however, to distinguish this stage of Progress from thati in acy the rr Neen 
has learned to control others. 


154 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


the social environment in this example probably rests upon the 
conditioning of the prepotent withdrawal reflex (and flight habits) 
in the one to be controlled by the terrifying behavior of the in- 
dividual exercising the control. The first animal has learned that 
such social stimuli mean danger; therefore he withdraws when he 
sees them. 

Among both mankind and the lower animals it is generally the 
stronger individuals who are the best able to control others through 
their behavior. ‘The weaker and the less attractive must be con- 
tent with the subordinate role of adapting themselves to social 
conditions which they are powerless to alter. In evolutional de- 
velopment the highest point of controlling social behavior has 
been reached by man in the perfected communication made pos- 
sible by language. 

For a more complete account of the development through self- 
adapting to controlling social behavior, we must turn to specific 
examples selected from various levels of the animal kingdom. 


SocIAL BEHAVIOR IN ANIMALS 


The Lower Forms of Life. Adjustments based on Difference of 
Structure. Only in the most general sense can the behavior of the 
more primitive forms of life be described as social. There is no 
true response to stimulation from the activity of individuals, but 
only to the morphological characteristics by which different species 
satisfy or supplement one another’s vital needs. Parasites of the 
protozoan and worm phyla find that the body of their host pro- 
vides a supply of nourishment for themselves and their progeny. 
‘Symbiosis’ is the term given to a form of association in which the 
advantage to the participants is mutual. Certain bacteria which 
thrive on the roots of plants render the latter valuable service 
because of their ability to extract needed elements from the soil. 
The convoluta, a marine worm, harbors a symbiotic alga (plant) 
which is essential to its own metabolism. A somewhat more 
highly evolved relationship exists between detached organisms, the 
development of whose structures has been determined by their 
mutual service. The insect, for example, has receptors which are 
stimulated by the color and odor of the flower. He has also a long 


THE NATURE OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 155 


tongue capable of reaching the honey in the flower’s corolla and so 
obtaining his nourishment. His back and legs are adapted for 
carrying pollen, thus enabling the plant to reproduce. This adap- 
tation of structure to the social environment is often a means of 
sharing the food supply of another animal, a relationship known as 
‘commensalism.’ Certain species of small fish obtain transporta- 
tion to food supplies by attaching themselves with sucker-like 
proboscis to larger fishes. The domestication of animals by man 
may be regarded as a kind of commensalism in which the structure 
of one commensal has been somewhat modified by artificial selec- 
tion and his habits rendered serviceable to the other by training. 

Insects and Allied Forms. The insect group combines the primi- 
tive response to morphological characteristics with true social be- 
havior. Differences of structure exist among the members of a 
single colony or species (polymorphism). Among the ants there 
are the queens, or fertile females, the workers who are sterile 
females, and the fighters, ants equipped with powerful jaws. 
There are also smaller insects, called aphids, which are protected 
in the colony for the nutritive secretion which they provide as food 
for the ants. Each of these different genders or types assumes a 
share of the total work of the colony. Each is also reacted to in a 
characteristic manner by the others. The queen is protected and 
sheltered, the aphids are touched upon the antennz to make them 
disgorge their secretion, and the larve are carried and deposited 
where they can obtain food. A similar division of labor and dif- 
ference of treatment are found among the queens, drones, and 
workers of a hive of bees. 

But insects also respond to the presence and behavior of one 
another in a manner not determined by polymorphism. Social 
stimuli are received through at least four different senses, namely, 
smell, touch, vision, and hearing. Ants recognize their nest mates 
by their particular odor, and attack intruders who emit a different 
odor. They also follow the trail of leaders to a food supply by the 
use of the same sense. Moths in particular make use of the sense 
of smell in the recognition of sex, the male being able to scent the 
location of the female at a great distance. Touch is used for social 
stimulation in the stroking of the aphids by the feelers of the ants. 


156 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


This is one of the most primitive instances of controlling social 
behavior in the animal kingdom. At times there spreads rapidly 
through the colony a wave of excitement, large numbers of in- 
dividuals falling upon a group of intruders who are no longer 
tolerated in the nest, rushing out to battle with an invading horde, 
or going out to bring in food. It is believed that this spread of 
stimulation is brought about by the strokes of the feelers; and some 
observers have alleged a kind of language of minute taps indicating 
different situations such as food and danger. This mass phenome- 
non seems analogous to the spread of excitement in a human crowd. 
There is a multiplicity of contributory stimuli having perhaps 
a circular effect within the group. Communication, however, is 
probably that of the ‘halfway’ or self-adapting type, rather than 
that of social control which the use of true language makes possi- 
ble. 

Visual and auditory social stimuli are no doubt important in ° 
insect communities, though they are at present little understood. 
On certain occasions, such as the death of the queen bee, an agi- 
tated humming spreads throughout the hive. The chirping of - 
crickets is believed to afford a means of sex recognition among those — 
insects. The hunting activities of other members of the arthropod 
group prove clearly the value of sight in responding to behavior | 
stimuli. The hermit crab has been observed in the act of stalking ' 
a sand-flea, dropping down quickly whenever the prey showed un- ° 
easiness, and-creeping closer when opportunity offered itself. 

A particular contrast in behavior, namely, that between the 
active and passive, is the source of many important responses of ° 
animals. Among minute forms of crustaceans (crablike animals), 
such as the amphipods, as well as among higher animals, this ' 
contrast is the basis of sex recognition. Male amphipods instinc- 
tively seize and carry about the females, who in turn roll up and 
become passive burdens. If two males collide they try to carry 
each other, and resistance is offered by each. If two females meet, 
both fall into the passive attitude for a time. The sexes do not 
recognize each other either by sight or by odor, but only by the » 
characteristic behavior ‘felt’ when two accidentally collide. Males 
which have been mutilated by the experimenter so that they become ° 


THE NATURE OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 157, 


relatively inactive are seized and carried about like females when | 
encountered by active males. 

Vertebrates. The insect group and the higher vertebrates, such 
as birds and mammals, each have a form of community life which 
favors the development of an intricate social behavior. The 
former group forms codperating hives or colonies, and the latter 
live in true families. The less gregarious lower vertebrates have 
little occasion for the development of social contacts. Fish recog- 
nize the opposite sex by sight or by behavior, or else by a combina- 
tion of both methods. They seize smaller members of the same 
class as prey and avoid the larger individuals. The strong clasping 
reaction of the male frog succeeds in getting for its object a female, 
though the exact basis of the discrimination is not known. Frogs, 
though possessing a sense of hearing, appear indifferent to most 
sounds. The croaking of their own kind is probably, however, an 
important stimulus in connection with breeding activities. 

. In marked contrast with these lower forms is the richness of the 
social life of birds and mammals. Dogs and cats are quick to 
detect the meaning of expressions and attitudes either in their own 
species or in human beings to whom they are accustomed. Curi- 
osity and fear are readily aroused in the finer breeds of these animals 
by similar behavior of their human associates. There should be 
mentioned also the high social adaptability of animals shown in the 
extent to which they may be trained by man. ‘The response to 
social stimulus marks a distinct progress in educability supplement- 
ing the use of punishment and reward. Trained horses such as 
Clever Hans have learned to tap the correct answer to amazingly 
difficult problems of arithmetic, not, as alleged, by calculation, 
but by detecting the small and entirely unconscious movements of 
the observers when the correct number was reached. ‘These social 
stimuli were so minute that for some time they entirely escaped the 
notice of investigators. Widespread effects of multiplied stimula- 
tions which are probably also circular are well known in groups of 
higher vertebrates. Herds are easily thrown into a panic when a 
few of the members become alarmed. ‘The safety of a flock of wild 
birds depends upon the same susceptibility to the social influ- 
ences. Where birds are confined together, any alarm, such as the 


158 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


flapping of wings at night, spreads quickly throughout the entire 
enclosure. 

The higher vertebrates are not only skillful in adapting them- 
selves to a variety of social stimuli, but many of them have learned 
the use of their own behavior as a means of control of others. Dr. 
Craig describes the fighting of many animals as a kind of ceremonial | 
which precedes and often obviates a more serious conflict. By 
blustering and assuming a warning attitude the opponent is fre- 
quently driven away without the necessity for doing him injury. 
Birds and mammals frighten away intruders by making feints, ruf- 
fling the fur or feathers, hissing, growling, and roaring. It is prob- 
able that originally the actual attack was made, and that animals 
then rapidly learned to react to the hostile display which just pre- 
ceded the attack as a conditioning stimulus, withdrawing from the 
sight of the claws and teeth as they would from the actual injury 
inflicted by them. Finally the animals who attacked learned that 
an actual assault was unnecessary, since the mere show of fighting 
sufficed to repel the antagonist. As we have seen in Chapter ITI, 
the law which governs the learning process is that of the fixation of 
the most economical method of satisfying the prepotent demand. 
Hence the actual duel, destructive to both contestants, is replaced 
wherever possible among animals by domination through social 
stimulus. 

Play attitudes are based upon the same principle. Control by 
threatening attitude and gesture, by swaggering, and by exhibition 
of power is the theme of many play attitudes both animal and 
human. The ‘bowing and scraping’ of dogs in a ceremonious play 
fight suggest the effort to overcome the enemy by a stealthy feint. 
Feigning is, indeed, a means of social control remarkably developed 
among animals, and far exceeding as an indication of intelligence 
their ability to control the non-social environment. A small female 
kitten is reported, on good authority, to have played the following 
trick on her brother who lay stretched out asleep on the floor. 
Beginning at the brother’s tail she began gently licking his fur in an 
ingratiating manner, working gradually up toward his head. When 
she had reached his neck she gave a spring and sunk her teeth into 
his ear causing him to give a tremendous leap and a cry of pain. 


THE NATURE OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 159 


Unlike the control exerted through a threatening attitude, the 
feigning method requires the use of decoy behavior entirely different 
in character from the hostile intent beneath. In terms of human 
experience this form of control is based upon an understanding of 
the psychology of the one to be controlled. The understanding, 
however, was probably acquired, like the use of the fighting ceremo- 
nial, through the trial-and-error method of learning. It is an evi- 
dence of a more perfect social adaptability and a higher stage in the 
learning process. 

So-called death-feigning appears to be nearer to the level of 
innate reflexes than that of advanced learning. Such behavior is 
probably purely instinctive, and the animal cannot be said ac- 
tually to ‘feign’ in a human sense. Insects and crustacea furnish 
many examples of rigidity and apparent lifelessness upon being 
molested. Birds and mammals make similar responses. The form 
of control exercised by this behavior is not always clear. Its signi- 
ficance as a social stimulus may be accepted in some cases only 
in a negative sense. By immobility the animal avoids giving any 
stimulus at all, and thus escapes becoming the prey of a larger 
animal. In other cases, for example among monkeys, the attack of 
a more powerful animal is often successfully countered by assuming 
a lifeless attitude which suggests the passivity of the female. Sub- 
mission, whether it produces a sexual reaction or not, is apparently 
an important means of escaping injury through pacification of the 
enemy. 

There are two groups of higher vertebrates whose behavior 
among their own species has been sufficiently studied to deserve 
special consideration. They are the pigeons and the sub-human 
primates. 

The Social Behavior of Pigeons. It is well known that pigeons 
are quick to respond to one another’s attitudes. A single boy with / 
a bag of corn in almost any public park can draw a great flock from 
all directions in less than three minutes. The behavior of other 
pigeons, rather than the actual sight of the food, is without doubt 
the initial stimulus operative upon a large number of the birds, 
Although pigeons do not distinguish one sex from the other by 
sight, they soon learn to recognize particular birds. After four 


“160 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


weeks of life a pigeon will behave in a friendly manner toward 
individuals brought up with it, but will regard others with fear or 
distrust. A pigeon recognizes its particular mate among others of 
the same sex, and codperates with the mate in driving out intruders 
from the nest. 

Sex recognition occurs among pigeons only through behavior. 
An unmated ring dove, for example, when it meets a strange dove 
becomes excited, charges up and down bowing and cooing, and 
behaves aggressively toward the other bird. If the latter is a male, 
he behaves in the same way, and a fight is likely to ensue. If the 
other is a female in season for mating, she coos seductively and 
assumes a submissive attitude toward the male. In the absence of 
true mates a male in season will sometimes attempt to carry on the 
breeding cycle with a less aggressive male; or a female will play the 
passive role with a stronger and more active female. Here, as in 
the case of immature human beings, homosexuality is merely an 
approximate and imperfect adjustment of the internally stimulated 
reflexes of sex. 

The aggressive behavior of the male dove is a kind of control 
which causes the strange bird to react in a manner which reveals its 
sex. Submissive behavior also, as noted in an earlier paragraph, has 
a certain power in determining the responses of the more powerful. 
A pigeon will sometimes attempt to maintain a desirable position 
on the perch by force, but that method failing or incurring retalia- 
tion, will fondle the rival and attempt to beguile him with wiles of a 
‘female character. It thus follows that the extremes both of ascend- 
ance and submissiveness have their value in the adjustment to the 
social environment. Creatures thus tend as rapidly as practicable 
to assume either the active or the passive rdle. We may call this 
fact the law of polarity in social contact. It was recognized in the 
chapter on traits of personality, and it will have a place in later 
discussions. Among pigeons the law is demonstrated by the faet 
that a bird, if attacked at bay, will either offer resistance of the 
most desperate character, or, if overpowered, will submit and allow 
itself to be maltreated mercilessly. | 

The Social Behavior of Apes and Monkeys. Gorillas and chim- 
- panzees in captivity show an extraordinary ability to interpret and 


THE NATURE OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 161 


«respond to the words and facial expressions of human beings. They 
-are apt in interpreting motives and judging character. Their 
ability to play tricks upon one another and to take advantage of an 
opportunity to gain their ends by stealth are well known. Gestures 
are well developed among the anthropoids. Chimpanzees express 
refusal, or enmity, like human beings by pushing the hand from the 
body outward toward the object. Acceptance is denoted by hold- 
ing out the hand extended toward the object. These movements 
probably fall in the class of controlling behavior. They are merely 
abridgments of the acts of rejecting and taking, and come into use 
just as the fighting ceremonial which is really an abbreviated form 
of attack. The human infant controls his social environment by 
precisely the same gestures.!. Mr. Garner, an intimate student of 
apes in their natural habitat, believes that they have a language 
consisting of about twelve sounds, which they use to indicate 
definite situations such as danger, food, sex play, water, moving 
object, and others. These sounds, however, are more likely to be 
‘mere ejaculations forming a part of the total visceral and somatic 
response to the object. While their meaning is known and re- 
sponded to by the apes which hear them, they are probably for the 
most part without social significance to the individual who utters 
them. An important exception must be made in regard to the 
sounds of wooing or invitation to sex play. In cases where an 
individual requires a certain form of behavior from others as a 
satisfaction of his needs, a word denoting the activity in question is 
likely to come into use; and to that extent language passes from the 
‘halfway,’ self-adapting stage to its true development as an agency 
for social control. Dr. Kempf and others have reported definite 
sex ‘words’ in use by monkeys. Sometimes the sound is like that 
of smacking the lips. Another variety is a gentle ‘ee-ah.’ The 
vocal stimulus is generally accompanied by the assumption of a 
posture inviting the sexual union. 

This method of controlling the behavior of other monkeys is so 
remarkably effective that it is used not only to obtain sexual 


1 The reason for this, however, must not be sought in the mystical explanation 
that a child ‘recapitulates’ in his development the behavior of his simian ancestors. 
It is to be explained by the similarity of the prepotent reflexes, environmental con- 
ditions, and learning process involved. 


162 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


gratification, but to achieve various other ends. A smaller monkey 
of either sex in possession of food, if approached by a stronger 
individual who desires the food, will sometimes make the sex sounds 
and assume an inviting posture. This behavior appeals to the 
other in a sexual way and makes him forget the food, which is re- 
tained and eaten by the weaker. Sex decoys of the same sort are 
used to obtain leniency or protection when chased or bullied by 
larger monkeys. A kind of death-feigning reaction also is used by 
monkeys as a means of obtaining immunity from attack. They 
either assume a catatonic rigidity or a passive attitude in which the 
limbs remain in whatever position they are placed. The latter 
form resembles the cerea flexibilitas of certain human psychopaths. 

It will be seen that the control exercised by the weaker indi- 
viduals generally follows the principle of appealing to a different 
desire of simian nature as a ruse. An approaching response is 
evoked from the stronger monkey, and his behavior is turned in 
another direction. ‘The weaker monkey, so to speak, ‘changes the 
subject.’ The domination exerted by the more powerful, on the 
other hand, is direct and aggressive. It is based upon the arousal 
of withdrawing reactions in the controlled ones. A number of 
monkeys in a cage were observed as to their behavior when fed. 
The stronger individuals usually seized the food and began eating 
it. Ifthe weaker ones attempted to get the food or approached too 
near, they were severely punished and chased into a corner where 
they nursed their wounds with their backs turned to their superiors. 
This posture was indicative of entire subjection and absence of 
predatory intent. Originally established as a conditioned with- 
drawing response, it came to be exacted of all the smaller monkeys 
on pain of injury as soon as food was thrown into the cage. Punish- 
ment in advance is indeed a novel and effective form of social 
control. 

A rare instance of intelligence in exploiting the mental character- 
istics of another for personal gain is reported by Dr. Kempf from 
the same group of monkeys. Monkey D, a timid though not very 
intelligent monkey, was eating some food desired by monkey E. 
When approached by the latter, D would become suspicious and 
run to another part of the cage. E then began to simulate indif- 


THE NATURE OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 163 


ference, and to scratch about in the sawdust apparently searching 
for food of his own. At the same time he glanced cautiously back 
over his shoulder, and worked his way casually backward as he 
searched until within grasping range of D’s morsel. He then 
turned, shot out the arm nearest D, and snatched the prize. Other 
monkeys speedily learned to respond to E’s strategic behavior; 
but D, who was evidently a socially stupid monkey, never made 
the adjustment. 

Living in an environment of their fellows, monkeys, like men, 
exhibit distinct personalities. One of the younger individuals of 
Kempf’s group was weak, sensitive, happy, affectionate, and timid. 
Another, also young, was bold, inquisitive, and aggressive. A 
third was irascible, sexually cruel, and unpopular. Each monkey 
stood in a definite relation to every other according to whether he 
was able to take food away from them or had to give it up himself. 
This relation was determined either from the start by differences of 
strength and aggressiveness or by experience. A smaller monkey 
would habitually dominate a larger one if he had once succeeded in 
robbing the latter of his food. Polarity in the extremes of ascend- 
ance and submission was thus apparent between individuals in 
the ‘hierarchy’ of domination by food-taking. 

Sociological Aspects of Animal Behavior. Social behavior in the 
precise sense of making and responding to social stimuli develops 
hand in hand with permanent and organized group life. It would 
be difficult to say which was genetically the more fundamental. 
In order to complete the picture of the social development which 
has led up to modern human society, it 1s expedient to turn from 
specific stimulus and response to the broader sociological considera- 
tions of animal life. Society is now generally believed to have orig- 
inated in the family. We do not need an instinct of gregariousness 
to account for it; for gregariousness itself is based upon the need of 
keeping the family together for the protection and training of the 
young until they shall have had time to fit themselves for life in a 
complex and highly evolved order. 

In the lower phyla there is little evidence of parental care. 
Nature’s purpose is fulfilled simply by endowing creatures with 
instincts to lay their eggs in places where the young when hatched 


164 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


will obtain food and protection. In certain species of spiders the 
mother carries the young after they are hatched by allowing them 
to cling to her body. ‘The social insects feed and tend their larve 
with great care. Actual recognition and care of the young, how- 
ever, does not occur below the higher vertebrates, with the excep- 
tion of a few species of nest-building fish, and certain fish who 
remain a short time in the vicinity of the young. Amphibians and 
reptiles take considerable care in placing and protecting their eggs, 
but parental interest seldom extends to the young in the active 
state. Incubation of eggs; which is universal among birds, seems 
to have had its feeble beginning among reptiles, and was a prereq- 
uisite for the evolutionary change from eggs which did not require 
heat to eggs which did. Accompanying the weak and extended 
infancy of birds and mammals we find a true family life, one, 
and, in many cases, both parents remaining constant in the feeding, 
protection, and training of the young until they are able to shift 
for themselves. The duties of bearing and rearing a family often 
require codperation and division of labor. One parent stays with 
the eggs or young while the other goes in search of food. In 
mammals the milk-secreting organs have developed as a direct 
outcome of the need for prolonged care and nourishment of the 
offspring. 

Family groups form the bases of societies in various ways. The 
insect colony is often one polymorphic family descended from a 
single queen. Among the social vertebrates there exist either ex- 
tended families (comparable to human kinship clans) or aggrega- 
tions of distinct families brought together by their need of food and 
protection, needs which among certain species are best fulfilled by 
gregarious life. This latter type of community, which most closely 
resembles human societies, is typical of monkeys. The higher 
anthropoids, because, perhaps, of the need of a larger quantity of 
food, are inclined to live in solitary family groups. A chimpanzee 
family usually consists of a male with three or four females and ten 
or twelve young. Sometimes several such families live peeseins 
under a patriarchal head. 

Many sociologists believe that the tender feelings originating 
through sex and sensitive zone reactions within the family are the 


THE NATURE OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 165 


origin of that altruistic regard for others which makes organized 
society possible. The evidence of deep emotions both conjugal 
and parental among the higher mammals are often touching. A 
gorilla will fight to the death to protect his young from beasts of 
prey. Maternal devotion is no less marked. Professor Yerkes 
describes the grief of a mother monkey for her dead baby. She 
persisted for several weeks carrying the dead body about with her 
wherever she went. Grief for the loss of young has been known to 
cause the death of females of certain species. 

Within the larger groups in which the interests of the whole 
transcend the narrower family responses, animals afford many 
examples of codperation, and often, like human beings, make real 
sacrifices for the welfare of the group. One of the simplest forms 
of codperation, aside from the more primitive division of labor 
based on polymorphism, is the taking of positions in such a way as 
to allow the best codrdination among the individuals of the group. 
Biologists speak of this behavior as “‘spacing out.’’ In a flock of 
flying geese each goose maintains an exact distance between himself 
and the goose ahead of him. Robins searching for worms on the 
lawn keep at a fairly constant distance from other robins. The 
migrations of schools of fish and of herds of animals of many kinds 
are conducted with orderly spacings between individuals. Pen- 
guins march well spaced in single file. Various kinds of birds allow 
regular intervals between their nests and the nests of others of their 
species. 

Co6peration in the stricter sense of each doing his share in a 
common labor is illustrated as low in the phylogenetic scale as the 
ants. The cutting and carrying of leaves into the nest for the use of 
the larvee of certain species is accomplished by the common effort 
of many individuals. Ants which inhabit India and Ceylon co- 
operate in fastening leaves together with silken threads to serve as 
receptacles for the larve. In a colony of beavers each member 
not only builds his own house in orderly sequence in the bank, but 
~ also does his share in felling trees and in the labor of constructing 
the dam. The posting of ‘guards’ or ‘sentinels’ constitutes another 
form of codperation among animals, and indicates both a high 
degree of social control and a keen susceptibility to social stimuli 


166 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


in the group concerned. It is stated by observers of penguins that 
these birds when they go in search of food leave a kind of ‘nursery 
guard’ consisting of the adult birds having no offspring, who 
form themselves in a circle about the little penguins. Protective 
codperation has also been observed among the anthropoids. A 
remarkable form of ‘communal dance,’ called a kanjo, occurs among 
free chimpanzees. A number of these apes join their efforts in 
making a sort of clay drum by beating down a surface of clay over a 
peat bog. When slapped this surface gives a hollow sound. They 
then begin the ‘dance’ by leaping up and down on this drum and 
shouting. They jump higher and higher and become noisier as the 
dance proceeds, until the limit of their powers is reached. ‘There 
is doubtless a strong circular effect from the rhythmic contributory 
stimuli, each chimpanzee inciting others and in turn being incited to 
wilder activity. 

Social evolution, which has produced among men a long history 
of civilization, is practically unknown among infra-human animals. 
In order that one generation may profit by the experience of the 
preceding, that experience must be reduced by language or by the 
use of tools to some permanent form. Social heredity, the product 
of human thought, labor, and social life, must supplement the 
germ cell heredity in the life of the individual. Only by this means 
can the work of individual genius survive to benefit the race. 
Although inventiveness or genius is hard to discern among animals, 
they are not altogether without a social inheritance. We have 
already noted that among some groups of birds and mammals the 
fear of ancient and predatory enemies of the species is not inherited, 
but must be handed down through the behavior of the parents as 
a ‘social tradition.’ Perhaps the best example of social heredity 
among animals is the acquisition of the song characteristic of 
species of birds through the association of the young birds with the 
older ones. Orioles reared in isolation from their own kind develop 
a song of their own unlike the cadence characteristic of the oriole. 
By being reared with adult canaries, sparrows have been made to 
acquire a song resembling that of the canary. 

Conclusions. Our study of the social activities of animals has 
revealed that in species not lower in the scale than insects indi- 


THE NATURE OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 167 


viduals respond to the presence and behavior of one another in a 
manner which aids their life adjustments. For the most part this 
social behavior is direct and linear, one individual simply reacting 
to another. Occasionally in their group activities animals afford 
contributory stimulation to one another; and in a few situations, 
no doubt, the effect of one individual’s response comes back to him 
in the increased activities of his fellows. Circular behavior is thus 
present, though comparatively rare, among animals. 

We must not suppose that the responsiveness to social objects 
develops to any large extent as a ‘social instinct.’ Originally all 
signs or actions which were of value as social stimuli acquired that 
value because they were either (1) associated with food, (2) used as 
a means of recognizing sex, or (3) interpreted as an indication of 
ensuing danger. The inborn prepotent requirements of the in- 
diwidual were thus the source of social behavior. The lower forms 
have progressed only to the point of adapting themselves to the 
signs unwittingly afforded by their fellows. The method here 
employed is that of the conditioned response. Birds and mammals 
have acquired controlling social behavior. In learning their social 
adjustments they have been able to substitute abridged responses 
of hostility, sex, or other behavior as signs by which to persuade, 
coerce, or divert their associates. The most intelligent of infra- 
human animals, the monkeys, have shown an aptitude for control- 
ling their fellows by misleading social stimuli. 

Probably the most important connection between the social 
behavior of animals and that of man is the capability for social 
control. Among human beings domination is exercised with vastly 
more potent result by language, custom, tradition, and social 
institutions. The finer nwances of human feeling are played upon, 
just as the stupid credulity or the sex interest of one monkey is 
exploited by another. This austere interpretation of society is, 
however, mollified by the consideration that human beings have 
come to enjoy social behavior in and for itself; and that the tender 
responses of family life, already conspicuous among the higher 
animals, represent true driving forces in social conduct. Control of 
individuals is coming to be exercised in the interest of the group 
as a whole rather than for the exclusive profit of the more cunning 
and powerful. 


168 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


REFERENCES 


Mead, G. H., ‘“‘What Social Objects must Psychology Presuppose?” Journai 
of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods, 1910, vir, 174-80. 

Miinsterberg, H., Psychology, General and Applied, ch. 17. 

Allport, F. H., ‘Behavior and Experiment in Social Psychology,” Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology, 1919, x1v, 297-306. 

Holmes, 8. J., Studies in Animal Behavior, chs. 2, 11, 12, 13. 

Parmelee, M., The Science of Human Behavior, chs. 17-21. 

Groos, K., The Play of Animals, chs. 3, 4. 

Lameere, M. A., “Les moeurs sociales des animaux,” Bulletin de Institut 
Général Psychologique, 1916, xvi, 23-39. 

Hobhouse, L. T., Mind in Evolution (2d ed.), ch. 13. 

Craig, W., “Why do Animals Fight?” International Journal of Ethics, 1921, 
XXXI, 264-78. 

“The Voices of Pigeons Regarded as a Means of Social Control,” 
American Journal of Sociology, 1908, x1v, 86-100. 

Whitman, C. O., Orthogenic Evolution in Pigeons, vol. 3, “The Behavior of 
Pigeons.” (Edited by Harvey Carr.) Carnegie Institute, Washington, Pub- 
lications, no. 257, 1919. 

Conradi, E., “Song and Call Notes of English Sparrows when Reared by 
Canaries,’’ American Journal of Psychology, 1905, xv1, 190-98. 

Kempf, E. J., ““The Social and Sexual Behavior of Infra-Human Primates,” 
Psychoanalytic Review, 1917, tv, 127-54. 

“Did Consciousness of Self Play a Part in the Behavior of this Mon- 
key?” Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods, 1916, xm, 
410-12. 

Garner, R. L., The Speech of Monkeys. 





CHAPTER VIII 
SOCIAL STIMULATION — LANGUAGE AND GESTURE 


Forms of Social Stimulation. The social behavior of human. 
beings falls naturally into two classes. The first class comprises 
that behavior which affords stimulation to others; while the second 
consists of the characteristic responses which one makes to such 
stimulation. In the present chapter and the following one we shall 
discuss the first of these two classes; that is, we shall examine the 
behavior of the individual in its capacity for stimulating others to 
react. The forms of social stimulation may be classified in a num- 
ber of ways. They may be treated according to the sense organs 
by which they are received, such as ‘auditory’ for languages and 
cries, ‘touch’ for pressures in a crowd, and so on. Or they may be 
grouped according to whether they are usually ‘direct,’ as language 
in conversation, or ‘contributory,’ as facial expressions and move- 
ments of others in a crowd. Some stimuli also are used for social 
control (language, gestures), while others merely enable us to 
adapt ourselves to the presence and characteristics of those who 
provide them (sight of others, physiognomy). For convenience, 
however, the most important forms of stimulating human behavior 
may be classified under the three main headings of Table III. This 
table makes use also of the principles of classification just men- 
tioned. 

In this chapter we shall consider the first and most important 
group of social stimuli, namely, vocal expression — both that of 
inarticulate sounds and actual speech. Because of their close 
genetic relation to language, gestures will be included in the same 
discussion. 


Tue PuHysroLtoaicaL Basis or Vocat EXPRESSION 
The Organs of Speech — General View. Audible speech is 
made up of two components, tone and noise. The structures for 
producing them are located in a succession of air passages leading 
from the lungs to the lips. Tone is set up by the expired air current 


170 ’ SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


setting into pendular vibration the vocal cords of the larynx. 
Noise results from non-pendular vibrations produced by frictions 
or explosions of air currents at various parts of the mouth cavity. 
A general view of the organs of speech in longitudinal section is seen 


TABLE IIT. Socrau Strmuut 


EFFECT UPON 


PE OF STIMULATING BEHAVIOR RECEPTOR 
TYPE 0 REACTOR 


I. Vocat BEHAVIOR Direct 
Inarticulate Sounds 
Language Controlling 


II. FactaL AND Bopiity BEHAVIOR 
Facial and Bodily Expression in Direct and 
Emotion Contributory 
Facial Posture in Repose 
(Physiognomy) Controlling 
Bodily Posture and 
Movements Self-Adapting 
Gestures 


III. Minor Stimvunations (Non-Ex- 
pressive Behavior and mere 
Presence) Various Contributory 
Sight of Others, Contact, Noise, | Exteroceptive 
Odor, Humidity, ete. Senses Self-Adapting 





in Figure 15. The expired air from the lungs passes through the 
trachea (windpipe) into the larynx (Figure 15, 23) where, the vocal 
cords (4) being properly adjusted, it produces a tone. Issuing up- 
ward through the vestibule of the larynx (20) it is deflected upward 
and backward by the epiglottvs (18), and passes into the pharynx 
(19) and thence out through the oral or mouth cavity (12). 


During speech the velum, or soft palate (Figure 15, 15), with its dependent 
projection, the wula (16), is raised so that it extends backward until it 
almost touches the back wall of the pharynx. In this way the nasal 
chambers are cut off from communication with the pharynx, and the air 
current is deflected forward through the mouth. The nasal chambers are 


SOCIAL STIMULATION 171 


separated from the mouth cavity also by the hard palate (11). In ordinary 
breathing the soft palate drops down close to the tongue, and, almost 
meeting the upraised epiglottis below, separates the mouth cavity more or 
less completely from the pharynx. The inspired air therefore passes 


fea tt fo 


Kp 


Fea 





FicureE 15. THe ORGANS oF SPEECH 


1; Cricoid eartilage; 2, thyroid cartilage; 3, ‘‘Adam’s apple”’; 4, vocal cord; 5, ventricle 
of the larynx; 6, hyoid bone; 7, mylo-hyoid muscle; 8, genio-hyoid muscle; 9, genio- 
glossus muscle; 10, nasal septum (dividing the nostrils); 71, hard palate; 12, mouth 
cavity; 13, nasal pharynx; 14, anterior arch of atlas; 15, soft palate; 16, uvula; 17, tonsil; 
18, epiglottis; 19, laryngeal pharynx; 20, vestibule of larynx; 21, esophagus; 22, cricoid 
cartilage; 23, interior of larynx. 

(Adapted with slight changes from Watson’s Psychology from the Stand point of a Behav- 
tortst, J. B. Lippincott Company, publishers.) 


172 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


through the nostrils, down the pharynx (13, 19), into the larynx and, 
trachea, finally reaching the lungs. In expiration it follows the same 
course. The epiglottis is a movable fold. It is lowered closing the en- 
trance to the larynx during the swallowing of food. It is raised during 
respiration and speech. ‘es 


The Larynx. The larynx consists essentially of a cartilaginous 
framework, or box, roughly cylindrical in shape, with both ends 





Figure 16. DiaGRammatTic Virw or THE Larynx (from the left side) 


A portion of the thyroid cartilage has been cut away to show internal structures. T.C., 
thyroid cartilage; v.c., vocal cord; tr.a.m., transverse arytenoid muscle; A.C., arytenoid 
cartilage; post.c.a.m., posterior crico-arytenoid muscle; ant.c.a.m., anterior crico-arytenoid 
muscle; thyr.a.m., thyro-arytenoid muscle; p, joint of the thyroid upon the ericoid carti- 
lage; c.thyr.m., crico-thyroid muscle; C.C., cricoid eartilage; trac., trachea (wind pipe); 
C.R.irac., cartilaginous rings of the trachea; vp, vocal process of the arytenoid; a, point of 
attachment of the vocal cords to the interior of the thyroid cartilage. ¢ represents a promi- 
nence of the thyroid cartilage seen externally as ‘Adam’s apple.’ 


left open. Two cartilages form the main part of this framework. 
The upper and larger one is the thyroid. It is not a complete 
cylinder, but is open behind; and is between the shape of a U anda 


SOCIAL STIMULATION 173 


V in cross-section. It is placed above the smaller cricoid, or signet- 
ring-shaped cartilage; and its sides project down and enclose the 
latter posteriorly, making a joint upon which it is free to rotate back 
and forth. Across the interior of this framework are stretched two 
elastic folds of mucous membrane, the vocal cords, which, being 
continuous with the | 
lining of the trachea 
and larynx, form with 
this lining a kind of 
roof over the wind- 
pipe, with an adjusta- 


ble slit, the glottis, 
lying between the 
cords. The thyroid 


cartilage is represented 
from different view- 
points in Figures 16 





Figure 17. DIAGRAM OF THE LARYNX (as seen — 


andwiie2.C.,- and: in 
longitudinal section in 
Figure 15, 2. The cri- 
coid is shown in Fig- 
Urecsionandels. C.C.: 
and in Figure 15, 1, 
22. The pivotal joint 
of the thyroid upon 
the cricoid is located 


from above) 


The shaded portions represent muscles; the unshaded, 
cartilages. C.C., cricoid cartilage; fr.a.m., transverse aryte= 
noid muscle; post.c.a.m., posterior crico-arytenoid muscle; 
A.C., arytenoid cartilage; anét.c.a.m., anterior crico-arytenoid 
muscle; vp, vocal process of the arytenoid; 7.C., thyroid 
eartilage; thyr.a.m., thyro-arytenoid muscle; v.c., vocal cord; 
x, point of articulation of the arytenoid upon the cricoid carti- 
lage; G, glottis; cg, cartilaginous glottis; lg, ligamentous glot- 
tis; a, point of attachment of vocal cords to the thyroid 
cartilage. f indicates the front aspect of the throat. 

(Modified from Von Meyer’s The Organs of Speech, by 


- permission of the publishers, Messrs. D. Appleton and Com- 


pany, New York.) 


at p in Figure 16. The vocal cords are designated in Figure 15, 


4, and in Figures 16 and 17, »v.c. 


tion of the glottis. 


Figure 17, G, shows the posi- 


Surmounting the cricoid cartilage is a pair of small, triangular-based, 


pyramidal cartilages called the arytenoids (Figures 16 and 17, A.C.). 


The 


forward points of their bases, the vocal processes (Figures 16 and 17, up), 
serve as points of attachment for the posterior ends of the vocal cords. 
Each vocal cord runs from its point of attachment inside the thyroid 
cartilage (Figures 16 and 17, a) to the vocal process of its arytenoid. The 
portion of the glottis lying between the cords is known as the lugamentous 
glottis (Figure 17, lg); while the shorter portion lying between the aryte- 
noids is called the cartilaginous glottis (Figure 17, cg). 


174 


SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


A fair understanding of the functions of the larynx may be gained 











Figure 18. Laryneoscorie 
VIEWS oF THE LARYNX WITH 
DIFFERENT POSITIONS OF 
THE GLOTTIS 
(Reversed from the position of 

Figure 17 because reflected in 


the laryngoscope) 

A, while singing a high note; B, 
in quiet breathing; C, during a deep 
inspiration. J, base of the tongue; e, 
parts of the epiglottis; ph, pharynx; 
w, 8, swellings caused by small car- 
tilages above the arytenoid; evs, roof 
of the ventricle of the larynx; ev, vo- 
cal cord; a, summit of the arytenoid 
cartilage; ir, trachea; b, beginning 
of bronchial tube. 

(From Quain’s Anatomy, after 
Czermak, by courtesy of Messrs. 
Longmans, Green and Company, 
New York and London.) 


from three lines of inquiry: (1) How is 
this mechanism, which serves ordinarily 
for noiseless breathing, converted into a 
tone-producing instrument? (2) What 
determines the pitch and loudness of 
the tones produced? (8) How do the 
larynx and related structures codperate 
in producing vowel sounds? 

Laryngeal Tone Production. When 
the glottis is open, as in Figure 18, B, 
it is in position for quiet breathing. 
Vocal utterances in this position are 
merely whispers, lacking in that true 
‘voice quality’ which depends on the 
formation of laryngeal tones. In order 
to produce true speech the cords must 
be brought close enough together to 
give periodic vibrations, lke reeds, 
when the air is driven upward between 
them. 


This effeet is produced in the following 
way: The open glottis is triangular in shape, 
being wider in the eartilaginous than in 
the ligamentous portion (Figure 17). The 
articulation of the arytenoid upon the cricoid 
cartilage (Figure 17, x) is not a definite 
joint. It serves either as a pivot or as a 
gliding surface according to the action of 
the controlling muscles. If its aetion is 
pivotal, and if the vocal processes be rotated 
inward until they meet, the hgamentous 
glottis will be closed, and the cords brought 
close together. This rotating movement is 
produced by the contraction of two sets of 
paired muscles, the thyro-arytenoid} (Fig- 

1 There is difference of opinion regarding the 


function of this muscle. Some authors maintain 
that it draws the arytenoids as a whole toward 


SOCIAL STIMULATION 175 


ures 16 and 17, thyr.a.m.) and the anterior crico-arytenoid (ant.c.a.m.). In 
combination with this movement the transverse arytenoid muscle (ér.a.m.) 
by contracting drags the two arytenoid cartilages bodily together, so 
that, by a kind of interlocking action, they close the cartilaginous glot- 
tis... The glottis as a whole is thus closed or narrowed, and is ready for the 
production of tone (Figure 18, A). 

In opening the glottis the muscles just mentioned relax, and a pull is 
exerted by their antagonists, the posterior crico-arytenotds (Figures 16 and 
17, post.c.a.m.), which, by a lever-like action about x, rotate the vocal 
processes outward and separate the cords. Extreme outward rotation 
gives a wide, rhomboidal opening characteristic of labored breathing 
(Figure 18, C). Inward or outward rotation about x also produces a 
stretching and tightening effect upon the cords. By a vertical lever action 
about the same point the vocal processes and cords are also raised (ante- 
rior and posterior crico-arytenoids) or lowered (thyro-arytenoids). (See 
Figure 16.) The nature of the laryngeal tone is probably influenced by 
these changes. The intrinsic muscles of the larynx, being in a continual 
state of tonic contraction, constitute an equilibrium of forces. Slight 
alterations of nerve impulse disturb the balance and produce minutely 
graded changes in the condition of the cords and glottis, with resulting 
differentiations of sound. 


Pitch and Intensity of Laryngeal Tones. Variation in the pitch 
of the voice is produced chiefly by the action of the crico-thyroid 
muscle (Figure 16, c.thyr.m.). By its contraction the thyroid 
cartilage is either rocked forward and downward, or else pulled 
bodily forward, on its gliding articulation, p. An arc with p as 
center through a (Figure 16) describes the course taken by the point 
of attachment of the vocal cords (a—d) when the thyroid cartilage is 
tilted. The straight dotted line (Figure 16, d-vp) indicates the 
new position of the vocal cords, and shows that they are now 
stretched to a greater length and therefore rendered more tense. 
Increase in the tension of a vibrating string, of course, produces a 
rise in pitch.2 The range in pitch of tones producible by the aver- 
age human larynx is from two to two and one half octaves. 


The tones of the larynx are enhanced in their strong, sonorous quality 


the thyroid, thereby slackening the vocal cords. The contraction of its internal 
portion is also supposed to thicken the cord itself. 
1 The combined action of these ‘adductor’ muscles is much like that of a sphincter. 
2 Tension being constant, pitch varies inversely with the length of vibrating bodies. 
For this reason (that is, because of greater diameter of the larynx) the voices of 
adult males are pitched lower than those of females. 


176 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY | 


by a system of resonating cavities to whose confined air masses the vibra- 
tions are conducted. The ventricles of the larynx (Figure 15, 5), vestibule, 
pharynx, and nasal and oral cavities are all important resonators. A high 
tone requires a smaller resonator than a low one. The throat and mouth 
passages are therefore shortened in high tones by raising the entire larynx, 
a movement produced by muscles connecting the thyroid cartilage with 
the hyoid bone above it (Figure 15, 6). By the contraction of muscles 
running from the thyroid down to the sternum the larynx is lowered for 
low tones, and the resonating cavities correspondingly lengthened.' 

Muscles surrounding the pharynx also coéperate in modifying resonance 
spaces. There are two special adjustments of the larynx, one for very 
high (head) tones, the other for deep (chest) tones. Head tones resonate 
in the head cavities, and are produced with the glottis slightly open, the 
cords tense and thin, and vibrating only in part. Chest tones resonate 
through the windpipe and chest cavity, and are made with the cords fairly 
lax but pressed together, and vibrant throughout their whole extent. 


Intensity or loudness of voice depends on the strength of the 
blast from the lungs, which governs the amplitude of the cordal 
vibrations. | 

The Formation of Vowels. The vowels of speech are modified 
laryngeal tones of varying pitch and quality. The peculiar quality 
by which the various vowels are distinguished is produced by 
specific alterations of the size and shape of the resonance chambers. 
In this way a resonator is produced capable of emphasizing the 
particular overtones or accompanying tones characteristic of a 
viven vowel. 


In U (pronounced as 00 in boot) the larynx is depressed, the soft palate 
highly raised, the front part of the tongue flattened and the back part 
elevated, and the resonance chamber further prolonged by protruding and 
rounding the lips. In A (as in father) the larynx is somewhat raised, the 
mouth open more widely, the soft palate less sharply elevated, the entire 
tongue depressed, and the lips normal. In O (as in go) and in A (all) the 
shape of the mouth cavity and lip positions are intermediate between 
those of U and broad A. FE (asin eve) employs a high-pitched, closed, and 
shortened resonator. The lips are drawn back against the teeth, and the 
tongue raised and carried forward until it almost touches the hard palate, 
leaving a large pharyngeal space behind. The soft palate and larynx are 
considerably elevated. The vowels A (am), E (bet), and A (pay) form a 


* These movements may be detected by placing the finger on the ‘‘Adam’s apple”’ 
while singing the scale or pronouncing vowels of different pitches. 


SOCIAL STIMULATION 177 


graded series between broad A and long £, the tongue being brought suc- 
cessively forward and upward, the larynx raised, the mouth opening 
lessened, and the lips drawn back. 


_ Articulate Speech. Consonants. Vowels, as we have seen, are 
modified laryngeal tones which contribute to language that sonor- 
ous and sustained quality called ‘voice.’ Within the cavity of the 
mouth are produced the characteristic noises which are blended and 
joined with the laryngeal tones in articulate speech. In themselves 
these noises are weak and unsustained, serving merely to initiate 
or terminate the vowel sounds. They are called consonants. The 
most important organ for the articulation of consonants with 
vowels is the tongue. It consists of a mass of muscle tissue capable 
of movement in any direction, or of modifying its own shape and 
surface. Muscles attached to the skull, hyoid bone, and lower 
jaw (Figure 15, 9) draw it respectively upward and backward, 
downward and backward, and downward and forward. Most. 
consonants are produced by frictions or explosions of the air caused 
by bringing some part of the tongue into proximity or contact with 
the teeth, upper gums, or hard or soft palate. 


_ Consonantal sounds are usually classified as fricative and explosive. The 
former result from the friction of the air in passing through a small opening, 
such as that made between the tip of the tongue and the teeth in pronounc- 
ing th. The latter are minute explosions caused by the air rushing in 
when two hermetically opposed surfaces are quickly separated. K, for 
example, is made by a sudden separation of the back of the tongue from 
the soft palate. Initial p is produced by the expired air forcing apart 
the closed lips. Terminal explosives (p in dip) are caused by the sudden 
clapping together of the lips or other surfaces. Fricative sounds may be 
prolonged for some time, while explosive sounds are momentary. Among 
fricatives we may further distinguish the open or aspirate (breathing) sound 
(h), the more closed and stridulous sh, f, or s, and the vibratory r. 

The consonants are also classified according to the place where they are 
articulated. We thus have the labials, p, b, and w, produced by the lips; 
the dentals, t, d, r, s, and th, articulated as explosives or fricatives by the 
tongue against the upper teeth, gums, or forward hard palate; the labio- 
dentals, f and v; the marginals, | and y, in which the tip of the tongue ap- 
proximates the hard palate, and the air passes out over its sides; the 
palatals, ch, j, and sh, formed between the tongue and hard palate; and the 
gutturals, k, g, and ng, formed between the tongue and soft palate. M, n, 


178 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


and ng, though articulated and functioning as consonants, are actually 
voiced elements of vowel character in which the mouth cavity is closed and 
the soft palate lowered, allowing the air to pass out through the nose. 
They are called nasals. 

There is, finally, a distinction according to whether consonants are 
produced as obstructions of tone, and hence have a certain voice quality 
(called sonants), or are simply breathed or made by mouth opening and 
closing (called surds). For each place of articulation there is a pair, a 
sonant consonant with its corresponding surd. Thus we have 6 (sonant) 
and p (surd), g (sonant) and & (surd), etc. Table IV summarizes the 
above classifications. 


> 


TABLE IV. ENGLISH CONSONANTS! 
NASAL 


Continu- 


PLACE oF ARTICULATION Explosive Fricative ous 
Tonal 


Surd | Sonant Surd Sonant | Sonant 


th(thin) | th(thy) 
Tongue and hard palate (forward) 8 Z,T 


Tongue and hard palate (back) j sh zh,r 





Tongue, hard palate, and soft palate.... i We #3 y, 1 


Tongue and soft palate 


Various places 





THE GENETIC DEVELOPMENT OF VocAL EXPRESSION 


Gesture Language in Infants. The earliest form of communica- 
tion in infancy is not speech, nor indeed vocal expression of any 
sort, but gesture. The language of gesture develops from natural 
and serviceable movements originally of purely individualistic 
significance. The head-shaking gesture illustrates the genetic 
process. At the beginning the baby turns his head away so as to 
prevent undesired substances which touch his lips from entering 


1 Adapted, by permission, from Webster's Collegiate Dictionary. (Copyright, 1898, by 
G. & C. Merriam Company, Springfield, Massachusetts.) 


SOCIAL STIMULATION 179 


his mouth. This is the stage of simple avoidance or withdrawing. 
By conditioned response the sight of the undesirable object later 
calls forth the same reaction, and the effect is now avoidance in 
advance, or refusai. The movement serves as a sign which is 
readily understood and reacted to by the person offering the 
rejected substance. Since the action serves thus to control the 
behavior of others in a manner useful to the individual it is fixated 
according to the principles of arc fixation in learning. It is now 
used as a sign; in other words, it has become a gesture. The 
movement therefore has passed from a simple avoiding response of 
no social significance to a truly expressive one, valuable in the 
control of the social environment for the prepotent interests of the 
individual who uses it. We have observed the operation of this 
same principle in the social behavior of the lower animals. It is 
one of the fundamental laws upon which the acquisition of all 
habits of communication is based. 

The final stage in the head-shaking reaction is that expressing 
dissent (refusal of acceptance) toward a purely declarative state- 
ment. The use of the gesture for mere negation in the indicative 
mode, however, scarcely develops until after the period of infancy. 
To the baby every negation is a refusal of some object or proposal: 
the only mode used is the imperative. Other gestures are used in 
infancy, such as holding out the hand toward a desired object, or 
tugging at the hands or clothing of an adult. They are all socially 
controlling stimuli of an imperative sort, established as satisfiers of 
prepotent demands within the social sphere. 

Pre-linguistic or Laryngeal Stage of Vocal Expression. While 
the gesture repertory is expanding there is also progress in the 
strength and variety of tone produced by the larynx. The cry of 
the newborn child, evoked by hunger or organic distress, is weak, 
rhythmic, tremulous, and unvaried. The sounds most frequently 
heard are short a, as in at, and wu, as in up, articulated with a few 
simple consonants apparently formed by random articulatory 
movements (for example, ‘nah,’ ‘wuh,’ ‘ha,’ etc.). Within the 
first month marked variations occur in tempo, loudness, pitch, and 
vowel quality of the vocal utterances — all expressive of the de- 
velopment and differentiation of shades of feeling and emotion. 


180 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


In the crying of his son at three months of age the writer could 
discern at least five emotional varieties: the quick exhalations of 
fretting and annoyance, whining or entreating, the long drawn, 
detached sleepy cry, spasmodic inspirations of sobbing after hard 
crying, and the rasping and crescendo cry of anger. By the age of 
four months thwarting of efforts to feed evokes a quick and de- 
cisive anger cry. Laryngeal expression is acquired with far greater 
facility than the difficult movements of articulation. The baby 
consequently has mastered all the vowels in the language (and 
more) long before he can articulate them clearly with the various 
consonantal noises. 

The laryngeal stage, or period of cries, in human expression is 
comparable to the vocal behavior of the lower animals. The 
primitive glottal reflexes and coédrdinations early acquired become 
part of the general emotional response of the individual. Among 
animals we have seen that these cries are responded to in appropri- 
ate ways by fellow creatures who learn their significance. Simi- 
larly in man, the early glottal sounds of infancy acquire significance 
for the parents as suggesting certain emotional states and needs of 
the child, and thus bring about the appropriate ministrations. 
These sounds therefore take on a social significance which is not 
innate either in parent or child but a product of experience in 
reactions between them. 

As in the case of infra-human vocalization and human gesture 
we find here a transition from a purely individualistic emotional 
response to expressive behavior, that is, to behavior as a means of 
communication and social control. The anger cry, if found effec- 
tive, quickly assumes the role of an infantile imperative. A 
spoiled child of three or four, if suddenly thwarted in his wishes, 
lapses into his earlier method of shouting and screaming, substi- 
tuting for the unavailing word symbol the more primitive and 
vehement method of control by the larynx. The ‘stereotyped 
tantrum’ is a pre-linguistic form of social control. There is an early 
development, as the baby grows, from mere crying, through whin- 
ing, coaxing, scolding, and finally yelling; all of these stages appear- 
ing before true speech habits are acquired. 

_ Somewhat later there evolves a distinctly different wail sugges 


SOCIAL STIMULATION 181 


tive of a hopeless and ‘hurt’ feeling. It is accompanied by a facial 
expression of intense grief. Though appearing significantly in 
cases where strong desires are blocked by a parent, it is also evoked 
by severe physical pains, such as a pinched finger or bruised head. 
Beginning as a mere emotional outburst, it rapidly assumes a value 
for social control as an appeal for sympathetic ministrations. An 
additional adaptive value is added in the good ‘hurt ery’ which 
a small boy works up in order to have his bullying elder brother 
punished. Even when fully grown the ‘hurt feeling’ retains for us 
the significance of a desire both for sympathy and for the punish- 
ment of the offender by having his injustices recognized by others. 

Behavior of this sort serves the same purpose for the acquisition 
of objects or ends as the gesture of head-shaking serves in their 
rejection. The mode in all cases is imperative, and the effect is the 
securing of some infantile form of adaptation through the control 
of others. Laryngeal expression may be regarded as a kind of 
vocal gesture of infancy. 

The Development of Language: Stage 1. Random Articulation 
with Fixation of Circular Responses. The marvelously intricate 
and versatile speech mechanism described earlier in this chapter is 
at birth, like other motor mechanisms, simply a crude possibility. 
Further growth of the nerves and muscles must combine with 
practice to produce a repertory of sounds adequate for language. 
With such development as a basis the social environment furnishes 
the stimuli necessary for the acquisition of perfected speech habits. 
The earliest used consonants, which, according to Miss Blanton, 
occur during the first month of life, are chiefly nasals and gutturals, 
such as m, n, ng, g, and k (also h, w, and y). These represent easy 
mouth positions adopted probably as random movements. They 
are articulated with various long and broad vowel sounds, and 
with some diphthongs (double vowels), as in “‘gow”’ (writer’s son 
at two months). 

Overlapping with the period of laryngeal expression and finally 
succeeding it there appears the stage of random articulation, the 
babbling and cooing of the child during its second and third half 
years of life. In this period the early consonants are repeated with 
better control and supplemented by new ones. The dental and 


182 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


labial explosives, p, b, é, and d, are soon acquired. The fricatives 
s, f, v, and th are more intricate and come later. L, which requires 
inversion of the tip of the tongue, may require three years to 
perfect. R also is difficult as an initial sound. Examples of 
early mispronunciations are “‘whing”’ (sing), “yight”’ (light), ete. 
Double consonants cause much difficulty, the second consonant 
generally being slighted; for example, ‘‘p’ease”’ (please). 

With random articulation we enter upon a new phase contrast- 
ing somewhat with that of pure laryngeal utterance. The latter is 
imperative in mode. It arises with some strong, unpleasant emo- 
tion due to thwarting or discomfort; and it rapidly assumes the 
function of social control. ‘Baby talk’ on the other hand is spon- 
taneous and indicative of a pleasant mood. It is a form of play, a 
part of the diffuse outflow of energy, rather than an effort at the 
control of others. If stronger emotions enter the field, bringing in 
the functions of the sympathetic nervous system, the pleasant 
prattle at once gives place to the inarticulate cries of the earlier 
period.! 

Too much attention has been paid to the acquisition of vocabu- 
laries, and too little to the study of the pre-verbal stage of random 
articulation in infants. This stage not only affords the material for 
language but gives the practice necessary for the control through 
the ear of the muscles of speech. The chief significance of the vocal 
play of babies seems to be in establishing circular reflexes between 
the sound of the syllable and the response of speaking it.2 Let us 
suppose, for example, that the baby utters the syllable da. By so 
doing he stimulates himself through two channels. He receives 
certain kinesthetic sensations from the movement of the vocal 
organs, and certain auditory sensations from the sound which he 
produced. It is with the auditory stimulation that we shall be 
chiefly concerned. Returning to the brain centers these afferent 
impulses are, or tend to be, redischarged through the same motor 
pathways as those used in speaking the syllable itself. There are 
two possible methods of explaining this. We may suppose that 
the synapses connecting the afferent impulse with the motor outlet 


1 Cf. the theory of antagonistic emotions explained in Chapter IV. 
_ 2 The general mechanism of circular reflexes was described on p. 39. 


SOCIAL STIMULATION 183 


of speaking da, having been recently used, are in a state of relatively 
lowered resistance, and are therefore readily put into operation 
again. Or we may infer that, in some cases at least, the return 
stimulations are received while the speaking response is still going 
on (as in a prolonged vowel sound), and the motor synaptic resist- 
ances for da are completely overcome because discharge through 
those synapses is actually taking place. We have here the exact 
situation for the formation of a conditioned response. The response 
da becomes circularly conditioned by the sound da; and this sound 
when later heard will tend of itself to evoke the response of speak- 
ing it. This latter explanation is probably the true one.! While 
the babe is practicing the syllabic elements of his future vocabulary 
he is therefore also fixating ear-vocal reflexes through which a 
spoken sound may directly evoke its enunciation. Articulation 
has now advanced to a stage where it is capable of being con- 
trolled through the auditory receptor. The process just described 
is illustrated diagrammatically in Figure 19, A. 

Stage 2. — Evoking of the Articulate Elements by the Speech of 
Others (so-called ‘Imitation’). At this point the social influence 
enters the process of language development. If the ear-vocal 
reflexes have been sufficiently established for the sound of a word to 
call forth the response of articulating it, it is no longer necessary 
that the child himself should speak the stimulating word. It may 
be spoken by another. ‘The effect will then be that of the child 
repeating the sounds which he hears others utter. This stage is 
suggested in Figure 19, B. It is, of course, assumed that only such 
speech responses as have been acquired through growth and practice 
will be evoked in this manner. The child does not imitate or du- 
plicate the speech of his elders. There is evoked simply the nearest 
similar ear-vocal reflex which, with his present limitations of pro- 
nouncing, he has been able to fixate. The word ‘‘doll,”’ spoken by 

1 Direct proof of this process is, of course, difficult to obtain. There are, however, 
a number of exact analogies, of which the micturition reflex is perhaps the most con- 
vincing. When the bladder is partially filled, the mere sound of running water is a 
sufficient stimulus to cause either an increase in bladder tonus (desire to urinate), or 
the act of voiding itself. Here, as in the vocal reflexes, the sound produced by the 
act performed in the past by the individual himself has acquired, by conditioning, a 


stimulus value for evoking the act itself. Feeling impelled to cough when we hear 
others cough is a similar example. 


184 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


the parent, would probably be repeated da (a asin father). In this 
manner whole phrases far beyond the learner’s comprehension may 
be reiterated rote fashion with as fair accuracy as the speech habits 
already acquired permit. It is essentially a parrot stage. In 





A, Stage 1. — Random articulation of syllables with fixation of circular responses. Chance 
articulation of the syllable da causes the baby to hear himself say it. The auditory impulse 
is conveyed to the brain centers where it discharges into the efferent neurons to muscle groups 
used in pronouncing the same syllable. An ear-vocal habit for da is thus established. 

B, Stage 2. — Evoking of the same articulate elements by the speech sounds of others. An 
adult speaking the word ‘“‘doll,’’ which is closely similar to da, causes the auditory excitation 
again to discharge into the response da. 





4 
D | ey 
eo at ‘% 


\E 


C and D, Stage 3.— Conditioning of the articulate elements (evoked by others) by objects. In C 
the process shown in Bisrepeated. A doll shown at the same time stimulates the baby’s eye, 
and forms a visual connection with the motor neurons being used in pronouncing the syllable. 
There is thus established a conditioned response between the sight of the doll and the speaking 
of da. The sight of the doll alone (D) is now sufficient to evoke its name (da being as close as 
the baby can come to the pronunciation of ‘“‘doll’’). 





Fiaure 19. Tae DEVELOPMENT OF LANGUAGE HABITS IN THE INFANT 


popular parlance it is known as ‘learning by imitation.’ The term 
‘imitation’ is however both inexact and misleading, for it suggests 
that the process is one of learning the speech reactions of others by 
voluntarily copying them; whereas it is really the touching off of 


SOCIAL STIMULATION 185 


previously acquired speech habits by their conditioning auditory 
stimuli.! 

Discussion of the Theory involved in Stages 1 and 2. The reader 
should bear in mind that the process thus far described is largely 
hypothetical. Precise physiological data are wanting; but in their 
absence we may review certain lines of evidence in support of the 
hypothesis. 

(1) If vocal responses are circularly fixated, with the sound of 
speaking them serving as stimulus, we should expect that reitera- 
tion of the same syllable over and over would be a necessary result. 
The baby would learn to mimic himself as a prerequisite for repeat- 
ing sounds made by others. The facts support this supposition. 
Reduplication of syllables (da-da-da, etc.) in a tireless manner is a 
common phenomenon of baby talk. Later many objects are named 
with doubling of syllables (for example, wah-wah for water), and 
longer phrases are reiterated as a kind of play. 

(2) Only sounds which have been already pronounced in random 
articulation can be evoked by the speech sounds of others. That 
is, only those sounds can be evoked which have had a chance to 
become circularly fixated as ear-vocal reflexes. The spoken word 
‘“‘nencil’”? was repeated by the writer’s son as punka (c and J sounds 
not yet acquired). The phrase ‘‘ What is that?” involving difficult 
consonants, was reproduced as wh 7% d. The words ‘down,’ 
“doll,” and ‘“‘clock,’’ when spoken to him, were all repeated as da. 
Ba, similarly, was his reproduction of “box,” “bath,” bottle,” 
“block,” and “‘bye.”’ ? 

(3) There exist in the central nervous system mechanisms ade- 
quate for the circular fixation of vocal habits. Leaving out of 
account the cortex, relatively undeveloped in infancy, there are 
adequate connections between the auditory nuclei of the brain 
stem and motor fibers controlling the organs of speech. Neither 
high intelligence nor conscious imitation are necessary for the use 
of this apparatus. The ear-vocal connection is direct and im- 

1 Although the theory thus far discussed was developed independently by the 
writer, he does not claim to be the first one to have advanced it. A concise state- 
ment of the principles involved may be found in Smith and Guthrie: General Psy- 


chology in Terms of Behavior, p. 132. 
2 Cf. E. L. Thorndike: Educational Psychology, Briefer Course, p. 43. 


186 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


mediate. The evidence for this is at hand in cases of echolalia in 
idiots and aphasic patients.!_ These ‘human parrots’ accurately 
reiterate whole phrases spoken in their hearing without the slight- 
est comprehension of their meaning. We are probably dealing 
here with sub-cortical mechanisms representing early formed and 
circularly fixed responses comparable to those of the baby. 

(4) It is well known that congenital or early deafness is usually 
accompanied by mutism. Deaf-mutes are able to articulate in the 
manner of the random infantile period (baby talk); but they can- 
not, without special methods, learn the use of spoken language. 
Since the ear-vocal reflexes were not and cannot be acquired, some 
other form, such as eye-vocal reflexes, must be substituted if the 
knack of speaking words is to be imparted to them. The lack of the 
usual, early formed, circular vocal reactions is responsible for their 
mutism. 

Without pursuing this question further we may tentatively 
accept the foregoing explanation of the so-called ‘imitative stage’ 
of language development.? Word habits have been formed which 
are capable of being put into effect by the sound of the same words 
spoken within hearing. The next step is to convert these parrot- 
like reactions into true language. This step like the preceding is 
achieved through social agencies. 

Stage 3. — Conditioning of the Articulate Elements (evoked by 
others) by Objects and Situations. As soon as the stage is reached 
in which the parent can evoke repetitions of words from the infant 
at will, the process of teaching him to name objects begins. It does 
not suffice to say ‘‘doll”’ and hear the child repeat da. The doll 


117. S. Hollingworth: ‘‘Echolalia in Idiots,’”’ Journal of Educational Psychology, 
1917, vu, 212-19. 

2 A rival theory asserts that every vocal response pattern is connected innately 
with the sensory pattern produced by the sound of the word in question. Special 
instinctive mechanisms of imitation supply the ear-vocal connections which we have 
assumed to be developed through a conditioned circular response within the experi- 
ence of the individual. The four points in the discussion above might all be con- 
strued to fit this theory. (Cf. Professor Hollingworth’s article, loc. cit., in regard to 
echolalia.) It would be necessary, however, to meet the criticisms in regard to 
maturation theories and inheritance of ‘‘ perceptual dispositions’ raised in Chapter 
III. The maturation theory is particularly awkward, compared with the circular 
reflex theory, in connection with the second point of the discussion. Instinctive 
imitation is at best a speculative hypothesis, while cases of circularly fixated, ear- 
motor reflexes are clearly established (see footnote to p. 183). 


SOCIAL STIMULATION 187 


itself is held up for inspection while the learner repeats the word 
pronounced by the parent or nurse. A conditioned response is 
thus formed; the afferent visual impulse from the doll discharges its 
energy through the motor pathways of the speech pattern of pro- 
nouncing the word. ‘The object itself thus becomes a stimulus 
adequate for evoking the response of speaking its name. Figure 
19, C and D, illustrate schematically this conditioning process. 
Stages two and three are practically synchronous in the actual 
development of the child. We have separated them in the descrip- 
tion only for the sake of clearness. 

Progress from this point is rapid. A child may learn in this 
manner to speak the approximate names of several hundred objects 
while he is still laboring over the exact pronunciation of difficult 
consonants. ‘The naming, or vocabulary-acquiring, process begins 
early in the second year and increases by ever-lengthening strides 
up to six years, at which age the average child has a vocabulary of 
about three thousand words. 

Our explanation thus far has involved only the control of the 
speech reactions of the child by the adult. Social control, however, 
soon operates in the reverse direction. The child learns to use his 
naming habits as demanding habits. Suppose he sees a new and 
interesting doll out of reach on a shelf. Manipulative tendencies 
cause him to reach forit. Failing in this, the usual law of trial and 
error brings into play all possible movements. One of the readiest 
and easiest of these movements is the pronunciation of the word 
‘doll’? —a reaction which is moreover elicited by its recent associa- 
tion (conditioning) with the sight of an object of that general sort. 
The word is therefore spoken, and the pleased parent presents the 
doll as a reward. The manipulative drive now proceeds unham- 
pered, and the ares involved in this solution of the problem are 
fixated for future use. By simple vocal expression the child thus 
learns to control others. He increases vicariously his own stature, 
his power, and his sagacity by enlisting these attributes of adults in 
the service of his needs. Little wonder that his linguistic progress 
is rapid! 

The naming reaction can be conditioned not only by the sight 
of an object but by other stimuli inherent in the general situation. 


188 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


The word “‘doll”’ may have been evoked at a time when the child 
was handling the toy, ‘talking’ to it, or even running to get it. 
The proprioceptive stimulations arising from these acts therefore 
become adequate conditioning stimuli for producing the response of 
speaking the word. In all relations in which the doll itself was 
formerly experienced the word ‘doll’? may now be called up in 
consciousness and evoked as an audible or a ‘thought’ response. 
At any future time therefore when the child may recall or have the 
tendency to manipulate such an object through habit, he will be 
likely to say ‘“doll.”’ The attendant again produces the object; 
and the arcs involved in this solution are fixated as before. The 
learner has now reached the advanced stage of demanding objects 
desired but not seen. Verbs, adverbs, and particles, such as “give,” 
“down,” “‘again,” “‘move,” and ‘‘no,” are acquired and used in 
the same fashion. Having been learned through social agents in 
connection with attitudes, postures, and situations, they are now 
used to control these agents with respect to the situations they 
represent. 

In the learning of language then, as in the stages of laryngeal and 
gestural expression, we find that social control is a cogent factor. 
With increasing development, however, other considerations enter. 
In addition to naming and demanding objects the child begins to 
talk about them. He discourses to his toys and about them. He 
verbally reviews bits of the day’s experience as he lies in his crib 
in the evening, and in so doing substitutes word responses for the 
overt movements he originally employed in living them. In other 
words, language becomes for him a vehicle of thought. 

Development of Response to Language. A few words may be 
added concerning the understanding of language by the infant, a 
function which precedes its actual use by some weeks or months. 
Speech sounds of others stimulate the child in many ways beside the 
eliciting of ear-vocal reflexes. They control his behavior in con- 
soling him, diverting his attention, and offering signs by which he 
knows that he is to be tended in various ways. Language serves 
to condition the prepotent activities of the baby in the same way 
that the incidental growls or sex sounds condition the withdrawing 
or approaching responses of the lower animals. Experiments show 


SOCIAL STIMULATION 189 


that dogs respond very little to words as articulated symbols, but 
chiefly to the pitch, intensity, and quality of the voice. The earliest 
effect of vocal stimuli upon the baby is through these same laryn- 
geal components. An infant will cry at a scolding tone of the 
parent long before the words themselves are understood. By the 
end of the first year the response to commands, or to the direction 
of attention, that is, to some part of the child’s body, indicate that 
he is beginning to understand the meaning of articulate word 
symbols.! 

The final achievement of linguistic development is the response 
to language by the use of language, as In answering a question. 
This occurs late, usually after a fair mastery of speech has been 
obtained. Aside from the intellectual difficulty involved, there 
appears to be a kind of inertia: the child is loath to quit the placid, 
irresponsible haven of ear-vocal reflexes for the uncharted sea of 
interrogation. 


GESTURE AND VocAL EXPRESSION IN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 


Infantile and Primitive Language. Although the old notion that 
the child in his development recapitulates the stages in the evolu- 
tion of mankind is becoming obsolete, we may still profitably bear 
in mind some of the facts of child language in seeking to understand 
its development in the race. In certain aspects the same conditions 
and explanatory principles apply to each. (1) Neither the child 
nor aboriginal man was innately endowed with speech. The drives, 
moreover, and laws of learning by which it had to be acquired are 
the same for both. (2) Pre-linguistic man, as well as the modern 
baby, probably possessed as material for language development a 
set of random laryngeal and articulate utterances. The main 
differences between the two situations are (1) that the child learns 
the speech reactions already established in the vocabulary of his 
elders, while the primitive man had to evolve a language of his 
own; and (2) that in the former case the language is mastered in 

1 Romanes states the case as follows: “While the understanding of certain tones 
of the human voice extends at least through the entire vertebrated series, and occurs 
in infants only a few weeks old; the understanding of words without the assistance of 


tones appears to occur only in a few of the higher mammalia, and first dawns in the 
growing child during the second year.’ (Mental Evolution in Man, p. 124.) 


190 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


the first few years of an individual’s life, whereas in the latter whole 
tribes were busy for many generations contributing word symbols, 
and modifying and transmitting linguistic art, before an adequate 
language was achieved. These statements will be developed in the 
sections following. 

Theories of the Origin of Language. Gesture. Speculation on 
the roots of language has yielded a considerable crop of theories. 
Three of the most significant are the gesture theory, the interjec- 
tional theory, and the onomatopoetic theory. The gesture theory 
of Wundt traces the origin of language to gesticulation. Stress is 
laid upon the precedence of gesture to speech in the infant, and 
upon the fact that gesture is an effective and spontaneously 
adopted means of communication among both primitive and 
civilized when the speakers have no language in common. An- 
thropologists report detailed, narrative conversations carried on 
by pantomime between Indians of distant tribes.!_ The American 
soldier in France had little difficulty in making his wants known 
through gesture and grimace. Deaf-mutes and aphasic patients 
are very skilled in this form of communication. Even idiots can be 
taught to obey commands given in gesture which would be mean- 
ingless in verbal form. 

Gestures are of three kinds, emotional, demonstrative, and 
graphic. Bodily movements form a natural part of the primitive 
emotional reactions. The fist is clenched in anger. The hand is 
waved to one side and the foot stamped in impatience. Pointing 
the finger with the hand clenched and palm to the inside is a gesture 
of threat or accusation. Pointing with the palm down is merely for 
directing attention. Some of these gestures seem as immediate and 
innate as facial expressions. Their significance as stimuli is even 
greater: they are rarely misunderstood. Most emotional gestures 
belong to the ‘halfway stage’ of communication; that is, they are 
of more significance for the one who sees them than for the one who 
makes them. They afford the former a clue for adapting himself 
to the mental condition of the latter. Among the lower animals, 
who possess no language proper, they become important means 


1 For a good account of gesture language see Romanes: Mental Evolution in Man, 
ch. 6. 


SOCIAL STIMULATION 191 


for controlling other creatures. Demonstrative gestures consist 
merely of pointing to the objects one desires to call to attention, 
allowing the situation to make clear any control which the ‘ pointer’ 
desires to exercise in regard to them. The vocabulary in this case 
is, of course, limited to the range of objects within sight. This 
defect is remedied by the use of descriptive or graphic gestures. 
One may, for example, represent a house by movements of the hands 
suggestive of a sloping roof and walls; or he may denote a certain 
person or animal by mimicking his essential characteristics. Ac- 
tion may be described in a similar manner. A wide range of con- 
versation is possible by the use of graphic gesticulation.! 

Graphic Gesture in Relation to Infantile and Primitive Language. 
In several ways graphic gesture resembles the language of the in- 
fant and of primitive man. First, it does not lend itself to abstrac- 
tions. Since all the movements are descriptive of specific things 
none of them qualifies as a conveyer of abstract meaning. The 
phrase “all men are mortal” would be difficult to render either in 
gesture language, or in infant or primitive speech. A word such 
as “make” can be expressed only by movements suggesting the 
making of some particular object. Concrete familiar terms are 
used in lieu of class concepts for new generalizations. Thus a 
savage, at first sight of a slate pencil, called it a “stone scratch 
something.”” The writer’s small son, on being initiated into the 
delights of whipped cream, shouted “‘more piece o’ milk!” So 
particularistic are primitive languages that some of them have no 
general pronouns indicating the person in all his relations. Sepa- 
rate words must be used to denote “‘he sitting,” ‘‘he running,” “he 
absent,” and the like. The descriptive resemblance to graphic 
gesture is thus clearly shown. 

Secondly, the concreteness of these early languages is shown in 
the flow or succession of images employed. ‘The significance of 
Santa Claus would be explained by the two-year-old by such im- 
pressions as, ‘‘Santa drop down chimney — snow on Santa Claus 
— Santa put toys in stocking — Santa go away — come again next 


1 The natural readiness of graphic gesture in daily life is notorious: instance the 
riotous mimicry of children, or the old ‘sell’ of the practical joker who asks his 
fellow man to tell him what an accordion is, and then pokes fun at the naive descrip- 
tive gestures made by the hands of the victim. 


192 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


Christmas.”’ In a similar manner the Indian might relate the 
coming of the white man. Everything is impression; interpreta- 
tion, feelings, motives, cause and effect must all be supplied from 
the context. The order of words in gestures indicates the same 
impressionistic treatment. The sentence ‘‘The angry teacher 
strikes the child’? would be rendered ‘‘Teacher, angry — child, 
strikes.” Infantile word order is somewhat similar. The elemen- 
tal languages thus resemble gestures in lying closer to the level of 
immediate sensory experience than do the abstract expressions of 
civilized adults. j | 

The third resemblance is in defect of syntax. In gesture, and 
in much of infant language, the tense must be inferred from the 
situation. So also with mood: a look of interrogation converts the 
indicative gesture into a question. A determined or angry counte- 
nance gives the mimetic gesture the force of acommand. Similarly 
with infant speech, the single word ‘“‘doll”’ may denote tenderness 
for the object, meditation about it, or an angry desire to have it 
_from the shelf, according to the tone with which it is pronounced 
and the accompanying gestures. Single words used by children to 
convey whole commands or other meanings are called ‘sentence 
words.’ There is an analogy in primitive speech, though not an 
exact analogy, in the holophrase, a single word denoting a complete 
action or situation. Thus in Aztecan the word onictemacac means 
“‘T have given something to somebody.” In dispensing with parts 
of speech, and in presenting a total situation in one symbol, the 
holophrase might be called a ‘word gesture.’ 

To summarize: we have seen that gesture exists in both the infant 
and the aboriginal adult as an elementary means of communication, 
and that genetically in both child and race vocal language is 
peculiarly gestural in its structure. Wundt’s theory is further sup- 
ported by the fact that many primitive tribes combine grimace and 
gesticulation as an integral part of spoken discourse. It is said 
that in some cases tribesmen can hardly converse with one another 
in the dark. Although the gesture theory is thus supported by 
ethnological and genetic observations, it must, however, be re- 
membered that gestures are visual stimuli, while words are audi- 
tory. The similarities between gesture and early language bespeak 


SOCIAL STIMULATION 193 


the primitive state of the sign-making function underlying both; 
but they do not explain the transition from manual significa- 
tion to vocal. Language possesses enormous advantages over 
gestural expression, advantages which made it certain that in the 
course of evolution it would replace the latter as an entirely new 
variety of communication. 

The Interjectional and Onomatopoetic Theories. The inter- 
jectional theory bases the origin of language upon primitive ejacu- 
lations of an emotional sort, which were probably common among 
aboriginal men as among animals. In so far as emotional growls 
and cries are products of the larynx there is probably a sound basis 
for this theory. Tonal differentiations play a large part in primi- 
tive tongues, in many cases changes of pitch and quality giving a 
modified or entirely different meaning to a word whose form other- 
wise remains the same. Civilized languages also show many traces 
of an ‘interjectional stage.’ Changes of intonation are used in 
fairy stories; the voices of the father, mother, and baby bears, for 
example, being portrayed by a kind of ‘vocal gesture.’ ‘‘ Yes,’’ 
spoken with a rising inflection, and in widely different languages, 
asks a question; with a falling tone it denotes certainty. ‘Ah!’ 
may be so intoned as to convey a feeling of pain, pleasure, surprise, 
admiration, or reproof. ‘The limitation of the interjectional theory 
is that it can carry us no further than the laryngeal stage. It offers 
no foundation for articulate speech. 

The onomatopoetic theory ascribes aboriginal speech to the 
imitation by man of natural sounds, such as the roar of the wind or 
the cries of animals. Attention is called to the rich variety of ono- 
matopoetic words in the vocabularies of primitive and infantile 
language. Many of these are probably, however, of recent origin. 
At best this theory merely states a source for some linguistic ele- 
ments; it does not explain how the elements were acquired. In 
answer to this last question the following wholly tentative theory is 
advanced. 

A Social Behavior Account of the Origin of Language. ‘There is 
a fair agreement among philologists that a laryngeal, or glottal, 
period comparable to the cries of animals and babies existed for a 
long time in the history of man before the rise of articulate speech. 


194 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


We have indicated in Chapter VII how the prepotent behavior of 
animals is conditioned by the cries of anger, fear, and sex desire of 
their fellows, and how the makers of these sounds thus learn to use 
them for controlling the responses of other animals. It is fully 
conceivable that a similar development occurred in the human 
race, and that self-adaptation and control of others by inarticulate 
laryngeal sounds evolved as the earliest language of mankind. 
Social control, heretofore neglected by philologists, must therefore 
be recognized as a potent factor in the origin of language. 

The real problem, however, arises in explaining the transition 
from this narrow emotional repertory of the glottis to the enor- 
mous array of articulated consonantal and vowel groupings which 
constitute the most primitive of tongues. Only through the use of 
words can language achieve its true réle as a symbolization of 
objects. We may begin with the very probable assumption that 
aboriginal man, like the infant, was possessed of some sort of articu- 
lating mechanism, and that he was capable of producing random 
articulated syllables. The first two stages of our theory of infant 
language would then apply. That is, he would fixate in himself 
certain circular reflexes of the ear-vocal sort, and these responses 
would therefore be capable of being evoked by hearing the same 
sounds spoken by another. Evidence for the existence of the 
circular process is seen in the extensive reduplication of syllables 
which is even more characteristic of words in primitive than in 
infantile vocabularies. 

With the third stage, however, we seem to reach an impasse. 
The conditioning of syllable responses by the sight of objects, as 
described in the naming habits of the child, presupposes a social 
agent who knows the names of objects and can teach them im this 
way to the learner. There is of course no one who knows the 
language In question prior to its coming into existence. Our answer 
to the dilemma is that the first word response occurred and was 
fixated by a chance articulation spoken by an individual in associa- 
tion with some object or situation, and in the sight and hearing of 
another individual. The ear-vocal reflex of the spoken syllable 
would be then conditioned in the speaker by the sight of the object; 
and, what is equally important, it would be evoked in another 


_ SOCIAL STIMULATION — 195 


individual and similarly conditioned. Here then we have the basis 
for the use of the same word-sign or name by two or more persons, 
the essence, in other words, of language itself. Success in commu- 
nicating and controlling one’s fellows with reference to the object 
would serve to fixate this conditioned ear-vocal reflex as a perma- 
nent habit. With the advancement of human intelligence mankind 
probably learned to profit by this accidental discovery and, grasp- 
ing the significance of the principle involved, began to apply it, at 
first unconsciously and then more or less deliberately, in the coining 
and adoption of new word-signs. Like roast pigs in Lamb’s Essay 
words were eventually found possible of achievement by design as 
well as by accident. Here no doubt entered the influence of ap- 
propriateness in the social fixation of object-names. Onomatopes 
were naturally chosen in great number because they seemed to fit 
their objects so well; and in a sense the objects denoted taught man 
their own names through the noises they produced. If the fore- 
going theory is correct, social stimulation and response lie at the 
very root of language, and deserve far more attention than they 
have received in philological discussions. ! 

Written Language. By the aid of writing social stimulation is 
extended through vast reaches of time and space. Published or- 
ders from the army Chief-of-staff may direct the movements of 
soldiers in the opposite hemisphere. Mosaic law still has its po- 
tency in controlling human thought and action. Though subject 
to modification of meaning through interpolation and through loss 
of the effects of the intonation and personality of the writer, every 
bit of language read represents an influence exerted upon one indi- 
vidual by the linguistic mechanisms of another. 

In both the child and the race written language is acquired long 
after the spoken form, which it merely symbolizes. Picture-writing 
was the earliest form of chirography. Writing, like gesture and 
speech, was originally graphic in character. The pictures were 


1 The theory, though speculative, is not without empirical support. There are 
many authentic cases of originating word-names, and even languages, among groups 
of very young children. A pair of identical twins, who through similarities of 
structure and habit and through constant and affectionate comradeship were pre- 
disposed toward identical ear-vocal reflexes, evolved between them a fairly complete 
language understood only by themselves. For details of this interesting case see 
Romanes: Mental Evolution in Man, pp. 138-44. 


196 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


gradually reduced to bare conventional symbols of the objects they 
formerly depicted (an example is the modern Chinese alphabet). 
Inasmuch as articulated auditory stimuli had proved more versatile 
than the visual language of gesture, written language advanced by 
providing visual symbols for the articulated sounds. The first 
stage of phonetic writing was the rebus. An impression given 
visually was interpreted by the reader in an auditory fashion, and 
a different meaning assigned. Thus the word “male” might be 
represented by a picture of a coat of mail. In this way abstract 
words, impossible to picturize directly, could be visually repre- 
sented. The final stage of writing, and one of the greatest 
social achievements of all time, was the invention of the Phoenician 
alphabet, in which each language sound has its arbitrary symbol. 


CoNcLUSION — THE SocraL BAsIs AND VALUE OF LANGUAGE 
- Language, the major form of social stimulation, has evolved 
through that very type of situation in which it exercises its present 
social function, namely, the stimulation of one person by the vocal 
reactions of another. Let us briefly sum up the process. It began 
both in the infant child and the infant man by gestures. These 
comprised natural emotional expressions, pointing, and descriptive 
movements. Vocal expression meanwhile came into play. Alike 
in animals, children, and the race it first took the form of variable 
cries produced chiefly by the vocal cords. By learning the signif- 
icance of gestures and tonal interjections animals, children, and 
men learned to adapt themselves — that is, to behave appropri- 
ately — toward their fellows. On the other hand in using these 
stimuli they soon learned that the behavior of others could be con- 
trolled for their own interests. Incidental vocal acts were then 
deliberately performed as coercive signs. 

A more refined form of control through the use of sounds as 
symbols was the next step. A set of word symbols far more elab- 
orate than the range of laryngeal and gestural possibilities was 
needed. Consonants articulated by the tongue and other mouth 
parts with the glottal vowel sounds fulfilled this need. Beginning 
with random articulation, according to the theory advanced, con- 
trol of the elements by the ear was gained through circular self- 


SOCIAL STIMULATION 197 


stimulation. The speech elements were then evoked by others and 
attached as conditioned responses to afferent impulses from objects 
and situations. In the child these conditioned word habits are the 
legacy of social inheritance. In the history of language they prob- 
ably arose fortuitously by chance association, and were developed 
by human invention. Brought into the service of the prepotent 
needs, the use of words rapidly extended from mere nomenclature 
to demanding and controlling others with respect to objects and 
situations denoted. 

Every human advance, whether it be by learning, problem-solv- 
ing, or invention, must be based ultimately upon some prepotent 
need (see Chapter III). The control of others in the service of such 
needs is clearly the drive behind the original acquisition of language. 
This, rather than the desire to communicate, ‘instinct to express,’ 
or other alleged social instinct, has been the guiding principle. To 
this drive a somewhat later but important allied drive was added, 
namely, the effort to control the non-social environment. Primi- 
tive man did not, of course, speak words to animals, trees, and 
metals; but he spoke words to himself about them. He used 
implicitly pronounced language symbols in representing their 
properties and relations, and in predicting certain things concern- 
ing them. In other words, language helped him, as it helps the 
infant, to learn to think, and to develop a practical and a scientific 
culture. This use of language, however, was a later development. 
In the very origin of speech the leading drive was probably the 
immediate incentive of social control. 

Turning from the social foundations of vocal expression to its 
current value as a social stimulus, we enter upon a field covering 
the major segment of human life. Making and responding to 
language stimuli, oral and written, has become deeply rooted in 
our most vital interests. We can scarcely conceive what human 
culture, or even human nature itself, would be without this func- 
tion. The institutions upon which the social order rests are really 
systems of traditional and recorded language. Education is the 
socialization and training of the individual through language sym- 
bols. The edicts of government and public opinion, in rumor or 
print, direct his thought and conduct through the same medium. 


198 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


These forms of control are ‘institutionalized’; through them, by 
means of language, each individual is trained and controlled for the 
good of all. 

In the more personal relations language retains, in a subtle form, 
its pristine function of control. In conversations we strive to 
impress upon others our experiences, attitudes, and feelings. In 
letters we do the same, and also politely request our correspond- 
ents to perform services for which we ‘‘feel ourselves deeply in- 
debted.”’ The novelist and dramatist control the flow of emotion 
and imagery in their auditors to suit their own purposes. Even the 
professor in delivering a scientific lecture controls the thought 
processes of his students; for communication of ideas is a form of 
social control. 

In most of these instances, however, the community of interest 
and thought and the pleasure of contact and discussion are so 
absorbing that the control factor is obscured. Modern man has 
become socialized both in the character of his demands upon others 
and in his willingness to meet reasonable demands made upon him. 
Give and take has become a pleasure in his social life. Hence ac- 
tual control through language stimuli may be readily brought about 
without his being aware that he is either employing or submitting 
to it. Language, therefore, is no longer regarded as a coercion, but 
as a form of intercourse through which human nature finds its 
fullest expression. 


REFERENCES 


Meyer (Von), G. H., The Organs of Speech. 

Foster, M. A., A Textbook of Physiology (6th edition, revised), part tv, book 11, 
ch. 7 (sees. l.and 2). 

Scripture, E. W., The Elements of Experimental Phonetics, chs. 17-19, 28, 29. 

Webster’s New International Dictionary (1911 edition, unabridged), pp. 
xxxvill-xlvil. (Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, pp. vi-xxvi; lii-liv.) 

Sapir, Edward, Language: an Introduction to the Study of Speech. 

Watson, J. B., Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist, ch. 9. 

Meyer, Max F., The Psychology of the Other One, ch. 14. 

Brown, H. C., ‘‘Language and the Associative Reflex,” Journal of Philosophy, 
Psychology, and Scientific Methods, 1916, x11, 645-49. 

Edman, I., Human Traits, ch. 10. 

Judd, C. H., Psychology, ch. 10. 

Chamberlain, A. F., The Child: a Study in the Evolution of Man, ch. 5. 


SOCIAL STIMULATION 199 


Tanner, A. E., The Child, ch. 16. 

Buckman, 8. S., ‘‘The Speech of Children,’”’ Nineteenth Century, 1897, xu1, 793- 
807. 

Romanes, G. J., Mental Evolution in Man, chs. 5-9, 12, 18, 17. 

Wundt, W., Elements of Folk Psychology (Translated by Schaub), ch. 1 (secs. 
5 and 6). 

Marett, R. R., Anthropology, ch. 5. 

Weiss, A. P., ‘““Conscious Behavior,” Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and 
Scientific Methods, 1918, xv, 631-41. 


CHAPTER IX 


SOCIAL STIMULATION — FACIAL AND BODILY 
EXPRESSION 


Introductory Statement. ‘Say to a dog, toa child who does not 
yet know how to speak, or to a foreigner ... the word brigand, at 
the same time smiling benevolently or making affectionate gestures; 
these three beings, very different in their natures, ... will reply to 
you with an expression of affection. Say to them, on the contrary, 
the word dearest with an expression of hatred or a threatening 
gesture. You will see them shrink with terror, attempt:to escape, 
or utter complaints.” By this quaint truism Paolo Mantegazza 
indicates “the boundary which separates conventional language 
from the simple and elementary language of physical expression.” 
We have already given some attention to the primitive language of 
gesture. In this chapter we shall consider further the emotional 
and other expressive movements of the face and body, and estimate 
their significance for social stimulation. Our starting-point is again 
the physiological mechanism. 

The Facial Muscles and their Expressive Function. The facial 
muscles are of the striped, or voluntary, variety. They are gen- 
erally flat in shape, and most of them run from a fixed point on 
bony structure, called the ‘origin,’ to some mobile mass of skin or 
muscle, called the ‘insertion.’ Thus in contracting (shortening) the 
muscle pulls the region of insertion toward the point of origin. 
The facial muscles comprise about twenty-four pairs, and may be 
grouped into seven regional classes — the facial divisions being as 
follows: : 

Brows and Forehead 
Eyes 

Nose 

Upper Lip 

Lower Lip and Chin 
Mouth-aperture 
Lower Jaw 


SOCIAL STIMULATION 201 


Figure 20 should be studied in connection with the following de- 
scription. Each muscle will be readily identified from the name or 
abbreviation printed upon it. Most of these names express (in 
Latin) the function of the muscle. 


- O GSR UTIS 
4 


pe Its Teng, 


/ (jj 
YY t ig : 



















































a Moral Faso, 
S y ¢ 
(GORRUGATOR SUPERCILII-f NN a if wn! . | fi 
¢ SN \Y HG i ye aee: 3 ! 
| ; | \ | i] / 4 
ne Wye 
| ve uk i j 
Le “y Uae Mn Fe 4 
Z Y ee ae! A fy \ war YN 
WRAVATOR NARIG ANTERIOR Vi ig) gf St My Cy ‘4 anh vil y 
QILATATOR NARIS POSTERIOR. } , . al 5: : 
COMPRESSOR NARIUM MINOR se "pe? ee 
DEPRESSOR AL NASI. ob ON : | i" 
GAY > e Nui 4g "ee 
SHA va ow WAY (Ah Wee 
c a % op Mf \. Ky Pon \ \ ; 1 |! I) 
BI 4 Le 5 \ \ \\ DEAR |, | Yi Yj 
pe) 2 \\ a saws A\\\ \\ pan | Cn! HY Y/ 
Pp) ae NY a 
$M \\ eh My} ) Ata “he, \ 
= “dt SS iy iron mo 
Nore eS to WS 
LEVATOR MENTI—/) ALABI/ Poh) Sl ~ OO SSS 
i CSS QQ nnn 
RTRSY 
. SAX. +S \ 





\ 
~ 









\ RAY AS\. M \ 
pas AK 
NON WAX 
ANY 
Figure 20. Tue Muscues or FAcIAL EXPRESSION 
(From Gray’s Anatomy, by permission of the publishers, Messrs. Lea and Febiger, Philadelphia.) 


The movements of the brows are effected by two muscles. One of these 
is the long occipito-frontalis. The contraction of its frontal portion raises 
the eyebrows and draws the scalp forward producing horizontal wrinkles 
in the forehead, asin fright. This muscle has an antagonist in the corruga- 
tor supercilit (origin, skull at inner end of brow; insertion, skin above the 
eye). This is the frowning muscle: it draws the brows inward and down- 
ward, producing vertical wrinkles between them. 

The eye is closed by the contraction of the circular fibers of the sphincter 
muscle, orbicularis palpebrarum. Its inner portion produces the quick 
protective wink of the lids; the surrounding part closes the eye forcibly 
making wrinkles, or ‘crow’s-feet’ at its outer corner. The levator palpe- 


202 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


bre supervoris (origin, roof of eye cavity; insertion, upper lid) is not shown 
in the drawing. It raises the lid in antagonism to the orbicularis muscle. 
The glance or movement of the eyeball itself has expressive significance. 
Six muscles within the eye socket, arranged in pairs, give the eyeball 
motility in all directions. 

The brow and eyes are chiefly expressive of fear and anger; the nose, on 
the other hand, is the organ of disgust. The pyramidalis nasi (origin, 
bridge of nose; insertion, skin between eyebrows) draws down the inner 
angle of the brows and produces transverse wrinkles over the root of the 
nose. The levator labw superioris alaeque nasi (origin, high on upper jaw 
bone; insertion, upper lip and ala,! or wing, of nose) shortens the nose and 
widens the nostril as in contémpt. Two other muscles aid in distending 
the nostrils, the dilatator naris, posterior and anterior (origin, upper jaw 
bone and nose cartilage respectively; both are inserted in the ala). They 
dilate the nostrils in labored breathing and anger. The dilatators are 
opposed by the depressor ale nasi (origin, low in upper jaw bone; insertion, 
septum and ala) which draws downward and narrows the nose. The lower 
part of the nose is flattened by the compressor nasi (origin, upper jaw bone; 
insertion, skin over front of nose). 

The upper lip is moved by four muscles, all originating in the upper jaw 
or cheek bone. They are the levator labii superioris, the zygomaticus minor, 
the zygomaticus major, and the levator anguli orts. They are inserted 
along the upper lip. The first of these raises and slightly protrudes the 
lip. The levator anguli oris and the zygomaticus major raise the corner of 
the mouth and draw it inward, or backward and upward, as in smiling. 
The zygomaticus minor draws the upper lip (not the corner of the mouth) 
backward, upward, and outward, producing an effect of sadness. 

The lower lip has two depressors, the depressor labit inferioris and the 
depressor anguli orts (origin of both, lower jaw bone; insertion, respectively 
lower lip and corner of mouth). The former draws the lower lip downward 
and outward ironically, while the latter depresses the corners of the mouth 
in opposition to the levator anguli oris. The levator menti (origin, lower jaw 
bone; insertion, descending to integument of chin) by contracting forces 
the lower lip upward and protrudes it disdainfully, and also wrinkles the 
surface of the chin. 

Several important muscles close or modify the aperture of the mouth as 
a whole. The orbicularts oris, a circular band surrounding the mouth, 
draws the lips together in antagonism to the lip muscles. Its deeper por- 
tion closes and retracts the lips (determinedly) against the teeth. The 
superficial layer closes and protrudes them, as in pouting. The buccinator 
muscle (origin, both jaw bones; insertion, corner of mouth) compresses the 
cheeks as in blowing a trumpet. The risorius, a muscle similarly placed, 
retracts the corner of the mouth as in unpleasant sardonic laughter. 


1 The ale are the rounded prominences at the sides of the lower part of the nostrils, | 


SOCIAL STIMULATION 203 


Two muscles significant for raising the lower jaw are the masseter and the 
— temporal' (origin cheek and temporal bones, respectively; insertion, lower 
jaw). While they determine the extent of mouth opening in expression, 
their chief function is for mastication. The large neck muscles controlling 
the head movements are also suggested in Figure 20. 


The facial muscles, like the muscles of the larynx, work in com- 
binations. They produce expressive patterns denoting simple and 
complex emotions. The muscles of expression are voluntary, that 
is, they are under the control of the cortex. It is likely, however, 
that the nuclei of the seventh (facial) nerve, lying in the medulla, 
provide subcortical reflexes governing facial expression. Auto- 
nomic impulses may play a part, as suggested by the involuntary 
play of the features in emotion. Marked differences exist in in- 
dividuals, in ages (infancy, maturity), and in races with respect to 
the development and control of the various expressive muscles. 

The Language of the Face. Beneath all the wealth and variety 
of facial expression in emotions there may be recognized two 
fundamental types: the pleasant and the unpleasant. It will be 
recalled that in Chapter IV a theory of emotion was developed 
upon the antagonism of these two elementary affective states. 
This theory is further 
supported by facial ex- 
pression in the emo- 
tions. The basic pleas- 
ant expression consists 
chiefly of the eleva- 
tion of the corners of 
the mouth, the cheeks 
also being raised and 
the brow smooth. The Figure 21. Tae ELEMENTARY AFFECTIVE 
unpleasant type has - EXPRESSIONS be 

3 (Modified from Piderit’s Mimik und Physiognomik.) 
a depression of the 
corners of the mouth, a drawing down and elongation of the cheeks,? 
and a wrinkled brow. The two types are produced by antagonis- 
tic muscular patterns (for example, the antagonism between the 





1 Not shown in Figure 20. 
_2 Except where complicated by such mimetic expressions as disgust. | 


204 “SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


levator and the depressor anguli oris) thus conforming to the vis- 
ceral antagonism characteristic of the two states. A sketch is 
presented in Figure 21. ‘The basic pleasantness pattern may be 
found in all pleasantly toned emotional expressions, such as smiling, 
laughing, joy, love, etc.; see Figure 22 B, 16, 17, 18. The pattern 
of unpleasantness (wrinkled brow and inverted crescent mouth) 
is seen in pain, grief, anger, fear, scorn, disgust, hatred, and similar 
unpleasant emotions. It is clearly shown in Figure 22 A, 2, 3, 4, 6, 
7, 8, 9, and Figure 22 B, 12, 14. 

In their various combinations and degrees the manifest expres- 
sions run well into the hundreds. We can, however, reduce this 
facial vocabulary to six elementary roots, represented by the follow- 
ing groups: pain-grief, surprise-fear, anger, disgust, pleasure, and 
various attitudes. The first four of these groups are unpleasantly 
toned; the sixth is neutral. Figures 22 A and 22 B should be 
examined while reading the following account.! 

I. The Pain-Grief Group. In bodily pain, the extreme form of 
unpleasantness, there is a contraction of both sets of brow muscles 
producing both horizontal and vertical wrinkles in the forehead. 
Figure 22 A, 1, although posed for despair, presents the main char- 
acteristics of pain.2 The inner portions of the brows are raised 
more than the outer, resulting in the oblique eyebrows (sloping 
outward and downward) invariably seen in painful feelings. At- 
tention being directed inward rather than outward the eyes tend to 
close. The drooping lids clearly distinguish this expression from 
intense fear (6). The mouth in intense states is somewhat open 
and drawn to one side (groaning), producing a deep line between 
the angle of the nose and the corner of the mouth (naso-labial 
furrow). Judging from facial expression ‘bodily’ pain is also 
‘mental’ pain; at least the unpleasant affective reaction common 


1 The pictures have been selected from among 680 modified photographs of a 
German actor, contained in Heinrich Rudolph’s Der Ausdruck des Menschen 
(Atlas). They are reprinted by special arrangement. 

2 The student is advised to prepare a piece of pliable cardboard, about ten inches 
square, with a rectangular hole in the center the size of one of the small pictures. 
By placing the opening over each picture examined the expression will be seen with 
maximum effect. 

3 Study the upper and lower portions of the face separately, SES the un- 
attended portion with a card. 








Figure 22 A. VARIETIES OF FactaL EXPRESSION 


1. Despair 2. Sadness 3. Grief 
4, Amazement 5. Disillusionment 6. Horror 
7. Hate with Distrust 8. Rage 9. Rage with Fear 


(From H. Rudolph’s Der Ausdruck des Menschen.) 











Figure 22 B. Varieties or FactaL, EXPRESSION (continued) 


10. Incredulous Doubt 11. Anxiety 12. Disgust 
13. Sneering 14. Watchful Scorn 15. Laughing Seorn 
16. Meaningful Smile 17. Entreating Smile 18. Laughing 


SOCIAL STIMULATION 205 


to both produces remarkably similar effects in the face. Figure 
22A, 1, representing despair might readily pass for bodily pain. 

Sorrow, 2 form of the primitive pain reaction, is shown in its mild 
form, sadness, in Figure 22 A, 2. Grief is depicted in 3 of the same 
figure; the artist’s title for this picture being ‘Sobbing, Suppressed 
Weeping.” In addition to the oblique brows and inverted crescent 
mouth, the orbicular eye muscles are contracted (weeping), the 
upper lip depressed and drawn backward making naso-labial 
furrows, the lower lip trembles loosely, and the face and nose are 
elongated and narrowed. 

II. The Surprise-Fear Group. When a person’s sensorial at- 
tention is absorbed by some object before his gaze his eyes are 
usually opened wide and his brows lifted suggesting horizontal 
wrinkles in the forehead.. Since being surprised or astonished al- 
ways involves attention of this type, its expression becomes a 
component of the astonished face. Amazement is shown in Figure 
22 A, 4. The mouth drops open in a speechless manner, and the 
horizontal brow wrinkles are prominent. Disconcertedness or 
dismay, states in which we are not only surprised but baffled, 
combine with this expression an unpleasant one of mild anger, 
having vertical wrinkles added. Dz¢sillusionment, another interest- 
ing modification, is shown in Figure 22 A, 8. Pain, for disillusion- 
ment is usually painful, is clearly added to the amazed look by the 
obliquity of the brows and facial elongation. 

The unusual and astonishing is often the terrifying: hence we 
pass from amazement, through alarm and fear, to horror, the ex- 
pression facing us in Figure 22 A, 6. The brows strongly suggest 
the pain imminent from the terrifying object, which is fixated with 
wide open eyes. The mouth is opened wider and more rigidly set 
than in amazement or pain. The nostrils are dilated, and the head 
averted in a withdrawing reaction of flight. Milder forms of fear 
are not clearly distinguishable from amazement. Fear combines 
with pain in the expression of anxiety (Figure 22 B, 11); the former 
component being shown in the brow and eyes, the latter in the 
opening of the mouth (cf. Figure 22 A, 1).1 

III. The Anger Group. In anger, a violent form of which 

1 See footnote to p. 95. 


206 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


appears in Figure 22 A, 8, the brows are knit together and drawn 
downward at their inner ends. Hence the brow wrinkles in this 
state are vertical. The obliquity of the eyebrows is opposite from 
that of the pain group, the brows sloping inward and downward. 
The eyes are opened wide to fixate the object of wrath. The lower 
lip is drawn tensely backward and downward exposing the lower 
teeth, while the jaw is protruded rigidly. ‘There is a widening of 
the nostrils. Annoyance and irritation are similar but milder states 
shown chiefly in the brows. Abiding or repressed anger, commonly 
known as hate, is seen combined with distrust in Figure 22 A, 7. 
The covert glance and averted head of distrust are not markedly 
distinct from the expression of hatred. A feeling of ‘bitterness’ is 
suggested in the lateral region between nose and mouth. The 
facies of rage and fear are effectively combined in Figure 22 A, 9, 
the mouth expressing anger and the brows a combination of the two 
emotions. | 

IV. The Disgust Group. Disgust in its numerous varieties is a 
remarkably expressive reaction. Its simple form is shown in 
Figure 22 B, 12. Its central indications are the drawing up and 
shortening of the nose, producing transverse wrinkles across its 
root, and the elevating of the sides of the ale thus widening the 
bottoms of the nostrils. Depression of the angles of the mouth 
deepens the naso-labial furrow, and the cheeks as well as the nose 
are puckered so that the lower lids are raised and partially closed. 
Thus the eyes, if separately examined, have a laughing expression, 
which, however, is belied by vertical brow wrinkles suggesting dis- 
pleasure from the disgusting object. The lower lip is raised and 
protruded suggesting loathing or mild nausea, an expression akin to 
incipient vomiting. Contempt is a mild and ‘intellectualized’ form 
of disgust implying the insignificance as well as the repugnance of 
the evoking stimulus. Combined with mild laughing it produces 
the odious expression of sneering (Figure 22 B, 13). The mouth in 
this expression is not raised at the corners, as in frank laughter, 
but drawn straight back with a sardonic effect. The upper lip, 
however, is raised toward the side, baring the upper canines. 
Disgust is shown in the nose; while an ugly conflict is present be- 
tween the laughter of the eyes and the angry slant of the brows. 


SOCIAL STIMULATION 207 


Scorn, a slightly less ignoble expression, is portrayed together 
with watchfulness, in Figure 22 B, 14. It is a mixture of mild 
anger (shown in brows) and contempt (seen in the nose). The 
head is averted as if to avoid the scorned object. The scornful 
laugh, Figure 22 B, 15, again illustrates the horizontal, sardonic 
aperture of the mouth. 

V. The Pleasure Group. The human face is as mute in its 
expression of pleasurable emotions as it is eloquent in the language 
of displeasure. Hedonic states, beyond varying degrees of the 
smile and laugh, have little to distinguish them. Whether the 
mouth is closed, as in smiling, or open, as in laughing, its corners are 
drawn backward and upward. In the grin and the laugh the upper 
lip is raised and drawn tense, exposing the upper teeth (Figure 22 
B, 18). In violent laughing the lower jaw drops far down and 
trembles spasmodically. In smiling the well marked naso-labial 
furrow is almost horizontal (see Figure 22 B, 16). The cheek 
muscles are raised with the upper lip, thus pushing up the lower lid 
into a nearly horizontal position. The orbicularis muscles also 
contract partially closing the eyes (Figure 22B, 13, 15, 18). 
Characteristic wrinkles (‘crow’s-feet’) are thus produced below 
and at the outer corners of the eyes (13, 18). In Figure 22 B, 16, 
however, the eyes are wide open and slyly directed askance; and 
repressed mirth is implied by keeping the lips closed during so 
broad a smile. The artist’s apt title for this picture is “ Meaning- 
ful Smiling.” 

The scornful laugh implies mere amusement at the scorned 
one. The malicious, vengeful laugh, and the laugh of re- 
leased envy (schadenfreude) are sardonic forms modified by angry 
brows. The mouth slightly opened and smiling, with rapt gaze, 
expresses expectation or desire. Smiling also combines with the 
surprised countenance as in delight. ‘The expression of Jove is much 
more subtle and difficult to describe than the expressions of other 
emotions.!_ The pleasure in love is, of course, expressed by a smile, 
and by a mimetic expression of sweetness.” The eyes are kindly, as 
in smiling; or else open wide at the loved object, as in the infatuated 


1 Rudolph’s entire collection of 680 faces does not present a single example. 
2 Vide infra. 


208 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


‘maiden who cannot take her eyes from her lover. Admitration and 
devotion are expressed by similar looks, the former having also an 
element of amazement. The smile of entreaty (Figure 22 B, 17) is 
somewhat similar to the expression of love. In love, laughter, and 
good spirits generally, the eyes are bright and glowing. The tender 
expressions of pity and sympathy merely add a suggestion of love to 
the facies of sorrow, the emotion with which we generally sympa- 
thize. 

VI. The Attitudinal Group. In addition to the emotional play 
of the features there are facial reactions of an intellectual sort. 
They portray such attitudes as belief, incredulity, certainty, help- 
lessness, and the like. Admitting a wide range of individual differ- 
ence in these mannerisms, we may mention a few which are fairly 
universal. Doubt, or hesitation, is expressed by raising the brows. 
The eyes, however, are not widely opened as in attention or fear. 
Incredulous or critical doubt adds also a protruding or pursing of 
the lips. For both these expressions see Figure 22 B, 10.1 Raised 
brows and a wide direct gaze after speaking serve as a facial inter- 
rogation point, and demand an answer. Determination, or com- 
mand, the facial imperative, is shown in the firm closure of the lips 
and teeth, tense jaw muscles, and wrinkles beneath the lower lip 
and upon the chin. It is represented in conjunction with hateful 
distrust in Figure 22 A, 7. 

- For convenience of review the facial expressions are classified 
according to both the emotions and the features in Table V. 

Dynamic and Bodily Components of Expression. ‘The foregoing 
account has dealt with facial expression in a stationary, photo- 
graphic manner. Dynamic aspects such as the shifting of the eyes, 
the quickness of the frown, and the changes in respiration, require 
a motion-picture in order to complete the analysis of expression. 
A great deal also is added to facial expression by the accompanying 
position and movement of the head, arms, hands, and body. In 
many cases they enable us to read a significance into the facial as- 
pect which we otherwise should miss. The hands held vertically in 
front of the body with palms inward convert a sober, upward gaze 


1 Those who are in the habit of giving oral tests to children know the importance 
of avoiding such expressions as these. 


into a religious expression. 


- SOCIAL STIMULATION 


209 


With palms forward in front of the 


chest, and fingers joined, they connote repulsion or a command for 


silence. 


Brows 
AND 
FOREHEAD 


TABLE V. Synopsis of FAactAL EXPRESSIONS 


Pain 
AND GRIEF 


Raised. Knit- 
ted. Oblique 

out and down 
Wrinkles h.v.! 


AMAZEMENT 
AND FRAR 


Raised. Wrin- 
kles h. (amaze- 
ment) (Terror 
as in Pain) 





ANGER 


Lowered. Knit- 
ted. Oblique 
in and down 
Wrinkles 2. 


DNS ee ee 


Partly or 
fully closed 
(Tears) 


DisGustT 


Slightly 
knitted 
Wrinkles v 


e 
Varying. Usu- 
ally narrow, 
resembling 
smiling 


i | 


Movut# 


Lips 


LOWER 
Jaw 


HEAD 


Compressed 
(thinned) 
Elongated 


Lowered. 
Open and 
skewed (in 
groaning) 


Depressed 
at corners 
Lower lip 
trembling 


Drooping 


Sunk forward 








Ale dilated 
(in terror) 


Opened. 
Wide and 
fixed (in 
strong fear) 


Somewhat 
depressed 
at corners 


Immovable 


Drawn back 
or averted 


1h. and v. denote horizontal and vertical. | : : 
Note: To be able to produce desired expressions memorize the columns vertically; to be able 
to identify expressions produced by others memorize them horizontally. 





Ale dilated 
(in rage) 


Rectangular 
rigid opening 
Exposing 
lower teeth 


Depressed 
at corners 
Lower lip 
tense 


Rigid 
Protruding 


Advanced 





Raised. Short- 
ened. Wrinkled 
Ale raised 

at sides 


Slightly 
elevated 


Depressed 
at corners 
Lower lip 
protruding 


Raised 


Sometimes 
averted 





When the hands are held somewhat lower, with palms 


PLEASURE 
(Smiling and 
Laughing) 


Smooth 
(except in 
violent 
laughing) 


Partly shut. 
Lower lid 
raised 
‘Crow’s-feet’ 


Natural 


Raised. Open, 
upper teeth 

shown (laugh) 
Closed (smile) 


Corners 
drawn back 
and up 
Upper lip 
raised, tense 


Dropped and 
trembling (in 
laughing) 


Thrown back 
(in laugh- 
ing) 


forward and downward and fingers spread, the effect is one of 
Raising them high and drawing them back, 
with palms forward and fingers spread, universally expresses 


abhorrence or disgust. 


amazement.! 


A cringing posture with head and eyes lowered con- 


1 These reactions belong to the class of ‘emotional gestures’ of Chapter VIII, and 
are the stock in trade of every actor and elocutionist. 


210 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


verts a friendly smile into an obsequious one. Coquetry resides in 
a sweet, smiling expression with lowered head and upward glance.! 
We often assign to facial expression that which we infer from the 
rest of the body. It is indeed difficult to distinguish between the 
expressions manifest in the face and those which we project, or read 
into it, from the posture, the gestures, or the situation. 


THe THEORY OF FAcIAL EXPRESSION 


Darwin’s Three Principles. Travelers have reported that facial 
expressions are substantially the same for all races of men, primi- 
tive or civilized. They also appear to be innate, since they develop 
in children without any conscious process of learning. They are 
not acquired from the social environment, for they are observed in 
the congenitally blind. Certain of the expressions, moreover, are 
common to man and the lower animals. The universality and 
antiquity of these reactions challenged the interest of the great 
evolutionist, Charles Darwin. 

The well-known ‘three principles’ of Darwin may be stated as 
follows: (1) The first is that of the survival of serviceable associated 
habits. Facial reactions were originally used by our remote ances- 
tors as means of defense or satisfaction of needs. They were 
transmitted as inherited reflexes to the descendants. ‘The latter 
no longer needed them; but they persisted because ‘deeply in- 
grained in the germ-plasm,’ and became simply ‘facial expressions’ 
characteristic of certain situations. They are the last vestige of 
the total primitive reaction which our forbears made to objects 
arousing the emotions. We no longer attack with our teeth; but 
our simian (and perhaps human) ancestors did so, and we still 
uncover our teeth in the snarl of anger. The oblique eyebrows of 
pain Darwin explained as follows. The primitive and infantile 
reaction to pain is violent screaming. In this the eyes would 
become harmfully engorged with blood were they not compressed 
by the contraction of the corrugator, pyramidal, and orbicular 
muscles. As civilized adults we usually inhibit screaming in pain- 
ful situations; but the less voluntary, and hereditarily associated, 


1 For further illustrations consult the photographs in the textbeok portion of 
Rudolph’s work. 


SOCIAL STIMULATION 211 


contractions of these muscles still take place. We therefore over- 
come the pull of these muscles by voluntarily contracting the 
central part of the frontalis muscle. The eyebrows are thus both 
knitted and raised in the center, giving them the familiar oblique 
position. The expression of disgust is similarly explained as the 
facial vestige of the total reaction of vomiting, no longer required in 
our contacts with offensive objects. 

(2) The second principle is that of antithesis. Darwin conceived 
that emotions were ranged in pairs of opposites. The fact that one 
emotion had acquired a certain pattern of response he considered 
was sufficient ground for its opposite to be expressed by opposed 
forms of reaction. Thus the cringing and fawning of the happy, 
affectionate dog, together with his lowered ears and tail, and 
sinuous movements, could be understood only as the opposites of 
the erect and stiffened posture, and pricked up ears and tail, of the 
dog in anger. 

(3) Other expressive reactions were ascribed by Darwin to his 
third principle of direct action of the nervous system. In emotions 
there is a diffuse flow of motor impulse into whatever channels 
afford the readiest outlet, habits, of course, belonging to this class. 
We have here also such involuntary effects as trembling, writhing, 
blushing, respiratory changes, and erection of the hairs. — 

A Reinterpretation of Darwin’s Theory. Captious critics have 
sought to minimize Darwin’s expressional theories in contrast with 
his main contribution to science. When reformulated, however, in 
the light of recent conceptions we shall see that they still bear the 
stamp of his genius for sensing important truths. In the first place 
he demonstrated that facial expression, or communication, was not 
the original function of the facial muscles; but that such biological 
ends as mastication, dilatation of the nostrils for breathing, and 
shading the eyes were their proper functions. The purpose to 
express was therefore not the origin of this behavior. It seems 
however that Darwin neglected the possibility of the facial move- 
ments becoming important in adaptation to the social environment. 
In earlier chapters we have seen that, in both lower animals and 
man, original vocal utterances and gestures which were purely 
random or emotional in character have become definite means of 


212 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


communication. Other creatures first understood them through 
their association with the actions they accompanied, and reacted 
for their own good. ‘Then, since they served in this way as means 
of conditioning the behavior of others, they finally became true 
language stimuli and were used for social control. It is likely that 
facial expressions have followed the same course of development. 
Beginning as complete reactions of the whole animal (attack, biting, 
etc.) they were shortened to those facial and bodily components 
alone which could serve as expressive signs for controlling others 
(facies of rage, etc.).1. Where a more adequate language has 
evolved, as in man, they serve to emphasize and lend emotional 
color to the words themselves. 

Darwin’s three principles may be most conveniently examined 
in the reverse order to that of their statement. First, as to the 
‘direct effects of the nervous system.’ Most of these seem to be a 
part of the general and diffuse emotional response controlled by 
the autonomic. They belong with the class of visceral reactions 
described in Chapter IV. It is at least probable, however, that the 
facial reactions also come under autonomic control; and that they 
too are ‘direct effects’ or parts of the emotional response, rather 
than expressions of an emotion first aroused in the cortex and 
then expressed in the face. From the James-Lange viewpoint con- 
sciousness of these reactions constitutes a part of the emotional 
experience itself. 

We have advanced the theory in Chapter IV that the visceral 
changes in emotion are based upon the principle of muscular an- 
tagonism between the effects of the cranio-sacral division for pleas- 
ant states, and the sympathetic for unpleasant ones. The further 
application of this view, together with the suggestion just made as 
to the autonomic control of expression, would account satisfactorily 
for the two basic and antagonistic forms of facial expression (pleas- 
ant and unpleasant) described on page 203. We arrive in this way 
at the second principle, the antithesis between certain emotional 
expressions, which Darwin recognized, but did not satisfactorily 
explain. The examples cited by him of human and animal be- 


1 Dr. Craig in particular attacks the Darwinian assumption that expressions are 
useless inherited reflex patterns (see reference cited at the end of this chapter). 


SOCIAL STIMULATION | 213 


havior in pleased and displeased emotional states clearly illustrate 
the antagonistic action of the expressive muscles. His limitation 
lay in his failure to observe that antithesis applies, not to emotions 
as a whole, but only to their affective components, pleasure and un- 
pleasantness. The antithetical relation holds between emotional 
expressions because they contain as components these two an- 
tagonistic affective reactions of the face. 

We find, therefore, that by including expressions themselves in 
Darwin’s principle of direct (autonomic) response, and by giving 
more precise and physiological definition to his theory of antithesis, 
these conceptions may be fitted into an acceptable scheme of 
explanation. 

We have previously seen that the emotional states of the new- 
born child consist of an undifferentiated, unpleasant affectivity 
(protopathetic state); the special emotions of fear, anger, and the 
like developing later. Similarly, the sole facial expressive equip- 
ment of the newborn babe is that of bodily pain. Smiling, the 
basic pleasant expression, developing within a few weeks, also 
considerably antedates the expression of any particular hedonic 
emotion. Our emotional theory offered the explanation that the 
different emotions (fear, anger, love) were developed through the 
addition of somatic responses of escape, attack, affection, and the 
like, toward the stimulating objects. May we not therefore expect 
that the facial reactions, constituting a part of the emotional re- 
sponse, develop in the same manner? ‘This question leads us back 
to the first principle of Darwin and the genetic explanation it ad- 
vances. 

Darwin, to recall briefly, regarded expressions as inherited ves- 
tiges of serviceable habits acquired by our anthropoid ancestors. 
To the inheritance of facial reflexes we can surely find no 
objection. But in the innate connection of these reactions with 
complex and meaningful situations, we reéncounter the confusion 
of the instinct hypothesis. Our recourse is, as formerly, to onto- 
genetic development. 

We may begin by attempting to explain the frown. In infancy 
thwarting or irritating stimuli caused fits of crying with the attend- 
ant contraction of the corrugator and other muscles. We are not 
here concerned with the origin of the brow contraction in crying. 


Q14 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


It is no doubt an innate reflex serviceable, like respiration and 
sneezing, to the child himself. We are interested merely in know- 
ing how the brow contraction happens to be associated as a frown 
with pain and anger. This may be explained, as Darwin said, by 
the persistence of a response, once serviceable, in situations similar 
to the ones in which it was originally evoked. That is, in later life 
when hurtful or thwarting conditions arise, although the screaming 
fit may be inhibited, the semi-involuntary brow contractions re- 
main and become an expressive abridgment of the whole pain or 
anger response. So far we have sound behavior psychology, and 
can agree with Darwin. 

But this statement implies no reaction whose expressive signif- 
icance is inherited as a vestige of an ancestrally useful habit. The 
original response was serviceable for the life of the individual him- 
self, and within his life passed into an expressive act. That the 
baby’s ancestors protected their eyes in screaming by the frown is 
of no particular interest to us; it is sufficient to know that the baby 
himself does.!_ Nor do we need ‘innumerable generations of scream- 
ing and frowning infants’ in order to fix the expression. If the 
baby in question were the first child who had ever frowned in ery- 
ing we could account equally well for the expressive réle the frown 
assumes in his adult behavior.” 

The same may be said of the exposure of the teeth in rage. 
Biting becomes a part of the prepotent struggle response of young 
children. ‘Tendencies to bite destructively are often inhibited by 
the social environment. Biting also is not uncommon in the fight- 
ing of civilized as well as primitive adults. It is significant that the 
baring of the teeth in anger does not occur until late infancy or 
childhood, that is, until the use of the teeth as tools and weapons is 
well advanced. Darwin’s formula was, “The ancestor bites in 
angry attacks and the child instinctively expresses rage by baring 
his teeth.” Our revision would read, “ The child bites and so 

1 Besides, we are far more certain that the baby has screaming fits than that the 
pre-human adult had them. 

2 Darwin himself seemed to recognize this fact at times. Though his introductory 
chapter makes use of the ‘ inherited vestiges’ notion, relatively little application of 
it is made in dealing with specific expressions. Disgust he explains solely from in- 
fantile behavior. 


The vestige theory has been developed to a rather far-fetched conclusion by 
Herbert Spencer. 


SOCIAL STIMULATION meets 


acquires the habit of expressing rage by baring his teeth.” The 
original movements of nausea similarly are facial reactions accom- 
panying vomiting and tasting bitter or nauseating substances. 
These are made early in life by the child himself and form the basis 
of the later appearing expressive reaction of disgust. | 

Darwin’s first principle therefore is accepted with the important 
modification that the original serviceable reflexes, but not their 
expressive significance, are inherited. Instead of the biologically 
useful reaction being present in the ancestor and the expressive 
vestige in the descendant, we regard both these functions as present 
in the descendant, the former serving as a basis from which the 
latter develops. Foreshortened in this way Darwin’s theory be- 
comes a useful principle of explanation. 

The Mimetic Responses. Our discussion up to this point has 
been largely concerned with the motor side of the facial reactions, 
explained by Darwinian principles. There now remains the 
problem of their extension upon the afferent side. Originally 
evoked only by biologically prepotent stimuli (pain, noxious tastes, 
etc.), facial expressions come eventually to be produced in response 
to objects or situations, often social in character, which are 
merely analogous to the original stimuli. The recognition of these 
analogies constitutes the mimetic theory of Wundt and Piderit. 
Disgust is an excellent example. ‘The facial reaction here is that 
accompanying the rejection of an unsavory substance from the 
alimentary canal, as in vomiting; or the puckering of the nose so 
as to prevent the entrance of unpleasant odors into the nostrils. 
Originally this response was produced oniy when stimulated by 
such disagreeable substances; but with increasing development it 
becomes extended to persons, language, scenes, and proposals 
which offend one’s esthetic habits or moral principles. The 
language of the face is cruder and more frank than that of the 
tongue. To look at a person with contempt is to say to him 
mimetically, ‘I can’t stand your odor!’ To look at him with 
loathing is to liken him to an intolerable substance which one is 
about to vomit.! 


1 Darwin’s theory implies the mimetic theory in that it ascribes the origin of 
expressions to originally serviceable habits, quite useless in the situations in which 
they later are called forth; but it does not do justice to the analogical association of 
certain expressions with particular situations. 


216 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


Since one of the original functions of facial muscles was move- 
ment facilitating smelling and tasting, there is good reason for 
including these reactions as sources of expressive meaning. The 
mimetic of gustatory movements is especially interesting. In 
tasting a sweet substance the lips are closed and drawn back against 
the parted teeth so that they come into contact with the tip of the 
tongue and help rub the sapid stimulus against the taste buds. 
This ‘sweet’ expression of the face is extended by analogy to all 
persons who arouse pleasurable reactions in us. It passes readily 
into smiling. In the ‘bitter’ expression the blade of the tongue is 
drawn as far down as possible away from the palate so as to mini- 
mize any taste-enhancing contact. The result is the lengthening 
of the naso-labial distance, as seen in countenances of hate and 
bitter envy. The pursing of the lips in mentally examining some 
new proposal or theory is mimetically described by Piderit as the 
movement of tasting an unfamiliar substance. 

The field of analogical extension, however, is wider than that of 
the alimentary functions. We express grief or remorse facially 
almost in the same way as we do bodily affliction. Refined persons 
often react to insulting proposals as they would to threatening 
objects, namely, by winking their eyes. We frown when thwarted 
in our movements; we frown also when in thinking we come to some 
perplexing (thwarting) problem. As babies we laugh when a sud- 
den movement is made toward our ticklish parts. When we are 
grown up we laugh at any incongruous (hence sudden) situation, 
or at a ‘thrust’ of wit. In our efforts to draw on a refractory boot 
we set our jaw firmly. This produces the same ‘determined’ 
expression with which we coérce a stubborn child. We raise our 
brows and wrinkle our foreheads when surprised; we raise them 
also when in doubt, for doubt is a kind of internal surprise. The 
object of surprise is unfamiliar to our senses; the object of doubt is 
unfamiliar to our habits of thought.! 

Theory of Mimetic Expression. The language of facial expres- 
sion is thus largely one of unconscious metaphor. How these 
metaphors come into existence we can only conjecture. ‘The 


1 Mantegazza cites a number of these ‘synonyms of expression.’ See his Physiogs 
nomy and Expression (English ed.), pp. 90, 91, 103. 


SOCIAL STIMULATION Q17 


situation, being a stimulus substitution, is strongly suggestive of 
the conditioned response. The difficulty with this explanation, 
however, lies in the fact that the new stimulus does not need to be 
present at the same time that the response to the original stimulus 
is evoked. Persons arouse our expressions of disgust although we 
have never seen them simultaneously with smelling a bad odor. 
Some mediating link is therefore needed that will explain the trans- 
fer not by contiguity but by analogy. We venture the suggestion 
that a bodily or neural setting of some sort provides such a link. 

Suppose, for example, that we are confronted by a person we 
had thought to be on another continent. We raise our brows in 
astonishment. At the same time there occurs a suspension of all 
our bodily responses because of our lack of preparation for the 
surprise. This suspension constitutes our ‘setting’ for the mo- 
ment, and it undoubtedly affords proprioceptive stimulation from 
the muscles and joints. These latter stimuli serve to condition the 
brow-raising response which they accompany. Now let us suppose 
that some friend tells us he has been to a séance and has talked with 
his dead uncle. We are startled by this information, and immedi- 
ately become doubtful or even incredulous. It has given our 
habits of thought the same sort of surprise that the unexpected 
appearance of an acquaintance gave to our settled attitudes of 
overt response. Modern psychology, however, teaches that thought 
is also a sequence of bodily attitudes. Its responses are aroused 
in the form of internal speech, or other symbolic reactions repre- 
senting objects, as truly as outward behavior is evoked as a re- 
action to the objects themselves. Our thought attitudes under the 
influence of our friend’s remark would thus be blocked, precisely as 
our overt responses were in the former instance. This blocking, 
however, provides proprioceptive stimuli which have previously 
become adequate for evoking the reaction of raising the brows: 
hence this response takes place. We learn, therefore, to raise our 
brows in doubt just as we do in amazement. An intermediary 
or common bodily setting would thus account for the transfer from 
the original to the mimetic signification. In behavioristic terms 
this setting would be the meaning of the situation and of the facial 
expression. 


218 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


A further possibility is that these intermediating stimuli might 
arise from faint language responses. Muimetic expression does not 
occur in children until the beginning of true speech and understand- 
ing of words. It is also absent in animals below man, that is, 
among creatures who possess no articulate language.! Further- 
more, human speech is as rich in affective metaphors as is facial 
language. We may cite such familiar phrases as ‘mental anguish,’ 
‘a bitter cup,’ ‘a bitter pill’ (slang), ‘he makes me sick,’ ‘biting 
sarcasm,’ ‘filthy habits,’ ‘poking fun,’ ‘tickled to death,’ ‘sweet 
disposition,’ and ‘stiff-ne¢ked.’ In so far as this possibility is 
realized the social environment, by calling attention verbally to 
these analogies of feeling and sensation, plays a part in the develop- 
ment of the expressive function. In the race, however, the bodily 
settings must have been the original causes, for the language sym- 
bols are but names for these settings. 

Summary. We may bring together the various threads of the dis- 
cussion in the following statements. Expression as such is neither 
an original nor an inherited function of facial muscles. It de- 
velops, probably within the early life of the individual, from facial 
reflexes serviceable in other ways to the organism. Among animals 
and primitive peoples it may acquire significance as a form of social 
control. 

Genetically facial expressions are built upon two fundamental 
and antagonistic affective expressions, the pleasant and the un- 
pleasant. These facial reactions are innate accompaniments of 
their respective feeling states. They give an antithetical aspect to 
the full emotional expressions into which they enter. ‘They are 
earliest in appearance in the life of the infant, and are gradually 
modified by the addition of special muscular contractions serving 
such biological uses as protection of the eyes, rejection of bad tastes 
and smells, biting, mastication, and facilitation of looking, listen- 
ing, smelling, and tasting. In many situations of this kind in later 
life, these adaptive reactions are either reduced, inhibited, or dis- 
used; or else are called forth as mere analogies to their original 
function. The movements of the facial muscles, however, remain 
and serve as indices of the emotional states or attitudes involved. 


1 A possible exception may occur in the case of some of the anthropoids. 


SOCIAL STIMULATION 219 


Upon the afferent side the expressions become conditioned by 
increasingly remote and ‘intellectualized’ stimuli bearing merely 
an analogy to the original stimulus. This analogy is carried as an 
intermediary bodily setting, aided perhaps by language symbols. 


EXPRESSION THROUGH PosTURE AND PHYSIOGNOMY 


Muscle Tonus and Posture as Social Stimuli. If we place a cat 
upon the floor its legs will stiffen as soon as its feet touch, and a 
standing posture will result. If its cerebral hemispheres are re- 
moved this reaction will still take place. It is explained by the 
fact that kinesthetic or tactual stimuli in the legs or feet send 
impulses to the cerebellum, whence efferent impulses pass outward 
again to the extensors of the limbs causing them to become fixed 
and to resist flexion and collapse as gravity pulls the animal down- 
ward. ‘The standing and in fact many of the postures of human 
beings are due to the same sort of mechanism. Continual postural 
reflexes keep up a steady, unconscious flow of mild innervation, 
holding the skeletal parts in useful positions against the force of 
gravity (see p. 26). We ean thus stand, sit, or hold objects in our 
hands without conscious effort or fatigue. Another important 
function of tonic contraction is to prepare our muscles for rapid 
and energetic action; for a high level of tonus is the physiological 
basis for the vigorous movements of the executive or leader. 
Postural tonus varies with the state of the organism. When re- 
fresned, cheerful, and in good health it is well maintained. In 
opposite conditions our muscles are flaccid and inert, and we seem 
to be ‘losing our grip.’ 

Some of the best examples of the social effects of tonicity are 
seen in military and other forms of drill. Some drill masters, whose 
tonus is high, suggest power and energy in their bearing and every 
syllable of their commands. ‘Troops respond immediately and 
almost unconsciously by greater snap and precision of movement. 
Officers’ ‘Click Schools’ established in war-time army camps had 
this very purpose in view; for the effect upon the morale of troops 
exerted through the bearing and energy of their officers is axiom- 
atic in military life.1 The same influence is felt in the contacts of 


1 The ideal, reiterated in these schools, of the officer as an upstanding man is a 
literal recognition of muscle tonus as a power in resisting gravity. 


220 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


personalities in daily life, and in the establishment of the ascend- 
ant-submissive relation. The firm grip of the hand inspires us 
with energy and confidence; the flabby handshake, literally speak- 
ing, makes us tired. 

A sudden increase in tonus level, seen as alertness, together with 
orientation toward some object, forms a most compelling stimulus 
to others. A group of people on the street alert, motionless, and 
all facing in the same direction, catches the corner of our eye with 
amazing swiftness. Changes in the posture of a few pigeons quickly 
sets the whole flock into alarm and flight. 

Physiognomy. ‘The human face in its quiet, unemotional mo- 
ments is a significant social stimulus in the clue it gives to the 
possessor’s habits and personal traits. Two factors enter into 
physiognomy as an indication of character: (1) tonus level, and 
(2) habits of the features and permanent wrinkles formed at right 
angles to the direction of contraction of frequently used muscles. 
A slight perpetual frown frequently indicates the irascible tempera- 
ment, while ‘crow’s-feet’ show about the lids of the jovial fat man. 
Mild contempt is a physiognomic trait of the ‘exclusive’ person. 
The ‘sweet’ and ‘bitter’ personalities are often told by their facial 
postures. The hard expression of the criminal is of the bitter type. 
Occupation or habits are also revealed, as in the ‘used’ and mature 
look about the eyes of the student. ‘Wear and tear’ on the face 
often betrays character. Flabbiness of feature, sagging of the 
eyelids, and a used, inelastic drag of the lips signalize the roué and 
the prostitute. Dissipation of bodily resources has brought facial 
tonus to its lowest ebb. Stimuli of this sort are often responded 
to unconsciously, or, as we say, intuitively. Yet they determine 
an infinite variety of subtle approaching and avoiding tendencies 
which we display toward our fellows. For one sensitive to such 
influences an hour spent in a café frequented by debauchees, or in 
a street car gazing into the worn or expressionless faces of shoppers 
and laborers, becomes intolerably depressing. 

Observation of physiognemic traits based on tonus and on 
temperament and habit shown in the face is a useful supplement to 
the methods of personality measurement described in Chapter VI. 
Many persons have tried to analyze character, temperament, and 


4 
’ 
> 


SOCIAL STIMULATION , 221 


even abilities, by dimensions of the forehead, prominence of the 
chin, shape of the nose, convexity of profile, texture of skin and 
hair, and other morphological aspects governed by metabolism 
and skeletal growth rather than by behavior. The correlation of 
these factors with personality is unproved and probably remote.! 
Differences of texture and fineness of feature no doubt sometimes 
distinguish opposite extremes in human breeding, just as the race 
horse is finer and cleaner limbed than the draft animal. Mental 
defectives have facial crudities, or stigmata, and as a rule, under- 
sized crania. But these of course are extreme types. Experiments 
have shown that ability to estimate intelligence from photographs 
is so low, even with very intelligent persons as judges, that the 
method is of little value in employment selection. Here again, the 
extremes of intelligence and stupidity are recognized; but not the 
more moderate grades. There is little, therefore, to justify the 
absurd pretension of the ‘character analysts’ that their methods 
constitute an exact science. Facts of behavior, and evidences of 
behavior traits seen in the face are the only reliable criteria of 
personality. 


THe STIMULUS VALUE OF FACIAL AND BopILy EXPRESSION 


Genetic Aspects and Extremes of Sensitivity. Within a few 
weeks after birth the infant manifests an interest in the grimaces of 
its elders. Movements of mouth and eyes, made close to him, 
cause him to fixate the expressions with an attentive frown and to 
cease his random kicking and squirming. The closed fist is some- 
times held out toward the stimulating countenance. As early as 
six months of age the baby begins to watch the play of the features 
and to connect with them a meaning for self-adaptation in a manner 
previously described. Professor Cooley observes, no doubt cor- 
rectly, that the response to facial expression is learned rather than 
instinctive. The smile is a social conditioner of the child’s pleasant 
experiences. Hence it evokes his smile as a part of his own pleasure 
response, and not as an imitation of his parent’s expression. The 


1The pseudo-science of physiognomy is phrenology with the ‘bumps’ moved 
down onto the face. For a modern example, see G. E. Fosbroke’s Character Reading 
through Analysis of the Features. It contains some useful suggestions if read with 
‘discrimination. 


222 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


expression of anger produces in him, not the instinctive fear of a 
wrathful visage, but fear and avoidance of the unfamiliar. Since 
response to facial expression antedates that to articulate language, 
expression becomes an early stimulus for conditioning the prepo- 
tent activities of approach and withdrawal. The year-old child 
reacts quickly to new situations on the basis of expressions manifest 
in his parents’ faces and postures; and comes also to look for these 
expressions in order to direct his reaction.! Children do not learn 
to make facial expressions by imitating their elders; nor do they 
often mimic expressions or physiognomies in their pantomimic 
play. 

We have previously referred to the unusual sensitivity of such 
animals as Clever Hans in reacting to small clues furnished by un- 
conscious movements. Certain persoris also develop this ability to 
an extraordinary degree. So-called mind readers and spiritualists 
rely on subtle indications of facial expression, voice, and bodily 
movement in response to questions they put to the subject. These 
stimuli are often so slight as to elude their own consciousness; they 
seem, even to themselves, to be following the guidance of mystical 
forces.? 

Experiments in Reading Facial Expression. The stimulating 
power of facial expressions must of course be measured in terms of 
the differential responses which subjects are capable of making to 
them. The language reaction has been used in all studies made up 


to the present time; the significance of the expression for the subject _~ 


being assumed to be cominensurate with his ability correctly to 
name it. Unfortunately it has been necessary to use photographs 
rather than actual faces, because of the impossibility of obtaining 
standardized stimuli in the case of the latter. The cinematograph 
may afford a more dynamic and realistic technique for future 
experiments. The results thus far achieved deal with three main 
questions. (1) How many and what facial expressions are 


1 Many parents assert that their children have inherited their own fears of cer- 
tain objects, because they have ‘never said a word about it’ to them. The fact 
is that they have involuntarily said a great deal through the language of emo- 
tional expression and bodily attitude. To the child the attitude of the parent is 
often more significant than words. 

2 A remarkable case, elucidated experimentally by Professor Stratton, is cited in 
the references at the end of this chapter. 


SOCIAL STIMULATION 223 


accurately identified; and what characteristic confusions exist? 
(2) What methods are used by the subject in identifying them? 
(3) What differences between individuals exist with respect to 
this ability, and how are these differences te be interpreted? 

1. How many and what expressions are correcily named? In 1917 
Professor H. 8. Langfeld conducted a study with 105 pictures 
selected from the same source as those of Figures 22 A and B, and 
representing fourteen distinct groups of facial expression. In some 
of these tests five subjects were used, and in others, six. The sub- 
jects examined the photographs and named the expressions in their 
own words. A total of 525 judgments were obtained, of which only 
about 33 per cent were correct. If only the eight groups in the 
following table are selected (the others being unusually difficult or 
perhaps only ‘projected’ expressions) the accuracy rises to 43 per 
cent, which is still surprisingly low. Laughter was the most 
readily identified, being correctly named in 64 per cent of the cases; 
anger the least readily (30 per cent accuracy). Pain was also 
readily seen (50 per cent); while disgust and fear were low (36 per 
cent each). 

Another method of determining accuracy in this function was 
developed as a facral expression test by the present writer. Four- 
teen of the Rudolph pictures (previously selected by Professor 
Langfeld) were shown as lantern slides to various classes of students. 
Each subject was given a sheet containing fourteen groups of 
names of expressions. Each of these groups comprised eight titles, 
some approximating that of the corresponding picture, but only 
one absolutely correct. The task required was to underline the 
expression in each group which best suited the corresponding 
picture. Partial credits were given for the approximate names. 
A perfect score — that is, correct titles chosen for all fourteen 
pictures — was considered as 100 per cent.!. Employing this 
method results were obtained somewhat similar to those of Lang- 
feld. The average scores attained by various groups of subjects 
ranged between 45 and 50 per cent. ; 


1 By the use of this method — that is, with names given to choose from — indi- 
vidual differences in the result stand as differences in ability to react to the expres- 
sion, and not as differences in fluency or vocabulary. 


224 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


Table VI presents the rank order of the more important expres- 
sions according to the frequency of correct identification in these 
two investigations. The first expression in each column is the one 
judged correctly in the greatest number of cases; the second ex- 
pression is second in accuracy of identification, and so on. 


TABLE VI. FactAL EXPRESSIONS IN ORDER OF IDENTIFIABILITY 





(LANGFELD) (ALLPORT) 
6 subjects 105 pictures 48 subjects 14 pictures 
Laughter Laughter 
Amazement Bodily Pain 
Bodily Pain Fear (Horror) 
Hate (Aversion-Hate Group) Distrust (similar to Hate) 
Fear (Anxiety-Fear-Terror Group) Amazement 
eae (Scorn-Contempt Group) pees 
Doubt Doubt 
Anger (Anger-Rage Group) Disgust 





Laughter and bodily pain stand out as the most readily identified 
of the expressions. This fact accords with our earlier treatment of 
them as the basic affective patterns underlying all emotional states 
and their expressions (see pp. 86, 212). Disgust, anger, and the 
attitudinal expression, doubt, stand last in correctness of judgment. 
Amazement, fear, and hate are intermediate. 

The pictures in the groups of expressions named in the left hand 
column of Table VI were later presented to the subjects again with 
the artist’s title, for acceptance or rejection. In 77 per cent of the 
pictures the artist’s title (presumably the correct one) was accepted. 
Suggestion was not the only factor here, for when the same pictures 
were presented at a later time with suggested erroneous titles, less 

1 These results confirm the findings of a rather extensive pioneer investigation by 
Dr. Antoinette Feleky, and are confirmed by a more recent study by Dr. C. A. 
Ruckmick. Both these investigators, however, found the disgust group interpreted 
with high accuracy. Photographs of a woman were used in both cases; possibly this 


expression is more marked or more recognizable on the female face. See references 
at the end of this chapter. 


SOCIAL STIMULATION 225 


than one third were accepted. Although the ability correctly to 
name a facial expression is generally low, the meaning of it is readily 
seen when its true name is given.! As to special cases of confusion, 
violent expressions of pain, rage, and terror were sometimes not 
distinguished. Similarity of brow wrinkles was probably the cause 
of the failure to discriminate. Strong amazement and fear were 
also confused. Subtler components in strong states were some- 
what obscured by the major emotion, though they were at once 
recognized when pointed out. Some subtleties, however, were well 
observed, such as vindictiveness in anger, anger in scorn (bitter 
expression), and conflicts, for example, between jest and earnest. 
(Langfeld). | 

2. What methods do the subjects use in identifying facial expres- 
sions ? A significant fact in the studies by both Langfeld and Ruck~ 
mick was the manner in which the task was performed. ‘The re- 
ports of most of the subjects agreed in the endeavor to imagine a 
concrete situation in which the expression they were examining would 
be appropriate. The following are instances of this attempt: 
imagining one’s self as the object of the emotion expressed, or as a 
spectator; imagining what object could be before the man’s eyes to 
evoke such a response; visualizing the expression on a friend’s face 
and deducing its cause; recalling an actual situation in which a 
similar expression was seen; developing auditory imagery of what 
the man might be saying. ‘The association between the face and 
the attendant circumstances is thus seen to be very close. We do 
not react to facial expressions alone in daily life; and we can 
scarcely do so in an experiment. ‘The situation as a whole — 
words, gestures, postures, and known circumstances — lend an 
indispensable support in our interpretation. 

An auxiliary method frequently used was the attempt to imitate 
the expression with the subject’s own features. The purpose of 
this procedure seemed to be to receive all possible stimulations 
(facial in this case) which might bring up by association (condition- 
ing) situations in which such expressions were previously experienced, 
thereby receiving a clue for the identification. It is more difficult, 


1 Darwin, in a slightly different fashion, encountered the same phenomenon 
(Expression of Emotion in Man and Animals, p. 14). 


226. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


however, to derive the situation from the facial expression than to 
recognize the expression once the situation is known. ‘This truth 
is a matter of common experience. When we come upon an 
individual or a group of people expressing some strong emotion, we 
immediately attempt to find out what has happened. This know]l- 
edge at once gives significance to the otherwise chaotic mass of 
facial expressions. Dropping into the middle of a moving-picture 
show, we find the expressions of the actors merely a disturbing or 
ridiculous set of grimaces until we have caught up the thread of the 
story. 

We are now able to magi ee the immediate recognition of an 
expression, and acceptance of the artist’s title, once the name of it 
is given. Words are integrated most minutely with all our bodily 
attitudes. Merely hearing the name puts the subject into a def- 
inite situation. If the expression seems to ‘snap into place’ in this 
perceptual setting, the suggested name is accepted; if not, the name 
is rejected. 

A third method of denn eaeton used by some was to make an 
analysis of the various components of the expression. 
3. How do individuals differ in their ability to name facial ex- 
pressions; and to what are these differences due? A wide range of 
ability exists among subjects for reading expressions. In testing 
several college classes with the facial expressions test described 
above, the writer has found scores ranging between 21 and 72 per 
cent, fairly evenly distributed according to the probability curve, 
with the median (middle score) at about 48. There is no pro- 
nounced difference between the sexes in this capacity.! Are these 
wide individual variations due to differences of innate susceptibility 
to social stimulation, or do they result from discrepancies in prac- 
tice and in the methods employed? To answer this the writer 
conducted three lines of experimentation, dealing with variations 

in the three methods described under question 2. 

(a) The effect of analysis. We may first inquire what difference 

1 An interesting difference, however, is shown in the time required to make a 
decision in regard to the picture. The women made their judgments in about one 
half the time needed by the men. The inference is that the factors upon which the 


decision is based are less consciously reasoned (more ‘intuitive’) with women than 
with men. 


SOCIAL STIMULATION ' 227 


is made in one’s performance by a knowledge of the emotions ex- 
pressed by positions of the various features taken separately. The 
facial expressions test was given to twelve young women. They 
were then asked to study a chart of expressions similar to Table V 
for a period of fifteen minutes, afteg which they took the test again 
and made use of what they had learned. The results are presented 
in Table VII. 


TaBLeE VII. Errect or KNowina How TO ANALYZE EXPRESSIONS 
UPON SUCCESS OF IDENTIFYING THEM 


II Il 


SUBJECT 


Score before | Score after | Gain 
study of study of through 
chart chart study 


Average 





Correlation between ranks in columns I and III: r = — .86 





Judging from this table the following interesting facts and con- 
clusions may be established: (1) Out of twelve subjects, all but four 
improve in their identification of facial reactions with study and 
application of the principles of expression. (2) Practice in this 
regard tends to equalize the ability of the various subjects. The 
less efficient gain the most, and the more efficient gain the least. 
The three best judges in the original test actually lost after study of 


228 — SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


the chart, and lost in direct proportion to their ability. The gain 
of the poorer judges was also roughly proportional to their lack of 
ability. There is, in other words, a fairly high inverse correlation 
(—.86) between the original ability to name expressions and the 
improvement through learning how to analyze the component 
positions of the features.? (3) We conclude, therefore, that while 
there may be innate differences of a general sort in the sensitivity 
required to learn facial expressions, the broad differences between 
individuals in this respect are due to differences of practice in 
reacting to the expressive criteria. Some. persons, through special 
incentive or opportunity, have already learned how to read faces, 
and probably at an early age. The methods by which they do it 
have become automatic and unconscious through continual use. 
To recall them, therefore, as in substituting conscious analysis, 
proves an unnecessary distraction and in some cases actually 
hinders their judgments, in the same way that playing with notes a 
pianoforte piece one has long played from memory usually con- 
fuses one. Others have never had the drive or the occasion to 
observe what emotions facial reactions indicate. The less they had 
noticed them the lower they stood in the test: hence their great 
improvement when this knowledge was acquired and used. 

(b) The effect of reacting to situations given in words. The second 
experiment was performed upon a mixed group of fourteen sub- 
jects, and consisted of two parts. In the first, the test pictures 
were given the subjects with a list of twenty-eight names. They 
were asked to examine each photograph carefully and select the 
most suitable title from among those offered. One week later they 
were given the pictures again with the list of names in a different 
order. The pictures were spread out and each subject was asked 
to fix his attention upon each title given in turn, and try to develop 
in himself the emotion and expression indicated by that title. 
With this state fully aroused he was to look over all the photo- 
graphs and select that which best fitted the emotion he was 
experiencing. ‘Thus in the first case the task was to find a word to 


| 1 Note that in column I the poorest subject is 36 per cent below the best; after 
study (column II) she is only 2 per cent below the same person. 
2 For an explanation of correlation see p. 131. 


SOCIAL STIMULATION 229 


suit the expression; in the second it was to fit an expression to the 
word. The results were strikingly similar to those of the preceding 
experiment. One half the subjects succeeded better with the first 
method, and the other half with the second. These were the better 
and the poorer judges respectively. The more efficient were uni- 
formly and slightly reduced in their scores by fitting the picture to 
an adopted situation; the scores of the less efficient were consider- 
ably enhanced by this method. The correlation between improve- 
ment through the second procedure and original ability in the test 
was therefore again inverse (—.54). Here again the superior judges 
seem to react almost ‘intuitively’ to the face itself. The inferior 
ones are aided by grasping at any clue which will support their 
meager understanding of the features. 

(c) The effect of amitating the expression. A final experiment was 
conducted to determine the result upon the test score of trying to 
imitate with one’s own features the expression shown. ‘The com- 
pared results of two sets of scores, one with and the other without 
imitation, confirm the tendencies shown in (a) and (6b). In the 
superior half of the group slightly more were hindered than were 
helped by the use of imitation; in the lower half almost twice as 
many were helped as were hindered by this method. 

Further Interpretations. A few remarks may be added upon the 
question as to why some persons naturally acquire this facility in 
judging faces while others do not. It has been found through a vis- 
ual observation test that this ability does not correlate with powers 
of observation in general. Some special incentive or reason must, 
therefore, be found for the tendency to observe faces in particular. 
Opportunity may have had some influence, as in the contrast be- 
tween the only or the solitary child and the child in a large family. 
Special abilities or interests, such as the literary and artistic, 
appear to have some relation to the social sensitivity. The per- 
sonality type, especially in the relations of the individual to his 
social sphere, seems to be fairly significant. The self-conscious or 
submissive individual who avoids face-to-face contacts, especially 
in strenuous moods, and who is somewhat embarrassed in the 
presence of ‘scenes,’ would naturally miss many opportunities 
for learning the vocabulary of facial expression. In the group of 


230 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


twelve young women tested, the scores showed a slight correlation 
(.45) with ratings in the trait of ascendance-submission. ‘The re- 
clusive, self-centered, and asocial individual may also stand low in 
the test through indifference to the reactions of others. It is 1m- 
possible, however, to generalize, since a drive for reading others 
may develop as a compensation for defect in the social sphere. No 
single cause, but a complex of capacities, circumstances, and traits, 
appears to underlie this ability. 

General Aspects of Expressional Stimulation. The language of 
facial behavior is, as we have seen, a supplementary and uncon- 
scious one. While it is capable of gaining much significance 
through careful interpretation, in its usual réle it is more often 
contributory than direct. It acquires its meaning through the 
bodily movements and other stimuli of the whole situation in which 
it occurs. As we shall see later it attains great significance as a 
contributory stimulus in crowds. For two reasons facial expres- 
sion has been neglected by man as a form of communication. 
First, the language of speech has proved a far more versatile and 
practicable method. Secondly, displays of violent emotion in face 
or body have been discouraged by custom. 

Facial expression is an involuntary stimulus which can be used 
to read what the individual is unwilling to make known in words. 
The grosser reactions we can inhibit; but a keen eye still detects the 
widening of the eyes in fear or doubt and the incipient frown. The 
psychiatrist, the lawyer, the diplomat, and the salesman depend 
continually upon such indications from persons with whom they 
deal. This is the ‘halfway’ or self-adapting stage characteristic of 
the adjustments of lower animals. One adapts himself (reacts) 
to the behavior of his fellows without their special cognizance. 
Social control through facial expression is relatively rare among 
human beings. In cases of secrecy where words and gestures are 
out of the question the twitch of the mouth, the mandatory wink, 
and the covert frown of warning exert direct influence upon the 
behavior of others. 


Minor Forms oF SocriaAL STIMULATION 
- In order to complete the survey of social stimulations we must 


SOCIAL STIMULATION 231 


recognize a large group of impressions purely incidental to the 
presence and personal behavior of others. The mere sight of others 
about us influences our responses in definite ways. Ina room filled 
with workers or office clerks the peripheral vision of the movements 
and posture of others, the noise of their work, and even the human 
odor and humidity of the atmosphere, all have their effect on the 
total reaction of each individual. Physical contact and pressures 
incident to mobs and crowded streets is a stimulation which, in 
emotional excitement, may achieve great power. ‘Shopper’s 
fatigue’ is due in part to the protracted strain of reacting to the 
close proximity of others, and to resisting the constant and oppres- 
sive stimulations from crowding. These minor forms of excita- 
tion are not used for social control. Furthermore they are devoid 
of any expressive significance. They are produced unwittingly; 
and are responded to neither directly nor consciously by those 
whom they affect. Yet they exert a powerful influence in many 
social situations. 


REFERENCES 


(The first ten of the following references contain useful illustrations of facial 
and bodily expressions.) 


Darwin, Charles, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals. 

Piderit, Th., Mimik und Physiognomik (2d ed.). Detmold, H. Denecke, 
1886. 

Mantegazza, P., Physiognomy and Expression (English ed.). 

Duchenne, G. B., Mécanisme de la Physionomie Humaine. Paris, Bailliére, 
1876. 

Bell, Sir Charles, The Anatomy and Philosophy of Expression. 

Hughes, H., Die Mimik des Menschen. Frankfurt, Johannes Alt, 1900. 

Rudolph, H., Der Ausdruck der Gemiitsbewegungen des Menschen. (Textbook 
and Atlas.) Dresden, Kiihtmann, 1903. 

Crile, G. W., The Origin and Nature of the Emotions (see illustrations). 

——— Man — An Adaptive Mechanism (see illustrations). 

Schulze, R., Experimental Psychology and Pedagogy. (Translated by Pintner.) 
Illustrations in chs. 4, 6, 10. 

Sherrington, C.S., ‘Postural Activity of Nerve and Muscle,” Brain, 1915, 
XXXVIII, 191-234. 

James, Wm., Principles of Psychology, vol. 11, ch. 25 (pp. 442-47; 477-85). 

Dumas, G., ‘‘L’expression des émotions,” Revue Philosophique, 1922, xLvit, 
32-72; 235-58. 

Breese, B. B., Psychology, pp. 384-91. 


232 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


Wundt, W., Essays (2d ed.), no. 7, ‘‘Der Ausdruck der Gemiitsbewegungen.”’ 
Leipzig, Engelmann, 1906. 

Craig, W., ““A Note on Darwin’s Work on the Expression of the Emotions in 
Man and Animals,” Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology, 
1921-22, xvi, 356-66. 

Nony, C., ‘‘The Biological and Social Significance of the Expression of the 
Emotions,” British Journal of Psychology (General Section), 1922, xin, 
76-91. 

Cooley, C. H., Human Nature and the Social Order, ch. 3 (pp. 62-79). 

Feleky, A. M., ‘““The Expression of Emotions,” Psychological Review, 1914, 
XXI, Jo—41. 

Langfeld, H. 8., ‘The Judgment of Emotions from Facial Expressions,’ 
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 1918-19, x11, 172-84. 

—“Judgments of Facial Expression and Suggestion, 
Review, 1918, xxv, 488-94. 

Ruckmick, C. A., “A Preliminary Study of the Emotions,” Psychological 
Monographs, 1921, xxx, no. 3 (whole no. 1386), pp. 30-35. 

Pintner, R., ‘Intelligence as Estimated from Photographs,” Psychological 
Review, 1918, xxv, 286-96. 

Anderson, L. D., ‘‘Estimation of Intelligence by Means of Printed Photo- 
graphs,” Journal of Applied Psychology, 1921, v, 152-55. 

Pope, D. V., “The Interpretation of the Human Face from Photographs’ 
(conducted by L. R. Geissler), Bulletin of Randolph-Macon Woman’s College, 
1922, vil, no. 4, 3-17. 

Stratton, G. M., ‘‘The Control of Another Person by Obscure Signs,” Psy- 
chological Review, 1921, xxvii, 301-14. 


” 





Psychological 


CHAPTER X 
RESPONSE TO SOCIAL STIMULATION: ELEMENTARY FORMS 


Types of Reactions to Social Objects. Social behavior, as 
previously stated, falls into two classes: the acts by which one 
individual stimulates another, and the characteristic responses 
which are made to these acts. The former class, namely the social 
stimuli, have been discussed in the two preceding chapters. We 
shall consider now the various ways in which the individual reacts 
to these stimulations. Not all such reactions are equally impor- 
tant from the present viewpoint; for many of them do not differ 
materially from the responses made to non-social objects. The 
motorist reacts to the sign ‘Road Closed’ in the same way that 
he would to a permanent obstruction placed across the highway. 
The fact that some human being has written the sign has no special 
significance. He responds to the behavior of the traffic policeman 
as he would to the arms of a wooden semaphore. When we follow 
oral directions, make use of the knowledge gained in a lecture, or 
obey the social stimuli implicit in the law, we are reacting a little 
more to the specific social element of the stimulus; but even here 
our behavior does not differ in kind from control and learning 
through contact with non-social objects. When, on the other 
hand, we sympathize with our friend’s grief, converse with him, 
smile in answer to his smile, yield submissively to his suggestion, 
work more rapidly because he is working with us, or feel hurt or 
angry at his neglect, our response is uniquely a response to social 
stimulation. | 

On the side, therefore, of response, behavior shades off from types 
which are distinctly characteristic of the social and only the social 
situation, to forms which are exhibited in any kind of environment. 
Social psychology is concerned only with the former variety, that 
is, with reactions which follow exclusively or at least mainly from 
social stimulation. Elementary forms of such response, including 
sympathy, imitation, suggestion, and laughter will be discussed in 
this chapter. > 


234 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


SYMPATHY 


The Mechanism of Sympathy. Sympathy is usually defined as 
‘feeling with’ an individual, or sharing his emotions. It is thus no 
emotion in particular, but a mechanism whereby any emotion or 
feeling in another comes to arouse the same state in us. Since the 
principle of sympathy is fundamental in social life, it is necessary 
to get as clear a notion as possible of the process it involves. 
Professor McDougall has advanced a theory of sympathy which 
has been the center of much controversy. For each emotion, 
according to his view, there are two classes of stimuli which have 
the innate capacity for evoking it. One of these is the actual 
object, such as thwarting agencies for anger and dangerous stimuli 
for fear. The other comprises the perception of the emotion in 
question as expressed in the behavior of another. Thus the facial 
expression, cries, and movements of fear directly arouse fear in a 
person witnessing them, and arouse it, moreover, as an instinctive 
response. This alleged process is known as the ‘sympathetic in- 
duction of emotions.’ 

This theory has the advantage of simplicity of statement. 
Deeper consideration, however, reveals certain fundamental ob- 
jections to it. First, it presupposes the maturation of complex 
innate ‘perceptual dispositions,’ and thus incurs the objections to 
the general instinct theory raised in Chapter III. Secondly, it is 
seriously at odds with the experimental findings, related in Chapter 
IX, bearing upon the response to facial expressions in emotion. 
The general accuracy of individuals in identifying such expressions 
is less than fifty per cent. If the expression tended instinctively 
to evoke the corresponding emotion in the spectator, it seems 
certain that the ability to select the correct name for it would have 
been much higher and more universal. It is clear also from the 
experiments that the proficiency of different individuals in this 
regard is due not to innate reaction to expression, but to the amount 
of training or effort at learning which they have experienced. 
Again, most persons strive to recognize the expression by recalling 
specific situations in which such a facial response would be fitting. 
This last point affords us an important clue: 7t ¢s not the direct 


te 


RESPONSE TO SOCIAL STIMULATION 235 


emotional behavior of the person, so much as the knowledge of the 
conditions affecting him that makes vt possible for us to understand 
(and indeed to sympathize) with his state of mind. Thirdly, the 
facts not only of experiment but of real life are against the theory. 
If we witness the anger of two men who are fighting, our anger is 
not necessarily aroused. We may instead be amused, frightened, 
or interested, according to the circumstances. If one of the 
combatants is our dearest friend, we feel anger and participate in 
the conflict. But our anger is not a ‘sympathetic anger’ aroused 
by the sight of our friend’s angry behavior. It is aroused by the 
enemy who is injuring our friend, and thereby thwarting certain of 
‘our own affections and interests. Here again it is the whole situa- 
tion rather than the perception of an emotion in another which 
arouses the emotion in us. 

A theory far more plausible than that of instinctive induction of 
emotion may now be considered. ‘This is the principle of condi- 
tioned emotional response. It may be illustrated by the panic which 
seizes all the persons in a throng when a few of them show signs of 
terror. Granting that the true cause for alarm has been seen by 
only the original few, we have here a case of fear aroused by a 
process of sympathy. The explanation, according to the present 
theory, is as follows: We have been previously terrified in company 
with others and so have had our fear emotion transferred to char- 
acteristic attendant stimuli, such as the cries and visible expres- 
sions of the emotion in those about us. We now react at once to 
the sight of fear in others by a fear response of our own. Here 
the conception of sympathetic induction loses its force. We fear 
not merely because we see the expression of fear in others; but 
because we have learned to read these expressions as signs that 
there really is something to be afraid of. It is not fear induced from 
others that we experience, but our own fear of dangerous situations 
which has been conditioned by social stimuli. 

The tender emotions of love and grief are more popularly iden- 
tified with the sympathetic reaction than anger and fear. The 
following example is a familiar instance explained by the condi- 
tioned response theory. I receive a letter from my friend announc- 
ing the death of his wife. Suppose I have previously lost my own 


236 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


wife. The words serve to recall (by conditioning) many feelings of 
grief and thwarted love I have formerly experienced, and I may 
be said to sympathize fully with my friend.! Let us suppose I 
have never experienced such bereavement. My reaction is different 
only in degree. I have imagined and worried about such a mis- 
fortune occurring (or I can easily imagine it), and have thus carried 
out thought reactions tinged with emotion similar to the grief of 
my friend. The letter announcing the sad news draws upon this 
stock of my experience, and I thus sympathize, though to a less 
degree than in the former case. If we suppose that I am not even 
married, my sympathetic reaction, though present, is much less 

still. , 

There is then a law that the closer the situation arousing sympa- 
thy to the past experience of the individual, the greater will be his 
sympathy with the person involved. This fact is the fourth and 
most telling argument in favor of the conditioned response theory 
as against the theory of sympathetically induced emotion. For 
according to the latter view, provided the expression of feelung were 
always of the same intensity, it would make no difference in the 
sympathetic response whether the situation were familiar or un- 
familiar to the sympathizer; whereas, following the conditioned 
response theory, we should expect the arousal of the ‘sympathetic’ 
emotion to be directly proportional to the number and strength of 
its previous arousals in the situation in question. 

Conditions Favoring the Sympathetic Response. In addition to 
the degree of familiarity with the situation there are several other 
factors which favor the conditioned release of emotional reactions 
by like emotional expressions in others. They have the common 
effect of rendering the organism more receptive to the stimulus. 
Love, in particular, involves an attitude of constant readiness to 
react to the behavior of the loved one. This openness to stimula- 
tion is probably a part of that general desire for contact with the 


1 Strictly speaking, however, I have no way of knowing that my emotion is ex- 
actly like my friend’s. It is more properly described as sympathy with my own past 
experience than as sympathy with his. It contains moreover other components 
than revived grief for a dead loved one, for it is mingled with love, pity and other 
emotions toward my friend. In this sense also my whole reaction is not an exact 
copy of his. The popular notion, therefore, of sympathy being a replica of the 
jeelings sympathized with is true only in the most general sense. 


RESPONSE TO SOCIAL STIMULATION 237 


loved object. The mother therefore feels keenly the physical 
pains, and the dangers, discomforts, and disappointments of her 
child, because her own emotional responses are open to arousal 
through conditioning elements witnessed in the situation of the 
child. Submissive attitudes are similar in their susceptibility ta 
emotional stimuli from those toward whom one is submissive. 
Prestige is the common basis of this relation. We know that the 
doctor understands the condition of our sick friend far better than 
we do; hence our emotional reactions are in a condition of readi- 
ness to be aroused by any evidence of emotion from this person of 
prestige. If his manner is confident, we are calm and reassured; 
if he seems apprehensive, we take alarm at once. In the late war 
the writer felt a distinct wave of terror upon seeing some French 
troops look up into the sky and run for cover. The new American 
troops were always in readiness to react to the signs afforded by the 
soldiers of armies which had had long experience in the trenches. 
The quick, emotional response of the child to the emotion shown 
by the parent is based on this same submissiveness to prestige. 
One other condition favoring sympathy may be mentioned; namely, 
the nearness and vividness of the emotional expression and situation. 
We are thus inclined to feel deeper sympathy for the ery of a hun- 
gery child on the street than for the starving thousands which we 
read of in newspaper accounts of famines. 

The Social Significance of Sympathy. Sympathy, though impor- 
tant in enabling human beings to understand one another and so 
live together, is not in itself an altruistic response. The emotion 
sympathetically aroused leads us primarily to the removal of the 
unpleasant state in ourselves rather than in those whose suffering 
aroused it in us. ‘Thus when we feel sympathetic fear we get our- 
selves out of danger, often with little regard for the safety of others. 
When we are unpleasantly affected by the sight of suffering, we 
pass on and forget it, or else close our eyes to it. By the admixture 
of pity in our response we are sometimes led to remove our un- 
pleasant states by alleviating the suffering of the persons who 
arouse such states in us. But this type of reaction goes further 
than mere sympathy itself. 


1 There is present in such cases a strong attitude for overt assistance, and an 


238 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


There are some sentimental individuals who derive a mawkish 
satisfaction from sympathizing with every form of misfortune, 
whether it be real want and suffering or the fancied oppression of 
some portion of society. These persons revel in sympathy; but 
they do little to relieve the cause beyond railing at the general 
scheme of things which makes such conditions possible. Suspicion 
may be justly aroused that it is the scheme of things which they 
hate, and their sympathy is simply a form of rationalization for 
justifving their hatred. A similar tendency is seen in those who 
release certain repressed interests by sentimentalizing over the 
criminal. How completely we are made to share the feelings of 
‘Jimmy Valentine’ the burglar famed in song and drama! We 
sympathize also with those who rebel against social conventions, 
and who advocate free love and other forms of alleged freedom; 
not admitting that we ourselves sanction these things, but simply 
contending that we are persons of ‘broad sympathies.’ It should 
be remembered that the fact that we can sympathize with a crim- 
inal or a social rebel is in no measure a justification for the conduct 
of such a person. Sympathy merely obscures the issue and pre- 
vents taking the objective social viewpoint necessary for dealing 
with these cases. 

But it would be unfair to leave the impression that sympathy has 
no really useful social function. Where not indulged for personal 
satisfactions, but combined with a drive to be of service to others, 
it is one of the most vital forces of society. Its chief function is to 
knit us more closely with our fellows by conditioning our behavior 
not only upon the way in which they react overtly, but upon the 
evidences of their thought and feeling. Through the sympathetic 
reaction we enter into a fuller understanding of the conscious 
accompanying emotion of love. Let us suppose that circumstances or our own 
selfishness make it impossible to render such assistance. The incipient reactions of 
help-giving are then blocked at the outset, just as the affectionate habits are 
thwarted in the grief emotion (see p. 95). This thwarting of course increases the 
unpleasantness component already present. The emotion felt is a kind of helpless 
pitv. It is introspectively as well as physiologically similar to grief. But if there 
is some real assistance that we can render, and we are willing to take the trouble, 
the love component becomes ascendant over the unpleasant helplessness. As we 
proceed with our work of the Good Samaritan the sad, blocked feeling of pity and 


the ‘lump in the throat’ give place to an altruistic love emotion, somewhat pleasur- 
able in quality. 


RESPONSE TO SOCIAL STIMULATION 239 


feelings and motives of others. The unity of the group is thus 
emphasized in the subjective life as well as the behavior of its 
members. We shall return to this subject in connection with our 
study of social consciousness. 

Summary. We may conclude briefly as follows: (1) Sympathy 
is not an instinctive process; there is no direct innate effect of the 
emotion as expressed in one individual upon the emotional response 
of another. (2) The emotion aroused in the sympathizer is not 
necessarily a replica of that in the person who affords the stimulus. 
(3) The emotion aroused in the sympathizer is a part of his own 
system of emotional habits from past experience, evoked as a 
conditioned response to some element common to the original and 
the present situations. (4) Sympathy makes for better under- 
standing in human adjustments, but it is not necessarily conducive 
either to altruism or to social justice. 


IMITATION 


An Analysis of Acts to which the Term ‘Imitation’ is Applied. 
Before the rise of a really critical science of behavior the term 
‘imitation’ enjoyed wide repute in social theory. Tarde, Baldwin, 
and Ross have given it a basic position in their accounts of human 
nature and society. Psychologists to-day are fairly well agreed that 
the term is little more than an inexact expression for the similarities 
observed in the behavior of different individuals. Explanation for 
such similarities must be sought at a deeper level. Our treatment 
of imitation must therefore be mainly negative. In the six follow- 
ing propositions types of behavior sometimes ascribed to imitation 
will be traced to more fundamental origins. 

1. There is little ground for assuming specific instinctive tend- 
encies to react to the movements of others by producing similar 
movements of our own (see p. 76). It is very difficult to induce 
in a baby under a year and a half old an unequivocal instinctive 
imitation of a movement or expression.! Reactions which at first 

1 Professors McDougall and Preyer have reported the imitation of a limited type 
of facial grimace in young infants. These findings have not been generally con- 
firmed, and various statements of a contradictory sort appear in the literature. 


(Cf. Watson’s Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist, p. 318; also M. G. 
Blanton, in the Psychological Review, 1917, xxiv, 456-83.) 


240 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


appear to be due to instinctive imitation are explicable on other 
grounds. 

2. Many acts of alleged instinctive imitation are due to the 
conditioning of responses by social stimuli similar to the responses 
themselves. One day while the writer’s baby was visiting, the 
hostess observed him wave his hand aimlessly up and down. She 
at once drew his attention and waved her hand, at the same time 
crying ‘bye-bye.’ The affair interested him greatly, and there- 
after he would react either to the sight of a waving hand or to the 
sound of ‘bye-bye’ by waving his hand. By one unaccustomed 
to look for the genetic origin of behavior traits this trick would 
have doubtless been ascribed to spontaneous and _ instinctive 
imitation. It was really due to nothing of the sort, but to a 
conditioned response in which the conditioning stimulus was an 
act similar to the response itself. Smiling when others smile is 
probably due to a similar conditioning process. The whole cate- 
gory of sympathetic reactions, as explained earlier in this chapter, 
is derived, not through imitation, but through conditioning. The 
expression of fear in those about us means that we ourselves are in 
danger; hence we too become afraid. To say however that we 
amitate the fear of others is to state something which is either 
meaningless or else untrue. The heightened emotionality in 
crowds is likewise due to conditioning of our emotional reactions 
rather than to imitation of one individual’s behavior by an- 
other. 

3. Some acts of alleged instinctive imitation are to be explained 
as conditioned circular responses. In Chapter VIII the parrot- 
like stage of infantile language was shown to be due, not to in- 
stinctive imitation, but to the use of previously established con- 
nections between auditory and speech centers. When others 
speak syllables to the child they put into operation the ear-vocal 
reflexes which the child has already fixated by hearing himself talk. 
The sound is thus repeated but not imitated. Crying when other 
children cry, laughing when the parents laugh, and similar re- 
sponses are explained in the same manner. 

4. Many acts of alleged imitation are due not to the effect of one 
individual upon another, but to the fact that all are reacting to the 


RESPONSE TO SOCIAL STIMULATION Q41 


same stimulus. Watching others fight does not cause us to fight 
also. If we join in, it is not through imitation of the others, but 
because we are incited through hatred of a common enemy. 

5. Imitation is not a method of motor learning; it represents 
merely a drawing of the attention to some special part of the field 
of stimulation. The child or animal does not learn to open a box 
by deliberately copying the movements of another who is opening 
it. Such movements may serve to direct the efforts of the learner 
toward some limited and crucial portion of the box, for example, the 
latch. But within this sphere the only method employed is the 
trial and chance success, or the deliberate planning, of the individual 
himself. Ata later time the sight of another person opening a box 
may interest the child and cause him to open it. But this is only 
after the method of doing it has been acquired by purely individual 
practice. It is true that in the acquisition of complex habits we 
can assist our progress by trying to copy the exact positions of the 
hands or feet of our tutor. Even here however we reach only a 
rough approach to success; refinement by practice must complete 
the codrdinations approximated by imitation. Such motor copy- 
ing also does not apply to the elementary manipulative tendencies 
of childhood. 

6. There is no general instinctive drive to imitate. Behind each 
complex activity in which one individual copies another there is 
some personal and prepotent interest other than the mere desire 
to imitate. One boy follows another over the fence in order to get 
his share of the farmer’s apples. He copies the act of tipping his 
hat to ladies in order to secure social approval or to make a good 
impression upon a certain girl. Two of the most common drives of 
childhood are the effort to be grown up and the compensatory 
striving for power. Hence boys and girls ape the behavior of their 
parents, and play imitative family games in order to realize, in 
imagination at least, the first of these desires. Imitations of police- 
men, robbers, and engineers help them to attain the coveted feeling 
of power. Large integrated systems of behavior are thus brought 
in; not in order to imitate, but simply as means to a certain end. 
Given a definite goal to be reached we learn from the behavior of others 
that a certain type of action will help us to attain rt; but the goal rtself 


242 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


is not established by imitation, nor is the skill necessary for performing 
the suggested action acquired by that process. 

On the whole we may dispense with the conception of imitation 
in other senses than mere description of uniformities of behavior. 
The fact that the reaction of one individual resembles that of 
another is of course of vast social importance. In order to under- 
stand these uniformities, however, we must seek for deeper explana- 
tions than that afforded by the assuming of a tendency to imitate. 


SUGGESTION 


Various Definitions of Suggestion. The term ‘suggestion,’ like 
sympathy and imitation, denotes a certain relation of stimulus and 
response operative between individuals. Like sympathy it will be 
seen to involve no unique type of process, and like imitation it is a 
collective term embracing a number of distinct elementary mechan- 
isms. When we accept an opinion uncritically, using it as a basis 
for our belief or action, we may be said to respond to a suggestion. 
Thus Professor McDougall considers suggestion as a process 
resulting in the acceptance of a proposition in the absence of logi- 
cally adequate grounds. Professor Stern defines it as ‘‘the imita- 
tive assumption of a mental attitude under the illusion of assuming 
it spontaneously.” Both these statements indicate the relatively 
unconscious nature of the process; but the latter broadens the 
notion from a matter of mere belief to a mental ‘attitude,’ thus 
implying some action or readiness to act. Professor Baldwin 
introduces an explanatory element in his definition, and includes, 
like Stern, a motor factor. He regards the process as a mechanism 
of attention which narrows the consciousness and motor impulses 
to restricted lines, and inhibits attitudes of discrimination and 
selection. It is here justly recognized that suggestion has a nega- 
tive aspect, namely, the inhibiting of consciousness and action 
of a nature antagonistic to the suggested proposition. Finally, 
Miinsterberg conceived the process entirely in the behavioristic 
terms of action and inhibition. A suggestion, according to him, is 
“a proposition to action which overcomes antagonistic impulses”’ 
in the subject. The only criticism one can apply to these defini- 
tions is that, while each suggests an important aspect of response 


RESPONSE TO SOCIAL STIMULATION 243 


to suggestion, each is too limited to do justice to all the types and 
phases of the process. 

The Potency of Spoken Language in Bodily Control. Before 
attempting a complete analysis of suggestion, it will be profitable 
to consider the capabilities of the mechanism through which the 
suggestion is generally brought to bear, namely, the response of 
bodily effectors to language stimuli. The spoken word has a more 
profound effect upon the human organism than is commonly 
recognized. This effect is shown in two ways: (1) in the automatic 
and unconscious nature of language controls, and (2) in the far- 
reaching and complete character of the bodily changes produced. 

The first aspect is illustrated by the circular speech reflexes, in 
which the sound of a word directly stimulates the response of 
pronouncing it. As adults we unconsciously employ these mechan- 
isms in the reiteration of phrases spoken by others with whose 
opinions we are in perfect agreement. Echolalia is an abnormal 
extreme of the same phenomenon. Aphasia presents similar 
features in that spoken words, which the patient through his dis- 
order has lost all means of understanding, may be written mechan- 
ically by him from dictation. ‘Psychopathic obedience’ is a con- 
dition in which the patient immediately executes every action 
proposed to him. Perfectly normal individuals also show at times 
an immediate and undeliberated response to commands. These 
effects are based upon deeply fixed habits of association between 
word sounds and the bodily movements which they signify. It is 
convenient to regard them as sub-cortical or ‘short-circuited’ modes 
of response, having their centers at a lower level of the nervous - 
system than the portions concerned with thought and meaning. 
While this explanation is still a hypothesis, it fits well with the 
description of the suggestion consciousness as an unreasoned and 
immediate acceptance of a proposal. 

The influence of language not only approaches an immediate 
reflex; it is also remarkably thorough and far reaching. Hypnosis, 
which is essentially a state of heightened suggestibility, presents 
the clearest examples. By repeated suggestion the operator gains 
absolute control of all the mechanisms of the body. The resist- 
ance being broken down, the statement ‘‘You cannot open your 


Q44 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


eyes”? takes immediate effect, and the subject actually cannot 
move his lids. The auditory impulse enters the central nervous 
system and goes immediately out to the effectors. It is as though 
one were talking directly to the muscles of the subject. Even per- 
ceptual and thought mechanisms may be controlled in deeper 
hypnotic states. The subject will actually fail to see a person 
standing nearby if told he has left the room. The flow of tears, 
and other glandular and visceral changes not even under the con- 
trol of the subject himself, may be brought about through language 
suggestion. Among primitive tribes the magic formule of the 
shaman have, under conditions of fear, produced wasting illness, 
and, as some travelers allege, death. Such cases illustrate the 
profound integration which exists between the afferent mechanism 
for receiving language stimuli and the entire reaction system of the 
body. Though shown here in extreme form, the same general 
organization of neurons underlies the responses to all language 
suggestion, and gives to the social environment a possibility of the 
most intricate control of the individual through the spoken word. 

Suggestion Defined as a Control of Attitude. This then ts the 
type of physiological effect produced by verbal suggestion. An 
example of post-hypnotic suggestion will lead us to a still closer 
view of the normal mechanism. It is suggested under hypnosis 
that at six o’clock the subject will go to the telephone and call up a 
certain friend. A motor setting is thus prepared to perform this 
act at a certain signal, the approach of the hour of six; and when 
the time comes the subject, though now no longer under hypnosis, 
automatically performs the act. The motor set thus built up by 
suggestion we may call an attitude. In everyday hfe attitudes are 
built up in similar fashion. We talk over with our friend the 
feasibility of some civic project, or the merits of the new minister; 
and quite without knowing it we become set to react in accordance 
with this discussion when suitable occasion arises. We accept the 
words of ‘an expert’ on any subject and repeat them to our friends 
as spontaneously as if they were our own. A suggestion from a 
friend regarding our appearance, manners, or habits may determine 
in us a fixed attitude to react in the direction suggested. A refrac- 
tory child may with tact be ‘alked into an attitude of yielding 


RESPONSE TO SOCIAL STIMULATION Q45 


graciously to suggestions regarding his conduct. An enemy may 
often be handled in the same manner. All examples of this sort 
involve a preparatory setting of the synapses at the motor centers 
and possibly increases in tonicity of the muscles to be employed in 
carrying out the line of behavior suggested. 

Suggestion is concerned with the control of bodily attitudes in 
three possible ways. First, it serves to build up or prepare the 
setting for a definite response when the releasing signal is given. 
The examples just mentioned belong to this category. Secondly, 
it may serve as the signal (social stimulus) which releases the 
attitude already established. And thirdly, suggestion may aug- 
ment the released response as it is being carried out. These three 
effects of suggestion will be illustrated in the following sections. 

1. Suggestion in the Formation of Attitudes. There is a great 
power in the spoken word; but it is not a magic power. Every 
normal suggestion builds up its attitude upon some deep-lying 
reaction tendency already present. Interests, emotions, senti- 
ments, derived drives, and innate prepotent reactions (see Chapter 
III) serve as bases. A classic example is the jealousy and suspicion 
of Othello wrought upon by the persistent artifices of Iago until an 
attitude of infuriated vengeance toward Desdemona was developed. 
Advertisers notoriously exploit human drives in building up an 
attitude to purchase their products. Here also repeated suggestion 
is used in the attitude-forming process. Quality, good value, and 
the satisfaction of every form of human need are associated per- 
sistently with the particular trade name. 

The following story, at the writer’s expense, gives a clear picture 
of this phase of suggestion. One day the writer joined a rather 
apathetic audience upon whom an auctioneer of jewelry and silver- 
ware was endeavoring to make an impression. Little interest was 
felt by any of the group until the auctioneer (who knew what he 
was about) announced that a magnificent manicure outfit which he 
displayed would be given free to the first person to raise an existing 
bid to six dollars. A lady at once raised the bid and carried off 
article and bonus joyfully. At once the writer’s economic and 
bargaining interests were aroused. He drew mechanically nearer, 
all critical and discriminating tendencies abolished, and his con- 


246 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


sciousness filled with the realization that things were being given 
away and that he must bid without restraint upon the very next 
article. This he did — and carried home for an extreme price a 
‘nickel silver’ sugar bowl which he didn’t want! A clearer case of 
the formation of an attitude for response through suggestion could 
not be desired. 

2. Suggestion in the Release of Attitudes. There are situations 
in which previous events have already given rise to a motor setting, 
and in which the suggestion serves merely to release the act for 
which the body is prepared. Persons deprived of loved ones by 
the late war have developed an attitude of yearning expectancy 
concerning some future contact with the souls of the dead. Spirit- 
ualistic mediums and ouija boards have provided suggestions for 
the release of these tendencies; and an international craze for 
things ‘psychic’ has been the result. Yawning when others yawn 
is not sheer imitation. It occurs principally when we are tired and 
on the point of yawning ourselves. . With this preparation the 
sight of the act serves as arelease of the act in question. We have 
long standing attitudes of respect and obedience to age, prestige, 
and expert opinion. Hence any language suggestion from sources 
of this character liberates the response suggested. 

The release of motor settings often involves the principle of allied 
and antagonistic responses (see p. 37). Suppose one is starting 
from home on a cloudy morning. The appearance of the sky is a 
stimulus which tends to evoke the response of getting an umbrella. 
Thoughts of inconvenience and of the chance that it may noé rain 
represent a neural setting of an antagonistic sort, that is, leaving 
the umbrella behind. A friend suggests that the sky indicates rain, 
and immediately an allied stimulus is added to the attitude for 
taking the umbrella, and the antagonistic setting for leaving it is 
inhibited. The allied stimulus of the suggestion in this case is the 
deciding factor. | 

Both the formation and the release of attitudes are illustrated 
by familiar instances of suggestion. The art of the salesman is to 
build up a setting to purchase his product in the neuromuscular 
system of the prospect. When such a setting is developed and 
strengthened through argument and demonstration, the ‘psycho- 


RESPONSE TO SOCIAL STIMULATION Q47 


logical moment’ must be grasped and the contract blank produced 
or the direct suggestion to purchase delivered. The attitude is 
therewith released. Professor F. M. Davenport narrates an 
amusing instance of suggestion comprising these two phases, and 
vouches for its truth.! It is quoted in slightly abridged form 
below. 


In a little town between Cleveland, Tennessee, and Chattanooga, it was 
the purpose to give a donation to the colored minister. One of the breth- 
ren in the church volunteered to make a collection from the various homes, 
and an old colored woman loaned this brother her cart and a pair of steers 
for the purpose. After he had been throughout the neighborhood and 
had secured a load of provisions and clothing, he drove off to Chattanooga 
and sold everything, including the cart and the steers, pocketed the pro- 
ceeds and departed on a visit to Atlanta. Consternation and indignation 
reigned in the community when the affair became known. After some 
time the culprit drifted back, in deep contrition, but having spent all. 
Indignation once more arose to a white heat, and it was determined to 
give him a church trial at once. The meeting was crowded; and the 
preacher, after stating the charges, announced that the accused would be 
given a chance to be heard. He went forward and took the place of the 
preacher on the piatform. 

“T ain’t got nuffin to say fo’ myse’f,’”’ he began in a penitent voice, “‘I’se 
a po’ mis’able sinner. But, bredren, so is we all mis’able sinners. An’ de 
good book says we must fergib. How many times, bredren? ‘Till seven 
times? No, till seventy times seven. An’ I ain’t sinned no seventy times 
seven, and I’m jes’ go’ to sugges’ dat we turn dis into a fergibness meetin’, 
an’ eberybody in dis great comp’ny dat is willin’ to fergib me, come up 
now, while we sing one of our deah ole hymns, and shake ma hand.” 

He started one of the powerful revival tunes, and they began to come, 
first those who hadn’t given anything to the donation and were not much 
interested in the matter, then those who hadn’t lost much, and then the 
others. Finally all had passed before him except one, and she stuck to her 
seat. ‘‘Dar’s one po’ mis’able sinner lef’,’’ said he, “dat won’t fergib.”’ 
(She was the old lady who had lost the steers.) ‘Now I sugges’ dat we 
hab a season ob prayer, an’ gib dis po’ ole sinner one mo’ chance.”” And 
after they had prayed and sung a hymn, the old lady came up, too! 


3. Suggestion in the Increase of Responses already Released. 
The third effect of suggestion is related to the second. We have 
just seen that social influences help to discharge motor settings 


1 Primitive Traits in Religious Revivals, p. 52 f. Copyright, 1905, Quoted under 
special arrangement with the publishers, The Macmillan Company, New York. 


248 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


already prepared, as in going up to shake hands with the forgiven 
darky and in feeling an emotion of tenderness toward him. After 
these responses have been set off they may be intensified by a con- 
tinuance of the same social stimuli that brought them about. Thus 
one would go forward more quickly, and his emotion would reach a 
higher pitch, because he continued to see others doing the same act. 
The social stimulus thus serves as a suggestion not only for releasing 
the reaction but for augmenting it as it is being carried out. In 
both cases it serves as an allied stimulus and is contributory (see 
p. 37) to a motor setting already existing. The term social fa- 
cilitation may be used to include both these effects (releasing and 
intensifying) 

In the old-fashioned religious revival we find all three effects of 
suggestion upon attitude and response. First, through the preach- 
ing of ‘hell fire’ and ‘conviction of sin,’ the attitude of penitence 
is built up. Secondly, this setting is released by the invitation- 
hymn and the call to come forward. And thirdly, the acts bespeak- 
ing self-surrender and the cries of religious ecstasy from others 
increase the ardor of the emotional reaction of each convert. 
Situations of this sort will be more closely analyzed in the two fol- 
lowing chapters. It is sufficient here to recognize them as forms of 
response to suggestion. 

Conditioned Response in Suggestion. In the story of the 
penitent negro the singing of the revival hymn operated as a sug- 
gestion to come forward. ‘This was because the members of the 
congregation had so often before heard it while they were coming 
forward or watching others do so. Many suggestions not involv- 
ing language are based on the same principle, namely, the use of 
acts and objects usually accompanying a response as conditioning 
stimuli for bringing about the response at the will of the suggester. 
Boys, for example, enjoy the prank of sucking a lemon in front of 
the trombone player in a band in order to harass his performance 
by the conditioned puckerings of his mouth. The eccentric who 
goes hatless and gloveless in zero weather probably derives satis- 
faction in the knowledge that his habits are causing others to 
shiver. Hurrying to complete his lecture at the close of the hour, 
the professor is often distracted by the youth who leans forward 


RESPONSE TO SOCIAL STIMULATION 249 


and sits on the edge of his seat in order to produce a condition- 
ing suggestion for bringing the remarks to a close. 

The Conditions of Suggestibility. The main conditions favoring 
suggestion, like those for sympathy, represent the ‘openness’ of the 
organism to the stimulating suggestion, and are based, in particu- 
lar, upon an attitude of submissiveness toward the suggester. 
High self-expression in personality traits, physical strength, supe- 
tior social position, and prestige through power or knowledge place 
their possessors in an ascendant relation to those with whom they 
come in contact, thus giving their behavior a suggestive influence. 
Sex is sometimes a determinant of a suggestible attitude, females 
usually standing in the submissive role toward males, and hence 
susceptible to suggestions from them. Difference of age is also a 
strong factor in responsiveness to suggestion. Since most of the 
child’s knowledge comes from his elders, and also because he feels 
his physical weakness before them, he has formed the attitude of 
accepting all their suggestions without question. Where, as in 
childish ignorance, conviction is based entirely upon the authority 
of the speaker, suggestion shades imperceptibly into simple belief. 
Poverty of ideas and extreme submissiveness are thus the causes of 
the notorious suggestibility of childhood.! 

A situation which speedily places one in an attitude of submissive 
suggestibility is the presence of a group, or indeed the mere allusion 
to large numbers. We bow before the will of the majority. We 
rise irresistibly when the congregation rises, clap when the audi- 
ence claps, and express disapproval in unison with the throng. 
Adherence to style and custom is based in part upon the attitude 
of submission to suggestion from great numbers. ‘The mere fact 
of being in a crowd places one in this setting, and so prepares for the 
release of specific actions suggested by the behavior of the others. 

Advertisers play freely upon suggestibility toward both prestige 
and large numbers. Placards announce that a certain remedy is 
endorsed by eminent physicians (a picture representing one of them 
often accompanies), or that thousands have been cured by it and 


1 The same considerations apply to the unusual suggestibility of ignorant adults, 
and to the widespread belief in the Middle Ages in miraculous events backed by the 
authority of the clergy. 


250 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


are ready to extol its virtues. Professor H. T. Moore has measured 
the susceptibility of individuals to these forms of suggestion by 
having them pass judgment upon the seriousness of grammatical 
errors and moral faults, and upon the zsthetic value of musical 
cadences. A set of judgments was first obtained without any sug- 
gestive influence; and another set was taken later after telling the 
subjects (1) the opinion of the majority and (2) the opinion of 
‘experts’ in regard to each of the items to be evaluated. The 
tendency to change their previous judgments to accord with the 
majority opinion on speech and morals was found to be almost five 
times as great as the change which might be expected by mere 
chance. The effect of suggestion in the case of expert opinion was 
slightly less, but still substantially large, the subjects altering 
almost half of their former judgments which were at variance with 
the stated opinion of experts.! 

The two extremes in susceptibility to suggestion are represented 
by the hypnotized person, who is absolutely submissive and re- 
sponsive to the command of the operator, and the negatively 
suggestible person who is so thoroughly on his guard against yielding 
that he believes or acts in the manner opposite from that suggested. 
This is not mere passing stubbornness, but a trait of ‘personality. 
It is a resistance against domination by the social environment, 
and is so strong that some persons of this type will not admit seeing 
the ordinary optical illusions, because they do not wish to be 
tricked by a clever draughtsman or a joking friend. A temporary 
period of negative suggestibility occurs at the age of two or three 
years. It marks the transition from helpless infancy to assertive 
childhood. 

To complete our account we may mention a number of devices 
and special conditions for rendering suggestions effective. 1. It 
is useful closely to concentrate the subject’s attention by instruc- 
tion or artifice so that the suggested proposal alone is received. 


1 The effect of both classes of suggestion upon judgments of musical preference 
was much lower. Evidently we are most susceptible to social influences in regard 
to matters which are likely to affect our social standing, as in this case, our speech 
and conduct. In regard to standards of language the majority opinion was found to 
have somewhat more weight than that of experts. See reference at the end of this 
chapter. 


RESPONSE TO SOCIAL STIMULATION 251 


2 Monotony and rhythm, as in the chants of the medicine man or 
the passes of the hypnotist, relax and soothe the subject, and place 
him in a drowsy state of non-resistance. 38. Indirect suggestion 
takes the recipient off guard by avoiding the direct issue at first 
until a suitable attitude can be prepared for its acceptance. This 
method was employed in the story of the negro penitent. 4. A 
similar distraction of attention is produced by the interesting mc- 
tions made by the conjurer with his right hand while his left un- 
obtrusively performs the trick. 5. Fatigue and intoxicants some- 
times increase suggestibility. 6. It is important, finally, to word 
a suggestion in a positive rather than a negative manner. We have 
no response attitude for ‘‘thou shalt not”’; therefore we often trans- 
late the phrase for purposes of action into “thou shalt.” The 
skilled publicity agent never prints the slogan that “the cause 
cannot fail.’”’ He assures the public instead that ‘‘the cause is 
certain to succeed!”’ 

Final Definition of Suggestion. Throughout the preceding 
discussion we have spoken of ‘response to suggestion’ rather than 
of suggestion as a form of response in itself. There are two senses 
in which the word may be used: namely, as stimulus, and as the 
behavior process of the response. ‘The former use is rather more 
distinctive than the latter. ‘A suggestion’ is always a very definite 
thing; whereas the process of suggestion contains little that is 
unique. The attitude, for instance, of the runner crouching on the 
mark, and the release as he springs forward at the pistol shot, differ 
in no essential way from the physiological processes operative in 
cases that we would more appropriately term ‘suggestion.’ It 
might be stated that the suggestion process is characteristically, 
though not invariably, a response to a social form of stimulation, 
and that it implies a relation of ascendance and submission, that 
is, the control of one person by another (cf. Miinsterberg’s defini- 
tion). If we add that the neural pathways used are more im- 
mediate and less accompanied by thought consciousness than in 
other responses to language, the picture is fairly complete. The 
following somewhat cumbersome definition will serve to summa- 
rize the nature of suggestion, both as process and as stimulus. 

Suggestion 1s a process involving elementary behavior mechanisms 


252 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


an response to a social stimulus; the nature of the process being that 
the one who gives the stimulus controls the behavior and consciousness 
of the recipient 1n an wmmediate manner, relatively uninfluenced by 
thought, and through the method of building up motor attitudes, releas- 
ing them, or augmenting the released response as it 1s being carried out. 

‘A suggestion’ 1s a social stumulus producing the effect just de- 
scribed. FOES, 


LAUGHTER 


Genetic Origin of Laughter. The Incongruous. Laughter, 
which is preéminently a response to social stimulation, has been 
a subject of speculation among philosophers of all ages. The 
greatest obstacle to a satisfactory explanation has been that, unlike 
other basic forms of behavior, laughing does not serve any known 
biological purpose. Another drawback has been that scientists 
have attempted to explain the full-fledged humor of the adult as 
a kind of innate quality without going back to its beginnings in 
infancy. The genetic approach is the soundest one, for children 
are the greatest laughers. In later years their free and boisterous 
humor becomes restrained and ‘intellectualized’ into the witticism- 
and the satire. 

The elemental joke consists in being tickled. Laughter is the 
innate response to the stimulation of the sensitive or ticklish zones 
of the body (see p. 67). While the act of laughing is inborn, the 
range of things that come to be laughed at is extended by experi- 
ence (p. 68). Let us trace this expansion of the sense of humor in 
some of its details. 

The most obvious thing about tickling is that it represents a 
great fuss about nothing. It is the light touches and pokes that 
evoke laughter. But it is also true that the ticklish zones overlie 
some of the most vital organs of the body. Hence there is some- 
thing terrible in a thrust at these parts which throws into relief the 
antagonistic pleasant emotion aroused by the playful outcome of 
the thrust. The tickler moreover does not miss the opportunity of 
making the feint as sudden and terrifying as possible in order to 
get the heartiest peal of laughter from the child when the latter 
finds he is only being tickled. This is precisely the situation in 


RESPONSE TO SOCIAL STIMULATION 253 


numerous funny events of daily life. There is a sudden passage 
from a strained expectancy to nothingness (Kant’s theory of 
humor), or else a rapid shift from bigness, weight, or seriousness to 
the small and inconsequential (Lipps). It is the humorous passage 
from the sublime to the ridiculous. Fun of this type is common on 
the stage and in the circus. The acrobat takes a running leap and 
somersaults over four horses. The clown then runs down the plat- 
form in swaggering imitation, but suddenly stops and brushes a 
fly from the nearest horse. 

Not only is the transition effected between contrasting and 
incongruous situations; it is also a sudden transition. Suddenness, 
physiologically considered, means the abrupt change from one type 
of attitude to another. The tickled baby passes from a reaction of 
withdrawal and alarm to one of mirth and laughter as the playful- 
ness of the attack is felt. And it is also a sudden passage, for the 
tickler makes his movements very rapidly. It is no idle metaphor, 
therefore, which describes more mature humor as ‘ poking fun,’ and 
speaks of the ‘thrust,’ the ‘dig,’ and the ‘sally of wit... Though 
carried out by the thought mechanism, rather than va the ribs, 
the fundamental attitudes assumed are essentially the same as the 
infant’s, and are probably to be explained as developments of the 
latter. The mechanism involved is similar to that of mimetic 
facial expression (see p. 217). Whenever, therefore, the events of 
life lead to a quick and complete change of motor setting, providing 
the setting changed to is not a vital one like fear or rage, a laugh is 
likely to be the form of release. This is the humor of the incon- 
gruous. It represents a generic type, of which the transition from 
the important to the trivial is a single species. 

A good joke usually has a point, that is, an incident in the narra- 
tive or action where the sudden change of setting occurs that is 
released in laughter. It is generally led up to by a strain of expect- 
ancy. It is important not to give away the point before the proper 
moment, for then the attitude of the serious or sublime will not be © 
sufficiently established for the sudden shift, or incongruity, to be 
keenly felt. This fact should be borne in mind by those who make 
their point first and then try to illustrate it with a joke, and by the 
dismal professor who forgets that he has told the story to the same 


Q54 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


class before. The elementary aspect is represented by the fact that 
one cannot tickle his own ribs. He ‘gives away the point’ because 
he knows (1) that he is going to tickle and not gouge, and (2) that 
he is going to do it at a certain moment. There is thus neither 
suddenness nor change of attitude. An example of a jest giving 
the sudden twist that shifts our attitude is as follows. A philo- 
sophic old colored barber made the following observation to a 
new patron: 

““Yo’ has a large head, suh. It’s a good thing to have a large 
head, fo’ a large head means a large brain, an’ a large brain is de 
most useful thing a man kin have, fo’ it nourishes de roots of de 
Nain 

Other laughable situations do not lead up to a definite point, but 
present the two sides of the case simultaneously. We thus expe- 
rience a rapid alternation between the opposed attitudes. The 
writer remembers laughing uproariously with his college mates over 
the imagined situation of the dignified President of the college 
rolling aimlessly about the floor. The practical joke, such as 
causing a pompous gentleman to sit on his hat or slip on a banana 
peel, evokes the same contrast of attitude by simultaneous elements 
of the situation. In these instances our response to the usual 
dignity of the person alternates quickly with the opposite response 
to his present undignified position. The neatness of caricature 
and mimicry divert us by the same principle. 

Another phase of incongruity is that lying between pleasure and 
pain. We must remember that the ticklish zones, if more vigor- 
ously plied, yield emotions of an unpleasant sort. Situations, like- 
wise, in daily life lie on the border-line between tragedy and comedy. 
The small boy sometimes manages to release the pain of a stubbed 
toe through laughter instead of crying. Laughter is thus a release 
which may be used instead of a painfully toned emotional response, 
thereby making human life more tolerable. In the words of Lord 
Byron: | 

“Tf I laugh at any mortal thing 
Tis that I may not weep.” 


1 From an article, ‘Laughter, A Glory in Sanity,’ by R. Carpenter. American 
Journal of Psychology, 1922, xxx111, 419-22. 


RESPONSE TO SOCIAL STIMULATION 255 


Professor McDougall finds this release especially effective as an 
‘antidote’ for primitive sympathetic pain, and bases upon it an 
attempt to explain all instances of laughter. 

One more sequel of the infantile tickle reaction remains to be 
traced. The child is passive in the affair; he is acted upon by the 
tickler. Likewise, in experiencing jokes, the adult must be sub- 
missive. He must lay himself open to being tickled. If one adopts 
a critical or analytical attitude or otherwise asserts himself in 
listening to a joke, it will probably fail to strike him asfunny. We 
must be willing to follow along with the story, accepting, if need 
be, the incredible or absurd, merely for the sake of the game. We 
must, in short, assume the play attitude, whether in the childish 
banter of tickling assaults or in the refined raillery of grown-ups. 

Up to this point we have tried to show that the foundations 
of humor may be traced to the infantile response to sensitive 
zone stimulation; and that the range of the laughable increases 
with experience by carrying over the bodily settings for sudden, 
incongruous, play-like reactions from the original tickle encounter 
to analogous situations of mature life. 

Laughter as a Release of Inhibited Emotion. Freudian Wit. 
Another modern theory of laughter, now fairly well known, is that 
of Dr. Sigmund Freud. Before discussing it let us consider a special 
case of emotional behavior. If a child for the first time sees a 
false-face on a playmate, he may show signs of hesitation bordering 
on fear. As soon as the trick is discovered he is struck by the 
incongruity (his old friend with a new and marvelous physiognomy), 
and he bursts into laughter. This response is however due, not to 
the incongruous setting alone, but to the release through a new 
channel of the effects of a stimulus which previously had produced 
a fear reaction. The fearful state represented a blocking of action 
because the situation was wholly unfamiliar; but now a somatic 
outlet is obtained through the antagonistic and pleasant side of the 
emotional mechanism (see Chapter IV).!. The elementary re- 

1 Dr. Crile explains laughter in the following manner. We are rendered angry 
or terrified; but our usual reaction of attack or flight is suddenly thwarted by finding 
it all a joke. Nature must now find some way of liberating in action the energy 
stored up as a part of the emotional reaction (adrenal effects, etc.) Laughter 


affords this release, reduces the tensions, and restores the energy balance to normal. 
The physiological principle of this theory appears both sound and suggestive, 


256 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


sponse to tickling thus fulfills a distinct biological purpose in the 
release of inhibited emotional pressure. 

This is the physiological aspect of Freud’s theory of the comic, 
though Freud himself neither recognizes nor understands such 
mechanisms. If we keep these facts in mind we shall be repaid 
with a fuller understanding of the contributions of Freud’s brilliant 
but rather narrow genius. His theory explains the bulk of human 
wit as due to the sudden release of suppressed impulses from the 
‘unconscious.’ ‘These impulses, which have chiefly to do with our 
hostilities and our sex attitudes, are usually held in restraint through 
good breeding and habits of respect for custom and the opinion of 
others. A joke gives us an opportunity of releasing in a laugh such 
inhibited tendencies; because, as we assure ourselves, no one can 
blame us if it is allin fun. If, for example, we have some grudge 
against the dignified gentleman who steps on a banana peeling, or 
if we dislike his pompousness, this dishke, which we might other- 
wise feel obliged to conceal, is now released in a laugh, the very 
force of which often startles us. As in the case of the child’s 
laughter at the false-face, an inhibited emotional tendency finds 
release ina laugh. Inhibited feelings of contempt, superiority, and 
envy toward certain associates are often betrayed in this fashion. 

A corollary of the Freudian theory is that, unless there is some 
repression present in the listener, the joke will not carry its point. 
In many instances this is true. Jokes on Christian Science are 
usually not funny to the Christian Scientist, because he has no 
repressed contempt or incredulity in regard to that faith. A sexual 
joke, if not too open, appeals to nearly every one; for all of us must 
put some restraint upon our sex impulses. A joke may sometimes 
be interpreted in various ways by different people according to their 
inhibited tendencies. It is thus everybody’s joke on everybody else. 
A young man who was a Jew once told the writer the following story 
which he (the Jew) thought was an immensely humorous dig at the 
Roman Catholics. A Jewish boy and an Irish boy were disputing 
as to the merits of their respective religious leaders. ‘‘Our Priest 
knows more than your Rabbi,” said the Irish lad. ‘He ought to,” 
replied the Jewish boy contemptuously, “you tell him everything!”’ 
The young man who told this story had his mind filled with the 


RESPONSE TO SOCIAL STIMULATION 257 


delightful incongruity of the (supposedly) learned priest receiving 
all his instruction from ignorant boys; and it was very funny to 
him. The Catholic, on the other hand, will readily recognize in the 
jest an allusion to confession and a thrust at the Jew through ex- 
hibiting his shrewdness and his contempt for those who would let 
slip information to their own disadvantage. And so the story is 
funny for him, too. It is, in short, a joke with two handles. 

It is easily possible to overdo Freud’s theory; for many instances 
of humor are based upon pure incongruity or upon kindly banter. 
Since many of the situations releasing hostile or sexual attitudes 
are those in which persons get themselves into incongruous and 
inconsistent positions, the Freudian release really makes use of an 
incongruity laugh already on its way. Release of inhibited emo- 
tion thus adds fuel to the fire of our tickled laughter. 

Laughter is a Social Phenomenon. Laughing is uniquely a 
response to social stimulations. Animals and things occasionally 
amuse us, but only because we endow them with human charac- 
teristics. In a general sense we laugh only at people. Incongrui- 
ties arise chiefly through inconsistency with feelings, actions, and 
personality, in short through the living and human. A large rock 
and a small one side by side impress us with a sense of contrast; but 
the tall man and the short man in the circus fill us with the inde- 
finable humor of the incongruous. In the original tickle situation 
it was always a person who tickled us; and so our laughter has 
become conditioned entirely through human stimulation. The 
writer doubts that a ‘tickling machine,’ were one invented, would 
have much success. An element of caprice, or unaccountability, 
peculiar to the human humor-object alone, affords the necessary 
suddenness for our shift of attitude. Human beings are necessary 
also as objects of the Freudian laugh, in that our emotional re- 
sponses conie to be centered chiefly in persons; and toward humans 
only do we feel the obligation to curb the full expression of these im- 
pulses. Laughter is thus a kind of institution rooted in society itself. 

We not only laugh exclusively aé people, we laugh also with them. 
The social environment is necessary in the role of a contributory as 
well as a direct stimulus for our mirthful response. One who 
laughs often to himself is considered eccentric. The solemn face 


258 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


of a man sitting alone and perusing a comic paper is in itself a 
matter of humor. We may chuckle a little as we read good jokes; 
but we do not laugh outright unless a friend hands us the item o1 
tells it to us so that we can laugh with him. There is, in other 
words, a definite facilitating stimulus in the sound of another’s 
laugh. This sound helps to release and augment our own laughter 
response once we have been brought almost to the point of laughing 
through the comic story itself.1. The laughter of others thus oper- 
ates as a suggestion according to a process described earlier in this 
chapter. When we hear a good joke we wish to tell it to some one 
else to secure the pleasure of another hearty laugh. Although the 
joke is now old to us we keep on laughing at it so long as there is 
anybody to laugh with. This is why we do not tire of our own 
jokes. Another instance is the way a man behaves when one tells 
him a funny thing that happened in a crowd or a classroom. He 
usually asks how the crowd took it; and if the reply is that ‘‘they 
roared,” his own merriment is redoubled. 

It would follow from all this that laughter is directly proportional 
to the size of the group. And this is true provided the jest is 
broad enough to touch the inhibited complexes of all. The word 
‘broad’ is judiciously used, for it is generally the sexual joke which 
is of this type. Another factor is that in the large group there seems 
to be more justification for ‘letting one’s self out’; for all the rest 
are doing it, and so it must be all right. Men and women in a 
theater audience will laugh boisterously at salacious jokes which, 
were they in small mixed groups, would cause them mortal embar- 
rassment. A certain professor had to give up the use of the word 
‘chicken’ in his large classes because of the uproar it invariably 
caused, no matter how innocent the context. In smaller classes 
the word scarcely evoked more than an isolated snicker speedily 
suppressed; but in the large groups the professor was obliged to sub- 
stitute the euphemism, ‘domestic fowl.’ There appear, then, three 
causes which underlie the hilarity of the crowd: the large volume of 
stimuli facilitating to laughter present; the release of a common 
restrained impulse; and the feeling of moral sanction for its release. 


1 This stimulating value probably arises through the fixation of circularly con- 
ditioned responses to the sound of one’s own laughter in infancy. (Cf. p. 182.) 


RESPONSE TO SOCIAL STIMULATION 259 


REFERENCES 


Hunter, W.8., General Psychology, part 1, ch. 4. 

Ellwood, C. A., Introduction to Social Psychology, chs. 10, 11. 

Cooley, C. H., Human Nature and the Social Order, ch. 2. 

Miinsterberg, H., Psychology, General and Applied, ch. 18. 

Ross, E. A., Social Psychology, ch. 2. 

Sidis, B., The Psychology of Suggestion. 

The Psychology of Laughter. 

McDougall, W., Introduction to Social Psychology, chs. 4, 15. 

Ginsberg, M., The Psychology of Society, chs. 1, 2. 

Bogardus, E., Essentials of Social Psychology, chs. 5, 6. 

Gault, R. H., Social Psychology: The Bases of Behavior Called Social, ch. 6. 

Baldwin, J. M., Mental Development, chs. 6, 9-12. 

Brown, W., “Individual and Sex Differences in Suggestibility,” University of 
California, Publications in Psychology, 1916, 11, 291-430. 

Aveling, F., and Hargreaves, H.L., ‘“‘Suggestibility with and without Pres- 
tige in Children,” British Journal of Psychology, 1921, xm, 53-75. 

Moore, H. T., “The Comparative Influence of Majority and Expert Opinion,” 
American Journal of Psychology, 1921, xxx, 16—20. 

Gault, R. H., “Suggestion and Suggestibility,”’ American Journal of Sociology, 
1919, xxv, 185-94. 

Peterson, J., ‘Imitation and Mental Adjustment,” Journal of Abnormal Psy- 
chology and Social Psychology, 1922, xvir, 1-14. 

Humphrey, G., “Imitation and the Conditioned Reflex,’ Pedagogical Semi- 
nary, 1921, xxviml, 1-21. 

“The Conditioned Reflex and the Elementary Social Reaction,” Jour- 
nal of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology, 1922, xvu1, 113-19. 

Eastman, M., The Sense of Humor. 

Freud, 8., Wit and its Relation to the Unconscious. (Translated by Brill.) 

Sully, J., An Essay on Laughter. 

McDougall, W., ““A New Theory of Laughter,” Psyche, 1922, 1, 292-303. 

Hall, G. S., and Allin, A., “The Psychology of Tickling, Laughing, and the 
Comic,”’ American Journal of Psychology, 1897, 1x, 1-41. 

Crile, G. W., The Origin and Nature of the Emotions, pp. 77-109. 

McComas, H. C., “The Origin of Laughter,’ Psychological Review, 1923, xxx, 
45-55. 








CHAPTER XI 
RESPONSE TO SOCIAL STIMULATION IN THE GROUP 


The More Complex Social Situations. The forms of reaction 
described in the preceding chapter are the elementary responses 
which individuals make to one another. We now advance to the 
complex groupings in which those mechanisms are to be found at 
work. The pattern of social conditions in daily life is intricate. It 
involves varying numbers and arrangements of persons, attitudes 
of individuals toward one another, relations of personalities, and 
types of occupation or experience in which the various individuals 
share. Our present task is to trace the effect of these conditions 
upon the social behavior of the individual. 

Two types of aggregation may be distinguished: the growp and 
the crowd. The distinction between them is not sharply drawn, and 
one form is capable of passing into the other. For convenience, 
however, we may define a group as any aggregate consisting of two 
or more persons who are assembled to perform some task, to de- 
liberate upon some proposal or topic of interest, or to share some 
affective experience of common appeal.! Groups may be organized 
or unorganized. The crowd we shall distinguish from such forma- 
tions by the presence of emotional excitement and the replacing of 
the deliberate group activities by drives of the more primitive and 
prepotent level. 

Groups, in turn, may be classified under two heads: co-acting 
groups and face-to-face groups. In the former the individuals are 
primarily occupied with some stimulus other than one another. 
The social stimuli in operation are therefore merely contributory. 
Pupils in a classroom reading a lesson in concert from the black- 
board illustrate this type of group. In the face-to-face group, 

1 The word ‘group’ is sometimes used in a sociological sense to denote a collection 
of individuals, not assembled in one another’s presence, but joined by some common 
bond of interest or sympathy. In so far as the behavior of individuals in such groups 


may be termed social it has its original basis in the actual contacts described in this 
and the following chapters. 


RESPONSE WITHIN THE GROUP 261 


which is necessarily small, the individuals react mainly or entirely 
to one another. A committee of three or four directors discussing 
a business project is a group of this sort. The social stimulations 
in effect are of the direct order. Many groups, of course, combine 
the direct and contributory social influences, and are thus neither 
exclusively co-acting nor face-to-face. In the present chapter will 
be considered the behavior of the individual in response to stimula- 
tions from these two kinds of groups. 


INFLUENCE OF THE Co-AcTING GROUP 

Social Facilitation: The Influence of the Group upon the Indi- 
vidual’s Movements. In Chapter X there was described, under 
the general topic of suggestion, a two-fold effect of social stimula- 
tion in (1) releasing reactions for which the subject is in readiness, 
and (2) increasing these reactions once they have been initiated. 
This is precisely the effect of the co-acting group upon its members. 
The action prepared or in progress is some response participated in 
by all, and the social stimuli releasing or augmenting such response 
are the sight and sound of others doing the same thing. 

A number of simple phenomena illustrate this law. It has been 
found that in lifting loads (weights of an ergograph) by bending 
the finger, the ‘maximum’ weight that the subjects can lift while 
watching the similar movements of the experimenter’s finger is 
greater than the maximum that can be lifted when the signal to lift 
is merely the beat of a metronome. In ergographic work and 
dynamometric tests of hand grip a better score is made when work- 
ing with others than when working alone. Again, if one holds his 
hand in readiness for movement upon a freely moving writing 
board and attends to the hand of another while the latter traces 
curved designs, his own hand will follow automatically, producing 
similar tracings. 

The most striking instances of social facilitation are to be found 
on the race track. It is a common maxim among bicyclists that, 
provided two riders are of equal ability, the one who starts out 
ahead and keeps ahead throughout most of the race will lose in the 
end. ‘This is because the sight of his movements have afforded so 
great a contributory stimulus to the man behind that the latter’s 


262 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


energy is materially increased and he is enabled to win. There is 
thus a ‘competition for loafing’ until the final spurt, each contest- 
ant striving to make his opponent pace him. Races paced by a 
faster multicycle are sometimes run in twenty-five per cent less 
time than those where competition alone is the spur. ‘The well- 
known effect of pacing in horse races is similar. An experiment 
was performed by Professor Triplett! in which forty children were 
tested, in a number of trials each, for their speed in turning fishing 
reels. 

One half the trials were performed by the child alone, and one half 
in competition with another child. Although the instruction in 
each case was to ‘‘go as rapidly as possible so as to make a record” 
many of the subjects were able to exceed in their work in pairs the 
records they established as their maximum while working alone. 
Through the auditory sense as well as the visual, the performance 
of others increases that of the subject. Triplett found that children 
could be made to count at a faster rate by ‘pacing’ them; that is, 
by having the experimenter count at a faster rate than the child’s 
maximum for five seconds just preceding the trial of the child 
himself. 

In all kinds of competitive performance we may recognize two 
social factors. The first is social facilitation, which consists of an 
increase of response merely from the sight or sound of others mak- 
ing the same movements. The second is rivalry, an emotional re- 
inforcement of movement accompanied by the consciousness of 
a desire to win. Although the effects of the two are difficult to 
distinguish, they are in reality distinct factors in the total response. 
That social facilitation may exist independently of rivalry is seen in 
such instances as paced running and the ergographic experiments, 
in which rivalry was fairly eliminated by the setting. Though 
these two factors are naturally supplementary, we shall try for the 
sake of clearness to separate them in the following discussions. 

The Influence of the Group upon Attention and Mental Work. 
The pioneer investigation of the social influence by the method of 
comparing the individual’s mental work in the group with his per- 
formance when working alone was carried out by Dr. August Mayer 

1 Reference at the end of this chapter. 


RESPONSE WITHIN THE GROUP 263 


in 1903. His subjects were fourteen boys from the Volkschule of 
Wirzburg, Germany. Their average age was twelve years. Five 
types of test were selected as means of measuring reasoning, 
memory, and imagination. The tests involved writing from dic- 
tation, mental arithmetic, written arithmetic, learning nonsense 
syllables, and completing written sentences by supplying verbs 
which had been omitted. Five pairs of tests were used, one test 
in each pair being given in the classroom to all fourteen boys work- 
ing simultaneously, and the other to each boy separately. No 
attempt was made to eliminate rivalry.'. Three types of instruc- 
tion were used in the various tests. The first was, ‘‘ You are to 
finish as quickly and yet do your work as well as you possibly can”’; 
the second, “‘Go slowly but very carefully”; and the third, ‘‘Be as 
quick as you can — quality does not count.” 

[Throughout this chapter the following terms will be used to 
express various phases of the social influence upon work. ‘Social 
increment’ will be used to indicate a gain in the average quantity 
of work done in the group over the average done alone. ‘Social 
decrement’ will denote a loss in quantity of work done in the group. 
Corresponding gains or losses in the quality of the work done in the 
group compared with the quality of that done alone will be termed 
‘social supervaluents’ and ‘subvaluents,’ respectively.| 

Under the instruction ‘quickly but well,’ which is the most nat- 
ural and effective attitude for work, there was found a substantial 
social increment, amounting in some cases to from 30 to 50 per cent 
of the score made when working alone. ‘There was also a social 
supervaluent; that is, there were fewer errors in the group per- 
formance than in the work done by the subjects when isolated. 
Another interesting result was the greater uniformity of the work 
of individuals when under the group condition. Working in the 
group produced a lower average deviation among the scores of the 
workers than did solitary work. The work of a single individual 
was also more constant under the social condition. Mayer speaks 
of this phenomenon as the ‘uniform tendency’ of group work. 


1 The experimental situation in fact encouraged rivalry. Each subject was al- 
lowed to finish his test, and his time was then taken. The fact that some were fin- 
ishing and ceasing their work before others was doubtless a spur to the competition 
of the remaining workers. 


264. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


We thus find that social facilitation (sight and sounds of others 
working) combined with rivalry produces a distinct increase in the 
quantity and quality of the product of the individuals. In bring- 
ing the attainment of each more nearly to his maximum the social 
influence also brought them all more nearly to a common level. 
While working alone differences of energy, industry, and other 
traits produce wide deviations among individuals, deviations which 
_are reduced when the common incitements of facilitation and 
rivalry are brought to bear. 

Under the instruction ‘slowly but carefully’ the effect of the 
words was again reinforced by the social influence. That is, there 
was a social decrement (loss in speed), but a social supervaluent 
(gain in accuracy). When directed to work as ‘quickly as possible 
without regard for quality,’ there was a gain neither in the quantity 
nor the quality: only 40 per cent of the test pairs showed a social 
increment, as compared with 50 per cent which might have been 
expected by chance. ‘This latter result is probably to be explained 
as follows. Social facilitation and rivalry were of themselves 
sufficient to bring the speed of performance almost to its maximum, 
so that the added verbal instruction to hurry brought about an 
over-stimulation. The result was a loss of muscular control. 
Over-stimulation through rivalry alone, a similar phenomenon, 
will be discussed presently. 

In 1904 Dr. F. Schmidt published an account comparing the 
performance of children’s tasks done at home with equivalent 
work done in the schoolroom. ‘The work assigned included writ- 
ing exercises, written arithmetic, and German composition. No 
measure of speed of work was obtainable for the home work, but 
certain comparisons of quality were made. It is fair to assume 
that the home work represents the solitary condition of working. 
There was found a distinct supervaluent for the work done together 
(that is, in the schoolroom).! <A few individuals, however, did 

‘More recent experiments tend to show that inferior performance is not the 
necessary outcome of assigning tasks for home work. Under proper direction work 
done out of school can be made as effective as work done in the classroom. It seems 
however that special devices must be used to offset the disadvantage of the lack of 
stimulation from the group. This isa problem which belongs rather to educational 


than to social psychology. See Heck, W. H., ‘‘Comparative Tests of Home Work 
and School Work,” Journal of Educational Psychology, 1919, *, 153-62. 


RESPONSE WITHIN THE GROUP 265 


better at home. One group of subjects made 270 errors at home, 
and 184 at school. Schmidt found that omitted letters and words 
were characteristic of the home performance, while more superfluous 
letters and words were found in the exercises written at school. 
This seems to be another evidence of the heightened discharge of 
motor impulses under conditions of stimulation by the presence and 
similar movements of one’s fellows. Periods of distraction, during 
which the errors were made, were in group work filled with impul- 
sion to write on, thus producing the superfluous or ‘group’ type of 
mistake. 

Professor Meumann (1904) carried on experiments, similar to 
those of Mayer, upon rote memory for words. Lists of disyllabic 
words, ranging from four to twelve words in number, were read 
aloud; and the subjects immediately afterward wrote down all the 
words they could remember. A significant age difference was found 
in the social increment. Children eight and nine years of age re- 
membered more when tested in the group than when tested alone; 
while subjects thirteen and fourteen years of age were little affected 
by the social condition. 

In the years 1916-1919 the writer conducted a series of experi- 
ments in the Harvard Psychological Laboratory comparable to 
those already described, but with the following differences of 
method. Instead of children the writer used as subjects adult 
graduate students, their average age being twenty-five. Both sexes 
were included. The work done together was performed in groups 
of four or five, seated around a table. In the solitary tasks the 
subjects all worked at the same time, but each in a separate room, 
the time signals being given by buzzers located in the various rooms. 
The two conditions T and A! were alternated in successive tests in 
such a way that the effects of practice, adaptation, and fatigue 
were equalized between them. An attempt also was made to elim- 
inate rivalry, or at least to reduce it to’its natural minimum, so 
that the pure effects of social facilitation could be measured. 
Several expedients were used for this purpose: First, a constant 
amount of time was given for each test; and the subject’s speed 
was determined by the amount of the test completed. Hence no 


1 That is, together and alone. 


266 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


subject finished before the others. All comparisons of achievement 
and discussion of results were prohibited. Finally, it was em- 
phasized that the test was in no way a competition, and that the 
records of the subjects would not be compared. All, however, were 
instructed to work in each test at their maximum speed consistent 
with accuracy. The subjects while working in the group were 
made aware that each was doing the same task as all the others. 

A variety of mental functions was tested in these experiments. 
In this section will be described only the tests and results in the 
fields of attention and mental.work. ‘Three types of test were used 
for this purpose as follows: 

(1) Vowel Cancellation Test. Columns of newspaper material 
were placed before the subjects, and they were instructed to cross 
out all the vowels, working as rapidly as possible. 

(2) Reversible Perspective Test of Attention. A twelve-inch 
figure, similar to that in Figure 23, was placed before the group 

(seated side by side), or before each 


f subject in the solitary tests. In one 
Vi set of tests the instruction was given 
to look first along the line bd, and try 

Varios : 


to see the face abcd as nearer than the 

face efgh; and as soon as this was done 

to look at eg, and try to bring the face 

efgh nearer. When the control of the 

reversals was obtained, the subjects 

C ad were required to perceive these two per- 
Ficure 23 spectives alternately, making as many 

of the reversals as they could in one 

minute. Their report of the number of reversals obtained served 
as a measure of the speed factor of attention, corresponding to 
the amount of mental work done in the given time. In another 
series the instructions required the subjects to fixate the dot in the 
center of the figure as steadfastly as possible and try to keep the 
perspective from changing. Since the reversals are due mainly to 
eye movements, perfect fixation practically eliminates them. The 
number of changes occurring in spite of the effort to fixate was there- 
fore used as a measure of the constancy of attention, or the aspect of 


RESPONSE WITHIN THE GROUP 267 


attention concerned with accuracy or freedom from lapses in mental 
work. Two separate experiments were conducted with this test. 
In the first the data were secured from 7 subjects who were given 
10 trials alone and 20 trials in the group. The second experiment 
employed 15 subjects, each of whom had at least 30 trials alone 
and 30 in the group. 

(3) Multiplication Test. Horizontal rows of problems in multi- 
plication were arranged on sheets, with ten problems in each row. 
Each problem consisted of the multiplication of a two-digit number 
by another two-digit number. At the signal the subject began at 
the left end of the row and performed as many of the problems as 
possible in one minute. Speed of the process was measured by the 
number of problems or part problems multiplied; constancy of 
attention by the freedom of the work from errors. Fifteen sub- 
jects were used, each of whom had approximately 30 tests alone and 
30 in the group. 

The main results of this investigation are summarized in Table 
VIII. The social increments, decrements, super-, and subvaluents 
in this table are based upon the average scores of individuals in 
tests given under the two social conditions, respectively. 

The table shows that the presence of the co-working group tends 
to increase the quantity of work done by the individual members, 
but leaves the quality practically unaffected. In both vowel cross- 
ing and the two experiments with reversible perspective 71 per cent 
of the subjects affected by the group have a social increment in 
their work. The percentage for multiplying, though not so high, 
is also significant (66 per cent). The individual records (not shown 
in the table) furthermore indicated that the increments of those 
who did more work in the group were considerably larger than the 
decrements of those whose performance was greater alone. 

The constant character of these results suggests that, for mental 
work involving close attention: (1) most individuals work at higher 
speed when stimulated by co-workers, and (2) a few individuals, on 
the contrary, are retarded by the social influence. ‘These latter 
form a distinct type. 

Turning now to the qualitative aspect, it might be inferred that, 

since the individuals having social supervaluents and subvaluents 


268 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


are about equal in number, group stimuli produce little effect upon 
the quality of individual work. This impression is incorrect; for 
while some subjects were little influenced by the group in their 


TaBLE VIII. INFLUENCE OF THE Co-WORKING GROUP UPON ATTENTION 
AND MENTAL WORK 


CoNSTANC 
Sprep (QUANTITY) Y OF ATTENTION 





" UALITY 
Indicated by number of vowels ks (Q ) 
crossed, reversals of perspective Indicated by number of reversals oc- 
produced, or problems multiplied curring with effort to fixate, or num- 
ber of errors made in multiplying 
TEST 
USED N € tb 
_| No. of sub- | No. of sub- | No. of sub- | -*9; Of SUD- 
sas ant ceeis doin jects doing | jects hav- | jects hav- is ane 
ie Joa wold eoereN Oe equal work | ing greater | ing greater | 12& ae 
Bynes eho oe together constancy | constancy Peapairaee 
g and alone | alone together ORNS 
and alone 
Cross- Not 
ing 2 5 0 
Araerele recorded 
Rever- 
sible 
Perspec- 2 5 0 3 3 0 
tive (1st 
exp.) 
a fe | a | 
Rever- 
sible ) 
Perspec- 4 10 1 6 6 3 
tive (2d 
exp.) 
Multi- 
plying 4 8 0 7 8 0 


Note: Under Constancy of Attention in Reversible Perspective, 1st exp., the record of one subject 
was omitted owing to eye strain. Under Speed in the Multiplying test three subjects’ records 
were discarded because of continued practice effect which obscured the results. . 


quality score, others showed marked increase or decrease. Intro- 
spective reports indicated the presence of conflicting influences. 
There was felt the urge toward greater speed and accuracy (facilita- 
tion) because of the activity of the others; but there was also dis- 


_ RESPONSE WITHIN THE GROUP 269 


traction through noise and emotional factors. In some individuals 
the facilitating influences outweighed the distracting, producing a 
social supervaluent; in others the distracting effects were stronger 
(social subvaluent). The subvaluents of the latter class were, on 
the whole, greater than the supervaluents of the former. One 
subject, rather asocial in habits, made 39 errors in his solitary multi- 
plication, and 100 while working in the group. Judging from these 
considerations the advantage for quality of performance seems to 
be upon the side of the solitary condition. 

It is not difficult to understand why stimuli from the group 
should have a favorable effect upon the amount but not upon 
the quality of work. ‘Amount’ represents speed of movement; 
whereas ‘quality’ is determined, strictly speaking, not by move- 
ment at all, but by that fixity of the attention process which pre- 
vents any lapse or error. Our study of social facilitation has in all 
cases shown it to be a release or augmentation of some form of 
movement. The social stimuli reinforcing movement are more 
effective than those suggesting constancy of attention. 

The distribution of the errors throughout the multiplication 
tests is significant for interpreting the distracting influence of the 
group. In the social setting the errors tended to be bunched to- 
gether in successive problems of the test, while in solitary work 
they were more widely distributed. The index computed to ex- 
press this tendency of the errors to be closely grouped we may call 
the cwmulative error score. ‘This score was larger in the group work 
of 10 subjects, and larger in the solitary work of only 3.2. Distrac- 
tions are stronger in the presence of co-workers, and lapses of atten- 
tion involving errors are correspondingly lengthened. An emo- 
tional factor is also significant here. Probably many of the errors 
made were recognized, though both lack of time and the instrue- 
tions forbade their correction. It is likely also that the subject was 
conscious that others were probably solving the problem correctly 
and that his own performance was therefore inferior to that of his 
fellows. In consequence the recovery of composure was delayed 


1 The gross total of errors of all subjects supports this view. There were 683 
errors made in group work as compared with 571 in work done alone. 
2 It was equal in T and A in two cases. 


270 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


and further mistakes made in problems immediately following. 
This interpretation, if correct, points to a deep-lying tendency to 
estimate one’s own performance in relation to standards set by the 
group, and to be confused by comparisons which are unfavorable 
to one’s self. 

The Influence of the Group upon Association. The effect of 
stimulation from co-workers upon the free flow of associated word 
responses was studied by the writer in the following manner. The 
subjects in the two conditions, T and A, were given sheets of paper 
ruled with vertical columns dn which to write successive words as 
rapidly as they came to mind. At the expiration of the first and 
second minutes (in some of the tests) a signal was given, and the 
subjects indicated by a line the last word written at that instant. 
At the end of three minutes the test was terminated. Immediately 
after each test the subjects were required to underscore on their 
papers all personal (ego-centric) associations, that is, all words 
derived from some definite personal experience of the individual 
concerned. Since speed of association is likely to be greater than 
the speed of writing and therefore to be hampered by the latter, 
the subjects were instructed in some of the experiments to write 
down only every third or every fourth word that came to them. 

Table IX presents the number of subjects having social incre- 
ments and decrements in the average number of words written 
under the various conditions. 

An increase in speed and quantity of work under group influence 
seems to be as characteristic of free association as it is of other 
mental processes. In various experiments from 66 to 93 per cent 
of the subjects were facilitated by the stimulus of others doing the 
same task. In experiment 2 there were 14 social increments to 1 
decrement. Where every third word was written (exp. 4) 75 per 
cent worked more rapidly in the group; while in the third experi- 
ment where every fourth word only was written the number of 
social increments fell to 66 per cent of those affected. This result 
shows clearly the nature of social facilitation. When the response 
of individuals is mainly implicit or internal (as in pronouncing two 
thirds of the words to one’s self) facilitation is at its lowest. It is 
directly proportional to the amount of overt action through which 


RESPONSE WITHIN THE GROUP 271 


the co-workers stimulate one another. The decrease in facilitation 
may also be partially explained by the fact that ‘to think to one’s 
self’ is generally more difficult when others are present than when 
alone. 


Taste IX. INFLUENCE OF THE Co-WorRKING GrouP UPON SPEED 
oF ASSOCIATION 





No. of 
No. of | No. of BUDE ae 
Exp. | Number of Number of subjects | subjects ua eae 
No. Subjects Tests Method |) writing | writing number 
more more 
words words es sais 
alone together Dios 
A T gether 
Every 
1 3 9 12 word 1 2, 0 
written 
Every 
2 15 11 13. ‘| word 1 14 0 
written 
Every 
ourth 
3 14 5 6 a 4 8 2 
written 
Every 
third 
4 8 8 11 eer 2 6 0 
written 


The qualitative aspects (not shown in the table) were also signif- 
icant. In experiment 2 twelve subjects wrote a greater number of 
personal associations alone than they did in the group. Only three 
produced more in the group than alone. The introspection also 
verified this tendency to be ‘drawn out of one’s self’ in the play of 
word association in the presence of others. When alone there is a 


Q72 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


greater tendency toward the ego-centric type of response. Either 
the group directly affords many associations of a compelling sort, or 
else it inhibits the attitude of introversion and day-dreaming. It 
is harder to be ‘shut in’ in our thoughts when we are in the presence 
of fellow workers. The decrease of personal associations in the 
group is of especial interest because it represents, not the result of 
face-to-face reactions, but an attitude unconsciously »ssumed upon 
working in the mere presence of others. 

By counting the scores of the one-minute periods of the associa- 
tion tests separately the social’facilitation was found to be greatest 
in the first minute and least in the third. That is to say, during the 
first minute, when associations come readily, social stimulation 
produces a greater addition of speed than toward the end of the 
test, when through fatigue and the exhaustion of ready responses, 
the facility of association has decreased. The greater the degree 
of activity in progress, the stronger the effect of social facilitation 
upon it 4 

The Influence of the Group upon Thought. We have seen that 
the stimulation from the co-acting group facilitates the flow of free 
association. There now arises the question of its effect upon the 
more controlled process of reasoning. This problem was investi- 
gated by having the subjects write short arguments, during five-. 
minute periods, in the group and alone. Didactic passages of: 
uniform character were chosen from the writings of two ancient: 
philosophers. In each test the subject was given a passage and was 
directed to write arguments, as many and as valid as possible, to 
disprove the statement of the passage. While working together the 
subjects were made aware that all were writing upon the same 
selection. Nine subjects were used, and seventeen tests given in 
each of the two conditions, A and T. 

The effect upon quantity was again in favor of the group work. 
Eight out of the nine subjects produced a greater number of state- 
ments intended to disprove the passages in the social than in the 
solitary environment. The arguments written were next graded. 


1 Another possible interpretation is that the social stimulus when fresh adds to the 
signal for starting sufficient impetus for an ‘initial spurt’ which diminishes as the 
worker becomes more adapted to the presence of the others. 


RESPONSE WITHIN THE GROUP 273 


according to their value. The most cogent and relevant state- 
ments received a score of 3, those next in worth a score of 2, and the 
most superficial and unconvincing a value of only 1. Table X 
contains the result of this scoring. 


TABLE X. INFLUENCE OF THE Co-WoRKING GROUP UPON QUALITY 
or THOUGHT 


Number of subjects having higher 
percentage of arguments described Number of sub- 
Quality of in column at extreme left: jects having equal 
Arguments percentage alone 
and together 
Alone Together 


Arguments show- 
ing best reason- 
ing (score 3) 


Arguments show- 
ing reasoning of 
moderate value 
(score 2) 


Arguments show- 
ing poorest 
reasoning 

(score 1) 





It will be seen from the table that two thirds of the individuals 
produced a higher percentage of best arguments while working alone 
than while in the group; and that, by a reversal of the ratio, two 
thirds produced a higher percentage of poorest arguments while 
working in the group. The tendency toward reasoning of indiffer- 
ent value was equal in the two conditions. There is thus indicated 
a social subvaluent for argumentative or discursive reasoning. 
This finding is in accord with commonly observed facts. Upon 
recalling speeches made under a strong social influence, such as that 
of a political rally or an oral debate, we are often surprised that we 
had not noticed the faulty logic upon which the arguments were 


Q74 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


based. There appears to be a spreading out or ‘conversationalizing’ 
of our thought in the social setting. We strive rather for con- 
vineing effect than for separate ideas of logical worth. 

There is, in short, a kind of wordiness in the reasoning done in 
the group. Six out of nine subjects in the above investigation used 
more words in their arguments written with the others present than 
they did when alone.!' The same law is here illustrated as in the 
experiments upon association: it is the overt responses, such as 
writing, which receive facilitation through the stimulus of co- 
workers. The intellectual or implicit responses of thought are 
hampered rather than facilitated.? 

Although we have compared the results of the experiment just 
described with the quality of reasoning heard in a public debate, it 
must be remembered that in the group used there was no actual 
face-to-face contact of individuals. Such social stimuli as were 
present had only a contributory effect upon the subject’s response 
to the task set. For this reason the tendency to write rather for 
conversational effect than for logical precision is the more interest- 
ing. Asin the case of free association, merely being in the presence 
of others working upon the same problem places us in an attitude 
toward the task which is different from our approach to it in soli- 
tude. When working with others we respond in a measure as 
though we were reacting to them. 

The Influence of the Group upon Judgments of Comparison. 
A process allied to thought, namely, the evaluation and comparison 
of stimuli, has also been subjected experimentally to the group 
influence. In the first study of this sort the writer used judgments 
of pleasantness or unpleasantness of odors. Five series of ten 
different odors each were arranged in bottles, each series compris- 
ing a variety of affective values ranging from putrid odors to per- 


1 The average of the six social increments was moreover many times greater than 
the average of the three social decrements. 

2 The researches of Mayer and Schmidt tend to corroborate this statement. Work 
requiring careful thought, such as written arithmetic, showed, in their experiments, 
a much smaller tendency to social increment and supervaluent than the more me- 
chanical exercises. In the present writer’s experiments a smaller proportion of sub- 
jects had a social increment in multiplying than in the simpler processes, and a 
smaller proportion in writing every third or fourth associated word than in writing 
every word. 


RESPONSE WITHIN THE GROUP Q75 


fumes. Each subject was provided with a set of bottles, so that in 
the group work all were able to smell the same odor at the same 
time. The fact that each was judging the same odor at the same 
time as all the rest was further emphasized by interchanging the 
bottles among the subjects to show that their contents were iden- 
tical. The subjects judged the pleasantness of the odors by draw- 
ing lines on standard strips of paper, a short line for an unpleasant 
odor and a longer one for a pleasant odor. The length of the line 
was proportional to the pleasantness which the subject experienced 
from the odor in question. In other trials the affective quality was 
expressed numerically on a subjective scale ranging from 0 to 100. 

In each of the five series there were thus obtained ten judgments 
(one for each odor) while smelling the odors with the group, and ten 
judgments while working alone. This comprised the record of 
each individual for that series. The ten solitary judgments were 
now taken and arranged in a graph, the value of each judgment 
being laid off as distance from the base line upon a vertical ordinate. 
The ten odors were plotted in this way beginning with the most un- 
pleasant at the extreme left. A line connecting the ten points thus 
plotted represents the curve of affective judgment for the ten odors 
in the solitary condition of judging. For an illustration of such a 
curve see the solid-line curve in Figure 24. The values of the same 
odors when smelled and judged in the group were plotted upon the 
same ordinates, and a curve thus described expressing the affective 
judgments of the same series made under the social condition (see 
dotted-line curve in Figure 24). The curves for the five series 
together and alone were then averaged for each subject and in- 
dividual curves made whereby the social and solitary judgments of 
odors of various degrees of pleasantness could be readily compared 
for each subject. A final graph was made for the entire group 
of seventeen subjects based upon an average of the individual 
curves. This is the graph shown in Figure 24. 

An inspection of Figure 24 shows that the curves representing 
the judgments under conditions A and T cross in their middle 
portions. For the unpleasant odors (at the left) the A curve is 
lower than the T curve; while for the pleasant odors (at the right) 
the reverse relation holds. The unpleasant odors therefore were 


276 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


estimated as less unpleasant in the group than when judging alone; 
and the pleasant were estimated as less pleasant in the group than 
in the solitary judgments.! Expressed in other words there is a 
tendency toward moderation in judgments made in concert with 
others, the individual 
avoiding those ex- 
treme judgments at 
either end of the scale 
which he does not 
hesitate to make when 
judging alone. 

Figure 24 is more 
than a mere average of 
the individual curves. 
It is a type to which 
the curves of the indi- 
vidual subjects closely 
conform. The same 
type of crossing of 
the T and A curves, 


Figure 24. INFLUENCE OF THE Group upon Jupg- Indicating avoidance 
MENTS OF PLEASANTNESS AND UNPLEASANTNESS of extreme judgments 
(Based upon an average of the average curves of seventeen ; 
wubjentes in the _ group, was 
The vertical lines represent ten odors arranged from left to present in the graphs 
right in order of increasing pleasantness when smelled by 
the subjects alone. Those on the extreme left represent of 70 pes cent of the 
unpleasant odors. The distance along each vertical from the subjects, while the 
base line to the solid curve expresses the degree of pleasantness 
for the particular odor when smelled alone. The distance from graphs of 23 per cent 
the base line to the dotted curve indicates the pleasantness $ 
of the same odor when smelled with the group. ao appr oximated 
this type. 


The entire experiment was repeated using series of weights 
instead of odors. The subjects were required to estimate the 
weight of each of ten objects, identical in appearance, in relation to 
a light and a heavy standard given at the beginning of the test. 
Upon judging each weight they were asked to record their judg- 


Together 
Alone 





1 That this represents the social influence upon judgment, and not upon the 
pleasantness itself, is shown by a later experiment (vide infra) in which the same 
tendency was revealed in the judgment of non-affective stimuli (weights). 


RESPONSE WITHIN THE GROUP arly 


ments as they had done with the odors. The average curves for 
the judgments of all subjects, together and alone, are presented 
in Figure,25. This graph closely resembles that shown in Figure 
24. When judging in the group the heavier weights were judged 
as lighter than when 
judging alone; and 
the lighter weights 
were judged as heavier. 
insensory as well as af- 
fective judgments the 
individual avoids ex- 
treme opinions while 
working with others. 
Sixty-six per cent of 
the subjects had their 
T and A curves in the 
same relation as those 
in Figure 25; while 27 
per cent more came 
fairly close to this 





type. FiGcurE 25. INFLUENCE OF THE GROUP UPON 
The fact, therefore, JUDGMENTS OF WEIGHT 
of shunning extremes (Based upon an average of the average curves of fifteen 
; subjects) 
ni xpr n 
4 d oS OES 3 HONS The vertical lines represent ten weights arranged in order 
moderate estimates of increasing weight. The distance along each vertical from 
the base line to the solid curve denotes the position assigned 


when in the PYreSeNce to that weight with respect to a ‘heavy standard’ (represent- 


‘ ed by the base line) and a ‘light standard’ (represented by 
of other judges seems the top border of the figure), when the subject was working 
well established. How alone. The distance from the base to the dotted curve shows 

the position assigned to the same weight when the subject was 


shall it be interpreted? working with the group. 

In the writer’s opinion 

it is the result of an attitude of submission which we assume, ofter 
unconsciously, in the presence of a group. Where all are engaged 
upon the same sort of task this submission takes the character of 
conforming to the manner in which the other members are reacting. 
More specifically, upon approaching the extremes of the series, the 
question arises in the subject’s consciousness, ‘How extreme shall 
I make this judgment?’ He feels that he is more likely to be at 


278 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


odds with the judgment of his associates if he goes too far than if 
not quite extreme enough. Hence he errs upon the side of modera- 
tion. In the introspective reports the subjects showed lively 
interest in how the others were judging the odors or weights. This 
interest took the form of imaginal comparisons, feelings of restraint 
upon their own judgments, and desire for corroboration. One 
subject noted that his social consciousness rose to a higher pitch as 
he neared the extremes of the series. 

A social attitude of considerable importance is here revealed. 
Barring individual exceptions-(a few of which were found in the 
experiments described), there is a basic human tendency to temper 
one’s opinions and conduct by deference to the opinions and con- 
duct of others. Early training and social contact have bred in us 
the avoidance of extremes of all sorts, whether of clothing, of man- 
ners, or of belief. This tendency is so fundamental that we are 
seldom conscious of it; yet we are seldom if ever without it. In the 
writer’s experiment all discussion was prohibited. The individuals 
were aware that their judgments would not be compared and that 
there was no possible advantage in adhering in their reactions to an 
imagined group average. Yet, as in the case of association and 
reasoning, the mere proximity and co-working of other persons were 
stimuli which sufficed to evoke this modified form of response. To 
think and to judge with others is to submit one’s self unconsciously 
to their standards. We may call this the attitude of social con- 
formity. 

Individual Differences in Social Facilitation. Individuals differ 
in their degree of susceptibility to the influence of the group. 
Children are more susceptible to the facilitating social influence 
than adults. But even among adults there are conspicuous differ- 
ences. In the investigations described above certain individuals 
had a social decrement in their output, or failed to show the usual 
reaction to group stimulation in thought and conformity of judg- 
ment. Habit, customary work environment, nervousness and 
distractibility, as well as reclusiveness, negative suggestibility, 
attitudes of superiority, defect of sociality, and other traits are 
_ factors which may help us to account for these atypical reactions. 
Another type of individual difference deserves special notice. 


RESPONSE WITHIN THE GROUP 279 


The facilitating influence of the group is greatest for the slower and 
poorer workers and least for the more rapid and efficient. Mayer 
found a consistent relationship of this sort. It occurred also in 
the experiments upon mental work and association conducted by 
the writer: the correlation between speed of solitary work and gain 
through working in the group, though low, was always inverse. 
In certain instances it reached —.5 or -.6. The explanation of this 
phenomenon is partly as follows. The average speed of movement 
of the co-workers is less than that of the most rapid. Hence 
stimulation from the group would tend to retard rather than 
facilitate the movements of the latter. The effect would be similar 
to that of trying to pace a fast horse by a slower one. The slowest 
workers, on the other hand, would find the contributory stimuli 
rapid and hence facilitating. Rivalry also plays a part in this 
result, as will be later shown. 

Social Consciousness in the Co-Working Group. ‘The intro- 
spective reports of the subjects in these social experiments show 
practically always an awareness that the others ‘are working hard 
and fast.’ The individual is conscious of specific facilitating stimuli, 
such as the tapping of pencils, shuffling of feet, sounds of attentive 
respiration, peripheral vision of the speed, pauses, and degree of 
progress of one’s neighbors. The facilitation consciousness re- 
sembles other forms of suggestion consciousness in the impulsion 
toward movement without adequate motive or reason. There was 
a scarcely articulated awareness that ‘the others are writing rap- 
idly, so I must write rapidly also.’ Such conscious states may be 
quite independent of any feeling of rivalry. There was reported 
also a consciousness of impeding factors, including distraction and 
emotional inhibition resulting from imagined comparison of one’s 
own achievements with those of others. Realization of inferior 
performance or of other discrepancies always brought a heightened 
self and social consciousness. Social consciousness varies accord- 
ing to the type of occupation in which the group is engaged. It is 
greater for work requiring overt and conspicuous movement than 
for the more intellectual tasks, which both demand closer concen- 
tration and afford fewer stimulations from the behavior of one’s 
co-workers. 


280 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


Rivalry. Rivalry works hand in hand with social facilitation in 
the production of the large social increments found both in experi- 
ment and practice. Industry, education, and sport are three of the 
many fields in which the direct spur of competition may be added 
to social facilitation for increasing the energy and accomplishment 
of the worker. Combined with the economic incentive of bonuses, 
rewards, and payment by piece-work, the drive to excel others is an 
effective tool in the hands of the factory supervisor. 

There are limitations, however, to such methods. Rivalry, like 
social facilitation, increases the quantity, but does not improve the 
quality, of the output. There is likely in fact to be a deterioration 
in quality. This is the case in adult occupations even under the 
conventional instruction ‘work as quickly as you can consistently 
with careful work.’ The effect of competition is more favorable for 
speed of movement than for precision or constancy of attention. 

The laws of rivalry must be studied in relation to the individual. 
While competition is productive of speed in most persons it over- 
excites and retards the work of some. We may refer again to the 
experiment of Triplett upon rivalry in the turning of fishing reels 
(see p. 262). Forty subjects were used in this investigation. 
Twenty of them gained markedly in the competitive trials over 
their average for solitary work. Ten were little affected by the 
competition. ‘These were for the most part older children. And 
ten actually lost in speed under the influence of rivalry. These last 
showed evidences of emotional excitement and a loss of motor 
control. Young, nervous, and excitable subjects are prone to 
over-stimulation through rivalry, with a consequent lowering of 
efficiency in competitive performance. ‘Triplett found a higher 
percentage of girls than of boys susceptible to increase of perform- 
ance through competition. 

The effect of rivalry, like that of social facilitation, varies in- 
versely with the ability of the worker. In 1914 Dr. W. Moede 
published an account of rivalry in speed of tapping and strength 
of hand grip. Seventeen boys between twelve and fourteen years 
of age participated. ‘The more rapid tappers made actually lower 
scores when tapping in competition with the others than when 
working alone. The speed of the nine slowest individuals, on the 


RESPONSE WITHIN THE GROUP 281 


other hand, showed a distinct social increment. This increment 
was somewhat larger than the decrement of the more rapid half. 
By thus reducing the scores of the more rapid and increasing those 
of the slower workers the individual differences in performance were 
materially lessened. Moede thus found, like Mayer, that group 
work tends to bring the workers to a more nearly uniform rate of 
speed. This ‘uniform’ or ‘leveling’ tendency we have already 
partially explained by facilitation or retardation through the tempo 
of other workers’ movements (p. 279). The slower workers’ re- 
actions are facilitated because they are stimulated by movements 
made at a faster rate than their own. The more rapid lack such 
incitement. Rivalry also codperates in the leveling tendency. 
The more rapid workers, realizing the ease with which they excel, 
lose interest in the competition and slacken their efforts; whereas 
the slower subjects, provided they are not hopelessly outclassed, 
are aroused to greater effort through their zeal to rival the others. 
This effect of rivalry must be regarded as distinct from that of the 
difference of social facilitation with which it is allied. The latter 
is merely the influence of external stimulations from the working 
of others, while the former represents a difference of attitude and 
incentive. 

In the dual contest the situation is somewhat altered. Here 
greater ability and lesser ability become the basis of ascendance and 
submission, traits which are asserted early in the encounter (see 
p. 120). In contests in strength of hand grip between two boys 
Moede found that the rivalry attitude gave way almost 1mmedi- 
ately to an attitude on the part of the stronger to conquer his op- 
ponent, and on the part of the weaker merely to make the best show- 
ang he could. The more equally matched the two contestants the 
greater will be the effect of rivalry on both sides in the ensuing 
struggle. This is true also of work in groups. By separating the 
superior half of his group of tappers and allowing them to compete 
among themselves Moede found that a distinct social increment, 
instead of a decrement as formerly, was obtained. 

Apart from ability, rivalry seems to be more a part of some 
personalities than of others. There are ascendant individuals who 
love a contest of any sort, and whose attitude is persistently to win, 


282 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


and to stand at the head of the list. Others find strenuous con- 
tests too exciting. They are of the despairing, less self-confident 
type. Their desire is merely to ‘make a respectable showing,’ and 
not to stand at the foot of the list. Continual defeat will usually 
break down the attitude to win, and reduce it to the less ambitious 
desire to make a good record. Athletes employ a deliberate device 
for this purpose. A runner allows his opponent to keep abreast of 
him for some time, pretending that he is running at his maximum 
speed and struggling to keep up the pace. He then suddenly darts 
ahead with a disconcerting burst of power. This discouraging 
process is known as ‘running a man’s head off.’ 

Auto-Rivalry, ‘Team-Work,’ and Esprit de Corps. There is a 
consolation for the individual who is outclassed in a competitive 
performance. Although he cannot equal his rivals’ records he car. 
Improve upon his own. ‘This is the well-known attitude of auto- 
or self-competition. Its true origin in actual rivalry (hetero-com- 
petition) may be readily surmised; for it is by improving one’s 
own score that one decreases the distance between self and the 
next higher competitor. Also, if one cannot excel his rivals, he 
can at least show a greater capacity for unprovement. He can thus 
make a conquest in relative terms. The handicap and the chil- 
dren’s maxim of ‘taking a person your cwn size’ are practical illus- 
trations of this attitude. There is also less discomfort through 
emotional tension in the auto-rivalry than in the hetero-rivalry 
consciousness. 

Competition between groups combines the attitude of codperation 
with that of rivalry. The setting also favors auto-competition. 
Hach member of the team tries to ‘outdo himself’ in order that his 
side may outdo the other. There is also an extensicn of the aware- 
ness of self to include the group, and an exhilarating excitement in 
the feeling of magnified conquest. It is pleasant to win a personal 
contest; but it is little short of sublime to be a member of a victori- 
ous group. Moede’s researches included strength tests not only in 
dual contests, but between competing teams of five boys each. 
The records of the individuals in the group contests exceeded those 
in the dual contests, just as the latter excelled the records for the 
solitary tests. 





——— Se ee 


RESPONSE WITHIN THE GROUP 283 


A phenomenon closely allied to codperation is that known as 
esprit de corps. The attitude of the individual is the same as in 
inter-group competition, except that the ideal is permanent excel- 
lence, or morale, rather than immediate victory. The soldier with 
this attitude strives to make his company the best in the regiment, 
and his regiment the best in the division. 

The Physiological Basis of Social Facilitation and Rivalry. 
When, in the co-working group, rivalry enters and produces a social 
increment, we may assume that the task is no longer simply a 
mechanical duty, facilitated by working with others, but a definite 
struggle in which each individual strives to prevent the others from 
beating him (that is from thwarting his habit of self-esteem). 
Whatever the competitive occupation may be, it serves therefore 
as an efferent modification of the prepotent struggle response, that 
is, as a method of carrying on the struggle. 

As introspectively reported, rivalry is emotional in character. 
It is a kind of mild anger which accompanies the modified struggle 
reaction. Its close relation to the stronger form of the anger 
emotion is shown by the fact that it passes readily into the latter. 
Competition in industry, scholarship, or other fields usually pro- 
vides a successful method for use in the struggle to assert our pre- 
potent interests. Rivalry is the emotion here aroused. Under 
some circumstances, however, more violent struggle responses are 
needed. Anger, for example, is quickly aroused by unsportsman- 
like conduct on the football field, because without fair play it be- 
comes impossible to win the struggle by the method of sport; and 
this outlet being blocked, the more primitive responses are called 
forth. Friendly boxing contests lead often to more serious blows, 
the rivalry and the anger emotions being fundamentally of the 
same character. The visceral reaction in rivalry, as in other 
emotions, probably liberates internal secretions, and involves other 
responses characteristic of the sympathetic system. By this means 
a higher level of energy is provided for the competitive exertion. 

Social facilitation without rivalry is more difficult to explain. 
Since we usually both hear and see ourselves work we might sup- 
pose that the sound and sight of our movements become condition- 
ing stimuli; and that they tend to reévoke or augment in us these 


284 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


very movements from which they were derived. Similar move- 
ments made by others, since they give similar stimulations, would 
then serve the same purpose. When multiplied many fold by the 
co-working group these conditioning, contributory stimuli become 
important agents in facilitation. But on the other hand, there are 
many forms of task in which the explanation of conditioned response 
would scarcely apply. Attitudes of a more complex sort are also 
probable: knowing that those about us are to be doing the same 
task, we are disposed to work more rapidly from the start. Meu- 
mann ascribes social facilitation to an attitude of over-compensa- 
tion. We work so hard to overcome the distraction incident to 
group activity that we actually accomplish more than we would 
without these hindrances. 

Summary of the Experimental Study of the Group Influence. 
Groups in actual social life are far more complex in inter-relations 
of individuals than the experimental settings described above. 
For this reason, although the experimental findings are useful and 
important, generalizations from them must proceed with caution. 
We may summarize these results as follows: 

The social stimulations present in the co-acting group bring about 
an increase in the speed and quantity of work produced by the 
individuals. This increase is more pronounced in work involving 
overt, physical movements than in purely intellectual tasks. In 
adults the group produces no improvement in the constancy of 
attention or the quality of the work performed. Some individuals 
in fact do inferior work in the presence of co-workers. ‘There is a 
jowering of the logical value of reasoning carried out in the group; 
but an increase in the number of words by which such reasoning 
is expressed. In at least one type of work the tendency toward a 
social increment is strongest in the earlier part of the task. 

The social increment is subject to individual differences in respect 
to age, ability, and personality traits. It is greatest for the least 
able workers and least for the most able. . 

Two processes are accountable for the accelerating effect of the 
group upon the individual’s work. The first of these is social 
facilitation. The movements made by others performing the same 
task as ourselves serve as contributory stimuli, and increase or has- 


RESPONSE WITHIN THE GROUP 285 


ten our own responses. This process is accompanied by a con- 
sciousness of impulsion. The second process is rivalry. Its oecur- 
rence is in direct proportion to the competitive setting of the group 
occupation, though a certain degree of rivalry seems natural to all 
co-activity. Its effect is that of emotional reinforcement, the 
struggle to assert various prepotent needs or interests being the 
response which it reinforces. It improves the speed and quantity 
rather than the quality of the work in which it is operative. 
Rivalry, like social facilitation, varies with age, sex, and personal- 
ity. Some persons are susceptible to an actual loss in performance 
through over-stimulation when the rivalry situation is stressed. In 
order to get the maximum effect from rivalry, two individuals must 
be about equally matched in ability. When rivalry produces a 
social increment in a group there is a tendency for the perforraances 
of the individuals to approach a common level. ‘This is because the 
more rapid slacken their effort through absence of formidable com- 
petitors, while the slower increase their effort in the hope of excel- 
ling those above them. Auto-competition and rivalry between 
groups have their characteristic conscious attitudes, and are con- 
ducive to substantial gains in the output of the individuals. 

Working in the presence of others, even though there is no direct 
contact nor communication, establishes certain fundamental at- 
titudes. We are confused and distracted whenever we feel our 
reaction to be at variance with or inferior to the average behavior 
of those about us. In the association process we tend to inhibit 
ego-centric trends and personal complexes. In our thinking we 
assume a conversational attitude, becoming more expansive and 
less precise. And finally, we avoid extremes in passing judgment, 
tending, often unconsciously, toward conformity with what we 
think to be the opinion of those about us. 


INFLUENCE OF THE FACE-TO-FACE GROUP 


The Nature of Face-to-Face Groups. Direct social stimulation 
and response do not lend themselves to experimental control so 
readily as the contributory influences of the co-acting group. For 
this reason the investigation of responses in the face-to-face group 
has been neglected. Yet this is a large and important field. When- 


286 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


ever two or more persons talk or otherwise react directly to one 
another we have a primary, or face-to-face, group.! The doorstep 
conversation of two housewives represents one of the simplest and 
most universal forms. Other examples of the ‘sociability’ type 
are the children’s party, the reunion, and the intimate afternoon 
tea. Pals, cronies, and cliques of three or four (rarely exceeding 
six) are common in childhood and youth, but are generally dis- 
placed in adult life by associations of vocation and family. Small 
discussion groups, literary and scientific societies, and committees, 
though including a higher degree of organization as well as factors 
of co-activity, retain also a certain face-to-face character. The 
consultation of doctors, lawyers, and financiers, councils of war, 
and deliberations of juries illustrate more imposing aggregations of 
the same type. In the governmental assembly, the convention, and 
the political rally the face-to-face relation, though present, tends 
to pass over into the situation of the audience, the co-acting group, 
and the crowd. ‘The manner in which human beings react to one 
another under all these conditions presents a vast field of inquiry as 
yet scarcely touched by observation or experiment. 

Social Control, Participation, and Sex as Drives in Primary 
Groups. In many face-to-face groups, such as committees and 
other constructive bodies, social behavior takes the form of secur- 
ing adjustments of ascendance and submission among the members. 
Each asserts his opinion as to what should be done, and supports it 
by suggestion, by logic, or by the domination of his personality. 
Final decision in the adoption of a plan may come by discussion, 
persuasion, compromise, or sheer majority. In any case, however, 
the struggle for personal ascendancy looms large. The conclusion 
arrived at is as likely to be the result of control by ascendant per- 
sonalities as of rational planning. 

Face-to-face groups of the congeniality type are based upon the 
pleasure of responding to others and causing others to respond to 
us. The drive is for control of others, not to the extent of deter- 
mining their reactions, but simply to make them react. Social be- 
havior in itself is sought as an end. ‘There is a universal tendency 


1 A primary group, that is, in the psychological rather than the sociological sense 
(see footnote to p. 260). 





RESPONSE WITHIN THE GROUP 287 


to produce reactions in others. It originates probably in the habit 
developed in early childhood of controlling parents and others in 
order to secure satisfaction of the bodily needs (ef. Chapter III) and 
of interests based upon these drives. Another probable source is 
the childish habit of doing things in order to attract attention (that 
is, to make others react to one).! As we grow up and become more 
self-sufficient the old habit persists as an inclination to control 
merely for the sake of controlling. 

The reaction-getting habit is both striking and universal. The 
boy is not content with seeing a squirrel sitting in a tree; he must 
throw a stone at him to make him do something. The writer’s 
three-year-old son made stealthy efforts to tread on his father’s 
bandaged sore toe, looking meanwhile at his face in sober expect- 
ancy. <A boy of eight did the same thing, except that it was a 
‘make believe’ attempt. Bullying and teasing is universal in 
childhood, and in maturity grows into badinage and practical jok- 
ing. As the child treads on sore toes we grown-ups tread upon 
complexes and idiosyncrasies. Traveling salesmen contrive to get 
their interlocutor in a good light, and then try out various jokes and 
items of interest in order to make him reveal his personal traits. 
Reclusive persons irritate us, because it is difficult to get a response 
from them. The superiority of the mechanical toy and the talking 
doll to other playthings is based upon our reaction-getting drive. 
In all accounts of sensational trials, executions, and the like, the 
public demands to know just how the victim reacts when the 
sentence is passed or the noose adjusted. No newspaper account 
is complete without these details. The ‘close-up’ of the actor’s 
face in the ‘movie,’ and the savage humor of the comic supplement 
indulge our craving to get a reaction, ludicrous or tragic, but always 
intense, from every situation. 

Congenial face-to-face groups, to be sure, are not usually based 
on social participation in this elementary and savage form. Yet 
sociability, responding and producing responsive expressions in 
others, is a socialized form of the same drive. These groups afford 


1 Professors Smith and Guthrie have suggested that the so-called perversion of 
exhibitionism (as well as boisterous, profane, or obscene behavior generally) is the 
persistence of a childhood method of gaining attention and producing reactions in 
adults. 


288 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


also other pleasurable types of response. The facilitation of move- 
ment in co-activities such as dancing, card-playing, laughing, and 
experiencing pleasant emotions in the company of others are funda- 
mental enjoyments of social gatherings. We derive an increase of 
pleasure in our drives and hobbies by discussing them with those 
whose interests are similar. Novel ideas, witty remarks, and 
personal gossip, diversions sanctioned for us because others indulge 
in them, release our inhibited sex attitudes and hostilities in an 
agreeable fashion. More than is generally recognized the popu- 
larity and animation of the face-to-face group is based upon sex 
attraction. This impulse usually remains unconscious, and we 
ascribe our pleasure to ‘sociability’ or to a ‘gregarious instinct.’ 
But from the kissing games of pre-adolescents to the ballroom 
gayety of adults the mixed party is universally favored. The 
stag affair is sought only as a relief from the too rigorous strain of 
inhibitions made necessary by the presence of the opposite sex. 
Permanent face-to-face groups and ‘crushes’ among college girls 
depend to an unrecognized degree upon unconscious sexual fixation. 
Rivalry, display, and the prepotent habit of securing social approval 
add to the zest of the primary sociability group, and often ally 
themselves with the desire for sexual conquest. 

Conversation and Discussion. Conversation, the outstanding 
form of social behavior and contact in primary groups, deserves a 
word of notice. Little need be said about its more obvious aspect, 
namely, that it is an interchange of stimulus and response by which 
thoughts and feelings are aroused in one’s interlocutor. More 
fundamentally considered, it involves the opposed efforts of two 
persons for expansion and control through language, each being 
only partially successful. A tries to control B by impressing upon 
him his (A’s) knowledge, feelings, or beliefs; and B strives in the 


same manner to impress A; but neither succeeds to any marked 


extent. This fact can be readily observed by eavesdropping upon 
the conversation of others. It cannot be detected in our own 
conversations because we are so animated by our own narrative or 
viewpoint that we misjudge the other’s sympathy with what we 
are saying. We think it to be as thoroughgoing as our own.! The 


1 This is the phenomenon of social projection, a process which will be discussed 
more fully in later chapters. 


RESPONSE WITHIN THE GROUP 289 


attitude of the other speaker, however, might be put into words 
as follows: ‘“‘What you say is interesting. But now listen to this 
that happened to me!’’ Since B’s attitude is ascendant rather 
than passive and receptive he does not react to A’s remark 
with serious or logical consideration. Often he does not fully 
understand it. Some word or phrase of it serves as a trigger to 
set off his own habit of thought or his own associated experi- 
ences. “‘That reminds me”’ is the frequent overt indication of this 
process. 

In discussions, where one is not permitted to be ‘reminded of 
things’ at random, but must stick to a point, there is still the most 
imperfect sort of contact. In formal debates the argument of one 
speaker will be taken up by the opponent, not for the purpose of 
giving a direct answer on the former’s ground, but merely as an 
introduction from a new angle to the opponent’s attack. So he 
reiterates his arguments with new variations upon the old theme. 
We go away from such gatherings disappointed that such good 
minds should have wholly failed to connect. 

In spite of all this, discussion produces constructive results; for 
it brings new points of view to bear upon the thought habits of the 
participants. The writer has collected the written opinions of 
students upon debatable questions before and after a period of free 
discussion. In the reports written afterward there were instances 
where facts presented by others, though taken up in a sense differ- 
ent from that intended, had been worked into new and very sub- 
stantial arguments. Conversation and discussion thus proceed by 
a series of mutual partial misunderstandings which may produce 
good results in directing old habits of thought along new channels. 
This is what is meant when we say that one’s genius strikes fire 
from the words of another. If one is not too impervious to social 
stimuli, something great and even new may be produced by putting 
two or more heads together. From this standpoint it is as neces- 
sary also to have an opinion of one’s own as it is to be willing to 
listen to others. Otherwise the result is simply a replica of the 
other’s thought. To conceive a new idea we must have an old one 
to start with. This stimulation of new ways of conceiving old facts 
represents the profitable side of discussion. It is coming to be 


290 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


recognized in modern education in the ‘socialized recitation’ and 
the ‘group game.’ ! 

The good conversationalist is therefore one who can be a listener 
as well as a talker. In few human relations do personality traits 
count for so much. One must be ascendant, yet disciplined to 
alternate his ascendancy with attitudes of submissive and sympa- 
thetic attention. He must be expansive and still control his dis- 
course by tact and an esthetic understanding of proportion. He 
must be able and ready to respond to faint and even unconscious 
clues from the behavior of his-fellows. His associative processes 
must be rapid and capable of following abrupt changes. And he 
must possess insight, humor, and a genuine love of social partici- 
pation. 


REFERENCES 


Burnham, W. H., ‘The Group.asa Stimulus to Mental Activity,” Science, 
N.S. 1910, xxx1, 761-67. 

Triplett, N., ‘‘The Dynamogenic Factors in Pace-making and Competition,” 
American Journal of Psychology, 1897, 1x, 507-32. 

Scherfig, I’. E., Der psychische Wert des Einzel- und Klassen-unterrichtes. 
Leipzig, Dissert, 1882. 

Mayer, A., ‘‘Ueber Hinzel- und Gesamtleistung des Schulkindes,” Archiv fiir 
die Gesamte Psychologie, 1903, 1, 276-416. 

Meumann, E., Haus- und Schularbeit. Leipzig, Klinkhardt, 1914. 

Schmidt, F., ‘‘Experimentelle Untersuchungen iiber die Hausaufgaben des 
Schulkindes,’ Sammlung von Abhandlungen zur psychologische Pddagogie, 
1904, 1, 181-300. 

Moede, W., “‘Der Wetteifer, Seine Struktur und sein Ausmass,” Zeitschrift 
fiir Pdédagogische Psychologie, 1914, xv, 353-68. 

“Einzel- und Gruppenarbeit,” Praktische Psychologie, 1920-21, un, 

71-81; 108-15. 

— Experimentelle Massenpsychologie. Leipzig, Hirzel. 

Allport, F. H., “‘The Influence of the Group upon Association and Thought,” 
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 1920, u1, 159-82. 

Minsterberg, H., Psychology, General and Applied, ch. 20. 

Psychology and Social Sanity, pp. 181-202. 

Cooley, C. H., Human Nature and the Social Order, ch. 8. 











1 Tt is doubtful whether this advantage applies in judging between two clear-cut 
alternatives, such as the question of ‘guilty or not guilty’ which the jury tries to 
settle by discussion. Muinsterberg found an increase in the accuracy of individual’s 
judgments after such a discussion. These results, however, have been contradicted 
by the experiments of Professor Burtt (see references at the end of this chapter). 
_ Further experiment is needed upon the whole question. 


RESPONSE WITHIN THE GROUP 291 


Clow, F. R., ‘‘Cooley’s Doctrine of Primary Groups,’’ American Journal of 
Sociology, 1919, xxv, 326-47, 

Vincent, G. E., “The Rivalry of Social Groups,” American Journal of Socio- 
logy, 1911, xvi, 469-82. 

Smith, S., and Guthrie, E., ‘‘Exhibitionism,”’ Journal of Abnormal Psychology 
and Social Psychology, 1922, xv11, 206-09. 

Burtt, H. E., “Sex Differences in the Effect of Discussion,’’ Journal of Exper- 
imental Psychology, 1920, 111, 390-95. 

Woolbert, C. H., ‘‘Conviction and Persuasion: Some Considerations of 
Theory,” Quarterly Journal of Public Speaking, 1917, 111, 250-64. 

Williams, J. M., Principles of Social Psychology, ch. 2. 

Ordahl, G., “Rivalry: Its Genetic Development and Pedagogy,’’ Pedagogical 
Seminary, 1908, xv, 492-549. 


CHAPTER XII 
RESPONSE TO SOCIAL STIMULATION IN THE CROWD 


The Crowd Situation. A crowd isa collection of individuals who 
are all attending and reacting to some common object, their re- 
actions being of a simple prepotent sort and accompanied by strong 
emotional responses. ‘These conditions distinguish the crowd from 
the co-acting group, since in the latter the attention of each individ- 
ual is usually concentrated upon his own task, and his responses 
are non-emotional habits of a rather complex type. A co-acting 
group whose members are attending to a common stimulus may be 
readily converted into a crowd. The crowd differs from the face- 
to-face group in that its individuals respond to some object com- 
mon to all, while the members of the face-to-face group respond 
entirely to one another. The social stimuli offered by the face-to- 
face group are direct; those afforded by the crowd are contributory. 

Dynamically the crowd is a large-scale suggestion phenomenon. 
It exhibits all three phases of the suggestion process. The people 
are brought together by a common interest preparing them for a 
certain type of action. ‘The harangue of the leader, or similar 
stimulus common to all, increases this preparation to the point of 
breaking forth. The command or first movement of some individ- 
ual toward the act prepared affords the stimulus for release. And 
finally, when act and emotion are under way, the sights and sounds 
of others’ reactions facilitate and increase further the responses of 
each. 

A number of vivid accounts of crowd behavior have been written. 
They have, however, directed attention mainly to the crowd as a 
whole, and so have been descriptive rather than explanatory (cf. 
Chapter I). Individual causation has either been overlooked or 
else subordinated to such metaphors as ‘psychic planes,’ ‘forces,’ 
‘contagion of emotion,’ and ‘crowd self.’ Although valuable as 
pioneer studies, these accounts, in the writer’s opinion, fail to 
reach the heart of the crowd situation. 


RESPONSE WITHIN THE CROWD 293 


PREPOTENT INDIVIDUAL REACTIONS AS THE BASIS 
oF CrowpD PHENOMENA 

Prepotent Drives in Various Crowds. One often reads that in 
violent mobs the elemental cave-man stands revealed. Fear, lust, 
and rage appear in their naked simplicity and barbaric strength. 
Some writers assert that the ‘instincts’ are here released in their 
original, unmodified force. Others, of more romantic bent, believe 
that in the crowd there is a regression to an atavistic or primitive 
type of man. Whatever the manner of explanation, the fact is 
clear that in crowd phenomena the fundamental drives of protec- 
tion, hunger, and sex are the supreme controlling forces. These 
responses (described in detail in Chapter III) are modified in the 
direction of brutal strength rather than that of socialization. In 
the crowd panic in a theater fire the reactions of withdrawal and 
escape occur in their fullest power, unchecked or undirected by 
regard for others. The socialized modifications of these reactions, 
such as withdrawing in a way that does not inconvenience or en- 
danger others, are inhibited because insufficient to cope with so 
overwhelming a stimulus; and the original withdrawal reactions 
accompanied by terror are released in their immediate and most 
vigorous form. 

Food riots among the famished populations of the Central- 
European cities serve as recent illustrations of the release of the 
hunger reaction. A similar epidemic of looting accompanied the 
Boston police strike a few years ago. Old attitudes of envious 
longing for the goods displayed in shops were suddenly released by 
the removal of the pressure of the law. The participants in a 
lynching mob exhibit responses of struggle against the thwarting of 
certain fundamental individual drives. If our own kin are done 
violence, our prepotent habits of love (family and sexual responses) 
are violated or imperiled. Hence the primitive wrathful struggle 
reaction is evoked. It is precisely this response, conditioned by the 
various details of the case as stimuli, which is called forth when we 
learn of this sort of violence done to others. We put ourselves in 
the place of the person who has been outraged, or the near kin of 
that person, and react accordingly. Sympathetically aroused rage 


294 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


at the thwarting of family and sex interests is thus the dominant 
impulse. Indignation of the same type as that aroused in the 
lynching crowd has been widely expressed in regard to political 
radicalism, bomb plots, and reported ‘nationalization of women’ 
in Russia. The defense of life, of property, and of the love inter- 
ests in the family have become public issues precisely because they 
are felt as private demands in the life of each individual. The 
strike riot combines the various elementary drives. There are 
involved the fear of losing one’s livelihood and the angry struggle 
against powers which threater the hunger drive and the love in- 
terests centered in the family of the workman. 

All of the fundamental, prepotent reactions are therefore opera- 

tive in crowds of various sorts; and conversely, all spontaneous, 
mob-like crowds have their driving forces in these basic individual 
responses. 
- Crowds as Siruggle Groups. Crowds then are struggle groups 
of an elementary and violent character. With the exception of a 
few varieties, such as panics and religious revivals, the reactions of 
struggling, fighting, and destroying are their universal phenomena. 
The menacing of the drives of a large number of individuals simul- 
taneously both draws them together and incites them to common 
action. The struggle and the anger may take a mild form such as 
the rivalry for supremacy in a football match; or it may be as violent 
as that of the lynching party. But it is always a struggle of some 
sort against limitation, oppression, and opposition to the free 
satisfaction of original or derived drives. 

It is often said that crowds are creatures of hate and invariably 
demand their victims. There is, however, sufficient psychological 
reason for this. The formation of the crowd springs from the 
collective struggle responses of individuals. The mob members do 
not demand a victim merely in order to shed blood, but to restore 
their thwarted responses to their normal operation. The anger is 
often unreasonable, and the choice of the victim hasty and unjust; 
but the principle stated remains true. If the culprit lives, law- 
abiding people feel the security of their homes and _ property 
threatened. He must therefore be put to death. Crowd vengeance 
is thus a manifestation of the struggle response. 


RESPONSE WITHIN THE CROWD 295 


Individual factors are often neglected in crowd theories. Ac- 
counts of the earlier writers, such as M. Le Bon, suggest that crowd 
phenomena result from the mere fact of aggregation, and that the 
crowd is an enormous detached force to be wielded in any direction 
at the caprice of its leader. The first of these implications may be 
seen in the following quotation: — “the fact that they [the indi- 
viduals] have been transformed into a crowd puts them in posses= 
sion of a sort of collective mind which makes them feel, think, and 
act in a manner quite different from that in which cach individual 
of them would feel, think, and act were he in a state of isolation.” } 
This interpretation puts a premium upon the bare aggregation into 
a crowd, and minimizes the significance of those fundamental 
drives which control the individual. Le Bon drew many of his 
illustrations from the crowds of the French Revolution. Yet he 
failed strangely to realize that it was not the ‘collective mind’ or 
the ‘crowd impulse’ which stormed the Bastille and guillotined 
scores of aristocrats. It was the individual citizen who did this — 
the man who ‘in a state of isolation’ had for many years felt the 
same hatred and cherished the same spark of vengeance and lust 
for freedom that was now bursting into flame in the crowd. Noth- 
ing new or different was added by the crowd situation except an 
intensification of the feeling already present, and the possibility of 
concerted action. The individual in the crowd behaves just as he 
would behave alone, only more so. 

Since individual preparation for response underlies crowd phe- 
nomena, it follows that the course of action is fairly determined 
from the start.’ While the crowd may sometimes be quelled, it can 
scarcely be diverted from its original intent to an opposite one by 
the words of a demagogue. When such a one tries to do this he is 
usually ridiculed or forcibly silenced. If he succeeds in persuading 
many of the individuals to adopt his view, the crowd is dispersed. 
As long as it remains a crowd it must cling to the fundamental 
reactions upon which the individuals have been launched. Crowd 
members are suggestible in the hands of a leader; but the suggestion 
must always be in the direction of some compelling response of the 
individuals. The common notion of the fickleness of crowds must 
certainly be qualified. 

1 Gustave Le Bon: The Crowd, p. 6. 


296 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


It is the individual therefore who is the razson d’étre of the crowd. 
His response both provides the motive for the collective behavior 
and limits its direction. Action is facilitated and intensified 
through the presence of the crowd; but it originates in the drives of 
the individual. This fact is fundamental for our understanding of 
the more subtle phases of the crowd influence to which we now turn. 


RELEASE AND HEIGHTENING OF INDIVIDUAL REACTIONS 
IN CROWDS 

‘Contagion.’ The Induced Emotion Theory. Although the be- 
havior of the individual in the crowd is not different in kind from 
his behavior when alone, it is greater in degree. ‘The excesses to 
which some men go in the license of warfare, the industrial or race 
riot, the lynching mob, and the religious and financial craze, are too 
familiar to require special illustration. Certainly there is some- 
thing in the stimulations afforded by crowd members to one another 
which augments the responses of each in an extraordinary degree. 
This has been recognized for a long time; but attempts to explain 
the mechanism of such interstimulation have been very meager. 
Writers have been content to speak of it in metaphorical terms 
such as ‘conduction’ or ‘contagion of emotion.’ Professor Mc- 
Dougall has advanced his theory of sympathetic induction of the 
emotions as an explanation in this field.!. This theory has already 
been stated and criticized (p. 234). It will be recalled that its main 
hypothesis regards the facial and bodily expression of an emotion 
as a stimulus, arousing, as an instinctive response, the same emo- 
tion in the beholder. If we grant this theory to be a true account of 
the influence of the emotion of one person upon another, the large 
number of such evidences of emotion within the crowd would act 
with combined effect to evoke in each individual an emotional 
reaction of terrific power. 

We found occasion to question the existence of the process of 
sympathetic induction in Chapter X. A further objection to its 
use as an explanation here is that it overlooks the fact of sufficient 
reason for response within the individual himself. We can best 
illustrate the defects of this theory by applying it, with a rival 

1 The Group Mind, p. 36. 


RESPONSE WITHIN THE CROWD ‘297 


theory, to an actual incident analogous to the crowd phenomenon. 
The writer was once pulling two little children, a boy and a girl, in 
a small cart. Upon rounding a curve the cart upset spilling the 
occupants onto the pavement and shaking them up considerably. 
The boy, though bruised and alarmed, was evidently suppressing 
his tendency to cry, when the girl recovered her breath sufficiently 
to set up a loud wail. The boy thereupon broke into crying. Ac- 
cording to the ‘induction theory’ the sight and sound of the weep- 
ing in the girl served as stimuli which aroused the same reactions 
in the boy, because crying tends to follow as an instinctive response 
to the expression of grief in another. 

If we examine the case more closely, however, we shall find two 
essential elements: (1) a common stimulus (the shaking up) pro- 
ducing in both children a preparation for the same response (cry- 
ing); and (2) the release of this setting in the second individual by 
the sight and sound of its occurrence in the first. Both phases were / 
necessary parts of the incident. If the boy had not been spilled 
out of the cart along with the girl, the crying of the latter would 
probably not have caused him to cry. On the other hand, if the 
girl had kept silent, it is unlikely that the bruises received by the 
boy would have set him to weeping. Thus, although an important 
allied effect is seen in the social stimulus expressing the same emo- 
tion, we must recognize the necessity of a reason for the reaction in 
the indiwidual himself. To explain the boy’s behavior as the result 
of ‘sympathetic induction’ of emotion from the behavior of the girl 
is therefore to give false emphasis to the latter. There was already 
in the boy the beginning of the crying reaction (facial expression), 
showing that a reaction strongly prepared was being inhibited. 
The stimulus from the cry of the girl merely aided in breaking 
through this inhibition and releasing the prepared reaction. It 
contributed to the emotional response, but it did not induce it.} ? 

1The mechanism of the release, moreover, was probably not an instinctive re- 
sponse to sounds by the making of similar sounds, but the operation of the condi- 
tioned circular reflex formed early in infancy. The individual tends to respond to 
the sound of others crying by crying himself because he has previously heard similar 
sounds from his own crying while engaged in this act. This mechanism for language 
responses was explained in Chapter VIII. 


2 To show that we have not been too arbitrary in applying Professor McDougall’s 
theory to the incident used let us examine a similar case cited in support of the thes 


298 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


Stated in this way the incident falls definitely under the head of 
social facilitation as defined and illustrated in the preceding chap- 
ter. When the individual is set to respond by a certain act the 
stimulations received from the performance of that act by another 
serve to release the act and to augment it as it is being carried out. 
We have here, in the writer’s opinion, the exact situation existing in 
crowds. We have already seen that there zs a strong incentive 
operating in each individual quite apart from the social stimulations 
present. Given this preparation for action, or the incipient response 
itself, the similar behavior of others provides the release and the 
augmentation of the act and the emotion to a high pitch. 

Social Facilitation in Crowds. ‘The same law, therefore, which - 
explains the social increment in the co-working group is operative 
also in the heightening of emotion and action in the crowd. In 
the former case it was the performance of some complex task which 
was facilitated by the co-working of others. In the crowd it is the 
emotional reaction which is facilitated by the expressive behavior 
(facial expressions, gestures, shouts, hisses, murmurs) of the others. 
In the crowd there is also the attitude for the overt reaction of 
flight or attack, prepared in each individual by the common 
stimulus to which all are attending. This is released and aug- 
mented by the sight of others performing the same act. The pres- 
sure of elbows and bodies as the crowd surges forward effects the in- 
dividual in a powerful manner. It serves not only as a social facili- 
tation, but as a suggestion of the vast size and strength of the mob 
and the necessity for placing one’s self at its disposal. In the 
crowd, even more than in the group, the individual assumes an 
attitude of the most complete submission and conformity. This 


ory by that writer himself (Social Psychology, 8th ed., p. 95, footnote). He reports 
that his child while held in his arms was terrified by a peal of thunder. He himself, 
though normally unaffected by the noise of thunder, felt a distinct wave of terror 
upon hearing the scream of the child. His own fear he considered as a pure case of 
emotion induced in him by the expression of that emotion in another. But the facts 
seem also to fit the following very different explanation. Every one is frightened to 
some degree by sudden loud noises. (Such stimuli produce innate withdrawing re- 
sponses in the infant.) As adults, we have learned to inhibit the full expression of 
fear at the sound of thunder, or at least we rationalize it by ascribing it to the light- 
ning; but the neural setting is there, ready to be released by any allied stimulus 
which occurs in its support. Such an allied stimulus was given by the scream of the 
child. The emotion was therefore not induced, but only facilitated, by its expres- 
sion in another. 


RESPONSE WITHIN THE CROWD 299 


attitude renders him still more susceptible to the effects of social 
facilitation. 

Although social facilitation is rather an observed process than a 
complete principle of explanation, it is certainly a more accurate 
interpretation of the facts than is the induced emotion theory. 
The individual who is ‘one of the crowd’ will go to any extreme in 
carrying out the action he is set to perform. Facilitation can in- 
crease his response almost without limit. Lacking this common 
setting social stimuli have little facilitating value. We may 
summarize the explanation of crowd excitement in the following 
words: By the similarity of human nature the individuals of the crowd 
are all set to react to their common object in the same manner, quite 
apart from any social influence. Stimulations from one another 
release and augment these responses; but they do not originate them. 

There are two objections which might be raised to the statement 
that emotions are not caused by the expressions of one’s fellows, but 
only brought to a higher pitch. First, it is alleged that some par- 
ticipate in the laughter and excitement of crowds when the cause is 
unknown to them. They laugh because they hear others laugh. 
While there are probably individual differences, laughing under 
these conditions is usually a pretense. We usually inquire what 
the joke was, so that we can react with the others. The same 
tendency is noted in experiments in judging facial expressions. 
The attempt is made to guess the situation that would evoke such 
expressions; and upon determining this the recognitive response to 
the expression is immediate and genuine. This well represents the 
crowd situation. The cause of the reactions of the others is known 
because all are responding to the same situation; and this fact gives 
full meaning and stimulating value to the emotional behavior in 
one’s fellows. 

The second objection is that persons not in sympathy with the 
attitude of the crowd members are sometimes won over by stimula- 
tions from the crowd. ‘Those who “come to scoff remain to 
pray.’ A young man who went to a meeting of international 
radicals in a spirit of hostility to their views found himself rising 
with the throng when their brotherhood hymn was sung. Such 
cases, however, are explained by the attitude of submissiveness and 


300 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


suggestibility in the presence of large numbers. In certain indi- 
viduals this attitude leads to conformity of action. It is a set 
for general conformity, however, rather than an induction of specific 
responses by the sight of those responses in others. More ascend- 
ant persons report that their hostility and opposition to a crowd 
they oppose are increased, instead of abolished, by the expressive 
behavior of those about them. 

It seems likely, therefore, that our preceding interpretation of 
crowd excitement holds true in general. The origin of responses is 
determined not by crowd stimuli but by the prepotent trends of the 
individual himself. The increase in the violence of emotion and 
action in crowds is due to the effect of behavior stimuli from others 
in releasing and reinforcing these prepared responses of individuals. 

The Origin and Spread of Social Facilitation. Special Devices. 
The initial movements which release and augment the activity 
of the crowd members usually begin at some center, and spread in 
widening circles to the periphery of the crowd. The process is swift 
and complete. The first to act or express their feelings are the most 
suggestible and uninhibited persons. Ignorant and impulsive in- 
dividuals may thus precipitate an avalanche of social stimulation 
which finally overwhelms the more intelligent and self-controlled. 
The vast power of crowd facilitation may thus be at the disposal of 
the least competent. This is one of the serious charges brought 
against the crowd as a factor in modern social life. 

In our study of group influence we found that the social incre- 
ment was in direct proportion to the overt evidence of the co- 
working of others. The same rule applies to crowd excitement, 
and is practiced by all those skilled in the art of public control. 
Speakers who wish to stir their audiences use special methods for 
eliciting responses of a demonstrative sort, so that an abundance of 
contributory social stimuli may be in evidence. The introductory 
humorous story arouses the individual’s mirth, and facilitates 
through his laughter the laughter of others. Appeals are made to 
emotional rather than to thought responses; for emotional expres- 
sion is the very material of which crowd facilitation is made. A 
crowd cannot be made up of reasoning individuals, because reason- 
ing involves few outward responses through ,which individuals 


RESPONSE WITHIN THE CROWD 301 


stimulate one another. Sentiments common to all are touched 
upon, since these involve expressive postures of stimulating value. 
Revered names are mentioned, and appeals are made in the name 
of justice, brotherly love, and patriotism. Routine activities such 
as reading or singing in concert, and rising and sitting together are 
familiar methods of making individuals more aware of one another, 
and so establishing a receptive attitude toward the expressive 
stimuli later to be evoked. Crowd building thus forms a vital 
portion of the forensic art.! 

Spatial Factors and Circularity in Crowds. Social Behavior in 
the Audience. If a number of individuals attending to some com- 
mon object are arranged side by side in a row, each individual 
(except those at the ends) will receive contributory visual stimula- 
tions from two others, his right- and left-hand neighbors. In a crowd, 
however, the irregular grouping of persons makes it possible for 
each to be affected from all sides, and to receive stimuli, not from 
merely one or two, but from a large number of individuals. This 
fact, a purely mechanical one, must be recognized in explaining the 
heightened reactions of the individual in the crowd. Not only is 
the strength of social facilitation multiplied many fold by this ar- 
rangement; but each person is overwhelmed with greater submis- 
siveness in the observed presence of large numbers. 

Many of the persons, moreover, who stimulate their neighbors 
see or hear the intensified response which their behavior has pro- 
duced in the latter, and are in turn restimulated to a higher level of 
activity. This effect is again felt by their fellows. Thus the effects 
of social stimulation increase themselves by a kind of circular 
‘reverberation’ until an unprecedented violence of response is 
developed (cf. p. 152). The circular effect thus made possible upon 
the individual is multiplied by the number of persons in the crowd 
who are within range of mutual stimulation with that individual. 
It is thus said that in a crowd the strength of excitement increases 
in geometrical proportion to the number of individuals present. 

Public speakers not only aim to produce individual responses of 
value for social facilitation; they give attention also to the spatial 


1 Cf. W. D. Scott: The Psychology of Public Speaking, ch. 12. A number of the 
crowd-building devices mentioned above have been drawn from Dr. Scott’s account. 


302 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


factors influencing the action of such stimuli. Requesting a scat- 
tered audience to sit near the front not only increases the direct 
control of the speaker, but also brings the auditors sufficiently close 
together for their expressive behavior to take effect upon one 
another. Dr. C. R. Griffith has shown that the presence of social 
stimuli on all sides influences the progress of the student in the 
classroom. In lecture classes the average grades of students taken 
from various parts of the room show that the optimum region for 
high averages is slightly forward from the middle row of the class 
and well in from the sides. In the first couple of rows and in the 
rows at the extreme rear, as well as in sections separated from the 
main body by aisles and pillars, the average is distinctly lower. 
The good student sitting in these regions usually redoubles his 
effort and overcomes the handicap by harder work. But the 
indifferent student shows evidence of permanent lowering of marks 
traceable to the lack of the accustomed spur to effort which he re- 
ceived in other classes where he sat nearer the center of the group.! 

Due allowance being made for unfavorable angle of vision, dis- 
tance from the lecturer, and the like, there remains clear evidence 
that these differences in attainment are due to differences in facili- 
tation received from the attentive attitudes, note-taking, and signs 
of interest of those about one. Students in the front row had only 
their immediate right- and left-hand neighbors as sources of con- 
tributory stimulation. Those in the rear row had, in addition to 
these, a large number of stimulations from in front of them; but 
they lacked the ‘feeling of being backed up’ by fellow auditors. 
Though we are not visually stimulated by those behind us, our 
attitudes for work or excitement seem to be considerably deter- 
mined by the knowledge that they are there. Dr. Griffith’s results 
are the more remarkable because the social stimuli afforded by 
listeners to an academic discourse are usually very slight. In the 
excited behavior within the crowd these gradients of social facilita- 
tion must be marked indeed. 

1 These findings reveal the unfairness of always seating students alphabetically. 

2 Instance our uneasiness regarding behavior which takes place behind our backs. 
When sitting with their backs to the middle of the room some persons are so sensi- 


tive to faint sounds made behind them that they believe they have an uncanny 
power, or a ‘sixth sense,’ for feeling the presence of human beings. 


RESPONSE WITHIN THE CROWD 303 


The relation of audience and speaker is in itself a complex 
phenomenon. The individuals respond to the direct stimulation 
of the spoken sounds. Meanwhile the overt components of their 
responses are serving as contributory stimuli to one another 
enhancing the effect of the speaker’s words. The responses are 
further increased by the circular mechanism described above. 
Finally, there is a circular facilitation of response between the 
speaker and the listeners. The ‘amens’ and ‘hallelujahs’ of the 
congregation stir the revivalist to still more eloquent discourse, 
thereby increasing again the volume of religious emotion. The 
cries of the audience provoke ever fiercer denunciations from the 
revolutionary orator. These in turn release fresh torrents of 
emotional response.! Many audiences which begin as groups of 
reasoning, co-acting individuals thus develop into turbulent 
crowds. 

Suggestion and the Suggestion Consciousness in Crowds. The 
social facilitations present in crowd-audiences are a portion of the 
general suggestion process outlined in Chapter X. Before the 
actual suggestion for release of action there is the preparation of an 
attitude for compliance with whatever stimulations to action may 
be received. ‘The prestige of large numbers is probably based on 
the primitive ascendance of direct physical power. We are over- 
whelmed by the press of humanity about us. Individuals there- 
fore upon finding themselves in a crowd adopt an immediate, 
though perhaps unconscious, attitude of yielding to all suggestions 
coming from that source. The commands of the crowd leader are 
multiplied in their weight by the number of auditors upon whose 
ears they fall, for they seem to be coming to us from them as well as 
from him. In this thorough submission of attitude it is not to be 
wondered at that cries such as “ Lynch him!” and “ Kill the scab!” 
touch off the skeletal reactions with which they are integrated (see 
pp. 243-44). 


1 The term ‘polarization’ has been suggested to designate audiences which are 
under the perfect control of the speaker’s words, or whose attention is completely 
riveted upon the speaker. The term, however, is misleading in that it overlooks the 
contributory stimuli from another source, namely from other listeners, which are so 
vital in maintaining the relation indicated. 

Cf. Woolbert, C. H. (reference cited at the end of this chapter). 


304 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


Social facilitation and the submissive attitude inhibit all forms 
of response at variance with the crowd tendency. They also 
narrow the focus of attention upon the suggested act. All mar- 
ginal consciousness, all deliberative or restraining factors, and all 
critical attitudes are inhibited. Even the background of the con- 
sciousness of self, present in many of our more normal moments, is 
obliterated. There is a narrowing of the conscious field to the acts 
and feelings suggested. Emotional factors contribute to this effect. 
Even in a solitary environment an extremely violent emotion 
causes a temporary lapse of personal consciousness. As we say, 
‘we didn’t know what we were doing until it was all over.’ The 
bodily changes in the wild excitements of crowd action evidently 
produce a similar effect. 

The mental condition just described resembles the behavior and 
consciousness of the hypnotized subject. There is little reason, 
however, to assert with some writers, that crowds are hypnotized, 
and that crowd phenomena are due to the ‘subconscious activities’ 
of a ‘dissociated self.’ Hypnotic suggestion phenomena, such as 
collective hallucinations, ‘gift of tongues,’ and the like are some- 
times seen in crowds under long strain of hope or expectation. 
These, however, are to be regarded rather as anomalies due to 
special forms of preparation than as typical instances of suggesti- 
bility in crowds. 

The Conservatism of the Crowd Man. Submission to large 
numbers has a further consequence. It renders individuals in the 
crowd extremely conservative. Conservatism may be defined 
psychologically in two ways. The first way is to regard it as an 
attitude of conformity with one’s contemporaries. This we have 
found to be present in judgments rendered in the group. It is 
carried over into the crowd as conformity, not only of thought and 
belief, but of feeling and overt action. The second conception of 
conservatism is that of adherence to the historically established 
view, or tradition, of the crowd. This attitude is fundamentally 
the same as the other. The reason why we refuse to depart from 
the traditional form of response is largely because, until proved 
otherwise, it is the accepted form. After a sudden change in 
popular feeling or belief conformity to tradition is avoided and 


RESPONSE WITHIN THE CROWD 305 


stigmatized as ‘reactionism.’ It is the opinion of the present 
majority to which the individual adheres. Both forms of conserva- 
tism are thus based upon the attitude of submission to the crowd, 
and both are illustrated by the drift of opinion in such bodies. 
The conservatism of the crowd man is always in relation to his 
particular crowd. However radical a crowd may be from the stand- 
point of the nation at large, its individuals are always conservative 
in relation to the standards it maintains. Their submission to the 
decisions of its majority and to its established principles is absolute. 


ATTITUDINAL AND IMAGINAL FACTORS IN THE CROWD BEHAVIOR 
OF THE INDIVIDUAL 


The Impression of Universality. There are strict limits to the 
assumption, stated on page 301, that the number of stimulations 
brought to bear upon the individual increases in a geometric rela- 
tion to the number of persons in the crowd. If one is surrounded 
by a throng, those near at hand shut out the view of those more 
distant. Barring volume of sound, therefore, a man in the center 
of a crowd of five hundred should receive as many contributory 
stimulations as the man in the midst of a crowd of five thousand. 
It will be agreed, however, that excitement runs higher in the vast 
throng than in the smaller body. We must therefore find some 
explanation, other than facilitation through social stimuli, to 
account for this dependence of crowd excitement upon numbers. 
A number of references have been made to the attitude assumed by 
the individual when he knows that he is in the presence of a large 
company. This situation is more complex than that of the small 
crowd with actual all-to-all contacts, the form of the response being 
largely determined by a central adjustment in the individual’s 
nervous system, as well as by the external stimulations which call 
it forth. In terms of behavior we may say that the individual 
reacts to stimuli which he actually receives as if they were coming 
from an enormously greater number of individuals. In terms of 
consciousness he imagines that the entire vast assembly is stimu- 
lating him in this fashion. He has mental imagery — visual, 
auditory, and kinzsthetic — of a great throng of people whom he 
knows are there, although he does not see them. These people 


306 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


moreover are imagined as reacting to the common crowd object. 
There is vivid visual and motor imagery of their postures, expres- 
sions, and settings for action. We have already seen that there is 
an attitude to react as the other members of the crowd are reacting. 
There must of course be some evidence of how they are reacting in 
order to release this attitude. In default of evidence through 
stimulation (as in case of those concealed from view) mental 
imagery supplies the necessary clues. 

This fact has been well stated by Dr. W. D. Scott in the following 
introspective terms: ‘‘If the speaker has presented an idea in the 
form of a mental image, and I am a member of the crowd, the idea 
then seems to be presented to each individual, for I feel that each of 
them is thinking the thought and seeing the picture just as the 
speaker presented it, and hence it is in a sense presented to me by 
all of those present. Since the idea as presented is assumed by me 
to be accepted by all present, it would seem absurd for me to ques- 
tion it.” ! It will be convenient to speak of the attitude of respond- 
ing as if to a great number of social stimuli and the accompanying 
imaginal consciousness of the crowd’s reaction as the impression of 
universality. 

Social Projection. A further imaginal factor is revealed in the 
behavior of the individual in the crowd. Whence comes this im- 
pression that the entire crowd is accepting and acting upon the 
suggestions given by the speaker? Why does the individual suppose 
that the attitude of those whom he cannot observe is favorable 
rather than hostile to the words uttered? The sight of compliance 
in one’s immediate neighbors in part affords an impression which is 
extended to the entire crowd. The mere fact that the speaker is 
known to have prestige also counts. But a further explanation 
probably applies here. It may be stated as follows: As we catch a 
glimpse of the expressions of the others we ‘read into them’ the 
setting which for the time is dominating us. This tendency is true 
of all perceptions under the influence of a special attitude. We 
ourselves accept and respond to the words of the leader; and therefore 
we believe and act upon the assumption that others are doing so too. 


\ The Psychology of Public Speaking, p. 178. Quoted by courtesy of the publish 
ers, Messrs. Hinds, Hayden and Eldredge, Inc., New York. 


RESPONSE WITHIN THE CROWD 307 


The attitude and imagery involved in this reference of self-reaction 
to others we may call by the figurative term, social projection. 

In crowds social projection and the impression of universality 
work hand in hand. To feel fully the presence of the multitude we 
must realize an identity between their behavior and ours. The 
response which we imagine to be universal is a ‘projection’ of our 
own response. By a circular effect, moreover, this same response 
comes back to us with all the reinforcement that large numbers 
bring. The sequence is therefore as follows: (1) we react to the 
common object of attention; (2) we assume the attitude and belief 
that others are reacting in the same way, and interpret their ex- 
pressions so far as seen with that meaning; and (3) our response is 
increased all the more because of this (assumed) agreement and 
support of the others. 

A few illustrations from daily life will give a clearer notion of the 
imaginal and attitudinal behavior we are discussing. In conversa- 
tion one who makes a telling remark often laughs, raises his brows, 
or shows by other expressions that he is conscious of having deeply 
impressed or startled his interlocutor. Such consciousness may be, 
and often is, wholly fallacious. The speaker is so absorbed in his 
own enthusiasm that he misinterprets the response of the other to 
indicate a fuller sympathetic agreement with his own reaction than 
really exists. This is a special instance of the attitude of social 
projection. The impression of universality, if we may so call it 
when only two are concerned, becomes in this case an dlusion of 
universality. The bashful youth ‘projects’ his intense conscious- 
ness of himself into those about him and thus becomes embarrassed 
or timid. The swaggering individual and the adolescent, holding 
personal conversations in a loud tone of voice, regard others as 
sharing the admiring or sympathetic interest which they feel in 
themselves. Facial expressions and postures of others are often 
wrongly interpreted by us as signs of the same emotions we are 
experiencing. Asa boy the writer was harassed by the belief that 
other people, through some telepathic process, were aware of his 
inmost thoughts. In certain types of insanity unconscious and 
dissociated thought reactions are projected to others, so that the 
patient does not recognize them as his own, but alleges that they 


308 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


are the ideas or accusations of others concerning him. This is 
the ‘projection’ of psychoanalysis. We shall return to it in Chap- 
ter XIV. 

The Crowd Attitudes and Public Opinion. Psychologically 
speaking, ‘the public’ means to an individual an imagined crowd 
in which (as he believes) certain opinions, feelings, and overt re- 
actions are universal. What these responses are imagined to be is 
determined by the press, by rumor, and by social projection. IJm- 
pressed by some bit of public propaganda, the individual assumes 
that the impression created*is universal and therefore of vital 
consequence. Thus the impression of universality is exploited and 
commercialized both on the rostrum and in the daily press. News- 
paper columns abound in such statements as ‘‘it is the consensus 
of opinion here,” ‘telegrams [of remonstrance or petition] are 
pouring in from all sides,” ‘‘widespread amazement was felt,” and 
the like. 

In one of our large cities a great ado was created recently by the 
sensational newspapers in the interests of a reduction in street- 
railway fare. <A petition to the Legislature for lower fares was 
circulated and a large number of signatures secured. The news- 
papers meanwhile magnified the public codperation by editorial, 
article, and photograph. The names of petitioners were affixed, 
not to the pages of a book, but to a roll which when unwound would 
form “a document a mile and a half long”? and which ‘“‘could be 
wrapped around the State House many times.”’ This ‘“‘remarkable 
document”’ was ‘‘rolled on a giant reel,’’ and hauled to the State 
House “in a truck’ (although a single man with a wheelbarrow 
would have sufficed). Notwithstanding this great array of names, 
secured and exaggerated through the illusion of universality, no 
facts or figures were produced in support of legislative interference 
with the existing rate of fare. The whole movement was a piece 
of newspaper and political propaganda. And the “‘remarkable 
document”’ was laid upon the table. | 


1 Some speakers, in order to disarm the critical and avoid argument, prefix their 
statements by ‘‘it is generally conceded that,’’ or similar remarks. This, as 
Professor Pillsbury indicates, is usually an exaggeration, and sometimes a direct 
falsehood; but it produces in the unwary an illusion of universality and consequent 
submission to the opinion of the (imagined) public. Cf. W. B. Pillsbury: The Psy- 
thology of Nationality and Internationalism, p. 201. 


RESPONSE WITHIN THE CROWD 309 


During a recent visit of General Pershing to Boston there ap- 
peared a newspaper article inspired, perhaps, by a discontented 
faction of World War veterans. The following quotation will 
show the attempt of its author to magnify the personal grievance 
to one of civic interest. (Italics are by the present writer.) 

The controversy which has been raging since the refusal of certain YD 
leaders to attend the mayor’s banquet at the this evening [30 out of 
300 invited refused to come] has accentuated interest in the general’s « »ming, 


and Boston 1s perhaps more concerned over the character of the reception ac- 
corded him than in whatever he may do or say while here. 





The reader who is not on his guard is likely to be seriously misled 
by journalism of this character. The allusion to the ‘concern’ of . 
large numbers produces an unthinking belief in the importance of 
the statements made. The artifice, however, seems obvious enough 
when we pause to inquire how the reporter could possibly have 
known what Boston as a whole was ‘concerned over.’ 

The same deception lurks in flaring headlines. Our eye is caught 
by these ‘scare-heads,’ and we say to ourselves unconsciously: 
“This is big news: it is printed large to attract universal attention. 
Hence every one else is looking at it as lam doing. That which 
everybody is interested in must be of great importance.”! And 
we proceed, ready to be duly impressed with what follows. News- 
papers which capitalize the illusion of universality in this way un- 
fortunately have little to say that is fit to read. But the un- 
scrupulous and sensation-hunting journalist has scored in securing 
attention and in controlling a portion of public opinion through 
social projection and the illusion of universality. 


SPECIAL MECHANISMS FOR THE RELEASE OF PREPOTENT 
REACTIONS IN CROWDS 
Allied and Antagonistic Responses. Resolution of Individual 
Conflicts in the Crowd. In our discussion of social facilitation it 
was pointed out that the responses of the individual were augmented 
through the presence of the other crowd members. But the change 


1 We have, of course, no articulate consciousness of this sort upon seeing large 
headlines. These words are intended merely to convey what is implied in our at- 
titude at that moment. 


310 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


is not solely in the speed and strength of reactions; there is a 
qualitative difference as well. In the crowd the individual becomes 
more drastic and violent in carrying out his prepotent impulses 
than under other conditions. Extreme measures such as destruc- 
tion of life and property — measures from which the individual 
would shrink with abhorrence when acting alone — are employed 
and regarded as justified. This release of the crowd man from the 
usual moral restraints forms a special problem to which we must 
now give attention. Let us begin by considering a typical case. 

In a comparatively recent strike of coal miners in a Middle- 
Western State a mob of armed strikers raided the company’s 
property and seized forty or fifty imported, non-union workmen. 
The intention was to force them to march ahead of their column 
exposing them to ridicule and abuse through the streets of the 
mining settlement. Before they had gone very far, however, the 
shouts of rage from the strikers became so violent that those march- 
ing at the head advised the ‘scabs’ to fly for their lives. This they 
did, taking to the fields and woods on either side of the road. One 
of the strikers fired a shot, and immediately the column broke, 
pursuing the fugitives in all directions and shooting them down 
without mercy. 

This massacre was an immediate expression of the struggle 
response unmodified by social considerations. Any object which 
thwarts movement or which opposes prepotent demands for food 
and sex, and for the safeguarding of love interests in the family will 
evoke this sort of struggle. Such were the vital interests of the 
strikers which they felt were at stake in their industrial conflict. 
And the enemies who were, as they conceived, most active in 
threatening these interests were the non-union workmen; hence 
the powerful drive to crush these intruders. We may call this the 
egoistic (or unsocialized) drive. It was present in each striker. 
From the moment the ‘scabs’ were imported there was in each 
striker the neural setting to drive them out, or if necessary to 
destroy them. 

But although each individual previously to this incident had felt 
the desire to attack the intruders, he did not do so. There were 
two reasons for this. The first was fear, that is, the response of 


RESPONSE WITHIN THE CROWD 311 


withdrawing from any contemplated act which would cause him 
still greater suffering through punishment. The second reason, a 
deeper one, was that he had been taught from infancy to respect 
the lives and property of others. Even if there could have been no 
possibility of punishment, it is not likely that any single striker 
would have murdered one of the non-union men in cold blood. 
Long-standing habits of respect for others and aversion to acts 
socially regarded as crimes are too strong for this. We may call 
this restraining attitude the socialized drive. 

One phase of early habit formation is of special importance in the 
present connection. When the child plays with fire, or is other- 
wise careless with dangerous objects he is likely to be hurt by these 
objects themselves. He thus learns to withdraw from acts or 
objects which punish him by the laws of nature. When, however, 
he lies, steals, destroys property, or injures playmates, his elders 
play a necessary part in the punishing process. Social law, rather 
than natural law, will, he soon learns, punish him for these acts. 
It is an absolute rule that in the early stages of this moral training 
other human beings are present and inflict some form of punishment 
accompanied by reproving words and expressions. Withdrawal from 
antisocial acts therefore begins as a prepotent response (with- 
drawal from pain of chastisement) conditioned by the presence and 
reproving behavior of others. As the child grows older teachers, 
playmates, and friends take the place of parents as punishers and 
inhibiters of antisocial conduct. Finally it is the community at 
large, and the imaginal consensus of public opinion, which by 
reproving attitudes forbid the participation in crimes against 
others. Throughout life therefore, as in childhood, the real or 
imagined presence of others and their expressions of disapprobation 
remain the necessary conditions which restrain us. Inhibition of 
misconduct toward others is founded upon social disapproval. 

Tn the heightened emotional facilitation of the mob, such as that 
preceding the massacre of the workmen in our illustration, the ego- 
istic drive of each individual is brought into the sharpest antag- 
onism to this socialized drive. The struggle for satisfaction of 
personal needs is pitted against the powerful habit of regard for law 
and human life. The striker wishes to destroy the non-union 


$12 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


worker; yet he does not wish to destroy him. Since one cannot both 
kill and spare at the same time, a point of tension is reached in the 
crowd at which a slight added stimulus may decide the issue. 

The crucial moment arrives when the first gun is fired or the first 
blow struck. The individual then sees with his own eyes that 
others are delivering the blow that he longs to deliver, and are 
thereby expressing, not disapproval of acts of violence, but the 
strongest kind of approval. In the face of this it is impossible still to 
cling to the imagined disapproval of society at large. The crowd 
in flesh and blood, a more concrete evidence, is immediately and 
unthinkingly substituted for public opinion in general. By this 
stroke the entire support upon which the inhibition of violence had 
rested is cut away. Social disapproval has been converted before 
our eyes into social approval. That which had been an inhibition 
to killing the ‘scabs’ now becomes a facilitation; an attitude an- 
tagonistic to the egoistic drive has become an allied one. ‘The 
drive to kill or destroy now spends itself in unimpeded fury.! 

The Moral Consciousness of the Crowd Man. Justification of 
these acts in the consciousness of the individual follows a course 
parallel with the release of the egoistic drive. All doubt or worry 
as to one’s course of action disappears when one finds one is acting 
with the other members of the crowd. The fact that others approve 
of what one wants to do by doing the same thing themselves gives 
a comfortable sense of moral sanction. The experience of relief is 
like that of the boy who, having gone swimming or eaten the jam 
in the face of the sternest parental injunction not to do so, suddenly 
finds that his mother did not care very much after all. The atmos- 
phere clears in similar fashion when one’s egoistic drives are sanc- 
tioned and released through crowd stimuli. 

The moral consciousness of the individual in mob violence de- 
velops somewhat as follows: (1) “I could do this thing which 1 
want to do as a member of a crowd because no one would observe 
me, and I would therefore escape punishment. (2) Even if I should 
be detected, no one could punish me without punishing all the 


1 A sharp contrast is here presented with the common view that in a crowd all 
personal identity is lost and individuality ‘wilts.’ In the sense of freedom from re- 
straint upon his egoistic drives a man becomes far more individualistic in his behav- 
ior in the crowd than when acting alone. 


RESPONSE WITHIN THE CROWD 313 


others. But to punish all would be a physical impossibility. And 
(3) more than that, it doesn’t seem possible to punish a crowd, 
because that would be making a large number of people suffer. 
And that is unjust: it is the interest of the many which must always 
be safeguarded. Hence (4) since the whole crowd show by their 
acts that they wish the deed to be done, it must be right after all. 
So large a number of people could not be in the wrong. And 
finally (5) since so many people will benefit by this act, to perform 
it is a public duty and a righteous deed.” 

Words are soon found in which to rationalize the injustice of the 
mob’s action, and none of its participants raises a question. ‘‘ They 
got what was coming to them: they tried to steal our jobs,” was 
the remorseless statement of the striking miners as they surveyed 
the bodies of their victims. Where the struggle group is large and 
the impression of universality strong, the sense of moral justice 
is exalted to the plane of the heroic. Members of hooded mobs 
are impressed with the ‘patriotism’ of their self-justified acts of 
violence. The commander who sank the Lusitania received a 
medal expressing the admiration of the German nation. Revolu- 
tionists have put men, women, and children to death upon no 
further charge than that they were (or might have become) 
‘“enemies of The People.” 

Crowd Ethics in Vocational and Fraternal Groups. The formula 
that whatever all the members of the crowd do is right is carried 
over into the various imaginal crowds, or ‘publics,’ to which in- 
dividuals belong. If, for example, a tradesman finds that certain 
practices which he would like to employ, but which are against his 
ethical training, are used widely by his fellow-tradesmen, he is apt 
to reason, like the individual in the crowd: so many do it, therefore 
it must be right. He substitutes his particular. trade-class for 
society at large, just as the crowd member takes the action of a few 
individuals about him for an expression of the entire body politic. 
This impression of universality is, of course, an illusion; for the 
conduct sanctioned carries out what the individuals of the crowd 
concerned wish to do, but violates the interests of the rest of society. 

Class-made morals are one of the greatest enemies to that broader 
view upon which the theory of democracy is based. The ethics of 


314 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


the few sanctions injustice to the many. The reporter will not 
‘write any man up’ unless he refuse to provide the desired informa- 
tion for publication. Should he withhold this, it is right (since all 
reporters follow this practice) to expose him to public abuse or 
ridicule. Religious denominations and fraternal orders show this 
tribal tendency in their moral codes. A double standard of justice 
is set up for the ‘insiders’ and the ‘outsiders’ of the group con- 
cerned. The Bolshevist argues that it is right for him to send 
bombs through the mail, because he does it in the interest of the 
masses (his faction), and the capitalists have usurped all other 
agencies through which the rights of ‘The People’ can be asserted. 
There is, of course, honor among thieves; and even prostitutes have 
their codes of ethics.! 

Martin’s Principles of Crowd Behavior. Mr. E. D. Martin, ina 
suggestive book, The Behavior of Crowds, has applied the Freudian 
psychology to elucidate special mechanisms of release through 
crowd channels.2. The main thesis may be expressed in his own 
words as follows: ‘‘In the crowd the primitive ego achieves its wish 
by actually gaining the assent and support of a section of society. 
The immediate social environment is all pulled in the same direc- 
tion as the unconscious desire.” * And again: ‘‘The crowd is 
always formed for the unconscious purpose of relaxing the social 
control by mechanisms which mutually justify such antisocial con- 
duct on the part of members of the crowd.” 4 

This statement does not differ fundamentally from the account 
we have given above. But through calling attention to repression 
and the unconscious operation of egoistic drives Martin has been 
able to present in a novel fashion many of the characteristics of 
‘crowd behavior.’ The neural antagonism which we have observed 

1The writer knows of a girls’ school, held in a residence building, which was 
burglarized one night, and a number of valuables taken. A few days later the prin- 
cipal received a letter containing the stolen jewelry, and explaining that the burglar 
“never intended to rob ladies,’’ but thought he was in the home of one of those 
“damned idle rich!”’ 

2 This book should be read by every student of psychology or the social sciences. 
The quotations here included are reprinted by courtesy of Messrs. Harper and 
Brothers, publishers. (The Behavior of Crowds. Copyright 1920, by Harper & 
Brothers. All rights reserved.) 


3 Page 35. 
4 Page 231. 


RESPONSE WITHIN THE CROWD 315 


between the egoistic and socialized drives often goes on In uncon- 
scious terms. It resembles that class of neurotic and paranoid 
symptoms studied by modern psychopathology. 

The real motives for the actions of crowd members are not 
recognized, because they are antisocial. There are substituted 
rationalized motives, high-sounding abstract terms, and other 
‘defense mechanisms’ in order to keep up the appearance of high 
and unselfish ideals. Attention, as Martin says, is focused upon 
the abstract and general thus permitting the actual concrete and 
selfish causes to function unconsciously. The changes rung on the 
word ‘liberty’ illustrate this tendency. Whatever the partisan of 
any class may be fighting for, he is apt to fight for it in the name of 
liberty. Radical groups have recently borrowed the time-honored 
slogan, ‘Political Liberty,’ and have converted it into ‘Economic 
Liberty.’ For a man to be free economically would, in the sense 
intended, mean that he would be free to consume as much of the 
wealth of the world as he chose. No one would be able to place a 
curb upon his consumption by securing more goods than he. This 
real motive, obviously primitive and selfish, cannot be admitted in 
these bald terms. A fine phrase, such as ‘Economic Liberty,’ is 
demanded. ‘The crowd members are thus buoyed up by the ex- 
alted fiction that their intent is altruistic and even patriotic. In 
a similar way a group of aid-seeking War Veterans who were trying 
to secure the passage of a bonus bill substituted for the word 
‘bonus’ the more idealistic phrase ‘Adjusted Compensation.’ 

The very existence of the crowd depends upon its members being 
unaware that the crowd principles are only pretenses. The dis- 
guised motive must remain hidden from consciousness, or all sane 
individuals will at once recognize it and the illusion will be dispelled. 
This is the reason for the notorious intolerance of crowds. The good 
crowd man clings to the fictitious crowd slogans as a psychoneu- 
rotic person clings to his defense reactions. The hidden motive, or 
complex, is jealously guarded; and violent anger is shown toward 
all who threaten to discover it. 

The hatred of crowd members Is based upon a similar mechanism. 
By having an enemy to struggle against the crowd man strengthens 
his own cause. He is fighting against injustice and oppression; 


316 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


therefore he is fighting for the right. It does not matter if this 
hatred has to be elaborated as a pretense, so long as it is hatred. 
One of the commonest devices is unconsciously to ‘project’ into 
others the hidden motives that we ourselves possess (cf. p. 307). 
This accomplishes a double purpose: first, it provides some one to 
attack, and secondly, it conceals the true motives the more com- 
pletely by showing how righteously opposed one is to people having 
‘such base purposes.’ The German military party thus charged 
France and England with a conspiracy to conquer Germany and 
restrict her national life thfough control of the seas. The real 
motive behind the charge was the desire of Germany to conquer 
Europe and possess a maritime power equal to that of England. 
One of the favorite practices of present-day radicalism is to make 
itself appear the victim of all manner of oppression. A leaflet was 
recently circulated by the I. W. W. headquarters describing twenty- 
nine ways in which their members had been unjustly persecuted. 
References are frequent in these groups to their ‘economic oppres- 
sors,’ and to their ‘beloved leaders’ who are languishing in prison 
through the injustice of a capitalistic régime. Through hatreds of 
this sort crowd members fortify their belief in the absolute right- 
eousness of the crowd principles. 

Another interesting release which the crowd situation provides 
is an exalted attitude of self-importance. ‘The opening words of the 
conventional public address contain a note of flattery to the audi- 
ence. ‘The privilege of addressing so distinguished a body,’ or an 
equivalent phrase, is so common as to be considered good form. 
The members of the audience always respond favorably to such a 
tribute. It does not offend their modesty or good taste; for each 
one considers that the remark pertains to the crowd as a whole, and 
his own exaltation consists in being one of that remarkable crowd. 
Taking pride in one’s group is a socially justifiable means of feeling 
pride in one’s self. Crowd members for this reason can be cajoled 
with flattery of the most obvious type.! | 

1 The following excerpt from a student’s description of a crowd at a boxing con- 
test will illustrate this point (italics by the present writer): ‘‘Just before the main 
bout the announcer made an appeal for a collection for the ‘starving babies in 


Russia,’ ending with, ‘I am certain the largest collection ever made in the arena will 
be taken here to-night.’ With that a big exalted feeling went through the crowd. 


RESPONSE WITHIN THE CROWD © 317 


It is, of course, true that the principles just described are not 
applicable to all crowds. In many instances there is nothing un- 
conscious about the drives or the conflicts which they engender in 
individuals. In the strike riot, for example, the reactions are of the 
simple, undisguised, prepotent variety. The conflict is ‘out in the 
open’; hence there is no defense against the recognition of motives. 
Yet it must be acknowledged that Mr. Martin has made a valuable 
contribution to the theory of crowd influence. Through his efforts 
many of the long recognized phenomena of behavior in crowds are 
brought before us with a new and deeper significance. 

Summary. The reaction of the individual in the crowd is a 
primitive, unsocialized response. In mob violence it is for the 
immediate satisfaction of the demands of defense, hunger, or sex. 
Most crowds are struggle groups, resisting, often by violence, any 
limitation placed upon the individual members in regard to their 
fundamental needs. ‘The deeds of crowd members are not ration- 
ally controlled, because the thought process in crowds Is used only 
to serve the prepotent interests, and not to direct them. Hence the 
crowd thinking of the individual takes the form of rationalization, 
fine phrases, intolerance, and accusation, reactions which conceal 
the true egoistic nature of the motives at work. Crowd struggle 
requires some one to struggle against. Its normal enemy is the 
hostile crowd or agency which is thwarting the desires or activities 
of the crowd members. In instances where the thwarting is due 
rather to circumstances than to human beings some enemy is 
found, and hatred developed against him in order to justify the 
crowd in getting what its members want by force. 

The heightening of action and emotion in crowds is due largely 
to social facilitation through the expressions and movements of 
others. These movements must be of the same nature as those 
which the individual himself is set to perform or is actually per- 
forming. The attitude of submission to large numbers and con- 
sequent obedience to suggestion help in the release and augmenta- 
tion of the prepared responses. ‘The suggestibility of the crowd 


Every one gave, including the writer, who was affected much the same as the others.”’ 
Note also the excellent illustration of social projection and the impression of univer- 
sality so naively given in this incident. How could the writer possibly know that an 
exalted feeling went through the crowd, or, for that matter, that every one gave? 


di hela! is SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


member is extreme, and his consciousness 1s filled with the suggested 
object or action to the exclusion of all else. Facilitation through 
social stimuli in the crowd is increased by the eliciting of expressive 
behavior from the individuals, and by so arranging them that they 
stimulate one another with maximum effect. Circularity of social 
behavior obtains among the individuals of an audience-crowd and 
between the individuals and the leader. 

Parts of the crowd not actually seen or heard, as well as the 
‘general public,’ are represented by imaginal consciousness and 
attitudinal settings in the individual. We respond as 7f stimulated 
by the present but unseen members of the throng. We thus have 
an ‘impression of the universality’ of a certain response, without 
adequate sensory evidence of its universality. ‘Projection’ of one’s 
own consciousness and attitude into others, with resulting rein- 
forcement in one’s self, is common in such situations. It may lead 
to an ‘illusion’ of universality. 

A result of the submissive tendency of the crowd member is an 
increase in his conservatism. He is reluctant to oppose either the 
present or the past edicts of his crowd. This conformity is further 
maintained by his intolerance of any member who criticizes the 
crowd-principles, or who otherwise threatens the disclosure of the 
egoistic motives they conceal. 

The violence of action in crowds is explained partly by social 
facilitation combined with the removal of individual responsibility. 
The chief mechanism, however, is the converting of social agencies 
which have heretofore been znhibitors of aggressive action into allied 
stimulations which facilitate such responses. Morality and self- 
restraint are acquired through the approval and disapproval of 
society. In the climax of excitement and anger the individual 
substitutes the crowd he is in for society at large. Blows which he 
sees his immediate neighbors strike are considered by him to express 
universal social approval of the deed. The acts of crowds are, 
therefore, regarded by their members as morally necessary and 
right. They are in fact heroic acts; and the abstract principles in 
whose name they are committed are absolute and eternal. 


RESPONSE WITHIN THE CROWD 319 


REFERENCES 


Le Bon, G., The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind. 

Pillsbury, W. B., The Psychology of Nationality and Internationalism, chs. 3, 
One 

Gault, R. H., Social Psychology, ch. 7. 

Martin, E. D., The Behavior of Crowds, chs. 1-6. 

Sighele, 8., La foule criminelle. Paris, Alean, 1892. 

Davenport, F. M., Primitive Tratts in Religious Revivals. 

Scott, W. D., The Psychology of Public Speaking, chs. 10-12. 

Ross, E. A., Social Psychology, ch. 3. 

McDougall, W., The Group Mind, ch. 2. 

Bogardus, E. 8., E'ssentials of Social Psychology (2d ed.), ch. 11. 

Tarde, G., L’opinion et la foule, chs. 1, 2. 

Sidis, B., The Psychology of Suggestion, part 11. 

“The Source and Aim of Human Progress,” Journal of Abnormal Psy 
chology, 1919, xiv, 91-143. 

Galsworthy, J., The Mob (a drama). 

Griffith, C. R., “A Comment upon the Psychology of the Audience,”’ Psycho- 
logical Monographs, 1921, xxx (no. 186), 36-47. 

Woolbert, C. H., “The Audience,” Psychological Monographs, 1916, xxi (no. 92), 
36-54. 

Shroeder, T., “Revivals, Sex and Holy Ghost,”’ Journal of Abnormal Psychol- 
ogy, 1919, xiv, 34-47. 

Clark, H., “The Crowd,”’ Psychological Monographs, 1916, xx1 (no. 92), 26-36. 

Cooley, C. H., Human Nature and the Social Order, ch. 10. 





CHAPTER XIII 
SOCIAL ATTITUDES AND SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS 


General Social Attitudes. In a foot-race the runner becomes 
‘set’ on his mark ready to spring forward at the signal. At the 
same time all possible movements not allied to this act are in- 
hibited. A certain neural and muscular adjustment is established 
which determines the character and speed of the following response. 
We have likewise found on several occasions that to understand 
social behavior we must consider not only the stimulus and response, 
but also the preparations for response set up in the neuro-muscular 
system. Upon coming into the group or crowd attitudes are 
assumed for characteristic modes of behavior. Certain types of 
action are thus determined, and others inhibited, at the start. We 
are set, for example, to conform in our reactions to the conduct of 
the others. In thinking, we expand our range of associations to 
objects about us; and we tend to impress others with our conclu- 
sions, rather than prove them in a logical fashion. We set our- 
selves for rivalry, auto-competition, or codperation, and are affected 
accordingly in our work. We even assume an attitude to react as 
if certain imagined social stimulations were present. In all these 
instances the attitude, or preparation in advance of the actual 
response constitutes an important determinant of the ensuing 
social behavior. Such neural settings, with their accompanying 
consciousness, are numerous and significant in social life. The 
present chapter will be devoted to their study. 

There is a general social attitude more universal and permanent 
than the ones we have just mentioned. The latter refer to particu- 
lar tasks or situations in which we mingle with others. We have, 
however, a prepared set for responding in the presence of people as 
such. The mere presence of a fellow being determines us to a more 
selected and controlled group of reactions than when in the freedom 


1 For an additional account of attitude, review the discussion of suggestion in 
Chapter X. 


SOCIAL ATTITUDES 321 


of solitude. We must refrain from taking up the whole road or 
from monopolizing the comfortable seats. We tend to perform 
small services of a polite sort, and perhaps to communicate briefly 
with our fellows. Certain barriers are set up against the un- 
restrained use of language or emotional expression. Primitive 
tendencies in regard to sex and other matters for which convention 
demands privacy are held in abeyance. In short we adopt a bear- 
ing of courteous, socialized dignity; and this attitude determines the 
character of the things we do or say.! 

This complex attitude is seldom present in consciousness, but it 
may be readily verified by the following common experience. If, 
after entering a room and going about our affairs under the im- 
pression that no one else is present, we chance to look over in a 
corner and see some one sitting, we are startled often to the point 
of exclamation. This starting is not merely the effect of the unex- 
pected; for it is often natural te suppose that another person might 
be in the room. It is due to the sudden occurrence of the stimulus 
for assuming the general social attitude (inhibitions, controls, etc.) 
mentioned in the preceding paragraph, and to the neural conflict 
with the freer reactions already in progress. The abrupt shifting 
of motor settings is disconcerting. In such a situation we often 
reflect hurriedly upon what we have just done in order to assure 
ourselves that it was not undignified, unconventional, or otherwise 
at odds with the general social attitude. Preparation for response 
to persons, as distinct from response to things, is therefore funda- 
mental in behavior. 

Attitudes toward Specific Groups. Upon entering the presence of 
various groups we assume specific attitudes which control our 
responses in appropriate ways. Words heard in church arouse in us 
altogether different responses than the same words heard upon the 
street or in the club. Our immediate personal settings adopted in 
primary groups are inhibited by the formal attitude assumed when 
in a parliamentary body. Weare set to react to the book agent in 

1 In conversation we often experience an emotional tension, a kind of ‘visceral 
glow,’ and a hyperkinetic activity level. We feel that we have been ‘playing up’ to 
the social environment. A sudden kinesthetic drop in tension is thus felt when the 


guests have departed, or when we are walking with some one and a parting of the 
ways abruptly ends an animated conversation. 


322 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY — 


a manner very different from our reaction to a social caller. Agents 
sometimes capitalize this fact by simulating a caller at first, thus 
establishing in us an attitude of friendliness from which it is difficult 
for us later to withdraw. Our teachers, ministers, colleagues, 
merchants, and servants all derive their impressions of us from 
distinct attitudes we assume toward these classes respectively. 
We ourselves feel that it would be highly improper for us to con- 
fuse these attitudes. These varying aspects of our behavior are 
sometimes called different ‘social selves.’ The term ‘self’ thus 
employed is, however, vague and misleading; for it is not a self 
whose conduct is here observed, but only a segment of our habitual 
attitudes and reactions. 

Self-Expressive Social Attitudes. There is a fairly universal 
readiness to communicate to others thoughts or feelings which we 
regard as significant. We are usually aware that the information 
will produce a sensation, create a laugh, impress the hearer with 
our own importance, or otherwise control the reactions of our fellows 
(cf. p. 287). Differences in personality are of course operative in 
this reaction-getting tendency. Ascendant, expansive, and rival- 
rous students speak up continually in class, while the more submis- 
sive often want to do so but dare not. 

The same attitude exists when the group is not immediately 
present. When we have a bright idea or think of a joke we wish to 
go and tell some one. The scholar often meditates upon putting 
his thoughts before the public in an article or book. We want to 
see the direct effect of our action upon others. If we are of the 
day-dreaming sort, we are apt to imagine that our words and deeds 
are convincing others or evoking the plaudits of the throng, and in 
that way derive an innocuous satisfaction. A familiar example of 
self-expression is the annotating of one’s books with critical com- 
ments. In many cases the attitude is again as if the author were 
there to see, and the mental imagery is that of orally telling him 
what one thinks. A student writes his views in library books, not 
only as a reaction to the author, but to impress other students who 
may later read the same book. Later on another student writes his 
comment below, ridiculing not the author but the first commenta- 
tor. Then follows another, the thought meanwhile degenerating 


SOCIAL ATTITUDES 323 


to a personal level. No actual contact is made by any annotator 
with any other; but social attitudes and imagery are sufficient to 
bridge the gap. In every college library may be found textbooks 
embellished with such anachronistic conversations. 

In this connection should be mentioned the writing of names and 
personal views in public places. We long also to place our mark 
upon tops of high towers or mountains, or in distant historic spots. 
Books, ‘benefit blankets,’ and sofa cushions are autographed by us 
upon request. ew people object to recording their names in the 
visitors’ register at places of public interest. 

Attitudes toward Specific Persons. In addition to the general 
social attitude and the attitudes toward different groups or classes, 
we show also prepared responses toward specific individuals. 
Whereas we behave toward all chairs in about the same manner, 
and have certain common reactions for all dogs or all horses, we 
possess for each person of our acquaintance a highly specialized 
pattern of responses. The person himself, and the overt behavior 
traits of his personality, comprise a unique group of stimulations, 
evoking from us a reaction pattern different from our response to 
any other individual. One man compels our respect, admiration, 
and submission to his suggestions. Another arouses hatred and 
aversion, but also fear. Still another makes us contemptuous, or 
by his weakness invites our own responses of expansion and self- 
display. Some persons we must compel, some we seek to win, and 
others we strive merely to impress. One individual is our rival, 
another the object of our amorous desire, another our sympathetic 
confidant or advisor, and another is the one with whom we are most 
likely to stop and exchange jokes. 

Toward no two persons are these behavior patterns identical. 
We must realize also that this personal behavior is represented, like 
other social reactions, by an advance preparation. There is a 
complex attitude which we assume upon coming into the presence 
of a particular acquaintance. We have become set to react to just that 
person by responses similar to those described above. 

Recognition of a person is the assumption of just such a specific 
social attitude. We recognize an individual when we know how. 
on the basis of past experience, to react to him; that is, when we 


324 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


set ourselves for a specific pattern of reaction. Recognitive atti- 
tudes are often assumed with amazing swiftness, and upon the 
basis of the slightest sensory cues, such as shape of the back of the 
head, stoop of the body, or hang of the clothes. Mistakes in rec- 
ognition are therefore frequent. When on the street we some- 
times think we see a certain acquaintance coming and then avert 
our eyes until within speaking distance. If we have made a 
mistake in the person, we then discover it suddenly end when face 
to face with the individual. The effect is generally disconcerting, 
and we sometimes have an» embarrassed consciousness that the 
other is aware of our confusion (social projection). The unpleas- 
antness of this experience is largely due to the fact that as we drew 
near we were unconsciously assuming a specific attitude for greeting 
the supposed acquaintance. These prepared reactions were then 
suddenly blocked by discovery of the error; hence the visceral 
outlet in emotional confusion. 

Another evidence of specific social attitudes is seen in the person- 
ality adjustments of correspondence. A letter written for one 
person by another never sounds exactly as it would if the former 
had written it. Apart from content, apart even from style, there 
are subtle modes of address, fine shadings between command and 
request, touches of familiarity and jocularity which are peculiar to 
one’s relation to a specific correspondent, and which no amanuensis 
can duplicate. 

Attitudes based upon the Behavior of Others toward us: The 
Social Self. We have so far discussed but one side of the attitudinal 
relations of individuals. It must not be forgotten that in social life 
the response to one’s fellows forms a stimulus to which they in turn 
respond. Consequently each person toward whom the individual 
has prepared responses has also definite attitudes toward him. It 
makes a great deal of difference to us, moreover, what sort of atti- 
tudes our fellows assume. We strive to build up in them those 
settings which we wish them to have toward us. Furthermore, when 
such attitudes are established we strive to keep them as they 
are. 

_ We are hemmed in in our behavior by the manner in which others 
show they expect us to behave. We contribute to charities, enlist 


SOCIAL ATTITUDES 325 


for military service, and attend church largely because our associ- 
ates expect us to, or because we want them always to assume that 
we shall react in a charitable, patriotic, or pious manner. Stated in 
introspective terms, we are conscious of what we infer to be in the 
consciousness of others concerning us. Our consciousness of our- 
selves is largely a reflection of the consciousness which others have 
of us. This introspective phase of self has been aptly termed by 
Professor Cooley the ‘‘looking-glass self.”’ We shall refer to it 
hereafter as the social self. 

My idea of myself is thus largely my neighbor’s idea of me, or 
rather my own idea of my neighbor’s idea of me. To this we may 
add that ‘my idea of my neighbor’s idea’ is usually that which I 
want my neighbor to think; and hence may be an illusory social 
projection, a mental image rather than a reality. In this case the 
social self is the self which we wish and assume others to think we 
possess. ‘The inter-relation of social attitudes is thus both complex 
and vital. Attitudes of others toward us whether real, supposed, 
or only wished, control both our self-consciousness and our personal 
conduct. 

Behavior determined by the attitudes of others towards us may 
be conveniently illustrated under two heads: establishing the social 
self, and maintaining it. They will be discussed in order. 

Building up Attitudes in Others toward us. Individuals differ 
widely in their craving for the esteem of society. In some, this 
drive is so strong as to lead to superficiality and posing. This is 
the type who ape the standard of living of the more wealthy, who 
dress for display beyond their means, and who feign superiority to 
menial work. Competition in the pursuit of fashions takes the 
place of a just sense of values. The aim is to impress and dazzle 
the throng without caring whether the throng is refined or vulgar, 
intelligent or stupid.!. Others strive to build their social selves 
upon a worthier foundation. The good opinion is sought of those 


1 This tendency is well satirized in Synge’s drama, The Playboy of the Western 
World. A young vagabond, running away from home, comes into a strange country 
and gains a kind of prestige among the simple-minded rustics through the rumor 
that he has murdered his own father. He enjoys this réle of outlaw hero until the 
irate father himself appears upon the scene. In order to maintain his prestige 
(social self) in the minds of the peasants he sets about, though unsuccessfully, to 
commit the murder in earnest. 


326 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


who count; and this may indeed be a limited class. Ideals of 
character are placed ahead of material display. The effort is to 
merit the esteem and reputation for culture which they wish to 
establish in the minds of their fellow men. Ambition for merited 
renown and intellectual leadership are thus constructive drives in 
the personality. 

In most persons the building of the social self is a mean between 
the two extremes described above. Avoiding vulgar ostentation, 
we nevertheless pose a little. We are careful editors of our own 
narratives, elaborating the passages in which we shine, and censor- 
ing or extenuating the actions in which we appear to a disadvan- 
tage. This we do without consciousness of mendacity, distortion, or 
disingenuous motive. We believe for the time being that we are as 
we wish to have others see us. 

The fact that individuals differ in the kind of social selves they 
achieve points a moral often overlooked. ‘This moral is that our 
social self really originates in our own efforts to establish opinions 
and attitudes regarding us in others. ‘The traits and possessions 
which we ourselves value we desire to place in the foreground of the 
consciousness of others in their evaluation of us. We may succeed 
in this, or only imagine that we succeed; but in any case our social 
self is no mere passive reflection of us from the minds of others. It 
is a social projection of our own personal ideals and aims. Our 
behavior accordingly is reinforced in the same direction, and objec- 
tive personality traits become ingrained more deeply in response 
to the attitudes we seek to make others assurne toward us. 

Maintaining the Attitudes of Others toward us. The most re- 
markable fact about the social self is that once established it passes 
beyond the control of the individual. The attitude which others 
have toward us, that is, their expectation that we shall react in a 
given manner, tends to compel us to react in that manner. We 
feel that we must live up to our social self, or in some cases, per- 
haps, live down to it. The war hero and the famous man feel the 
necessity of playing an exalted réle in their home town, because the 
consciousness of their achievements is perpetually evident in the 
attitudes of their fellow townsmen toward them. The girl who has 
lost her reputation for chastity finds the downward path an easy 


SOCIAL ATTITUDES . 327 


one, because the community shows that it expects further lapses in 
her conduct. 

In cases where there is a discrepancy between the social and the 
actual self every effort is made to keep up pretenses. We cherish 
our hypocrisies. We dread disillusionment sometimes more than 
death itself. This reluctance is naturally strongest where the 
disclosure would lower us in the public estimation. The struggle 
here is often a conflict within the individual himself. Subjectively 
it is a craving for honesty with one’s self and the world struggling 
against the desire for social approval. This conflict has formed the 
theme of numerous works of literature. Ibsen’s Pillars of Society 
and Zangwill’s Plaster Saints are familiar examples. 

When the dénowement finally comes and the sin has found us out 
the social self collapses like a ‘house built upon the sands.’ The 
protagonist is no longer buoyed up nor constrained to high pur- 
poses by the admiring attitudes of his fellowmen. Their good 
opinion and their expectation of greatness has changed into an 
expectation of meanness. There springs up in the individual’s 
consciousness a new and baser social self. Unfathomable remorse 
and self-abasement form the climax of such a drama. 

The foregoing considerations explain why repentance comes 
rather upon discovery than upon the actual commission of the 
misdeed. The experience commonly designated as ‘conscience’ 
is practically identical with consciousness of the social self. As 
long as the behavior of others toward us is of a respectful type it is 
difficult for us to feel ourselves worthy only of reproach. Dis- 
closure makes us realize that attitudes toward us express no longer 
respect, but condemnation; and thereupon we feel the emotion of 
shame. A public official may without qualms of conscience hold 
his office and enjoy the respect of all while concealing a crime he has 
committed. As soon as a public disclosure is made, though it be 
years later, he resigns from his office with a sudden, overwhelming 
consciousness of guilt. 

A more hopeful phase of the shattering of the social self is the 
possibility that it may be rebuilt upon a surer foundation. The 
collapse of undeserved prestige is a necessary condition for its 
reconstruction upon a basis of genuine merit. The noblest char- 


$28 | SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


acters are those whose social selves are laid upon a foundation of 
‘one hundred per cent’ truth. Just as one lie leads to another, so 
hypocrisy widens the gap between character-fact and character- 
pretense, until nothing but the total collapse and shame of dis- 
covery can clear the way for a new start. In youths this process 
forms one of the most useful means of character building. In the 
early and plastic years the response to attitudes of others involves 
the formation of principles of conduct which time cannot alter. 

The desire to preserve one’s status in the attitudes of associates 
is not limited to a defense against the lowering of reputation. 
Even though the change of attitude would be in no way deroga- 
tory, we still hesitate to break up old habits of others toward us. 
If a person has for some time been under a wrong impression con- 
cerning us, we have a curious dislike in regard to correcting that 
impression.! It is unpleasant to disturb settled relationships and 
ways of regarding us, even for the sake of vindicating ourselves. 

The same tendency shows itself in the reluctance to alter arrange- 
ments of our business and social life. Any sudden change in our 
person or habits which may disturb the expectations of our fellows 
is distasteful. The man who has recently shaved his moustache 
feels notoriously ill at ease until his friends have become accus- 
tomed to his altered appearance. When we have prepared for de- 
parture on a trip and have said farewell to our friends we do not 
like to meet them again before we start. It is awkward and even 
embarrassing to have to say good-bye a second time. Since our 
friend has considered us gone, at least so far as he is concerned, it 
seems inappropriate for us still to be present. A similar awkward- 
ness is felt in making any sort of unexpected appearance before 
another. Some are loath to make calls without previous intima- 
tions. The guest feels more comfortable when announced or pre- 
ceded by his visiting card than when making an unheralded en- 
trance upon his host. 

In almost every community there are long-standing enmities 
in which the original dispute has been forgotten, but the persons 


1 Those who have been mistakenly reported as dead, and duly mourned, have 
been reluctant, both in truth and fiction, to upset everybody by ‘coming to life.’ 
Numerous plots in fiction have been based upon the failure to correct mistaken 
identities. 


SOCIAL ATTITUDES 329 


remain estranged merely because each is too proud to “ break the 
ice.’ Each party to the quarrel feels that the other expects him to 
behave as an enemy; and so he plays the hostile réle until it be- 
comes a part of his social self. In more temporary situations similar 
behavior is observed. Our facial expression and bearing sometimes 
assume a character to accord with the way in which others are 
at the moment regarding us. If we realize that we are suspected, 
although we may be perfectly innocent of the charge, we often find 
ourselves putting on a ‘hang-dog’ look, and even having for the 
moment a consciousness of guilt.1 When some one expresses 
admiration for our courage we cannot avoid swaggering a little 
though we know the praise may be unwarranted. When some one 
plies us to divulge a secret which we are supposed to possess, but 
which in reality we know nothing about, it is hard to keep from 
assuming a wise and knowing expression. Responses such as these 
are immediate and involuntary. And, what is strangest of all, we 
have the characteristic consciousness for the time, of possessing the 
traits, the knowledge, or the status, which others are attributing to 
us, and this in spite of our certain knowledge that the attribution is 
false. Surely the control exercised by the attitudes of others upon 
behavior and consciousness is most pervasive and fundamental. 

Social Consciousness. We may define social consciousness as 
the consciousness accompanying social attitudes and overt re- 
sponses to stimuli. It is the awareness of the various social relation- 
ships we have been discussing. Considered in detail, it embraces 
the following: (1) consciousness of attitudes and of emotional and 
overt behavior toward others and toward society at large; (2) per- 
ceptual consciousness of how others are responding to this behavior 
of ours, or imagery of how they would respond if present; (3) con- 
sciousness, either in sensory or imaginal terms, of the permanent 
attitudes or overt behavior of others toward us (social self); and 
(4) sensory or imaginal consciousness that others are reacting to 
the same object or situation that we are, and that their response is 
similar to or different from our own. 


1A lady of the writer’s acquaintance received an anonymous birthday gift and 
proceeded to accuse her sister of having sent it. The latter immediately assumed a 
guilty expression, and remarked that she knew she looked guilty, but the truth was 
she had not sent the present. 


530 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


The pattern of social consciousness is complex and subtle. Be- 
cause of its omnipresence in our lives it is seldom clearly distin- 
guished from other conscious data. It seldom attains focal clear- 
ness (that is, occupies our attention directly), but forms a vague 
background of daily experience, giving a social tinge to our feelings, 
thoughts, attitudes, and acts. It is so fleeting that it is difficult even 
for the trained introspectionist to analyze. A quick thrill of elated 
emotion is felt when we are the object of admiration, combined with 
fragmentary imagery or sensations of the admiring and submissive 
expressions of those about us. When tempted to commit some un- 
worthy deed, a vague and fleeting panorama of mental imagery 
sometimes appears, composed of disapproving expressions of our 
fellow beings. ‘This may be combined with the kinesthetic ex- 
perience of hanging our heads or cowering in shame. ‘The im- 
pression of universality in the crowd experience, or in merely read- 
ing or contemplating matters of public interest, is carried in terms 
of social mental imagery. The awareness of our ‘position in the 
community,’ our ‘sense of personal dignity,’ and our ‘honor,’ all 
involve imaginative, emotional, and attitudinal consciousness of 
our relations with our fellow men. These are a few of the more 
typical forms of social consciousness. ! 

The Genetic Development of Social Consciousness and the 
Social Self. Although all accounts of the self and social con- 
sciousness of the infant must be speculative, there is good reason to 
believe that development in this respect is gradual. Various stages 
may be roughly distinguished. The first experience of self is 
probably gained through the earliest situations in which the baby 
reacts vigorously to the world about him. The prepotent re- 
sponses, combined with the protopathetic emotion (p. 93), afford 
a basis for such awareness. Hunger is not an abstract, deperson- 
alized experience; it is the baby’s own hunger. Struggling against 
obstacles to movement brings to consciousness an array of emo- 
tional and kinesthetic elements associated with the effort of the 
child to free himself. Such elements no doubt provide a distinct 
consciousness of self in opposition to the thwarting agencies. 


1 Other forms have already been described, such as the consciousness in the fol- 
lowing: social facilitation (p. 279), projection (p. 306), rivalry (p. 281), suggestibility 
in crowd behavior (p. 304), moral reactions in crowds (pp. 312-13), and egotism in 
crowds (p. 316 and footnote). 


SOCIAL ATTITUDES 331 


This self, however, is necessarily limited to the bare activities in 
operation. The child distinguishes only between this struggling, 
hungry self on the one hand, and the ‘not-self’ or environment on 
the other. He does not distinguish between social and non-social 
objects in this environment. But before many months have elapsed 
the child’s behavior shows a clear differentiation. Social objects 
are recognized and responded to in a manner quite different from 
the behavior toward non-social objects. The anger and hunger 
cries are used more specifically to control human beings. There 
appears also a new laryngeal response, the ‘hurt cry,’ as a remon- 
strance against oppression and an appeal for sympathy (see p. 181). 
Pleasurable responses such as those of feeding and responses to 
caressing and tickling are conditioned by human facial expres- 
sions, tones, and words which accompany these acts. The infant 
therefore adds these associated social impressions to the general 
consciousness of his own bodily states and activities. 

With further development these responses to social stimuli and 
special controls of others acquire a new significance. Professor 
Baldwin and others have pointed out a stage in which the child is 
conscious of those about him, not only as sources of important and 
pleasant stimulation, but as selves similar to his own. Expressive 
behavior now acquires for him a new meaning. He is aware of 
what it means in terms of his own thoughts and feelings when he 
makes such expressions himself. The mechanism involved here 
is probably that of sympathy, or socially conditioned emotional 
response, described in Chapter X. Broadening of experience has 
also made the child aware that various states of feeling and emo- 
tion follow upon certain types of situations. The child who ts 
familiar with the pain of a burn can sympathize with the same 
feeling when he sees another burned and observes the expression of 
pain. ‘There is thus developed an awareness of an environment 
composed of selves similar to hisown. This stage marks a distinct 
advance in the richness of the self-experience. It has been aptly, 
though figuratively, called the ‘ejective stage’ of self-conscious- 
ness.! 


1 One of the earliest signs of this stage is seen when the child is affected by the 
simulated crying of its parent. The sound of weeping, similar to that made by the 


$32 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


Hjective consciousness is of fundamental importance in human 
society. Its possession, according to Professor Washburn, not 
only distinguishes the child from the asocial infant, but places the 
social psychology of man upon a different plane from that of the 
lower animals. Instead of responding, like the latter, merely to 
the overt acts of his fellows, man is able to respond by sympathetic 
reaction to the evidences of their thought and feeling. It is pos- 
sible therefore to establish permanent attitudes for .our behavior 
toward others, attitudes based upon a standing knowledge of how 
others habitually feel and think concerning various matters. 
Upon ejective self-consciousness is founded therefore that stable 
regard for others which is the very basis of social life. 

The development of awareness of the social self forms an interest- 
ing chapter in the history of the child. After a realization has 
come to him that the other members of the family are real selves, it 
is a short step to regarding himself as one of the family group and 
as a self recognized by the other selves just as he recognizes them. 
Language encourages this point of view, for the child is often ad- 
dressed by his own name used in the third person rather than by 
the pronoun ‘you.’ (For example, ‘“‘ Does Helen want to play with 
her doll?”’ Or, “John is a naughty boy.” ) The child thus refers 
to himself by name (or sometimes by ‘you,’ when this form has 
been used in addressing him) long before he uses the pronoun ‘I.’ ! 
This use of his own name is to be regarded not merely as a sub- 
stitute for ‘I,’ but as an evidence that he is aware of himself largely 
as others see him. If he has been the object of continual parental 
admonition and concern, this tendency will of course be more 
pronounced. The writer’s son at the age of three would often 
scold himself and deprecate his own conduct while at the same 
time performing the forbidden act. Examples such as the follow- 
ing were common: “Santa won’t bring you any toys if you squeal 
like that’’; or, while riding on his tricycle, “If you fall off, Edward, 


child himself, has become a conditioner of the grief emotion which it accompanies. 
The response of the child to the pretended hurt cry of the parent is at first astonish- 
ment and then sympathetic grief. 

! Since the word ‘I’ is not employed by elders in indicating the child, its use has to 
be learned by inference from its use by others to mean themselves. For the child to 
refer to himself as ‘I’ is therefore a probable indication that the elective stage of self- 
consciousness has been reached. 


SOCIAL ATTITUDES 333 


you'll hurt my knee”; and after tasting sour milk against his 
mother’s advice, “‘Now, I told you that was sour.” Evidently a 
large portion of the child’s consciousness of himself is made up of 
the expressions used toward him by others. His self is largely a 
social self. 

With further growth the discrepancy between the social self and 
the real self diminishes. Not only is the child aware of himself as 
his parents see him; but he wants to be aware of himself as they 
wish him to be. He refrains from the forbidden act instead of 
merely verbally abjuring it. The social self and the real self 
coalesce, and he becomes socialized. In this way the family, the 
church, and the school unite in building up the social self of the 
child in accordance with the ideals for which these institutions 
stand. Throughout life the individual carries with him the image 
of himself which he retains from the primary, face-to-face groups 
in which he was reared.! 

Some General Aspects of Social Consciousness. ‘The social 
consciousness accompanying contributory social stimulation offers 
a few points worthy of notice. We have already discussed the 
awareness that others about us are reacting as we are to a common 
stimulus, an awareness which is present in the impression of uni- 
versality. Social consciousness of this sort arises whenever we are 
confronted by an object or situation which we realize at the same 
time is stimulating others. Printed slogans and public appeals of 
all sorts attain suggestive power because of the prestige of large 
numbers which comes into the individual’s consciousness as he 
realizes that thousands are reading and reacting to these appeals 
as he is doing. War posters exerted a powerful influence through 
attitudes of this sort. The splendid codperation which existed 
during the war reflected this consciousness of each that others were 
making patriotic sacrifices, and were expecting the same of him. 
The soldier as he marched in line was conscious of the others 
marching about him, of the fact that each was drilled as he was to 
execute precise movements upon command, and that each was 
marching along for the same purpose and toward the same goal 
as he. 

1 Cf. R. H. Gault (reference cited at the end of this chapter). 


334 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


One of the laws of such social consciousness is that it is par- 
ticularly strong when a command is given or when the group as a 
whole is directly addressed. If the speaker makes a personal appeal 
directly to his audience, a pleasantly exalted feeling is aroused 
in each individual. Each is impressed with the fact that every 
other is being addressed; and through thus calling the individual’s 
attention to the group as a whole the social consciousness of each is 
increased. Physical contact, touching elbows, holding hands (a 
practice followed in some revival services), rising or singing in con- 
cert, and similar measures tend to produce the same effect upon 
the social consciousness of the individual. 

Similar in effect to direct address is the giving of instructions and 
commands to a group drilled for the purpose. The writer can 
remember how at military training camp commands shouted by 
the officer were followed by vivid consciousness that the other 
soldiers were all hearing and obeying in the same manner as the 
writer. The change from marching in route order to marching 
at attention brought a tremendous experience, kinesthetic and 
visual, of fitting in precisely with a great body of comrades who 
marched as one man. In executing the manual of arms this ex- 
perience was particularly vivid, especially when the drill was con- 
ducted in entire regimental front. The tones of the Colonel’s voice, 
faint in the distance, were impressive because of the vastness of the 
group upon whose ears they fell. Although the writer could see 
only a few men on his right and left, his imagery of long lines of 
troops extending far into the distance on either side, all executing 
the movements in unison with himself, is still fresh in his mind. 

As a final example of the social consciousness we may mention 
that solemn and beautiful ceremony of the American Army, retreat. 
Standing at attention each soldier is proud to feel himself as one of 
an army and nation whose flag and whose anthem are thus to be 
honored. The impression of universality seems to each soldier to 
render his behavior a part of the response not only of his regiment 
but of the entire army, and beyond that of the nation at large, its 
ideals and its power. The exalted feeling of a participant in this 
ceremony is well described by Professor R. B. Perry in the follow- 
ing words: 


SOCIAL ATTITUDES 335 


Every late afternoon at the last note of retreat, the flag is lowered, and 
the band plays “‘The Star-Spangled Banner.” Men in ranks are ordered 
to attention. Men and officers out of ranks stand at attention where they 
are, facing the flag, and saluting as the music ceases. Thus to stand at 
attention toward sundown, listening to solemn music sounding faintly in 
the distance, to see and to feel that every fellow soldier is standing also 
rigid and intent — to experience this reverent and collective silence which 
forbears to say that which cannot be said, is at once to understand and to 
dedicate that day’s work.' 


REFERENCES 


Cooley, C. H., Human Nature and the Social Order, chs. 3, 5, 6. 

Ealdwin, J. M., Mental Development in the Child and the Race. 

Social and Ethical Interpretations, ch. 2. 

Gault, R. H., “The Standpoint of Social Psychology,” Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology and Social Psychology, 1921, xv1, 41-46. 

Social Psychology, ch. 2. 

Washburn, M. F., ““The Social Psychology of Man and the Lower Animals,” 
Studies in Psychology: Titchener Commemorative Volume, 1917, pp. 11-17. 

James, Wm., Principles of Psychology, vol. 1, ch. 10 (pp. 291-329). 

Bogardus, E. 8., Essentials of Social Psychology (2d ed.), ch. 4. 

Edman, I., Human Traits and their Social Significance, pp. 148-64. 

George, W. H., ‘‘“Economic and Social Factors in War,” American Journal of 
Soctology, 1918, xxi, 747-53. 

Mead, G. H., ‘‘The Social Self,” Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Sci- 
entific Methods, 1913, x, 374-80. 


1 The Free Man and the Soldier, p. 82. Quoted by courtesy of the publishers, 
Messrs. Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York. 








CHAPTER XIV 
SOCIAL ADJUSTMENTS 


Conflict and Adjustment in Social Behavior. The social rela- 
tions discussed up to this point have been relations of agreement 
or conformity. Sympathy, suggestion, social facilitation, release 
through crowd mechanisms, and the social self all work toward the 
same end as the drives and habits of the individual. But there is 
another phase of human relations. The demands of the individual’s 
life frequently lead to acts which hamper the satisfaction of these 
demands in others or which run counter to custom and tradition. 
The result is social behavior of an antagonistic sort, in other words 
social conflict. 

Two forms of conflict may be distinguished: the overt and the 
covert. The former is the more primitive; it results from the exer- 
cise of prepotent responses in their full strength and in a manner 
suited rather to immediate individual satisfaction than to the 
safeguarding of the social order. Conduct of others which thwarts 
these activities is countered by struggle responses of a primitive, 
unsocialized sort. Such overt conflicts occur frequently between 
struggle groups. Nations struggle against one another with 
methods of warfare designed by each for the destruction of the 
other’s material and personal power. Revolutionists, strike rioters, 
and lynchers carry on an equally unsocialized conflict. In its 
absence of social modification this behavior resembles the ruthless 
attack of the angry child, differing from the latter only in a com- 
plexity of efferent development productive of more thorough 
destruction. Within the group predatory assertion of desires and 
the resulting overt conflicts are comparatively rare. Here both the 
assertion and the struggle against limitation of drives are carried on 
through the socialized agencies of rivalry, competition, and legal 
and political action. 

Covert conflict is far more universal than the overt form. It is 
also more complex and interesting from a psychological standpoint. 


SOCIAL ADJUSTMENTS 837 


In covert conflict the forces which represent the two sides of the 
conflict lie within the individual himself. To illustrate: A hungry 
man stands with a stick in his hand in front of a bake-shop window. 
He wishes to break the window and seize the food inside, but the 
presence of a policeman at the nearby corner restrains him. Two 
responses are here directly in conflict. One is the food-getting 
reaction to the hunger stimulus; the other is the withdrawal (ac- 
companied by fear) from situations which entail punishment. In 
the overt or social form of conflict the man would try to seize the 
bread; and a struggle would ensue between him and another indi- 
vidual (the proprietor, or officer of the law). But the conflict is 
covert: it is within himself. The social aspect is represented in his 
own reaction system by an attitude or avoidance connected with 
anti-social acts. 

Another example: A doctor is called to attend a man for whose 
wife he has a secret infatuation. The man is on the verge of death. 
By the use of a treatment known only to this physician the man’s 
life can be saved. The doctor could easily fail to administer this 
treatment and thus let the man die without bringing any blame 
upon himself. There is here a conflict between the sex drive 
and socially conditioned humanitarian and professional attitudes, 
commonly known as conscience. Here again the conflict is not an 
overt one. It is not a struggle with another person for the posses- 
sion of a desired object. The ‘other person’ is represented by the 
socialized habits within the individual; hence the struggle is be- 
tween two antagonistic drives in the same person. ‘Through sociali- 
zation therefore the social conflict between separate individuals 
becomes a ‘mental conflict’ within the individual himself. 

Of the two opposing forces in our second illustration one, the sex 
drive, needs no further explanation. The other, conscience, is a 
habit extending back into the earliest days of character building. 
The love (sensitive zone responses) of the child is early conditioned 
by the signs of approval and disapproval of the parents; and the 
deepest affective cravings are thus satisfied through coniimual 
rapport with father and mother. This rapport can be maintained 
only if the child performs certain acts, and inhibits others, accord- 
ing to the parents’ wishes. Physical punishment also, as well as 


338 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


loss of affection, conditions the withdrawal from antisocial con- 
duct. Through such agencies the child learns to use the methods 
of satisfying his hunger and other cravings which are approved by 
society (ef. pp. 53, 60, 68-69). These he fixates as habits, and avoids 
less socialized, though more direct, methods. This training ex- 
tends to a general regard for the social import of all that he does. 
Regard for the rights of others and for social duties is thus built 
up as a permanent trait of character. 

Such sets of derived (prepotent) habits we may call the socvalized 
drives of the individual (cf. p. 311). The more primitive, direct 
reactions may be termed the ‘socially unmodified’ or unsocialized 
drives.1 Covert social conflicts arise between these antagonistic 
forms of reaction.’ 

Because of their concealed nature the full significance of covert 
conflicts has only recently been discovered. The credit for its 
discovery belongs chiefly to Freud. Although their main field of 
study belongs to psychopathology, conflicts are also of fundamen- 
tal importance for the student of social science; for one force in the 
conflict is usually a socialized drive. Hence the struggle is really 
a social conflict compressed into one individual. Self and alter are 
antagonistic, not between one person and another, but within the 
person himself. The present chapter will be concerned with the 
origin of such conflicts, the social behavior through which the 
opposed drives obtain release, and the effect upon society at large. 
Broadly speaking this is the problem of the adjustment between the 
individual and society. 

Clues to Inhibited Unsocialized Reactions. Although some per- 
sons go through life with very few overt social conflicts, hardly a 
day passes in the life of any one without some covert struggle be- 
tween the socialized and unsocialized drives. Living in harmonious 
relations with others entails a sacrifice of some of our more frankly 
selfish desires. Our overt conduct must suggest a willingness to 


1 Cf. the egoistic (or unsocialized) drive referred to on p. 310 as a special example 
of this class of reactions. 

2 It must be remembered that all drives have the same ultimate source; that is, 
the reflexes described in Chapter III. For this reason the terms chosen are better 
than ‘egoistic and altruistic,’ words which convey a false distinction. All drives are 
egoistic in origin; their difference lies in the manner in which they are modified 
through environment and learning. 


SOCIAL ADJUSTMENTS 339 


make such sacrifices; but the inhibited unsocialized impulse may 
be detected by a careful observer. For the sake of harmony 
members of polite society implicitly agree to overlook all evidence 
of such hidden feeling, provided the external form is in accord with 
good usage. The polite remonstrance and ‘white lie’ are not pried 
into too deeply. The social psychologist however has a more 
searching interest. Slight details of social behavior serve him as 
clues to a fuller understanding of these internal conflicts. 

Personal dislikes which one attempts to conceal are revealed in 
characteristic ways. At the approach of a certain acquaintance we 

‘sometimes find ourselves crossing the street, or becoming interested 

in a shop window. Snubbing is a similar phenomenon. Those 
who practice snobbishness become so adept at ‘not seeing people’ 
that it is almost unconscious with them. Dislike and contempt 
are shown by the sudden loud laugh at the expense of the disliked 
person or class of persons (p. 256). Forgetting a name is, in many 
cases, the result of ‘putting the person out of one’s mind.’ In 
shaking hands the manner may be perfunctory; and sometimes a 
slight repelling push of the hand can be detected. In feigning 
politeness to an unwelcome visitor the blank look and hesitant 
greeting give the lie to the effusive cordiality with which we im- 
mediately try to make amends. ‘The character of the smile is 
similarly eloquent of blocked feeling: there is often something dis- 
agreeable about it. Slips of the tongue or pen to the disadvantage 
of the one secretly disliked may often be traced to an inhibited 
hostile attitude which seizes a moment of inattention to gain 
release. 

The behavior just described is for the most part unconscious. 
The disguise which we offer to others we ourselves accept as the 
true state of affairs. If any one penetrates this and hints at our 
real motive, we are strangely angered. Such behavior is a kind of 
defense. Our very indignation is an argument that the too prying 
interpretation is false and unreasonable. It should be remembered 
that the conflict is within the individual rather than between two 
persons. Loosely speaking we may say that the individual de- 
ceives himself as to his underlying motives. 

The repeated use of an apologetic or conciliatory phrase may 


340 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


ay 


cast doubt on its sincerity, as the following true incident illustrates. 
A called B, who had been opposing him, into his office to impart to 
him the news that he (A) had been successful in accomplishing his 
purpose. Several times during the interview he expressed the 
hope that it was not ‘‘too much of a shock”’ to B, a statement which 
his thinly veiled triumph clearly belied. Extreme and unexpected 
friendliness of manner often betokens an unconscious correction for 
intentions of hostility. Nicknames afford a channel for releasing 
animosity or contempt without giving serious offense. They are 
familiar and therefore avowedly friendly; yet most of them are 
somewhat disparaging.! 

Greed is another unsocialized trait which conflicts with the drive 
for social approval. Mistakes in addition are usually in favor of 
the shopkeeper, and this without any consciously intentional dis- 
honesty on his part. If the merchant expresses indignation upon. 
being told that his price is too high, one may, particularly if the 
complaint is just, suspect that he is trying to inhibit his own realiza- 
tion of the fact. A man called upon a creditor to pay a bill. The 
latter, wishing to appear generous, assured the caller that ‘his credit 
was good’ for as long as he wished to extend it. At the same time 
there was a swift glance of his eye toward the check as it emerged 
from the debtor’s pocket. 

The drive for self-display comes into frequent conflict with the 
socialized regard for modesty. A form of release in this case is to 
refer indirectly or impersonally to the merit to which one wishes to 
cail attention. This focuses the conversation upon the desired 
topic and allows it to drift into more personal channels. The 
‘overseas’ World War veteran who is itching to relate his exploits 
generally opens the discussion by the question, ‘‘Did you get 
across?’’ Politeness will then require his interlocutor to ask the 
same question of him. The following is a good example of the 
boasting conflict. The writer in a game of bridge had been for some 
moments inhibiting the temptation to call attention to his success- 

1 Many names of American Indians were derived from traits or events in which 
the person appeared to a disadvantage; for example, ‘Sitting Bull,’ ‘Rain-in-the- 
Face,’ etc. A certain humorous book proposes the term ‘bripkin’ for rustic charac- 


ters who do not understand the ways of polite society. The amusing aptness of 
this name probably arises from its veiled similarity to ‘bumpkin’ or ‘lumpkin.’ 


SOCIAL ADJUSTMENTS 341 


ful playing. Finally he remarked innocently to his partner: ‘‘ Well, 
M , one or the other of us must be playing a very clever game.” 
One of the opponents laughed and said, ‘‘What conceit!’”’ The 
writer thereupon expressed quick resentment of this ‘unreason- 
able inference’ of the opponent. This was, of course, a rationalized 
anger aroused as a defense against acknowledging the ‘conceit’ 
motive. It was finally pointed out that he should have said, ‘‘We 
both are playing a clever game.”” Not until this obvious exposé did 
the maker of the original remark become aware of the drive for 
self-display by which it had been prompted. 

The Major Conflicts and their Social Adjustment. Turning 
from these surface manifestations we approach a deeper study of 
the forces which lie at the root of conflict. The main prepotent 
drives here concerned are two, namely, struggle and sex. The 
reasons for selecting these two are fairly obvious. Struggle against 
oppression or competitive thwarting is the response operative in 
overt social conflict. This overt struggle between persons must 
be mollified by developing socialized counter-tendencies within the 
individual. Without a curb upon anger struggles the social order 
could not exist. Such a curb within the individual’s action system 
gives rise to covert hostility, or struggle, conflict. The sex response 
is important in conflict because it comprises the most intimate 
relation between individuals; and although one of the strongest of 
drives, it is subject to rigorous limitation and social control.!. To 
these two sources of conflict may be added a third whose resolution 
or adjustment is of considerable social importance. This is the 
struggle against the realization of one’s own defects, commonly 
called ‘inferiority conflict.’ 





1. STRUGGLE CONFLICT: ADJUSTMENTS IN ANGER 
The Introversion of the Struggle Response. Apart from sociali-~ 
zation the original response when thwarted is to struggle with in- 
creasing violence until the thwarting agency is removed or con- 
quered. The visceral side of this process underlies the emotion of 
anger or rage. Fear, early socialization of drives, and practical 


1 It is significant that hostility and sex are the two impulses stressed in Freudian 
theory as obtaining release through laughter (pp.256—58). 


342 ‘SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


considerations inhibit this frank exercise of the struggle reaction. 
Outlet for it must be sought in indirect ways, such as competition 
or planning some revenge ‘within the law.’ Often the somatic 
response is inhibited completely, and there is no way of removing 
the thwarting stimulus or situation. In this case the hostility is 
said to be ‘repressed.’ This means merely that the struggle reac- 
tion is inhibited by drives or habits which are antagonistic to it and 
for the time being more powerful. 

In such cases of blocked somatic outlet the visceral core of emo- 
tion is intensified since it is the only efferent pathway available for 
the release. The process may be described as an introversion of the 
struggle reaction. Its first characteristic is the increase of affec- 
tivity. The person’s life becomes a succession of moods, of excite- 
ments and depressions. The effect of the visceral tensions is cu- 
mulative: it sometimes reaches the point of breaking through the 
resistance and becomes ‘extroverted’ into a response of unexpected 
violence. Such outbursts are the souzce of disharmony in social 
and domestic relations. Another result of introverted emotion is 
the play of mental imagery. One imagines that he is carrying out 
the violent attack upon his enemy which he has actually been re- 
quired to inhibit.! 

Types of Struggle Inhibition. In 1918, Dr. R. F. Richardson 
published a study of consciousness in anger, based upon a large 
number of introspective reports of actual anger experiences. ‘The 
causes of anger reported were behavior of others which (1) hindered 
some course of action on the part of the subject, or (2) lowered his 
self-feeling. The second cause as well as the first is really a form 
of thwarting, since it interferes with the habitual attitudes and 
bearing of self-esteem. 

Three types of anger response are distinguished in the material 
which Richardson collected. The first type (attributive), which 
comprised 71 per cent of the cases, is distinctly hostile and retalia- 
tive either in imagination or in fact. Examples are as follows: 
visual and motor imagery of maltreating the offender; use of imag- 
inary invective and sarcasm; defaming the offender to a third 


1 Marked introversion of anger and other emotions was indicated in 26 per cent 
of questionnaire reports collected by the writer from a class of students. 


SOCIAL ADJUSTMENTS 343 


person, either in reality or in imagination; cursing overtly at the 
‘whole business’ (making generalities, rather than the person, the 
victim of the anger); believing or imagining ill of the offender; 
imagining an exaltation of self so as to be able to heap retribution 
or scorn upon the offender; making or enjoying a joke at his 
expense; and substitution of ‘irascible play.’ The last named re- 
action accomplishes in a playful manner the bodily or verbal attack 
which one would like to make in earnest. Another method is to 
build up an attitude and a plan for future retribution through 
which the accumulated grudge may be released. 

It will be seen that all of these forms of attributive reaction are 
introverted except the last three. Irascible play and wit are success- 
ful forms of anger response, that is, they effectually remove the 
hindrance or relieve self-abasement. They are more overt than 
the other forms. The attitudinal reaction (grudge-building) also 
may be useful if it takes the form of a drive for competitive achieve- 
ment. ‘The enemy is to be shown that the one he has affronted is a 
better man than he. The thwarting agency is thus conquered in 
a constructive and socially approved fashion. Struggle (with the 
emotion of anger) may ally itself therefore with the hunger and 
sex drives as a dynamic factor in learning and progress. The 
proper control and direction of anger is thus an important pedagogi- 
cal problem. 

The second type of anger response is one of self-control, non- 
resistance, or deliberate friendliness (contrary reaction). Such 
habitual inhibition and passivity are often assumed toward inti- 
mate associates. There are also attitudes of ‘turning the other 
cheek,’ of martyrdom, and of inner superiority to the offender. 
Such anger is markedly introverted. It was found by Richard- 
son’s subjects to be both unpleasant and unsuccessful. It charac- 
terizes the ascetic and morbid personality rather than the socially 
developed one. The contrary reaction is relatively infrequent, 
occurring in 18 per cent of Richardson’s cases. 

The third type of response is an attitude of avoidance (indiffer- 
ence reaction). The subject puts the whole situation out of mind 
so as not to be bothered by it. This occurred in but a small per 
cent of cases, and proved to be an unsuccessful adjustment of the 
struggle responsc. 


B44 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


‘The importance of wit and humor as an outlet for anger is 
worthy of special comment. By taking an objective view the in- 
congruous elements of the situation are seen, and the pleasurable 
response akin to that of being tickled is aroused. This response is 
neurologically antagonistic to the unpleasant visceral core of anger 
(see Chapter IV). The latter is therefore inhibited from the field 
and laughter takes its place. At the same time the need of remov- 
ing the thwarting or humiliating agency is fulfilled; for the joke 
makes the offender appear at a disadvantage, while the situation as 
a whole is made to seem trivial. The ability to turn one’s anger 
into a jest goes with the trait of insight (p.118). Itisan invaluable 
asset in wife or husband, and is sometimes appropriately called 
‘the saving sense of humor.’ 

Rationalized Anger. Not infrequently anger is a reaction used 
to disguise other attitudes. We have already observed how greed, 
self-display, and the like are kept from recognition by the indigna- 
tion shown when they are in danger of being detected. This is the 
principle behind the belligerent intolerance of the crowd (p. 315). 
Another instance is the attitude of being indignant at some one in 
the name of society, of civilization, or of humanity. Though some- 
times genuine, ‘moral indignation’ is often a disguise for personal 
ill-feeling and irritation. ‘Outrages’ arise from the violation of 
personal feelings. We frequently hear the rationalization: ‘It’s 
not so much the thing itself as it is the principle which I object to.” 
Some religious persons derive satisfaction through speaking of their 
anger as ‘righteous indignation.’ 

Hatred may be ‘cultivated’ to give support upon other grounds 
to hostile intentions when the original motive for hostility does not 
pass the test of social approval. Between the North and South in 
the conflict over abolition there arose mutual recriminations and 
charges of immorality of all sorts; the basic hostility, essentially 
an economic one, was left unstressed. Hating in order to strengthen 
a cause has been discussed as a part of the behavior in crowds 
(pp. 315-16). 

Aversions are rationalized in the same manner. It is not hard to 
find socially acceptable motives for disliking people to fortify our 
socially unacceptable ones. The man whom we have owed money 


SOCIAL ADJUSTMENTS 345 


for a long time we come to dislike, sometimes for no conscious 
reason at all, and sometimes because of his suppesed hard feeling 
toward us. The motive of hostility which one is unwilling to recog- 
nize in himself is attributed to another (projection). Conspicuous 
hatred of tendencies in others is a decoy by which the individual 
draws his own attention and that of his associates away from the 
same elements in his own motivation. Another rationalization is 
present in estrangement between relatives or friends. When love 
turns to hate it must have some good reason to justify it beyond 
personal grievance. All manner of evil is, therefore, credited to the 
former friend. Accusations are believed which collapse like bubbles 
when a reconciliation is brought about. 


2. SEX CONFLICT AND ADJUSTMENTS IN FAMILY LIFE 


Sex Differences. Attitudes toward Women. Before discussing 
the conflicts and adjustments of the love drive it will be well to 
review some differences of personality between the sexes and some 
of the broader attitudes of one sex toward the other. It is nghtly 
said that women are more personal and emotional in their interests 
than men. Here in fact lie the only significant psychological 
ditferences of sex. These differences are more probably due to 
early influences and the pressure of a man-made double standard of 
morals than to innate factors. From the start the girl is denied 
opportunities for development which are held open to the boy. 
She is considered a ‘tom-boy’ if she secures birds’ nests, builds 
boats, plays ball, or studies electricity. Her lot is to be dressed, 
petted, admonished, and loved by those about her. She must 
react to people rather than to things. Play with dolls, the tradi- 
tionally ‘correct’ pastime for girls, still further emphasizes the 
personal element. Human feeling rather than* natural law be- 
comes her guiding principle of life. 

As adolescence approaches jealous parents set up barriers against 
free expression of the sex interest by building up in the girl a re- 
pression based on fear or abhorrence. Sex life is submerged and 
introverted; and emotionality toward persons who appeal to her 
is therefore raised to a high intensity. No understanding of her 
own nature, no true knowledge of the forces about her, is per- 


546 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


mitted. All problems are solved for her in advance. All her 
thoughts and actions are controlled by custom, which in this regard 
is largely the product of male jealousy. 

The fruits of inhibition, conflict and over-shielding are seen in 
the mature woman. Among university students young women, 
though gifted in literature and allied subjects, are markedly 
inferior to the men in laboratory sciences. ‘Their world has been 
one of persons rather than things; and they cannot be made to take 
a serious interest in the latter. Concepts into which feeling does 
not enter have little interest for them. Physiologically the 
heightened emotionality of women is indicated by wider variations 
in blood pressure under emotional excitement than exist in men 
(cf. p. 88).1. In their mature reactions women look for the same 
personal basis of response as that which existed in their early 
family life. In college a grade is not so much a measure of attain- 
ment as a mark of personal approval or disapproval. A business 
obligation is generally subordinated to the supremacy of feminine 
feelings. Numerous snatches of conversations collected by Pro- 
fessor H. T. Moore suggest that whereas men talk most frequently 
about money, business, and recreations, the dominant topics of 
female conversation are men, clothes, and decoration. Professors 
Haggerty and Kempf have found that in the word association test 
women greatly exceed men both in number of emotional inhibitions 
and in the substitution of responses which prevent embarrassing 
betrayal of conflicts. A greater tendency toward giving predicate 
(introverted) word reactions in such tests is also found among 
women. (Wells.)? The abnormal ranges of these phenomena 
also are more pronounced among women. Psychoneurotic condi- 
tions are more prevalent in the female than in the male sex. All 
this is the result; not so much of woman’s innate tendencies, as of 
spending her early years in a home and society warped through 
unrecognized conflicts and sex jealousies. The recent movement 
of Feminism is a struggle of woman toward freedom, not only politi- 
cal but psychological as well. Such freedom will never be obtained 


1 Marston, W. M., ‘‘Sex Characteristics of Systolic Blood Pressure Behavior.” 
Journal of Experimental Psychology. 
2 For a description of the word-association technique review pp. 116, 134. 


SOCIAL ADJUSTMENTS 347 


merely by giving her the ballot at the age of twenty-one. There 
must be deeper insight into the conditions which surround her in 
childhood and youth, and a revision of the standards for the de- 
velopment of the female personality. 

The life of woman in maturity is no less filled with barriers to 
self-expression than her formative years. Her sex drive, though 
repressed by masculine regulations, operates none the less power- 
fully. Through the attachment to husband and children it be- 
comes the central motive of her life. In the home, her prescribed 
sphere, the only fundamental interests which exist are love in- 
terests. Her only efferent modifications of this drive are personal 
ministration and caressing. The man’s field of development is 
broader. In order to satisfy his prepotent needs he learns a voca- 
tion and goes out into the world of men and things. The sex drive 
therefore becomes a basis for progress along many lines; and upon 
it are based derived drives (cf. p. 65) which come to be followed as 
ends or interests in themselves. Thus starting from the same 
prepotent factors, the pathways of man and woman diverge. 
Man loves ardently but for a short time only, and then is off about 
other business. In the life of woman love is the perpetual theme.! 
This difference, or rather the failure to adjust to it, is one of the 
chief causes of unhappiness in married life. 

Spurious standards of chivalry have done much to prevent a 
wholesome attitude toward women. Men are singularly jealous 
of their fiancées, wives, and daughters. This jealousy arises 
partly from their own sex tendencies. Sexual activities are in men 
less habitually restrained than in women either through early 
training or through social standards. There is often either a frank 
and promiscuous sexual indulgence or else a craving for such 
indulgence inhibited only by a conscious struggle. This conflict 
between socialized and unsocialized drives colors man’s feeling 
toward the woman whom he loves by an attitude of projection. 
He becomes worried about her sexual desire as he is about his own, 
and scans all of her dealings with other men with a kind of puritani- 
cal suspicion. He also fears the trespass of other males, constituted 
as he is, upon the domain of his desire. Such doubts fill his mind 

1 This fact is beautifully symbolized in Ibsen’s drama Peer Gynt. 


348 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


with horror. There is a conflict between his sex drive (toward a 
certain woman) and his jealous fear. The result is the erection of 
a barrier about the woman to prevent any possible lapses. He 
must protect her from all contact with the temptations of the world 
just as the Turk used to veil the ladies of his harem. For any 
one to accost her without proper introduction is an insult to her 
‘honor.’ This care for the morals of the fair sex is rationalized by 
ideal terms such as the ‘purity and honor of women,’ ‘chivalry,’ 
and the ‘sanctity of the home.’ Gentlemen make it a point of 
honor not to discuss with other men their conquests with women. 
The pretense of chivalry is here largely a rationalization for the 
true motive, namely, that they do not like to think of their in- 
timate sex experiences in connection with other men. Similar 
motives lie behind the prudish and austere codes for women estab- 
lished by the males of many communities. The presence of the 
fallen woman is both an insult and a menace to the ‘respectability’ 
of our wives and daughters. Strangely enough, women (who are 
supposed to be purer than men as a sex) show no dread of contam- 
ination from such a source. 

These conflicts and jealousies, disguised as chivalry and respect. 
for women, instead of ennobling woman, confine her to a narrow 
sphere of convention and moral bondage. There is continued in 
her maturity the type of control which robbed her of a wholesome 
development through childhood. 

Adjustments between Husband and Wife. The life of the 
family centers in the sexual reflexes of husband and wife. This is 
equivalent to saying that the family is based upon love. On the 
afferent side the love responses are conditioned and stimulated by 
every detail of the person and behavior of the loved one; and on the 
efferent they are developed to include not only the sex act itself 
but caressing, verbal endearment, and that protection of the home 
which is conducive to the fullest satisfaction of the love interest. 
All love between man and woman has its origin in the internal 
stimulation of sex (cf. pp. 69-70). 

The close relation of husband and wife and the restrictions with 
which marriage is surrounded produce inevitable overt conflicts. 
There are no born affinities; harmonious adjustments are obtained 


SOCIAL ADJUSTMENTS 349 


only through training in conjugal life. Anger aroused in domestic 
conflicts must meet with some balance or inhibiting agency if 
family ties are to remain unbroken. Such an agency nature pro- 
vides in the antagonism of autonomic reactions explained in 
Chapter IV. The process is as follows. The unpleasant feeling of 
anger accompanies the visceral changes evoked by sympathetic 
impulses. ‘The sex response, on the other hand, pleasant in con- 
summation, is the result of the discharge of sacral impulses. The 
motor effects of these two classes of impulses are, however, antago- 
nistic to each other. It is physiologically impossible for both to 
operate at the same time. Hence when sex (or love) activities are 
in progress, or when desire becomes strong, the emotion of anger is 
apso facto inhibited. When therefore domestic annoyances bring 
husband and wife to cross purposes, and catastrophe is threatened, 
the recurring organic need of one for the other enters to save the 
day. Sexual enjoyment of course does not abolish all effects of the 
anger struggle. Traces of annoyance may remain, or perhaps be 
repressed, which may contribute to the onset of another quarrel. 
But love is here an opportunist diplomat who prevents the tensions 
of anger from reaching the breaking point. Given an attitude of 
affection, the differences can then be gradually brought to a peace- 
ful and satisfactory adjustment. 

In marriages where love flourishes both persons avoid serious 
quarrels which would threaten a severance of affection for a day or 
even for an hour. Sharp words are quickly atoned for, lest a sug- 
gestion of estrangement arise. “It is all over between us” is a 
moment of the profoundest tragedy. Each dreads the emptiness 
of a situation in which the hundreds of attitudes and habits or- 
ganized about the sexual relation with a specific person will be 
forever thwarted. Rather than incur such a calamity some 
married persons put up with grave lapses in the conduct of their 
mates.! 

Causes of Marital Disharmony. If the sex drive is the force 
holding partners in marriage together, it follows that any agency 
which impedes its normal function tends to destroy family life. 


1 Children have the same feeling of being utterl:’ lost when their parents punish 
them by pretending that they do not care for them any longer, 


350 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


There is no marriage in the true sense without normal satisfaction 
of sexual needs. Miss Colcord found that sex difficulties were the 
most frequent sources of home-breaking and desertion. <A variety 
of causes contribute to the failure of the sex impulse in married life. 
A neurotic personality in husband or wife is a conspicuous factor. 
The establishing of unfortunate attitudes toward sex in childhocd 
and youth is generally the history of these cases. Fear, shame, 
and inseparable fixation of love impulses upon the parents are some 
of the forces which have been pitted against the normal and mature 
release of the sexual response. Apathy or aversion in marriage is 
the result. The false religious teaching that desires of the flesh are 
evil has been responsible in some cases for the introversion of the 
sex drive. An allied source of repugnance in women is the crude- 
ness with which sexual love-making is carried on by males who 
ignore the woman’s need of a gentler preparatory wooing. 

In homes where sex adjustment is inadequate to meet biological 
needs secondary love interests are likely to be substituted. Energy 
is given to religious or philanthropic work, to altruistic propaganda, 
to gardening, or to pets. If children are present, there is lavished 
upon them most of the caressing that would be given to the married 
partner were there no inhibitions in that direction. These love 
objects, instead of the spouse, become conditioners of tonicity in 
the internal organs of sex (sexual desire). Such balancing factors, 
as they are called by Dr. Wells, are, however, an imperfect sub- 
stitute; for they stimulate (by conditioning), but cannot satisfy, 
the love desire. At best they do the service of occupying the at- 
tention and reducing the painful consciousness of conflict in the 
sexual sphere proper. While they may occasionally lead to con- 
structive and altruistic endeavor, they are generally to be con- 
sidered as symptoms of marital maladjustment. 

There are other causes beside the sex conflict for domestic un- 
happiness. Unwise methods of control may be employed by one 
or both partners. The spoiled child who by screaming or sulking 
controls her parents grows into the headstrong and petulant 
woman. Austere domination in the husband may be due to a 
similar trait of personality. Or again, the man who feels himself 
insignificant in the presence of his fellow men may compensate by 


SOCIAL ADJUSTMENTS SOLE 


becoming an iron-handed autocrat in his own home. A frequent 
source of friction is the continual demand made by wives for gentle 
affection and sympathy, responses in which most husbands are 
sadly deficient. 

Sagacious women still obtain their ends through controlling their 
husbands by the age-old appeal to sex desire. It is done ina 
disguised fashion by saying “if you love me,” “if you are a man,” 
“if you have the courage,” and similar phrases. These appeals are 
effective because they express her opinion of him, and are therefore 
instrumental in the sex relation between them. According to Dr. 
G. 8. Hall it is the function of woman, by coyness and reserve in 
giving love-rewards, to spur her mate to the highest achievement 
of which he is capable. 

Appeals of this sort failing, tears and even hysterical attacks, 
half feigned, half real, are sometimes employed for accomplishing 
woman’s purpose. Through the dwarfing influences under which 
she was reared the eternal feminine again shows itself as the 
eternal child. Infantile habits are reawakened (regression) when 
more rational and ‘grown-up’ methods fail. The spirit of resigna- 
tion and of martyrdom are persistences of the infantile pouting 
habit. In a proud and sensitive husband these attitudes arouse 
quick resentment, for they imply both unfairness on his part and 
dissatisfaction of the wife with her marriage to him. Few reac- 
tions are as dangerous as this to the stability and happiness of 
wedded life. 

Women of neurotic constitution, when under too great a burden 
of repression, fear, or domination by the husband, develop abnor- 
mal symptoms as a method of escape. Physical fatigue, distaste 
for home-work, fear of having children, sexual aversion, and in- 
ability to transfer love from the parents to the husband are frequent 
conditions. The defense reactions shown include tendency to be 
ill without cause other than ‘nervousness,’ placing household 
responsibilities upon others, desire for medical treatment, sani- 
tarium rest-cures, or operations, and development of symptoms 
(real or imagined) which prevent sex relations with the husband. 


1 Local draft boards during the war were besieged by neurotic women who 
pleaded with the officials to draft their husbands for military service. 


$52 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


These symptoms are not a sign of deception or malingering in a 
wife, but the reaction of an unconscious mental disease in protest 
to her environment. The cure for such conditions lies in helping 
the patient to gain a complete understanding of herself. Oc- 
casionally these symptoms are a revolt against marital conditions 
which would be genuinely intolerable even for persons of stable 
constitution. Separation from the husband and establishing life 
upon a new basis is here the correct and only solution. Neurotic 
tendencies in the husband take the form of physical depletion, desire 
to be petted, bullying, studied cruelty or neglect, humiliation of 
the wife, ‘touchiness’ and moodiness, unreasonable jealousy, and 
tendency to blame the wife for his own shortcomings. 

Chronic jealousy is a grave indication of sexual maladjustment 
between husband and wife. The origin of one type of sex jealousy 
has already been described. Another form results from an attitude 
of inferiority combined with fear. Periods occur in the lives of 
women, such as pregnancy and the crisis of middle life, in which 
they are harassed by the thought of losing their physical attractive- 
ness. They worry, therefore, lest their husbands cease to care for 
them and transfer their affections elsewhere. In such a state a 
woman is on the alert and develops a ‘ perceptual set’ to detect the 
first symptom of infidelity. Some cause, whether real or fancied, is 
soon discovered, and open jealousy and accusation follow. In 
psychopathic conditions there occur delusions of infidelity on the 
part of the spouse. Inferiority jealousy is by no means limited to 
women. Men who lose their wealth, or become ill, crippled, or 
otherwise unattractive, are likely to show the same reaction. The 
effect upon the marital union is unfavorable. Such jealousy not 
only arouses resentment in the mate, but brings into a conspicuous 
light the defect from which it arises, thereby enhancing the es- 
trangement. 

The resort to tears, reproaches, jealousies, and similar controls 
have a further effect upon the partner in wedlock. It causes him 
or her to repress all resentment and discontent, and even to conceal 
thoughts and actions, for the sake of preserving peace. Domestic 
scenes are avoided in this way, but at the expense of conflict within 
the individual. Hostile attitudes are secretly built up, attitudes 


SOCIAL ADJUSTMENTS 353 


which, though barred from expression, widen the breach between 
husband and wife. The woman has many feelings whose overt 
signs must be inhibited. She must repress criticism and remon- 
strance which she believes are just. Often she must face the 
complete failure of her ideals for home and family life, and must 
reconstruct her plans without a word of complaint. Against the 
alienating effect of these conflicts only the most perfect co-adjust- 
ment in the sexual life can be a sufficient safeguard. 

There is a romance about courtship which disappears in married 
existence. The sex drive of the wooer is not yet released; every 
detail about the beloved from head to toe is, therefore, a stimulus 
which helps to augment the tonus already present in the pelvic 
viscera (see p. 70). This is the condition of being blindly in love. 
For the married one the mate loses this halo of perfection. The 
sex drive is more readily and frankly released; hence other consider- 
ations than those of love determine the perspective in which the 
spouse is perceived. A month’s absence restores the unsatisfied 
longing and with it a great deal of the romance. Marital vacations, 
and the exercise of restraint while living together, thus give to 
wedded life the happiness of a prolonged honeymoon. ‘To love 
ardently and well, to achieve insight into the cause of domestic 
troubles rather than to blame the other for them, and to see the 
humor of things — these are the best solutions of the problems of 
adjustment between husband and wife. 

Adjustments between Parents and Children. Introductory 
Statement. [Family life fulfills a double function. It is one of the 
greatest sources of individual happiness; and at the same time it 
transmits the lore and customs of the group and equips the indi- 
vidual for his life as a member of society. It is a face-to-face 
group, bound by the strongest of ties, and productive of ineradi- 
cable traits of character in its members. Leaving the broader 
aspects of the family to the sociologist, our present discussion will 
be confined to the problems of conflict and adjustment peculiar to. 
familial relationships. In spite of the inestimable value of the 
family as a socializing agency, its peculiar organization sometimes 
fosters serious covert conflicts in the individual members. The 
ehief tie which binds parents and children together is love. It is, 


354 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


however, a love of an incomplete or restricted kind. And this love 
struggling against the mature sex drive for the control of the final 
common path produces the central conflict of family life. The 
whole subject can best be understood through a review of the con- 
tributions of Freud and the psychoanalytic movement. It will be 
necessary, however, to distinguish carefully between fact and theory. 

The Freudian Conception. Freudian Fact: In working with 
adult psychoneurotic patients Freud found that there was pre- 
valent a conflict in which the normal sexual tendencies were re- 
pressed (blocked by some antagonistic reaction). Indications 
of this repression were seen in dreams and hysterical symptoms. 
Closer analysis usually revealed a strong but concealed attachment 
for a parent, generally the parent of the opposite sex from the 
patient. The inference follows that this attachment is of a sexual] 
character, and that the horror of incest causes not only the re- 
pression of the fondness for the parent but the blocking of the 
entire sexual impulse with which it is connected. This inference is 
justified by the fact that giving the subject insight into the facts 
just stated (psychoanalysis) releases the sex drive in a normal 
direction and cures the psychoneurosis. The type of conflict 
described probably occurs in milder form in a large number of 
families, and leaves recognizable traces upon the personalities of 
those affected. 

These are the facts. They are denied by many persons upon 
first hearing them, and accepted upon later reflection by most of 
those who deny. ‘The original denial is due to the conventional 
attitude that such things are too revolting to be considered possi- 
ble. Unbiased observation shows that they are neither revolting 
nor impossible, but natural and likely. Any objectively minded 
investigator can verify these facts if he will take the trouble.! 

Freudian Theory: Of psychoanalytic theory we cannot speak 
with the same confidence. The Freudians assert that sexuality 
extends back into earliest infancy; and the boy, by some instinctive 
predilection for a person of the other sex, almost as soon as born 
fixates his desire upon his mother. The girl in similar fashion 


1 The writer’s conviction of their truth is based upon personal work with mented 
conflicts in college students. 


SOCIAL ADJUSTMENTS 355 


selects her father for a lover. Before many years, however, the 
child learns that such love attachments are not tolerated by society, 
and that both his youth and the other parent stand in the way of 
their full realization. Thus we have in early childhood not only the 
root of sex conflict, but the conflict itself. As the child matures 
the horror of the suggestion of incest causes the sex desire for the 
parent to be inhibited (repressed). It becomes unconscious and is 
forgotten. The love however is not destroyed; it is merely dis- 
sociated from the individual’s daily thought and action. In 
Freudian terms it goes on ‘below the level of consciousness,’ and 
prevents the normal release of the sex drive with which it is in- 
separably associated. In the language of psychoanalysis the 
‘libido’ remains fixated at an earlier childhood level. 

Psychoanalysis effects a cure by bringing back the parent- 
complex to consciousness and allowing the more rational attitudes 
of the adult to play upon it and show the patient its absurdity 
(assimilation, abreaction). The sex drive, hitherto fixated upon the 
parent, is thus liberated and allowed to follow a normal course. 

The theory as stated above needs some revision from the view- 
point of scientific psychology. In the following attempt at re- 
statement it should be remembered that there are points still 
requiring proof. The wise reader will regard it merely as a basis 
for further study into the problems of adjustment between parent 
and child. 

Restatement of the Freudian Theory. 1. The Love of the Child 
for the Parent. The traditional view of filial love, namely, that it 
is an instinct and is what every parent has a right to expect of a 
child, is seriously in error. Some children do not love their parents 
at all; others love them far too much. In either case the parent is 
responsible. The child’s affections must be won by the parent. 
They are not acquired as a natural right. 

In an earlier chapter it was pointed out that the stimulation of 
the child’s sensitive zones (mouth, neck, breast, etc.) gives a 
pleasure similar to the lust pleasure of the adult, and produces 
responses for the continuation of the pleasurable contact. In the 


1 It is suggested that the student review the portions of Chapter III dealing with 
the sex and sensitive zone reflexes before proceeding with the following discussion. 


356 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


childhood form the enjoyable sensations are somewhat diffuse; 
in full sexual love the pleasure is diffuse but strongly emphasized 
in the genital regions. 

The psychoanalysts ignore the distinction between these two 
forms, and pronounce the childhood love sexual in character, call- 
ing the sensitive zones ‘erogenous zones.’ This interpretation is 
scarcely justified. In the sensitive zone reactions exteroceptive 
stimulation upon the skin, for example, tickling, brings forth the 
characteristic response. In sex reactions the chief stimulation is 
internal, arising probably front tonic changes in the pelvic viscera, 
external contact from sensitive zones serving merely as an allied 
stimulus. Sensitive zone responses therefore are allied to the sex 
drive, but appear genetically before the latter. The end result of 
the child’s impulse is more abridged than that of the adult. The 
stimulation of sensitive zones evokes movements aimed merely at 
securing further stimulation. Contact in sex excitement also yields 
the response of enhancing itself; but this response is only a means 
of reaching a climax resulting in the release of the pelvic tensions. 
Hence, all things considered, it is better to maintain a physiological 
distinction between childhood and mature love. 

From the social point of view there is an important reason for 
preserving this distinction. Society approves and encourages the 
love between parent and child based upon sensitive zone responses; 
but it as strongly forbids love based upon the sex response. In 
their continuity of development through puberty these two forms 
provide the root of covert conflict within the family. 

It is necessary now to retrace our steps and show the manner in 
which the young child’s love develops from the sensitive zone. 
reactions. This process, which is essentially one of conditioning, 
has been touched upon in preceding chapters (pp. 68, 71). In 
Freudian terminology the phenomenon is known as ‘fixation.’ 
Fixation is merely a technical word for falling in love. The im- 
mediate and precipitating cause of falling in love is physical con- 
tact. Prior to this there may have been admiration and friendship, 
but not until the actual caress or embrace are the deeper and more 
compelling feelings aroused. Now the merest touch or glance 
serves to evoke the love emotion in its full strength. This illus- 


SOCIAL ADJUSTMENTS 357 


trates clearly the conditioning of the sexual response. Given the 
hypertonic vesicular pressure, caressing contact with the beloved 
becomes an allied stimulus for increasing this pressure, that is, for 
raising the desire to a higher pitch. At the same time other 
stimuli present (for example, sight or voice of the loved person) 
acquire through conditioning the power of increasing the visceral 
tension independently of the tactual stimulus. The mere sight 
therefore (or even recall) of that person comes to evoke desire.! 

There is no reason to doubt that the sensitive zone responses can 
be conditioned in a similar manner. If this is true, the love of the 
child may be said to be ‘fixated’ upon the parent who fondles and 
caresses it in the same manner that the youth falls in love with the 
maiden, but with the difference that the child’s response lacks the 
specifically sexual element. By conditioning the sensitive zone 
reactions the parent becomes the object of the child’s love — love, 
that is, of the sort of which the child is capable. 

So far there is no occasion for social disapproval. This love 
fixation of the young child is regarded as natural and right. And 
unless it is too strong or the child unusually susceptible there is no 
immediate likelihood of serious conflict. Let us suppose, however, 
that a highly nervous girl, over-petted by her father, approaches 
pubescence. There begin to develop the internal functions which 
give rise to sexual desire. At the same time the sensitive zone 
mechanisms become bound up as allied stimuli with the sex func- 
tions themselves. This point is exceedingly important. The 
child’s kiss, which heretofore yielded only a simple sensitive zone 
pleasure, now stirs deeper feelings recognized as impossible of 
indulgence within the sphere of the family. Sensitive zone and 
sexual systems of response are welded into one. The adolescent 
struggles in vain to keep her love sexless when sex is becoming the 
great driving force in her life. 

The needed solution is obvious. The youth must give up the 


1 It must be remembered, of course, that the sexual basis for this experience is 
seldom clearly present in the consciousness of the participants. The conscious 
state is richer than the physiological elements just described, and contains much 
romantic imagery of ideal qualities, future happiness, devotion to the beloved, and 
the general exaltation characteristic of lovers. The present account is concerned 
merely with the physiological, or causal, basis of the experience. 


358 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


childish (sensitive zone) love fixation upon the parent. But this, 
in the case we have assumed, is too strong to be lightly broken. 
The shame and fear, therefore, that the love for the father is be- 
coming the love of a grown woman cause this fixation, and often 
the entire sexual drive, to be repressed from consciousness. (In 
neurological terms this amounts to inhibition and dissociation.) 
Puberty, therefore, brings on a crisis, an introverting of the love 
drive, and the beginning of a serious conflict. The boy’s love for 
his mother follows a similar course.! 

An occasional defense made by children and adolescents against 
the formation of too intense a parent-fixation is the development of 
an opposite type of response (ambivalence). To outward appear- 
ances the child becomes estranged from parental influences, and in 
some cases expresses hatred for the parent. ‘This aversion may be 
quite unaccountable to the child himself; and it is of course painful 
to the parent. The youth feels self-reproach for the restraint and 
coldness which he seems compelled to manifest toward those whom 
he ought to love. The wild, asocial period which occurs between 
ten and twelve probably marks the beginnings of the parent-fixa- 
tion conflict. Boys at this age cannot endure petting or caressing 
by grown women. ‘They have reached an age when physical de- 
monstrations of mother love can no longer be permitted. At this 
period parents are said to lose their children for a time. After the 
pubertal crisis is over and the childhood fixation broken, the parent 
gets his child back again. A mature friendship is now established; 
the sexual drive is no longer conditioned by the person of the 
parent. 

An important problem still remains to be solved. If there is no 
early instinctive love which recognizes the opposite sex as its 
object, why is it that the fixation of the girl is generally upon the 
father, and that of the boy upon the mother? This question will 
be discussed in the following section. 

2. The Love of the Parent for the Child. There is another side 
to the formation of the bond between parents and their offspring. 


1 Instead of agreeing with Freud that the love of the child is originally and in- 
stinctively sexual, our theory holds that it is based upon sensitive zone stimulation 
(by conditioning), and does not become sexualized until puberty. 


SOCIAL ADJUSTMENTS 359 


The chief cause of the child’s love fixation is the love manifested by 
the parent toward the child. ‘To find a child who has never received 
petting or caressing from a parent is indeed a rare phenomenon.! 
We have now to consider more fully the nature of this parental 
fondness. 

The clue to the interpretation of adult love we have already 
given in the statement that the sensitive zone responses no longer 
function independently in maturity, but are fused with the complete 
sexual love reactions. On the afferent side we may say therefore 
that adult love responses are always predominantly sexual; the 
major drive for the caressing of children as well as of the mate 
originates in the visceral stimulations of the sex organs. This fact 
is so seldom recognized, and so ‘unconventional,’ that a few obser- 
vations may well be given in its support. First, bodily contact 
and kissing assume a different and fuller significance among adults 
than among children. They become tokens of sexual attachment 
if pleasurably indulged. Hence the kiss between father and grown 
daughter is perfunctory and brief, a ceremony of affection carried 
over from childhood. Barring unrecognized love fixations, there 
is a similar restraint in the caresses between mother and grown 
son.” Society overlooks the sexual import of the adult kiss and 
embrace when bestowed upon a child; because, although in so far 
as they go these acts are a part of the full sexual embrace, it is 
fairly certain that they will not be carried further. An additional 
reason for this toleration is that, since the child is immature, his 
own sexual desire will not be aroused. Although the efferent 
expression of the love is thus restricted, there can be little doubt 
that its afferent origin is supported by sexual (visceral) stimulation. 

A second indication appears in the fact that children serve as a 
balancing factor for a blocked sexual outlet in the parent. Widows 
and divorced or neurotic women often love their sons with a 
fondness which suggests that the latter are taking the place of a 
husband. The behavior lies, of course, within conventional limits, 
and the sexual nature of the love is unconscious; but the réle of the 


1 The importance of the parent in the production of conflict has been somewhat 
neglected by the Freudian school. 

2 Our aversion to the sight of two gfown men kissing is to be ascribed to the sugs 
gestion of its sexual significance, and therefore of homosexuality. 


360 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


sex drive as the basis of the attachment is not to be doubted. In 
the same way, in periods of necessary sexual abstinence, the father 
is likely to feel a greater desire to caress his children than at other 
times. We are justified in concluding that there are not two sepa- 
rate love instincts, one for the spouse and the other for the off- 
spring; but that adult love is all of one kind and springs from the 
internal pressure of sexual desire. Only through social taboo and 
repression has the human race been kept from recognizing the 
sexual origin of its consanguineal love. 

These considerations enable us to answer the question raised at 
the end of the last section, namely, why it is that the child’s love 
tends to be fixated upon the parent of the opposite sex. Since there 
is a strong but unrecognized sexual component in all adult love, it 
is wholly natural that the father should lavish more affection upon 
the daughter, and that the mother should be more strongly at- 
tracted toward the son. The father has usually a different, a more 
tender feeling toward the daughter. He sees in her resemblances 
to her mother, which as partial conditioning stimuli tend uncon- 
sclously to evoke the love responses which have been habitual to- 
ward the latter. The same accentuation of feeling occurs between 
mother and son. Mature sexual love dictates, albeit unconsciously, 
the preference for the child of the opposite sex. Hence the ‘choice’ 
of the opposite-sexed parent by the child really represents the 
parent’s choice, and results from the more intense love-making 
which that parent bestows upon the child. 

At the approach of puberty the child not only feels his filial love 
to be assuming a sexual character, but recognizes the unconscious 
basis of this same love in the parent. The full understanding of 
the réle of male and female, and its exemplification between the 
child’s own father and mother, add to the force of this awakening, 
and render it more critical for the neuropathic individual.! 


1 Love fixations between parent and maturing child are guarded against by cus- 
toms whose significance is usually unrecognized. Among certain primitive tribes a 
girl must carefully avoid all association with her father between her puberty and the 
time of her marriage. The mother-in-law tabu, almost universal among primitive 
peoples, seems to be based upon a sex conflict. The mother-in-law is related to the 
son-in-law’s wife, hence she is associated with his feeling of sex desire; on the other 
hand, being his wife’s mother, she assumes.toward him a réle similar to that of his 
own mother. This attitude and the former are incompatible; hence the conflict 
and avoidance. This interpretation differs somewhat from that given by Freud. 


SOCIAL ADJUSTMENTS 361 


To summarize: The love of the. pre-adolescent child for the 
parent results from a conditioning of sensitive zone reactions 
(fixation). This conditioning is established usually for the parent 
of the opposite sex. The reason for this is that the parent’s love, 
being unconsciously sexual in origin, is greater for the oppesite- 
sexed child, and that child therefore is given greater physical affec- 
tion than the child of the same sex. At puberty the sensitive zone 
reactions become consolidated into the system of mature sexual 
responses. There is required therefore a detachment of the 
whole group of love reactions from the parent-stimulus, and a re- 
conditioning of them eventually by a person of opposite sex outside 
the family (transference). Children who have been petted to an 
unusual degree find it difficult to make this transfer complete, and 
show traces of the parent fixation in their later social and marital 
adjustments. Adolescents who have suffered in addition from 
an unstable heredity fail altogether in re-conditioning their love 
impulses outside the family. They keep the parent fixation, but 
repress it from consciousness, and with it the entire sex life. Con- 
flict results. 

This account differs from the Freudian theory in the following 
points. (1) The love of the child for the parent is not regarded as 
sexual originally, but becomes such at puberty. (2) The critical 

“period of conflict is thus later childhood or adolescence. (3) The 
fixation upon the parent of the opposite sex is due rather to the 
behavior of that parent toward the child than to any instinctive 
sex preference upon the part of the latter. (4) The figurative 
methods of explanation employed by psychoanalysis have been 
replaced by concepts of physiology and behavior psychology. 

Personal and Social Significance of the Child-Parent Fixation. 
The value of the facts and hypotheses we have discussed depends 
upon the universality with which they are applicable to family life. 
Psychoanalysts maintain that these phenomena arise from the 
normal sexuality of every infant, and are therefore universal. 
Traces of the Edipus and Electra complexes ! are found by them at 
the root of religion, art, folk-lore, and custom. Others limit the 
occurrence of parent fixations to strictly pathological cases. Some 


1 Names given to the parent fixations of boys and girls, respectively. 


362 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


degree of the phenomenon is no doubt natural in every home where 
the children are well loved. On the other hand the repression of 
the later sexualized form of the fixation, with resulting conflict, is 
much more rare. A middle ground between the two extreme views 
therefore seems desirable. 

The prevalence of the effects of parent fixation may be sum- 
marized tentatively under three heads. First there is the patholog- 
ical group, the borderline of insanity, including hysteria, psych- 
asthenia, perversions and psychoses, diseases which may be traced 
to conflicts arising from this source. These form a relatively small 
but unfortunate group. Isolated and milder symptoms such as 
moodiness, excessive day-dreaming, distractibility, high emotion- 
ality, and lack of energy, occur among a larger number who would 
not be diagnosed as having a definite mental disease. Retardation 
of personality development (a kind of infantilism) is a frequent 
condition. 

The second class exhibiting effects of parent fixation are those 
normal individuals who maintain a tender, sympathetic, and some- 
what idealistic attitude toward life. In such persons conflict and 
inhibition of the sex drive at puberty, while not strong enough to be 
pathogenic, was nevertheless present. This repression led to a life 
of fantasy and imaginal adjustment much of whose inner richness 
was retained in the adult. There is preserved also the tendency to 
shun the stern realities of life and to substitute an ideal realm of 
fancy. ‘This class has given rise to poets and dreamers, to philoso- 
phers, mystics, and religious zealots. In science such individuals 
prefer the vitalistic or purposive attitude to the mechanistic. 
They are, in short, the “tender-minded’ class described by William 
James. The writer is inclined to believe that this group coincides 
fairly well with the introverted type of personality discussed in 
Chapter V. Parent fixation would thus constitute the leading cause 
of introversion, a trait which characterizes about one third of the 
individuals tested by the writer. Further investigation, however, 
is necessary in order to confirm this view. 

Instead of a general introverting of the life adjustment, close 
attachment to the parent more frequently leads to the acquisition 
, of specific attitudes, traits, and interests from intimate contact 


SOCIAL ADJUSTMENTS = 863 


with the beloved parent. Love of the father or mother renders 
the child peculiarly suggestible toward word and deed coming from 
that source (cf. p. 286). Rapport of this sort explains the tremen- 
dous influence of early home life upon the permanent character of 
the individual. This is the third and widest sphere of influence of 
the fixation we are discussing. It is well-nigh universal. 

Parental love affects various children differently within the 
same family. Some children, for example, appear to be similar in 
nervous constitution to the parent upon whom the love fixation 
is strongest. Where one parent is neurotic one or more of the 
children of the opposite sex may resemble that parent markedly in 
temperament and outlook upon life, as well as in morphological 
and physiological characteristics. This is probably due both to 
inheritance of nervous and emotional instability and to the super- 
structure of habits and traits acquired from association with the 
belcved parent. Much more of the resemblance between child and 
parent is due to acquisition than is popularly supposed. Given on 
the one hand an hereditary susceptibility, and on the other a parent 
who loves the spouse too little and the child too much, and an 
abnormal fixation of the child’s love is an almost certain result. 

The first child and the last in the sequence of children are likely 
to be the most strongly affected. The eldest, being the first, and 
for a while the only child, receives the full effect of the parent’s 
inhibited love impulses. The youngest feels submission and in- 
feriority through having so many stronger than he about him. 
He requires the greatest protection and shielding, and in conse- 
quence carries through life the consciousness of being the ‘baby’ 
of the family. The last child is also the last resort of the love of 
the neurotic parent; hence the tendency to keep him from growing 
up. The children in the middle of the family sequence are more 
likely to escape notice and to be allowed to develop according to 
their own bent. Indeed, they sometimes suffer from the opposite 
evil, neglect. They lack the society and interest of the parent 
which are so valuable in character building. Their existence is 
colorless and mediocre. 

The harmful effects of exaggerated parent fixation can be 
avoided by watchful care. Excessive day and night dreaming, 


364 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


reclusiveness, craving to be petted, jealousy, stubbornness, lack of 
teachableness, emotionality, and nervousness are some of the in- 
dications. Knowledge regarding covert conflicts may enable one 
intelligently to guide the child through the crises of pubescence 
and the adolescent years to follow. Above all the parent must 
achieve insight into his own repressions, and must establish a 
satisfactory sexual adjustment with the married partner. These 
are the only true safeguards of the mental health of the child. 

Further Problems in the Parent-Child Relation. The Evil of 
Neglect. Although stress*is placed upon the evil of excess of 
family love, the opposite danger, its defect, must not be overlooked. 
The child requires the company of the parent in order to develop 
the maturer sympathies and the broader outlook needed at the 
approach of manhood or womanhood. Narrow and aggressive 
selfishness results from the lack of social education within the 
family. Individuals who have grown up destitute of parental love 
show a poverty of sympathy, of susceptibility to social influences, 
of understanding of humanity, and of general fineness of feeling. 
Like garden weeds their personalities are devoid of cultivation. 
The neglected child often develops compensatory fancies, imaginary 
playmates, and other imaginal means of satisfying its desire for 
love and friendship. One of the commonest of these is the ‘foster- 
child’ fantasy. This is the notion that one’s parents are not one’s 
real parents. In questioning 904 high-school seniors and college 
freshmen Professor Conklin found that 28 per cent of them recalled 
having had some form of this fantasy.!_ A few of them remembered 
believing it to be a fact until dispelled by adequate proof. In the 
case of half of those who had the fantasy its duration was over a 
year. The origin of the foster-child idea is frequently a wish of the 
child for parents who are greater, richer, and more loving than his 
own. A typical theory evolved by the child is that he is a foundling, 
and that his real parents are persons of great renown. In this way 
a compensatory explanation is achieved for his present obscurity, 
neglect, or mistreatment. 

The fact that most of these fantasies occur (according to Conk- 


1 The present writer found 24 per cent who recalled it among a group composed of 
the upper college grades. 


SOCIAL ADJUSTMENTS 365 


lin) between the ages of eight and twelve suggests a two-fold 
interpretation of their significance. In the first place the child is 
old enough to realize that his early belief in the greatness and 
omniscience of his parents was largely an illusion; hence an imag- 
inal reconstruction of his parentage is needed. Secondly, this is 
the period of general estrangement from parents owing to the 
maturing of the sexual component of filial love and the necessity 
for inhibition of the infantile love fixation. 

Brothers and Sisters, and Other Adjustments of Consanguinity. 
The childhood relations between brothers and sisters leave a per- 
manent influence upon many personalities. The ascendance of the 
elder and submission of the younger children are persisting traits. 
Sometimes compensations, in kind or in substituted fields of en- 
deavor, are developed by the younger and weaker child. Inferi- 
ority trends and resentment of domination also endure throughout 
life. Jealousy because of the greater parental love for a brother or 
sister is retained in adult attitudes. It may determine lifelong 
habits, interests, social traits, and even choice of vocation. An 
only child is likely to be spoiled by over-fixation upon its parents. 
Childhood love attachments sometimes occur between brother and 
sister owing to the resemblance of each to the more beloved parent 
of the other. 

The presence of parents and parents-in-law in the homes of 
erown children, and the relations between grandparents and the 
succeeding generations offer problems of practical interest. Space 
does not permit a discussion of these adjustments. We may merely 
remark that, as in all human relationships, conflict, overt or covert, 
usually plays a part. 

The Selection of Friends and Associates. Though somewhat 
outside the sphere of family adjustments, the choice of friends 
presents similar problems and may be discussed in the present 
connection. Personal attractiveness is very suotle. It depends to 
a large degree upon physical or sex attraction. Other things being 
equal, qualities which make one pleasing to look at or to caress 
render their possessor popular to many and loved by not a few. 
The clasp of the hand in friendship, or the friendly embrace, has 
probably a mild stimulus of visceral and sexual origin. It is this 


366 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


internal drive which makes such contacts pleasurable. The fact 
that the friendly contact is with a person of the same sex is of 
eourse no evidence against this physically pleasurable basis. 

The statements just made are not without empirical support. 
In a statistical rating study Professor Perrin found a high degree of 
association between affectionate disposition and physical attrac- 
tiveness on the one hand and liking for the possessors of these 
traits on the other. Physical appeal was recognized as sex appeal 
by a number of the subjects. An affectionate disposition was 
found to be a specially important basis for the liking of young 
women by young men. Neatness and general care of the body, 
also conducive to pleasurable contact, were likewise significant. 
Other factors emphasized as bases of liking were individuality and 
sincerity (as shown toward the person judging), and pleasing 
expressive behavior. Persons are well liked whose personalities 
afford many points of contact for stimulus and response with their 
fellows. Social participation and ‘reaction-getting’ have been pre- 
viously stressed as drives within primary sociability groups (p. 287). 

The love impulse in friendship frequently has a specific basis. 
Resemblance to a former friend or lover, to a child or a deceased 
relative may lead to a powerful (and to the individual often in- 
explicable) transference to the new acquaintance.” One occasion- 
ally sees a face upon the street which arouses in one a strange and 
irresistible feeling of attraction. Approaching attitudes are thus 
set up which sometimes lead to the warmest friendships. 

Personality traits not directly related to love are also important 
in the selection and adjustment of friends. There is the drive for 
social participation, a trait which renders friend-making a daily 
occupation: Insight into self, combined with humor, is also vital 
for friendship (pp. 118, 344). Introverted persons who lack in- 
sight are likely to have few friends; but those whom they have 
are intensely loved. Bitter jealousy toward rivals in such friend- 
ships is indicative of their origin in unconscious love fixations. 

Professor Perrin found that intellectual and ethical traits were 


1 Certain subjects also did not recognize it as sexual in character. 

2 ‘Transference’ is of course a figurative term. The real mechanism involved is 
the evoking of the old love habits by the recurrence of certain conditioning elements 
present in both the old and the new situations. 


SOCIAL ADJUSTMENTS 367 


not so significant in selecting friends as affection and social respon- 
siveness. The ascendant individual usually makes the most sat- 
isfactory adjustment with the submissive type. In most close 
friendships the ascendant-submissive relation becomes quickly 
established. Expansive persons make friends more readily than 
reclusive ones. High self-evaluation, if it is not obvious conceit, 
is no bar to friendship. For pleasurable companionship in work 
motility traits are very significant. Dr. M. J. Ream found that 
among a group of salesmen the more ‘rapid fire’ (hyperkinetic) 
type liked best to work with associates who also were quick in their 
reactions. The slower workers were not so decided in their prefer- 
ences. In face-to-face behavior, such as conversaticn, the rapid 
individual feels unpleasantly retarded by having a slow, deliberate 
interlocutor. 

Extreme opposites of type are often seen in the closest friend- 
ships. This seems explicable by the fact that one person finds 
relief from the monotony of his own attitudes in those of his friend. 
In some cases the foibles or vices of a friend afford an indirect 
release for tendencies repressed in an individual. Men of the 
highest attainments and position sometimes find pleasure in the 
most derelict companions. The friendship between Prince Hal 
and Falstaff,in King Henry the Fourth, isa famous example. There 
is a similar attraction toward those who are above us in social 
position, in wealth, or in attainments which we emulate. We 
derive a kind of vicarious satisfaction through contemplating their 
success. This process, which has been termed identification, has 
important social applications.1 

1 An example of identification is seen in the popularity and predominance of 
photoplays whose scenes are laid amid the luxury of wealth and society life. The 
humble ‘movie-goer’ exalts himself through imaginary identification with these 
grand personages! Another interesting instance is given by Willey and Herskovits, 
who ascribe the unwillingness of the servant class to organize into a union to their 
pleasurable identification of themselves with their masters or mistresses. The pos- 
sibility of such identification would be abolished by setting up any sort of group 
distinction between themselves and their employers. (‘‘Servitude and Progress,’’ 
Journal of Social Forces, 1923, I, 228-34.) 

Psychoanalysis employs this concept to describe the striving of the boy to be like 
(substitute himself for) his father, so as to claim full possession of his mother’s affec- 
tion. The daughter likewise identifies herself with the mother. Identification is 


common in the hero-worship of adolescents. To these we may add the many in- 
stances (pointed out by psychoanalysts) of fairy stories, myths, and novels in 


368 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


3. INFERIORITY CONFLICT: ADJUSTMENTS OF PERSONALITY 
TRAITS 


The Nature of Inferiority Conflict. Attitudes of inferiority are 
the source of considerable social maladjustment. Defect in some 
sphere of personality leaves the individual two alternatives. He 
may admit his limitation and try to compensate for it, directly or 
vicariously, by increased effort. Or he may refuse to acknowledge 
the defect, and struggle against every indication of it by defense 
reactions and flights from reality. In the second case a conflict 
arises between the habitual attitude of self-esteem and the accept- 
ance of facts derogatory to the self. Since the evidence of one’s 
inferiority always comes from without (failure to compete with 
others, unpopularity, etc.), one way of resolving the conflict is to 
deny or rationalize these environmental indications, thus allowing 
the self attitudes to go on unhampered by troublesome facts. It is 
therefore the environment which is considered at fault, and the 
individual is excused or justified. The reproach which he really 
should give himself he identifies with the attitude of society toward 
him, and rationalizes it as injustice. The conflict is projected upon 
society. It is obvious that dispositions of this sort may lead to 
serious social conflict. 

Neural conflicts of this type differ from the conflicts o1 struggle 
and sex in the following way. In struggle and sex the individual 
avoids an overt struggle with others by developing an internal 
struggle: the social conflict is made an individual one. In inferior- 


which heroes or heroines suffering from cruelty or obscurity are finally raised to 
eminence through being favored by wealthy patrons or by gods or fairies, or by 
having the secret of their noble lineage suddenly revealed. The story of Cinderella 
is a classic example. Such stories, reminding us of the foster-child fantasy, derive 
their popularity through the compensatory pleasure of identification of self (in 
both child and adult) with these romantic characters. (Cf. Green, G. H.: Psych- 
analysis in the Class Room, chs. 3, 10.) The same motive appears in mythology in the 
ascription to the gods of all the qualities, powers, and fortunes longed for by mortals. 
The Olympian deities were both omnipotent and eternally blissful. 

1 This form of projection differs from the ‘social projection’ described in earlier 
chapters by the fact that the ‘projected’ material is one of the factors in an uncon- 
scious conflict. Another name given to this sort of reaction in psychoanalysis is 
‘extraversion’ (of the libido). It is not to be confused with ‘extroversion’ in the 
sense used in this book. We have already studied projection in repressed hostility 
(pp. 316, 344). - 


SOCIAL ADJUSTMENTS 369 


ity the subject incites an overt struggle as a means of defense 
against recognizing a struggle within himself: the individual’s 
conflict is made a social one. 

Types of Inferiority Conflict. Although inferiority conflict can 
be recognized in almost every field in which the individual can be 
evaluated, there are tliree forms especially important from a social 
standpoint. These are conflicts due to: (1) inferiority in the in- 
tellectual sphere, rationalized by academic pretense and opinions; 
(2) inferiority in the economic and social spheres, rationalized by 
political and social radicalism; and (8) inferiority in the moral 
sphere, ‘over-corrected’ by intolerant reformism. 

a. The Intellectual Sphere. It is natural that human beings 
should be sensitive about defect in a capacity so fundamental as 
intelligence. In all the writer’s experience with students’ excuses 
for their failures he has only once heard the frank acknowledg- 
ment, “I guess I’m too thick.”’ Teachers are familiar with a class 
of students who, though tireless and enthusiastic workers, have 
insufficient ability to cope with the work which they are pursuing. 
Yet they persist, repeating courses in which they have failed, and 
attempting examinations for higher degrees for which they can 
never be fitted. Such behavior is an unsuccessful attempt to 
compensate for an innate lack. Instead of applying their efforts to 
a field in which success is possible, these persons keep on with the 
‘higher studies,’ vainly trying to prove themselves of college 
capacity and so still the troublesome doubt as to their intellec- 
tual equipment. 

Overt conflicts often arise when the inevitable failure comes. 
In some cases the instructor is blamed for unfairness. He is even 
accused of not crediting the student with much intelligence (pro- 
jection), and of judging his work upon the basis of such a prejudice. 
Others rationalize their failure in various ways. An ex-pugilist, 
who had been illiterate at the age of twenty-seven, achieved an 
education by hard effort so as to win the favor of a girl he wished to 
marry, and finally came to an Eastern university to work for a 
graduate degree in psychology. He heralded his coming by 
newspaper publicity. But his compensatory drive had carried him 
too far; he was unable to master the graduate studies. Instead of 


370 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


admitting this fact, he developed neurotic symptoms, went on a 
spree, got arrested, and later appeared before his instructors with 
the tale that his wife and child had renounced him and that he was 
unable to keep his mind on his books. He soon had a recurrence 
of an old lung affection and had to leave school and return to his 
home in a Western State. He now becomes an ardent advocate of 
the Western climate as an antidote for the ‘unwholesome Eastern 
atmosphere.’ Again his drive for publicity brought him into 
print, but this time as the head of a new sanitarium to be located 
in the salubrious climate of his home town! 

Hostile and envious attitudes are displayed by persons with 
inferiority conflicts toward those of superior intelligence. The 
well-known caricature of the professor, while not altogether with- 
out justification, seems to be enjoyed with surprising relish by less 
cultivated individuals. In local politics there is a prejudice against 
any professor who tries to run for office. Rather than elect such 
‘theorists’ and ‘ high-brows’ a person of the most meager capacity 
is usually chosen.1 The development of mental tests brought a 
storm of criticism against drawing conclusions from such devices. 
In some cases at least the critics had either stood low in the tests or 
had been unwilling to try them. But even in academic and pro- 
fessional circles compensations for inferiority are not uncommon. 
There is the pedant who never uses a short word when a longer one 
can be found. ‘There is the dignitarian forever on the alert lest 
some one slight his professional standing. 

It should be noted parenthetically that the defect which arouses 
the inferiority attitude may be imagined rather than real. Con- 
sciousness of inferiority may be a long-standing trait of personality 
resulting from some repressing situation in childhood. In such 
instances, however, the defensory behavior is of the same general 
type as in genuine inferiority. 

Behavior typical of inferiority conflict in the combined spheres 
of education, wealth, and social standing is illustrated by the fol- 
lowing clipping from a sensational Boston newspaper. 


1 Martin points out an opposite type of defense reaction. Many persons extol 
the wonders of a college education in order to support the belief that if they had had 
such advantages they would be able to rise as high as any one. (The Behavior of 
Crowds, pp. 172-75.) 


SOCIAL ADJUSTMENTS 371 


IN OVERALLS 


What perfectly innocent little fellows the Harvard seniors are! 

They enjoyed a picnic on Wednesday and dressed themselves in overalls, 
masons’ caps, and working shoes. Then they climbed aboard trucks and 
away they went. 

The majority of these playful little fellows will never wear overalls 
again; that is why they use the uniform of the honest workingman for a 
burlesque costume. The majority will spend their days in knickers and 
their evenings in dress-suits. 

There must be something radically wrong at Harvard when none pro- 
tests this insult to every honest workingman. Why should seniors, about 
to be graduated as educated American men, consider it funny to wear over- 
alls? Is work so complete a joke to them? 

Some day the seniors at Harvard and every other college will understand 
that those who wear overalls six days a week are better men than they are. 
When this enlightenment comes, a college will be more than a four-year 
recreation park for youths who would not know what to do with these 
years if colleges were closed. 


It is, of course, granted that the main protest of this editorial 
writer is well founded. No one should be allowed to make fun of 
the customary attire of a class less fortunate than he. It may also 
be granted that a thought entered the minds of some of these 
seniors to this effect: “I don’t have to wear these things, so I guess 
I'll wear them for a joke.’”’ There were, however, other good 
reasons operative in the selection of this garb. Tradition and con- 
venience demanded that the seniors should be attired in uniform, 
yet easily obtained and substantial, costumes. The working man’s 
outfit readily served the need. Why was it then that this un- 
thinking jocularity, which probably no senior intended as a slight 
to the working man, should be made the occasion of so violent an 
outburst? Why was the “honest workingman’ so certain that the 
picnickers wished to insult him and to call attention to his inferior 
social status by wearing his uniform? 

The answer is that the working man himself had a half-conscious 
realization that he was inferior. He projected this accusation, 
which he was struggling to inhibit and which kept haunting him, 
into the behavior of others. It was the educated aristocrats who 
were making fun of his honest labors. The defensory reaction 


372 SOCIAL PSYCHCLOGY 


follows that in reality “those who wear overalls six days a week are 
better men than they (the college students) are.” Here lies the 
justification for the resentment expressed in the paragraphs above. 
We thus have the following sequence: the arousal of a repressed 
self-accusation of inferiority; projection of the accusation; rational- 
ization of it as injustice by the compensatory assertion that unedu- 
cated men are of a higher character than educated; and finally a ridic- 
ulous indictment of collegesin general based upon rationalized envy. 

b. The Economic Sphere: Radicalism and Conservatism. Uncom- 
pensated attitudes of inferiority in regard to poverty and obscurity 
are reflected in the tendency toward political and philosophical 
radicalism. Here again the cry is against the injustice of the 
environment; but this time it is an unfair political and economic 
régime which has robbed the individual of success. Differences of 
ability are overlooked and all men are considered equal in merit and 
deserved reward. From this axiom it is deduced that, since some 
achieve more wealth and power than others, there must be a basic 
injustice in the social order. Inferiority within the individual 
himself is obscured by this rationalization. Radicals are thus 
usually the ‘have-nots,’ who demand a change in the entire system 
of things, and who believe that the cure for all social ills is to pre- 
vent one man from possessing more of this world’s goods than 
another. The type is too familiar to require illustration. 

The extreme radical is devoid of knowledge of his own motives 
and defense reactions. He represses his self-accusations of eco- 
nomic inferiority and projects them under the rationalization of 
economic persecution. The lack of insight in such individuals is 
well expressed by the old army saying: ‘It’s a case of everybody out 
of step but Jim.’ In personality rating studies a suggestive nega- 
tive correlation has been found between the trait of radicalism and 
the possession of insight. That is, there was a tendency for those 
who were judged as extremely radical to be judged low in insight, 
and vice versa.” This experimental evidence is the more convincing 


1 These defense reactions are, strictly speaking, to be ascribed to the writer of the 
editorial, who evidently feels a community of interest with the working man. They 
are in accord, however, with many of the publicly expressed sentiments of the labor- 
ing classes themselves. 

2 The writer is indebted for this information to the researches, not yet published, 
ef Dr. G. W. Allport. 


SOCIAL ADJUSTMENTS 373 


because these two traits are not likely to be confused by raters. 

It must be remembered that the radicalism here referred to ig 
not that of movements, but of individuals. Many support radical 
schemes who are not really radically minded. Moreover radical 
measures are sometimes justified and needed as solutions for 
political evils. The behavior described in this section is that 
which belongs to the radical personality, the individual who is by 
nature, and regardless of objective justification, a radical. Such 
as these are generally actuated by a rationalized inferiority conflict. 

The extreme conservative, the man whose personality traits 
incline him to resist all change, also has his conflicts and hypoc- 
risies. He belongs usually to the propertied class. His interests 
are best conserved by keeping in effect that régime, however unfair, 
which enabled him to accumulate and maintain his fortune. He 
therefore defends the existing scheme upon the grounds of tradition, 
past experience, and morality. Many of his arguments, like those 
of the radical, are pure rationalizations. The inferiority conflicts 
of the radical are, however, of greater import in social conflict than 
the defense reactions of the conservative. The latter merely clings 
to a tried system which, in spite of its defects, works after a fashion; 
the radical seeks, and sometimes accemplishes, a sudden over- 
throw of the entire political and social organization. Revolution, 
rather than evolution, is his goal. 

c. The Moral Sphere: Reformism. Persons who are struggling 
against habits and character traits of which they are ashamed but 
cannot overcome frequently rationalize these evils as due to en- 
vironmental causes. Often their cognition of moral inferiority is 
repressed, and the conflict banished from consciousness. There 
ensues an attitude of projection. They become violently opposed 
to the evil, not in themselves, but as it is manifested in society. 
This attitude gives them added impetus in their personal struggle. 
It also soothes their humiliation by detecting and denouncing the 
same weakness in others. ‘The vigorous testimonies of religious 
converts about their victory over the Evil One may convey the 
suggestion that the struggle against him is still in progress, and 
that they are merely trying to whip up their courage. Denuncia- 
tory preaching serves a similar end. The cry is now against the 


374 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


vice, rather than the injustice, of the world. One of the most con- 
vineing temperance sermons which the writer has heard was de- 
livered by a drunken man who drifted into a church congregation. 

From preaching the next step is to overt conflict. The individual 
becomes a militant reformer. Codes of honor and chivalry are 
worn upon his sleeve, and he is ready to fight any who oppose these 
principles. ‘Those who practice secret vices must be hounded out 
and exposed to the righteous gaze of the public. The outrages 
recently perpetrated by bands of masked men seem to be of this 
character. Acts of religious intolerance and racial persecution 
have been committed by secret organizations in the name of 
‘true Americanism.’ ! 

Not all attempts at reform, of course, are as misguided and ill- 
conceived as these. Reform movements, like radical policies, are 
based upon many and diverse drives in individuals. Not all per- 
sons who advocate reforms are neurotics or busy-bodies. We are 
speaking here of ‘reformism,’ not as a policy derived from an ob- 
jective survey of the moral status, but as a trait of personality. 
The acts of such ‘reformists’ are characterized by an irrational 
intolerance and belligerency. They are more intense and emotional 
than the cause would demand. Care should be exercised in dis- 
tinguishing between propaganda from such a source and genuine, 
constructive reformation. It should also be remembered that, 
while reforms are often instigated or abetted through conflicts of 
moral inferiority in individuals, these same reforms may also be 
objectively justified. 


SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF CoNFLICT ADJUSTMENT 

Conflicts between Egoistic Drives and Social Standards: Group 
Aspects. For the explanation of covert conflict given in the pre- 
ceding pages we have had to confine our attention wholly to the 
individual. In this source alone can we discover the antagonistic 
settings of the various drives. Leaving the causal point of view, it 
is, however, interesting to observe the social phenomena which 
arise by combining the similar conflict mechanisms of the members 


1 One of these acts, the whipping of farmers for not attending church, suggests a 
moral or religious conflict in the perpetrators. 


SOCIAL ADJUSTMENTS 375 


of agroup. There are thus collective repressions, rationalizations, 
and projections. By this we mean, of course, only the summation 
or massing of the individual mechanisms. We must renounce any 
suggestion of conflict within the “social mind’ since we have pre- 
viously been led to reject the existence of such a mind (Chapter I).! 

The conflicts offering the widest collective aspects are moral in 
their nature. Large numbers of persons, i.e., whole groups, find it 
difficult to restrain certain pleasurable indulgences so as to conform 
with the traditional and conventional standards of society. Each 
individual is endeavoring to repress these tendencies by asserting 
the socialized attitude. In Freudian terms this attitude is known 
as the censor, a metaphor which in its collective aspects is equivalent 
to social censorship. This concept does not imply an attitude of 
the ‘ social mind,’ but merely the consensus of individual minds who, 
in order to support their socialized attitudes, unite in an organized 
effort and produce laws and regulations of a censorial character. 

There results from such combined defense-reactions the enact- 
ment of ‘blue laws,’ which all are compelled to subscribe to in 
name, but which few obey in practice. All tacitly agree to let one 
another alone in private life so long as the proper standards are 
professed. ‘The forbidden conduct must of course be rationalized 
so that it may not seem a breach of the professed principle. 

A few years ago an ordinance was passed in one of our large 
cities prohibiting upon the stage, among other things, any allusions 
or other matters of a sexual character. If literally interpreted, 
this ordinance would, of course, have ruled out love themes and 
would have banished more than half of the content of dramatic art. 
Obviously it was not intended to bar allusion to such fundamental 
and unconscious driving forces; but only allusions of a recognizably 
sexual character. Sex life may be portrayed and enjoyed so long 
as it is not recognized as sexual. 

Managers of low theatrical performances are said to follow a rule 


1 Some writers have applied dissociation, repression, and other psychoanalytic 
concepts to groups as wholes, various social classes pitted against one another taking 
the place of conflicting motives within the individual. For such Freudian varieties 
of the group fallacy see M. P. Follett: ‘‘Community is a Process,’’ Philosophical Re- 
view, 1919, xxvi, 576-88; and V. Jordan: ‘‘The New Psychology and the Social 
Order,”’ The Dial, 1919, Lxvu1, 365-68. Freud’s notion of ‘the censor’ lends ‘tself 
particularly well to the social mind metaphor (vide infra). See also A. [iolnai’s 
Psychoanalysis and Sociology. 


376 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


that any joke, no matter how obscene, is permissible so long as it 
also has a proper meaning, that is, a meaning which would make 
sense to those who are ‘too pure’ to understand obscenities. In 
psychoanalysis it is often found that dreams, remarks, etc., have a 
similar double meaning. In the latter case the ‘ proper’ meaning 
is a palliative, not to the pure-minded censor of public morals, but 
to the consciousness of the individual himself. The sinister mean- 
ing is unconscious. The censorship metaphor is here interesting 
and instructive if ultimately interpreted in terms of the individual 
mind. But the maintenance by rationalization and hypocrisy of 
a standard above the level of actual practice is not altogether an 
evil. Such codes prevent open and therefore excessive indulgence 
in unsocialized habits, at the same time tolerating a necessary 
amount of release for the fundamental impulse. This form of 
hypocrisy permits also that elasticity of control needed in the 
period of transition between an outworn moral code and a new one 
better suited to the times. 

Conflicts between Egoistic Drives and Group Traditions. The 
type of hypocrisy which permits a deviation from socially trans- 
mitted habits or customs is worthy of special notice. Changing 
cnvironment often brings tradition into conflict with the needs of 
the present generation. When this occurs special devices are used 
to rationalize the departure from the past, thus concealing the fact 
of change. A savage tribe immigrating into a region where the 
totemic animal is the only source of food develops a ceremony in 
connection with which it is lawful to kill and eat this animal. The 
laws of certain Indian tribes required a strict blood relationship in 
order to be a member of a clan. Provision however might be made, 
in the case of a man devoid of heirs, for the adoption of a son from 
another clan. But in order to satisfy the requirement of custom, 
there had to be a ceremonial or symbolic birth of the newcomer into 
the clan. By a similar ignoring of fact foreign-born individuals 
were ‘ adopted,’ contrary to law, into the Roman state. Symbolism 
and rationalization are thus used to conceal the fact of change in the 
law as well as the fact of departure from an ethical code. In this 
way a resolution is found for the conflict between the conservatism 
of tradition and the need for social change. 


SOCIAL ADJUSTMENTS ~ 377 


Covert Conflicts in Hostility between Groups. When the mem- 
bers of one group are held in fear or bondage by another group or by 
a despotic government there will result in each individual a con- 
flict between hostile tendencies (struggle) and the inhibiting fear of 
punishment (withdrawal). Group phenomena then take place in 
which the repressed drives of individuals are released in a veiled 
manner, and punishment thereby avoided. Anthropologists have 
reported instances of subjugated tribes who maintained their old 
ceremonies, but with the outer aspects so modified as to present 
to the conquerors a meaning altogether different from the true one.! 
This phenomenon is parallel with the two-sided jokes of the bur- 
lesque stage. It resembles also the symbolization of the neurotic 
consciousness, except that here the symbol deceives another person, 
whereas in hysteria it deludes the individual himself. The concept 
of social censorship is a fact in the former case but a figure of 
speech in the latter.2, Burning or hanging a hated person in efiigy 
is another method by which the thwarted impulses of a large num- 
ber may be released. Here the symbol makes clear to all concerned 
the nature of the motive; at the same time it violates no established 
law. 

Is Conflict a Symptom of Socialization or Degeneracy? The 
question has been raised whether the numerous conflicts and malad- 
justments described in this chapter are not a sign of the weakening 
of the social order. One force in all covert conflict is society, or 
rather the socialized aspect of the individual. In some instances 
socialization opposes the free operation of food, sex, and struggle 
interests. In others it represents desire for esteem and self-respect 
in conflict with inferiority. It may be urged therefore that the social 
pressure upon the individual has reached too high a pitch, that it 

1 See Rivers, W. H. R.: Instinct and the Unconscious, p. 239; also a lecture on 


‘“‘Dreams and Primitive Culture,’’ by the same author, published by Longmans, 
Green & Co., 1918. 

2? The metaphor of the censor is however useful in showing the close relation be- 
tween the conscience of the individual and the moral code common to the group. 
That which produces a conflict within individuals is considered tabu for society as 
a whole, and vice versa. Hxogamy, a custom widespread among primitive races, 
arose as a defense against incestuous love fixations within the family. Incest is thus 
tabu not only within the mind of the individual, but through a tribal law imposed on 
the individuals as if from without. In this connection the student should recall the 
social aspects of moral and self consciousness discussed in Chapters XII and XIII. 


378 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


has overstepped the limits to which human nature can safely sup- 
press its ‘cave-man’ tendencies in the interest of group life. 

In support of this challenge attention is called to the seeming 
increase in insanities and psychoneuroses; to the “shell-shock’ dis- 
orders in the late war; to the weakening influences of the modern 
family; to the excesses of dancing and of motion-picture themes; 
to fanatical and intolerant laws incapable of enforcement; to 
political hysteria; to suppression of free speech; to deportation of 
radicals; and to numerous crowd phenomena through which neu- 
rotic repressions are released in every conceivable way. Such phe- 
nomena signify to some observers an over-susceptibility of the in- 
dividual to the ‘voice of the herd.’ There is urgent need for the 
assertion of fuller individual freedom if democracy is to be saved 
from its peculiar peril of the rule of each by all.! 

Although there is much to be said for this view, it is still possi- 
ble that the evils mentioned are not necessary accompaniments 
of contemporary civilization or of the socialization of mankind. 
Mental diseases exist among primitive as well as civilized peoples. 
It is doubtful also whether they are more prevalent among civilized 
races nowadays or merely better known. Many conflicts result 
from fear or shame inculcated in children by unwise parents. Such 
methods are not necessary to the present social régime. Violent 
attachment to parents, the most frequent element in conflict, is 
surely not essential to the socialization of the individual. It is 
merely the result of the neurotic repressions and jealousies of 
parents, coupled with ignorance of mental hygiene. There are 
highly moral and intelligent families in which these tendencies do 
not occur. There are also countries (for example, England) in 
which the crowd-engendered intolerance and moral inferiority 
conflict now rampant in America are but insignificant evils. 
Educational psychoanalysis, insight into defense reactions and 
rationalizations, and independent adherence to an objectively 
determined standard — these, as Martin rightly urges, are the anti- 
dotes for covert conflict in modern society. 

Finally, let us remember that socialization is in itself a goal 
toward which we are striving. The original reactions of individuals 


1 See Martin’s Behavior of Crowds for a brilliant exposition of this thesis. 


SOCIAL ADJUSTMENTS 379 


must be modified, not repressed; and this modification makes pos- 
sible the enjoyment of life by each individual at the same time that 
it permits equal opportunities for happiness to others. The drive 
toward this goal, though it involves conflict, is in itself a hopeful 
symptom. 

To oppose a strong force we must have a force of equal power. 
The socialized responses, by their very ability to conflict with the 
most powerful drives of human nature, demonstrate their right to 
a fundamental position. If our struggle reactions are blocked, it is 
because the aversion to hurting others has become a part of our 
very natures. If we flee from reality through inferiority conflicts, 
it is because we desire so ardently the esteem and approval of our 
fellows. If children are loved too much, it is with the thought, 
however deceived, of helping and protecting them. The same 
blocked love impulse and protective behavior when turned outside 
the family are often of the highest service to mankind. 

The various drives involved in the conflicts we have described 
are in themselves good. ‘The evil lies in the unwise controls by 
which they are brought into antagonism with one another. Covert 
conflict, while presenting a vast field for the amelioration of human 
life, is in itself an indication that socialization of a wholesome char- 
acter may be achieved. The adjustment of conflict within the 
individual is thus an indispensable element in social progress. 


REFERENCES 


General Psychoanalytic Background (Covert Conflict) : 

Jones, E., Papers on Psychoanalysis. 

Jung, C. G., Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology (2d ed.) (Translated 
by C. Long), chs. 3, 4, 7, 8, 11. 

Freud, S., Psychopathology of Everyday Ltfe, chs. 3, 7, 8. 

Hart, B., The Psychology of Insanity. 

Kempf, E. J., The Autonomic Functions and the Personality. 

Humphrey, G., “Education and Freudianism,” Journal of Abnormal Psy- 
chology, 1920-21, xv, 350-86. 


Sex and Personality Differences in Social Adjustment: 
Haggerty, M. E., and Kempf, E. J., ‘ Suppression and Substitution as a Fac- 
tor in Sex Differences,”’ American Journal of Psychology, 1913, xxtv, 414-25. 
Moore, H. T., ‘‘ Further Data Concerning Sex Differences,’ Journal of Ab- 
normal Psychology and Social Psychology, 1922, xvu1, 210-14. 


380 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


Ream, M. J., ‘‘Temperament in Harmonious Human Relationships,” Journal 
of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology, 1922, xvu1, 58-61. 

Perrin, F. A. C., ‘Physical Attractiveness and Repulsiveness,” Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 1921, 1v, 203-17. 

Barnett, A., Foundations of Feminism, ch. 2. 

Groves, E. R., Personality and Social Adjustment. 


Family Adjustments and Conflicts of Childhood: 
White, W. A., Mechanisms of Character Formation, chs. 4, 7, 10-13. 

The Mental Hygiene of Childhood. 

Theodoridis, C., “‘Sexuelles Fiihlen und Werten. Ein Beitrag zur Vélker- 
psychologie,” Archiv fiir die Gesamte Psychologie, 1920, xu, 1-88. 

Galbraith, A. M., The Family and the New Democracy. 

Gallichan, W. M., The Psychology of Marriage. 

Joleord, J. C., Broken Homes. 

Green, G. H., Psychanalysis in the Class Room. 

Lay, W., The Child’s Unconscious Mind. 

Evans, E., The Problem of the Nervous Child, chs. 4, 6, 7, 11, 12. 

Woolley, H. T., “Personality Studies of Three-Year-Olds,” Journal of Ex- 
perimental Psychology, 1922, v, 381-91. 

Hinkle, B. M., “‘A Study of Psychological Types,” Psychoanalytic Review, 
1922, 1x, 107-97. 

Wells, F. L., Mental Adjustments, ch. 8. 

Hall, G. 8., Morale, ch. 16. 

MacCurdy. J. T., Problems in Dynamic Psychology. 

Vaerting, Mathilde and Mathias, The Dominant Sez. 





Inferiority Conflict, Compensation, Radicalism and Conservatism: 

Adler, A., ‘‘The Study of Organic Inferiority and its Psychical Compensa- 
tion” (Translated by Jelliffe), Nervous and Mental Disease Monographs, 
no. 24, 1917. 

Tanner, A., “Adler’s Theory of Minderwertigkeit,’ Pedagogical Seminary, 
1915, xxu1, 204-17. 

Pruette, L., ‘“Some Applications of the Inferiority Complex to Pluralistie 
Behavior,” Psychoanalytic Review, 1922, 1x, 28-89. 

Martin, E. D., The Behavior of Crowds, chs. 5, 7. 

Wolfe, A. B., ‘The Motivation of Radicalism,” Psychological Review, 1921, 
xxvii, 280-300. 

“Emotion, Blame, and the Scientific Attitude in Relation to Radical 
Leadership and Method,” International Journal of Ethics, 1922, xxxu1, 
142-59. 

Spargo, J., The Psychology of Bolshevism. 

Trotter, W., Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War, pp. 60-201. 

Myers, C. 8., Mind and Work, ch. 6. 

Pratt, G. K., “The Problem of the Mental Misfit in Industry,” Mental Hy- 
giene, 1922, vi, 526-38. 

Allport, F. H., ‘‘Timidity and the Selling Personality,” The Eastern Undere 
writer, 1920, xx1, 15-17. 

Rinaldo, J., Psychoanalysis of the ‘“‘ Reformer.” 





SOCIAL ADJUSTMENTS 381 


Sociological Aspects of Overt and Covert Conflicts: 

Williams, J. M., Principles of Social Psychology, Books 0, 111, V, VII. 

Gault, R. H., Soctal Psychology, ch. 3. 

Cooley, C. H., Human Nature and the Social Order, chs. 7, 10, 11, 12. 

Ross, E. A., Social Psychology, chs. 17, 19, 21. 

Richardson, R. F., The Psychology and Pedagogy of Anger. 

Tead, O., Instincts in Industry. 

Jung, C. G., “Instinct and the Unconscious” (part m1 of a Symposium), 
British Journal of Psychelogy, 1919, x, 15-28. 

Freud, 8., “‘Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse.”’ Leipzig, Internationaler 
Psychoanalytischer Verlag. 1921. 

Totem and Taboo. 

Eliot, T. D., ‘‘A Psychoanalytic Interpretation of Group Formation and Be- 
havior,” American Journal of Sociology, 1920, xxv1, 1-20. 

Hartman, D., ‘The Psychological Point of View in History: Some Phases of 
the Slavery Struggle,” Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychol- 
ogy, 1922, xvu1, 261-73. 

Martin, E. D., The Behavior of Crowds, chs. 8-10. 

Ginzburg, B. ‘Hypocrisy as a Pathological Symptom,” International Journal 
of Hthics, 1922, xxxu, 160-66. 

Ogburn, W. F., Social Change, part v. 

Kolnai, A., Psychoanalysis and Soctology. 

Taylor, W. S., “Rationalization and Its Social Significance,” Journal of Ab- 
normal Psychology and Social Psychology, 1922-23, xvul, 410-18. 

Rivers, W. H. R., Psychology and Politics, ch. 3. 





CHAPTER XV 
SOCIAL BEHAVIOR IN RELATION TO SOCIETY 


The Place of Social Behavior in the Social Sciences. Social 
psychology, as defined in Chapter I, is the science of the social 
behavior and social consciousness of the individual. This point 
of view has been maintained fairly consistently up to this point. 
Whether the situation studied has been the face-to-face relation, 
the group, the crowd, or the complex adjustments of family and 
social life, the focus of attention has always been the individual in 
his relation to other individuals. It is the purpose of this closing ~ 
chapter to apply the laws of social behavior and consciousness to 
somewhat broader fields, such as social groupings, institutions, and 
the movements and changes of society. We enter here the domain 
of the social sciences, and particularly that of sociology. Since all 
behavior phenomena of groups are reducible to mechanisms of in- 
dividual behavior in the social environment, the relation of social 
psychology to the disciplines which treat of these higher aggregates 
is a fundamental one. This relationship will be developed in 
detail in the following pages. 


SoctaL AGGREGATES: UNITY 


Social Behavior in Relation to Population. The character of the 
physical groupings of individuals has an effect, through the inter- 
changes of social behavior, upon the development of individual 
traits. The isolation of inhabitants of rural districts diminishes 
both the consciousness of the group and social attitudes reflecting 
the obligations of the individual to the group. Zeal for securing 
approval and for codperation through awareness that others also 
are laboring for the good of the community is less intense than in 
the city. As pointed out by Professor Groves, the monotony and 
isolation of farm life fosters a suggestibility toward the newspaper 
and other propaganda coming from centers of great population. 
The prestige of numbers causes a considerable drift of the children 


SOCIAL BEHAVIOR IN RELATION TO SOCIETY 883 


of farmers toward the city. The more energetic, and those fitted 
for rapid interchanges of social stimulation and response seek ur- 
ban life, leaving the slower, less mobile types for the rural commu- 
nity. City life furthermore offers spheres of achievement for the 
more ascendant and ambitious youths from the country. Slowness 
in reaction is of course developed in succeeding rural generations 
by the tempo of social stimulations encountered by the individuals 
in early years, and perhaps by heredity. 

A serious result of.the lack of group control in rural life is the 
defect of socialization within the family. The sex drive, uncon- 
ditioned by the restraints of culture, and abetted by the direct 
example of nature, becomes too precocious in its expression. The 
drudgery of both parents, moreover, allows little possibility for the 
development of the finer traits which grow out of intimate and 
affectionate association with the offspring (cf. pp. 363-64). City 
life provides many opportunities for contact and discussion, and 
therefore develops inventions and progressive measures more 
rapidly than the country (cf. p. 289). Novel ideas and the produc- 
tion of geniuses are less frequent in rural than in urban communi- 
ties. Movements are now on foot in some localities to supply the 
lack of social attitudes and discussion by converting the country 
church and school buildings into social centers. Although city life 
is on the whole more highly socialized than rural, it too exhibits 
some tendencies of distinctly anti-social character. Mob-like 
behavior is frequent both in actual crowds and in the ‘stampede 
of public opinion.’ Crowding, especially in the poorer sections, 
heightens competition and develops in children an aggressive, 
elbowing ascendancy quite opposed to the ideals of good citizen- 
ship. 

The small town also presents definite problems of social behavior. 
Its crowds and publics consist of individuals who all know one 
another. The attitudes therefore of conformity and conservatism 
are more firmly established than in larger centers. Subservience 
to class made morals and opinions in small towns has been satirized 
in recent fiction. Loves and hatreds are intense; and the prev- 
alence of primary groups gives play to unmitigated gossip and 

scandal-mongering. This very emphasis upon social self and 


384 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


community opinion, however, affords possibilities for constructive 
civic organization. Unfortunately much of it is at present directed 
toward pretense of city life and creation of a caste which looks down 
upon the neighboring country-dwellers (Douglass). This may 
represent in part a conflict against recognition of cultural inferiority 
to the city. 

Primary Group and Community. Sociologists have justly 
empnasized the function of face-to-face groups, such as the family 
and the neighborhood group, in the socialization of behavior. The 
importance of the family in this connection has already been dis- 
cussed. These groups also provide a means for transmitting the 
culture and traditions of society. School children frequently form 
face-to-face groups of a fairly lasting character. Groups of this 
sort are usually of one sex, and are necessarily small, because each 
newly added member, having a possibility of disagreeing with every 
other member, increases the chances for disharmony by a number 
equal to the membership already present (Clow). These groups 
have a pedagogical value for inculcating moral attitudes through 
impression of universality and circular reinforcement among their 
members (pp. 305-07). 

Communities are small aggregates whose members are governed 
by attitudes and modes of conduct which they recognize to be 
universal within the group. Social projection, conformity, and the 
social self are prominent in the community attitude of individuals. 
The impression of universality is strengthened if there is sufficient 
organization to bring the individuals together in meetings. Such 
gatherings therefore greatly promote spontaneous coéperation in 
public enterprises. In most cases, however, personal leadership is 
necessary in order to direct the various crowd mechanisms within 
the community toward some definite goal. The egotism fos- 
tered by the crowd situation (or by one’s imaginal public) serves 
here as a useful aid to codperative effort (p. 316). Such egotism 
takes the form of ‘local pride.’ Dr. Boodin considers these small, 
closely knit publics to be the true moral units of e1vilization. 

Caste and Social Class. Aggregates based upon attitudes of 
superiority toward outsiders have been conspicuous in the social 
order of nearly every nation. In certain Oriental countries, and 


SOCIAL BEHAVIOR IN RELATION TO SOCIETY 385 


in some nations of the Occident, hereditary caste systems have 
erected impossible barriers against aspirants of humbler birth. In 
more democratic countries the consciousness of acquired social 
class is often instilled into the minds of the young before they leave 
the family circle. Sharing in the impression of superiority con- 
ceived to be universal in his group, the member of the upper class 
feels securely at ease. If he becomes impoverished, immoral, or 
degenerate, or if he is personally a nonentity, his badge of caste 
saves him: he is still reckoned as a member of one of the ‘best 
families.’ Rationalizations of this sort serve as defenses against 
the perception of deeper truths. 

An important causal factor, and one usually overlooked, is the 
attitude toward the higher caste of those not in the caste itself. 
This attitude is one of respect and submission, tinged with admi- 
ration and perhaps envy. The egotism of the aristocrat feeds 
directly upon the self-abasement and submission of the proletarian. 
To abolish obeisance to caste would be to abolish caste itself; for the 
real nature of the phenomenon is an attitude in individuals, and 
not an objective social fact. True nobility must reside in persons, 
not in classes. Superiority which is ascribed to a group rather than 
to individuals is indeed a fiction (cf. the discussion of ‘collective 
mind’ in Chapter I). 

Class distinction of some sort is perhaps inevitable, because in- 
nate or circumstantial inequalities among individuals will always 
enforce recognition. Provided the system is not too rigid to 
prevent rise through merit, it is not wholly an evil. So long also 
as the submissive attitude of the lower order does not become a 
hostile one there is no menace to social unity. But where resistance 
to recognition of inferiority springs up, radical action, and even 
revolution, areimminent. Thusin England a peaceful class system 
has existed for generations, while in America, with its widespread 
and crowd-like conflicts, the very beginnings of class recognition 
bring disruptive changes. Economic struggle is rapidly becoming 
a class warfare. 

Occupational distinctions of class deserve a word of comment. 
Efforts are made so to elevate one’s vocation that it shall be a 
credit to one’s self. There are perhaps few who would not like to 


386 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


be listed as a member of one of the recognized professions.’ That 
failing, a trade union with a long and imposing name will suffice. 
Professional standards in medicine, law, and academic fields guard 
the prestige of the calling against unworthy aspirants. The use of 
titles is punctiliously exacted in certain quarters. ‘Professional 
etiquette’ and ‘ethics’ are frequently rationalized names for class 
made morals and distinctions of vocational caste. 

Race and Racial Adjustments. The psychological differences 
between races are just beginning to attract the attention of scien- 
tists. M. Le Bon mistakenly held that there is a gap between 
superior and inferior races amounting almost to a distinction of 
species. The vast differences in cultural adaptation between 
primitive and civilized races are to be ascribed as much to ‘social 
inheritance’ and environmental factors as to innate difference of 
capacity. It is fairly well established, however, that the intelligence 
of the white race is of a more versatile and complex order than that 
of the black race. It is probably superior also to that of the red or 
yellow races.} 

This discrepancy in mental ability is not great enough to account 
for the problem which centers about the American negro, or to 
explain fully the ostracism to which he is subjected. High emo- 
tionality and defect of inhibition are supplementary causes. The 
truth of this statement seems to be attested by a greater variability 
of blood pressure in the negro than in the white man,? as well as vy 
overt indications. Investigations of these functions and of the 
possibility of educative controls of emotion are urgently needed at 
present. 

The heart of the negro question, however, is to be reached, not 
in the sphere of intelligence or temperament, but of sociality. The 
negro has not been educated socially; his drives have not been 


1 Various investigators rate the intelligence of the full-blooded negro as roughly 
between two thirds and three fourths of that of the white race. In the scores of the 
army mental tests the standing of the drafted negroes was very low. Experimental 
data regarding the intelligence of the Mongolian and American Indian races are 
meager. From present indications it seems that both these racial stocks are below 
the white in intelligence. The early and remarkable development of Oriental civil- 
ization is, however, a fact which indicates the need of caution in classing the Chinese 
and Japanese among the races which are inferior to the white in mental capacity. 

2 Researches of Dr. W. M. Marston (unpublished). 


SOCIAL BEHAVIOR IN RELATION TO SOCIETY 387 


conditioned or modified by agencies of social control, The reason 
for this seems obvious; but it is remarkable that it has so frequently 
been overlooked. In preceding chapters we have observed that 
the time for socializing the fundamental activities is childhood, and 
the place for doing it is the home. In post-adolescent years, or 
even in later childhood, the inhibition of anti-social trends and the 
formation of socialized habits become almost impossible. The 
reason why the negro tends to be asocial is that, growing up in an 
environment of poverty and ignorance, where stealth and depreda- 
tion are often the accepted means of livelihood, he has had no op- 
portunity for developing socialized traits. 

We often hear the charge that the more you educate the negro, 
the worse he becomes. ‘This is unfair; for the negro, though less 
gifted than the white man, is highly educable. His progress in 
fields of practical education has shown this. The whole trouble 
has been that the moral side of his education was not begun soon 
enough. He becomes literate and learns the skilled trades; but 
the deeper foundations of early character training are lacking. 
The aim, therefore, should be not only for more education, but for 
earlier education. We need not so much colleges for members of 
the colored race as homes in which they can be properly reared. 
Spec:fically we need organized supervision of the moral influences 
brought to bear upon young negro children. ‘This, to the writer’s 
knowledge, has never been seriously attempted. If it can be ac- 
complished, a great amelioration will probably occur in the racial 
situation of this country. The laissez-faire insistence upon the 
innate hopelessness of the negro has been one of the obstacles to 
such a rational procedure. 

Attitudes of suspicion and hostility are shown in many localities 
not only toward members of different races, but toward immigrants 
of other nationalities. Crowd influence in the public produces its 
usual effect of intolerant conservatism. The cry is for exclusion or 
else for immediate Americanization. There can, of course, be no 
true nation unless a recognition of common interests and ideals by 
each individual binds the whole body politic together. But this 
fact provides no evidence that the only desirable form of culture 
is that possessed by the ‘uncontaminated’ American. Solidarity 


388 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


of this narrow and provincial sort serves in some sections of the 
country as a defense against the recognition of backwardness in 
education and culture. 

Nationality. The psychology of nationality has been well dis- 
cussed in recent literature. Nationality transcends the bounds of 
racial and geographic origin and even of language, though homo- 
geneity in these respects naturally favors its development. Pro- 
fessor McDougall considers national consciousness to be the ex- 
tension of the ‘self-regarding sentiment’ to include the entire 
nation, so that a man himself feels proud when his country prespers, 
and is personally angered when his country is insulted.! There is 
in this nothing which necessitates considering a nation as a psycho- 
logical entity or as possessing a ‘collective’ or a ‘group’ mind. 
National honor is located solely in the individuals of the nation. 
Insults to the flag bring personal resentment because this emblem 
has become a conditioning stimulus for the individual’s attitudes 
of self-esteem and personal security. An abasement of the flag 
therefore thwarts these attitudes and evokes the struggle re- 
sponse. 

National consciousness 1s the consciousness which the individual 
has of his nation asa whole. It consists of imagery of a vast num- 
ber of people, of awareness of traditions which he supports in 
common with all the rest, and of present interests and ideals 
toward which all are disposed in the same manner as he. ‘This 
overwhelming impression of universality combines with the early 
teaching of patriotic attitudes to give nationalism a supreme power 
over the behavior of the individual. The exaltation of self-con- 
sciousness through identification with the nation plays no small 
part in this control. Hatred and struggle against a common en- 
emy bring the impression of universal patriotism and codperation 
into the focus of attention, and thus foster national solidarity. 

1 Compare Professor Pillsbury’s conception of the ‘national mind’: ‘‘... There 
is one sense in which the nation does assume many of the aspects of a person. This 
is as an ideal center of reference for emotions. The nation, as a concept, is a real- 
ity. Aboutit the emotions of the members cluster. Increasing it... gives them 
emotions of joy, impairing its existence... gives sorrow or anger very much as 
does the waxing or waning of the individual’s own ideal self.’’ (The Psychology of 


Nationality and Internationalism, p. 222 f.) This writer later rejects the idea of the 
uation as an objective entity separate from individuals. 


SOCIAL BEHAVIOR IN RELATION TO SOCIETY 389 


THe THEORY OF SOCIETY 


The Origin of Human Aggregation. The topic of nationality 
leads naturally into the broader question of human society itself. 
Original social aggregates among mankind were probably kinship 
groups. In the overlapping of generations and permanence of 
family ties we have a sufficient explanation of the beginnings of 
gregarious life. Among primitive peoples kinship is still the basis 
of social organization. Reaction within the family provides an 
origin for sympathy, susceptibility to social stimulation and ap- 
proval, codperation, control, and other functions necessary for 
social union in the larger aggregates. There is little need, there- 
fore, for a theory to explain the origin or existence of social groups; 
our interest lies rather in describing and interpreting the nature of 
their communal life. 

The Nature of Society: Theories of the ‘Ego-Alter’ Type. We 
may illustrate in their extreme form two opposed conceptions 
which have been prominent in the theory of social aggregation. 
The viewpoint of Le Dantec represents the first conception. This 
writer maintains that egoism, or self-interest, is the basis of all 
society. Each behaves solely for his own benefit. For defense 
against enemies, however, individuals join into a society, and allow 
their ‘egos’ to be somewhat ‘deformed’ by necessary concessions to 
others. Organized codperation is thus maintained for the indi- 
vidual’s good. Altruism is a rationalized hypocrisy. There are set 
up customs and laws the origin of which in self-interest must not be 
questioned too closely. Such controls are therefore regarded as 
‘Metaphysical Absolutes.’ This view is really a modern psycho- 
logical version of the social contract theory. 

The reverse of this notion is exemplified in the theory of Dr. 
E. W. Hirst. He conceives social union as originating in the complex 
familial instincts for the recognition, love, and care of offspring. 
These ‘social instincts’ are extended to wider circles than the 
family. As the pregnant mother in feeding herself also nourishes 
her child, so the welfare of others is instinctively sought as a part of 
our own welfare. ‘‘ Conscience,” says Hirst, “is tribal government 
set up in the human breast.”’ 


390 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


The truth of the matter probably lies between these two doc- 
trines. Huirst’s view that the individual is innately socialized lacks 
adequate foundation. Love fixations in the family, though they 
may become the basis of love for fellow man, are not social instincts, 
On the other hand Le Dantec’s notion of the permanently un- 
socializable nature of man is equally mistaken. Apart from self- 
interest human beings acquire a definite drive and interest in pro- 
moting the welfare of others. Le Dantec’s ‘deformation’ is really 
the normal form of modification of the prepotent responses. 

Imitation and Sympathy Theories. Tarde, who has been called 
the founder of social psychology, was impressed with the repetitive 
character of all natural phenomena. Society was considered by 
him to be based upon uniformities of behavior spread throughout 
the group by imitatzcon. Inner meaning or spirit was, he thought, 
imitated before the outer form of culture, and intellectual elements 
before material. There is also imitation of the higher caste by the 
lower. ‘Tarde’s theory, though it has inspired notable successors, 
is psychologically antiquated. Imitation as a cause of behavior is 
now largely discredited (cf. pp. 77, 239), while greater emphasis 
is placed upon the non-imitated original drives underlying the 
acquisition of both uniform and unique behavior. 

A theory based upon sympathy between similarly constructed 
individuals has been developed by Professor Giddings. ‘Like- 
mindedness,’ the sum of all similar feelings, thoughts, and acts, is 
the basis for the acquisition of a consciousness of kind which knits 
the group firmly together. More recently Professor Giddings has 
restated his conception in the following behavioristic manner under 
the title of ‘Pluralistic Behavior.’ The caw of one crow is more 
readily stimulated by the caw of another crow than by any other 
agency. Association follows this line of least resistance (greatest 
similarity), and individuals having like mechanisms of response 
tend to be drawn together. A stimulus, if strong enough, produces 
like responses in like organisms, a fact which gives rise to social 
solidarity. Circumstantial pressures, however, introduce new ele- 
ments and dissimilarities; hence arises a conflict resulting in social 
change and progress. 

The notion of consciousness of kind has had a well-merited in- 


SOCIAL BEHAVIOR IN RELATION TO SOCIETY 391 


fluence. Without recognizable similarities of expression, sympathy 
would, on either the instinctive or the conditioned-reflex theory, be 
impossible. Consciousness of kind is an elementary form of the 
impression of universality: it is the awareness of that universality 
of human nature which guarantees the essential agreement of all 
individuals. 

For ‘pluralistic behavior’ there seems to be less empirical support. 
Human beings associate not to evoke like responses, but to react to 
one another in all ways, like or unlike, with the social behavior 
which best satisfies their needs. Social codrdination is often served 
by unlike reactions, as in the ascendance of the parent and sub- 
mission of the child. Progress and change involve conflicts not 
between like and unlike, but between the new and the old as vested 
interests of opposed individuals. In some respects, however, the 
theory is suggestive. Similarity of action-patterns among in- 
dividuals affords a ready basis for forming ear-vocal responses in 
the transmission of language (pp. 183, 194). Language of course is 
fundamental in social union. Similarity of nervous structure also 
enhances social facilitation and suggestion in groups and crowds. 
It is in the direct social stimulation of face-to-face relationships 
that the theory seems inadequate. 

The conclusion we may draw from the present discussion is that 
no single theory is sufficient to comprehend the facts of human 
aggregation. Given the bare existence of human beings in one 
another’s presence, they may be expected to develop an intricate 
and far-reaching system of social stimulation and response. This 
system furnishes the data for the entire science of social psychology. 
It cannot be formulated into a single theory without over-simplif- 
cation. ; 


SocIAL ORDER: ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL 


The Nature of Social Control. Orderly social life necessitates a 
certain degree of subordination of individuals to one another and 
to the regulated institutions of society. Without such control 
unity and codrdination would be impossible. Social control is 
sometimes regarded as a purely external phenomenon, as if the 

controlling pressure were applied physically to individuals, moving 


— 892 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


them as a child moves his dolls. This conception is misleading. 
The mechanism of control lies within the individual. The whip 
controls the child because it evokes withdrawing reactions, first 
from the whip, and then from the forbidden activities in connection 
with which it is applied. The mere presence of the whip later has 
the effect of causing withdrawal from the contemplated misdeed; 
it has become a conditioning stimulus for the inhibition of wrong- 
doing. In the same way the punishments of the law condition and 
control the withdrawing responses of individuals. Punishment 
through the threatened loss of social esteem (social self) serves a 
like purpose. Were it not for this conditioning of primitive 
responses and of inhibitions, social control would be impossible. 
Society uses the fundamental responses of its members in order to 
control them. 

Throughout the preceding chapters we have noted instances of 
control in face-to-face relations. Animals drive away their enemies 
through snarls and show of teeth, stimuli which by conditioning 
have acquired the power of evoking the withdrawing response of 
intruders. Monkeys control one another through the conditioned 
stimulation of the sexual reactions (p. 162). Children gain pro- 
ficiency in speech by using language to control their parents (p. 
187). Suggestion illustrates a pure form of social control, and 
conversation an imperfect form. The ‘hurt cry’ of the child is a 
reaction used to coerce others. Infantile control of others persists 
as an adult interest in evoking reactions, as shown in face-to-face 
sociability groups (p. 287). 

We proceed now from these face-to-face coercions to the imper- 
sonal and organized social agencies which control each person for 
the interests of all. First, however, we must describe a few inter- 
mediate and unorganized forms. These include fashion, fad, craze, 
convention, custom, rumor, public opinion, and mob rule. 

Unorganized Controls: Fashion. Fashions originate with gar- 
ment manufacturers and milliners who exploit the controls inherent 
in social behavior for their personal interests. Certain persons who 
seek to assert their individuality and who crave the superficial 
admiration of others, quickly don the new style. These are usually 
the more suggestible persons, who first succumb to the display 


SOCIAL BEHAVIOR IN RELATION TO SOCIETY 393 


models and advertisements of the merchant. When a few appear 
in the new mode the impression of universality and social conform- 
ity begin to work upon the general public. There arises an un- 
thinking impression that all are adopting the style. Exceptions 
are overlooked. Social conformity (p. 278) swings the individual 
into line, and completes the attitude to purchase the new attire. 
The first stage of suggestion is thus accomplished (p. 245). These 
combined attitudes are commonly expressed by the phrase, “ they 
are wearing.” ‘The average person seeks to be a follower rather 
than a leader of fashion. He aims at conformity rather than 
differentiation. This fundamental and unreasoning conformity is 
generally rationalized by saying that one does not wish to appear 
shoddy, careless, out of date, or conspicuous. 

Distinctions of caste allow the manufacturers to keep the styles 
profitably moving. Those of the humbler level seek to identify 
themselves with the rich and exclusive by simulating the garb of 
this class. These in turn, finding their exclusiveness threatened, 
hasten to adopt a new mode. ‘Thus pursuit and differentiation 
follow one another in endless succession. 

Fad and Craze. ‘The following of fashion and other popular 
interests sometimes reaches an emotional intensity suggestive of 
crowd behavior. This is the phenomenon of fad or craze. Imag- 
inal factors in the crowd-public become very vivid. ‘It’s all the 
rage’ is the popular statement of the impression of the universality 
of these excitements. A compulsion toward conformity is felt, not 
unlike that in the crowd situation. Sociologists writing upon fad 
and craze have slighted the fact that these controls originate in the 
basic reactions of the individual. Fads such as bobbed hair, rolled 
stockings, feminine smoking, and general “flapperism’ are based 
upon the desire to arouse the interest of the opposite sex. Much of 
the present-day superficiality seems to express a persisting infantile 
drive for compelling attention through self-exhibition (cf. p. 287). 
Financial crazes represent a combination of prepotent and derived 
reactions; hunger, sex, social control, and desire for distinction 
being the predominant interests. Although particular fads and 
crazes rest largely upon individual drives, it is true that habits of 

1 Cf. p. 367, and footnote. 


394 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


susceptibility to craze stimulations may be developed. Thus, as 
Professor Ross rightly contends, one craze predisposes the public 
for another. 

Convention. One is influenced toward conformity not only by 
the fashions and fads of his contemporaries but by their manners 
and conduct. The individual forms the impression that certain 
modes of action are universal, a belief expressed by the phrase ‘ they 
are doing,’ or ‘it is being done.’ Since, however, acts are more 
important than styles, conventional usage is more stable than 
fashion. The tendency is to render permanent certain socially 
efficacious forms of behavior such as rules of etiquette. Acts of 
thought and attitudes upon fundamental questions also come 
under control of the habit of conformity. Widespread rationaliza- 
tions sometimes acquire the force of conventions. Conventions 
may outlast their generation and pass over into customs handed 
down through social tradition. The two controls are similar in 
that the attitude of social conformity compels obedience to each. 
The attitude of conformity may be expressed toward either ances- 
tors or contemporaries. 

Custom. The successive influence of one generation upon an- 
other in matters of conduct is known as custom. ‘The force of 
custom lies chiefly in the fact that its edicts are habits formed in the 
individual from earliest childhood. Custom acquires the additional 
force of convention. It goes deeper than the latter, however; for 
whereas convention is based upon the simple attitudes of univer- 
sality and conformity, custom has not only these factors to enforce 
it, but early habit fixation and strong social disapproval in case of 
departure from the customary mode. 

The explanation for the tendency to enforce customary behavior 
in society is to be found in habit. Breaches of custom seem objec- 
tionable to us chiefly because they do violence to long standing 
habits. Our dislike of such conduct is frequently expressed by the 
phrase, ‘That’s not the way I was brought up!’ Professor Hum- 
phrey has given the most satisfactory account of this process. 
Our own acts of approach and avoidance have become conditioned, 
Just as our feelings are conditioned in sympathy, by the sight of 
the same behavior in others. If my fellow performs a certain 


_ SOCIAL BEHAVIOR IN RELATION TO SOCIETY 395 


action, his behavior suggests (tends to evoke) the same response in 
me.! But this influence, if against the rule of custom, would go 
contrary (antagonistic) to my previously formed habit of response 
to that situation; hence an unpleasant thwarted feeling, and a 
struggle to prohibit this disturbing suggestion.2 This attitude of 
disapproval may be expressed in the words ‘he breaks my habit.’ 
Pressure is accordingly brought to bear upon the non-conformist to 
eliminate his disturbing stimulation to others. Overt social disap- 
proval thus allies itself with the attitude of social conformity to 
enforce adherence to custom. 

Rumor. Hearing a remark from two or three distinct sources, or 
hearing it with the added suggestion that ‘they are saying’ it, 
generally produces in the listener an impression that the statement 
is being universally accepted and widely discussed. Submission to 
great numbers (attitude of conformity) causes the remark to have 
the force of a suggestion. Though heard only as a rumor it is 
believed and passed on to others as a fact. It is not, however, 
communicated with accuracy. Faulty assimilation as in conver- 
sation (p. 289), thought habits of the transmitter, personal repres- 
sions given escape through magnifying unconventional details, 
and effort to create a sensation, — these are some of the factors 
which account for the distortion of rumor during its spread. 

Public Opinion. The term public opinion usually signifies some 
conviction, belief, or sentiment common to all or to the great 
majority. The distribution of opinion on a question, excluding 
the bias of parties or factions, probably follows the general form of 
the probability curve. The opposite views on any issue are repre- 
sented by fewer and fewer individuals as we approach the extreme 
forms of these views. The moderate position expresses the opinion 
of the majority. This high peak of the curve is the consideration 


1 This is due, not to instinctive imitation, but to the fact that I have observed 
others making the same movements formerly at a time when I was also making 
them; hence the establishment of this movement as a conditioned response to the 
sight of some one performing it. 

2‘*The Conditioned Reflex and the Elementary Social Reaction,” Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology, 1922, xvii, 113-19. 

3 Detailed illustrations of the rumor process may be found in the following works: 
Swift, E. J., Psychology and the Day’s Work, ch. 8; Smith and Guthrie, General Psy- 
chology, p. 236; Jung, C. G., Analytical Psychology, ch. 4. 


- 


396 | SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


which guides political leaders in their quest of public favor. It 
is also exploited by the press. Revolutionary mobs, crowd-like 
subservience to party principles, and like phenomena destroy this 
sober balance between opposing extremes. 

Public opinion is merely the collection of individual opinions. 
It has no existence except in individual minds; and these minds can 
only conjecture what the general consensus is. Like the other 
unorganized forms of social control public opinion acquires its 
power through the attitude of the individual. This attitude is one 
of ascribing universality to certain convictions and then supporting 
them strongly in order to conform with the supposed universal view. 
Newspapers and journals are self-constituted exponents of that 
which they assert to be the voice of the public. Their assertions 
are often hasty generalizations and sometimes deliberate propa- 
ganda. By pretending to express public opinion they in reality 
create and control it (p. 309). The illusion of universality may of 
course be used to establish a popular acceptance of enlightened views. 
The press thus has great possibilities, and indeed responsibilities, 
for promoting solidarity in constructive citizenship. 

One of the most serious evils of American democracy is the ex- 
aggerated susceptibility to crowd-like control of private opinion. 
Impression of universality and the conformity attitude are so 
powerful that liberty of thought is scarcely tolerated. This fetter- 
ing of free expression continues as an after-effect of the censorship 
necessary in the World War. Crowds and crowd-like publics 
dominate the thinking of the individual and tend to stifle inde- 
pendence of judgment. 

Mob Rule. The processes of control operative upon the mem- 
bers of assembled mobs have been treated in Chapter XII. Mobs 
also attempt to control through violence all those whom they are 
pitted against. Small mobs, under the leadership of probable 
neurotics, commit coercive acts usurping the power of government. 
Racial and class hatreds, inferiority conflicts, and other mechanisms 
of maladjusted individuals motivate these efforts for social control. 
The crowd attitudes persist after the disbanding of the actual mob, 
leaving an emotional and intolerant public. 

In a lynching mob, as exemplified by a lynching for sex assault, 


SOCIAL BEHAVIOR IN RELATION TO SOCIETY 397 


the following elements may be noted: (1) There is an immediate, 
sympathetically aroused, furious attack, as though the injury had 
been done to one’s own family instead of to a neighbor’s. (2) There 
is an attitude to protect one’s family and the community from 
similar assaults in the future by controlling potential criminals 
through fear of death. This is the essence of rule by mob law. 
(3) Attitudes of male chivalry demand punishment of the offender. 
These attitudes take belligerent form partly because they are based 
upon rationalized sex jealousy and the double moral standard 
(p. 348). A genuine sexual assault committed by a woman upon a 
man would be regarded probably with humor rather than moral 
indignation. Committed upon a woman, the same act, through 
our man-made social standard, arouses horror and justifies ven- 
geance through the life-blood of the offender. If the racial factor 
is present, a fourth element may be added in the desire to assert 
both the supremacy and the ‘superiority’ of the white race. This 
attitude makes a sex assault committed by a negro seem more 
heinous than the same deed done by a white man. 

Lynching as a form of social control is an unmitigated blemish 
upon civilization. Yet it must be noted that the first two motives 
described above are in themselves far from evil. They contain the 
basis of sympathy, social unity, and government. The great harm 
of lynching lies not so much in the punishment given the offender 
as in the fact that he is denied the right of a fair trial. This alone 
is sufficient to condemn the practice. It should be remembered, 
however, that definite and powerful drives of human nature mo- 
tivate such punishments, drives which are not evil but wholly 
natural. Overweening sentimentalists, therefore, who denounce 
lynchers as lawless barbarians who ought to be hung for murder, 
contribute nothing to the solution of the problem. So long as 
there are races or individuals too poorly socialized to be controlled 
by any power less than fear of immediate death, this form of 
punishment will probably continue to exist. What is needed is not 
righteous indignation, but a deeper psychological understanding of 
the whole matter. 

Before leaving the subject of mob rule it should be noted that 
the mechanisms of control through crowds may be used for 


398 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


socially constructive ends. If we omit the intolerance arising from 
mental conflicts released in mass movements, we shall find that 
the other factors, such as social facilitation, impression of universal- 
ity, conformity, suggestibility, and social projection, are valuable 
means for enlisting codperation. Campaigns for building schools 
and hospitals, patriotic enlistment and self-sacrifice in war, con- 
structive pride in community, and reformation through evangelistic 
revivals are a few results of the more favorable influences of the 
crowd. If combined with insight and civic education, and if used 
for the true interest of humanity, such influences make for per- 
manent as well as present achievement. 

Control through Institutions. a. Government. The most stabiliz- 
ing of social controls are exerted, not by the changeable sweep of 
public opinion or mob rule, but by the organized and regulated 
institutions of society. Foremost among these are government 
and law, education, and religion. Law is largely custom which is 
enforced not merely by threatened disapproval, but by the more 
drastic punishments of governmental control. The body of people 
upon whom such controls are operative make up the state. While 
following roughly the lines of race and nationality, the state is not 
coterminous with these groupings. The control exercised by gov- 
ernment has usually been one of fear. Withdrawal from wrong- 
doing or inhibition of anti-social acts has become established by 
punishment administered upon the commission of these acts. The 
government, standing permanently ready to inflict pain or depriva- 
tion upon the wrong-doer, forms a control which has the full strength 
of the avoiding responses. Institutional control, like all other 
forms, is thus established by conditioning of mechanisms within 
the individual. 

Contemporary sociologists are unanimous in their plea for the 
socialization of government, and for rendering its control positive 
and constructive rather than purely prohibitive. Government 
should be considered not as a control separate from and above the 
people, but as a working expression of each individual’s will. The 
larger interest must be made personal (Follett). Genuine democ- 
racy means not merely a list of rules to keep one person from over- 
riding another, nor yet the balancing against each other of the 


SOCIAL BEHAVIOR IN RELATION TO SOCIETY 399 


representatives of opposing factions. It means rather the codper- 
ation of all individuals and parties toward the common good. 
Officials shouid be elected with a view to their ability to govern all, 
not as champions of a particular group of interests (Kern). 

Such ideals would require a widespread campaign for social 
participation among the mass of voters and citizens. There must 
be a fuller socialization of all the drives, not merely of the avoiding 
reactions. The pleasurable, or approaching responses must be 
conditioned by situations giving opportunity for social service. 
A drive for obedience to law and regard for others is as necessary as 
x fear of disobedience. Desirable as this goal may be we must 
admit it to be very difficult of attainment. An extensive program 
of public education would seem to be the first step. The school 
presents a valuable opportunity for socialization which will be 
discussed presently. 

Revolution, or sudden change in government, has been ascribed 
to the failure of this institution to adapt itself to the progressive 
changes of economic and social life. Immobility leads to sudden 
and complete disruption of political control.t A clearer netion 
may be gained by considering revolution as an overt conflict 
resulting, like all conflict, from an attempted thwarting of the 
needs and actions of individuals. The old government maintains 
an active struggle to suppress all measures aiding the champions 
of the new order, measures which would reduce the advantage and 
prestige of those already in power. The radicals struggle to change 
the form of control in such a way that their desires can be more 
readily satisfied. Such change is sought partly as a compensation 
for inferiority ‘projected’ as a charge of injustice against the ré- 
gime in power (cf. the radical personality, p. 372). On the part of 
many adherents it is also an objectively justified struggle against 
actual political oppression. 

The occurrence of a revolution depends upon several factors. 
The most important of these are: (1) the degree of thwarting pres- 
sure exercised by the party in control, (2) the arousal of inferiority 
conflict in the subjugated class, and (3) the waning of the strength 
of the upper power. Martin assumes the continual presence of 

1 Ellwood, C. A.: Introduction to Social Psychology, pp. 179-7" 


400 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


crowds all struggling for supremacy. He lays greac stress upon the 
third point mentioned, showing how, as soon as the controlling 
faction weakens or disintegrates, the ‘radical’ crowd, closely united 
through struggle, drives it out and usurps the government. Being 
essentially a crowd, this party proceeds to govern with all the in- 
tolerance, hatred, and lack of insight of the crowd man. At length 
it too goes to pieces through failure of its ‘abstract principles’ to 
give free play to the desires of all its members.! This view of 
revolution and its consequences applies no doubt to some political 
upheavals, for example the French Revolution; but it is by no 
means a universal sequence. Revolution, it is true, does not in 
itself establish a proper government; but it does ‘clear the air’ and 
allow an opportunity for unhampered political thought. Mob 
control is a danger that arises pending the selection of leaders who 
can administer the government wisely and constructively. 
Revolution is a beneficial social change if it represents the 
struggle of the large majority against the tyranny of thefew. It is 
detrimental if brought about by a few of the radically minded who 
impose their will upon the majority. The same estimate applies 
to changes not in the government itself, but in the character of the 
legislation which it enacts. A good example is the recent prohibi- 
tion amendment in this country. It is clear that a wholesome and 
needed drift of opinion toward restriction of alcoholic liquors had 
been developing during the years preceding this legislation. This 
represented the wish of the substantial majority. The passage 
of this sudden and drastic measure, however, and the violence of 
its attempted enforcement in many quarters, suggest the defense 
mechanism of the neurotic in whom alcohol is bound up with 
mental conflict. Agitators of this type exploited the temperance 
sentiment already present in launching their extreme campaign. 
The impression of universality and attitude of conformity operated 
in swelling the ranks of prohibition supporters. It was indeed 
difficult for a voter or a legislator to cast a ballot against what he 
felt to be the opinion of the vast majority of morally minded 
citizens. As a result of this crowd-like legislation widespread dis- 
content is felt. The law is openly violated in many places. Judi- 
1 The Behavior of Crowds, chs. 7-9. 


SOCIAL BEHAVIOR IN RELATION TO SOCIETY 401 


claries have posted placards warning the people to support the 
government against the collapse of legal authority. A disruptive 
movement is imminent which may do ultimate injury to the cause 
of temperance as well as to judicious reform in other directions. 

We have already discussed the function of government in pro- 
tecting society by the control of anti-social members. Control of 
enemies without is its second fundamental purpose. Such protec- 
tion has been traditionally maintained by powerful armaments 
through which respect for the rights of the individuals of the nation 
has been enforced upon other countries. This form of control 
represents the conditioning of the withdrawal responses upon a 
nation-wide scale. Intimidation, however, sometimes fails to avert 
aggression, and war ensues. Warfare is a struggle resulting from 
the thwarting of the prepotent drives of the individuals of one na- 
tion by the governmental power of another. We have previously 
seen that there is no instinct to fight merely for the sake of fighting 
(p. 58, footnote), but that the sole cause of struggle is the thwarting 
of the drives of one individual by the behavior of another. The 
only way to eliminate war is therefore to eliminate aggression. 
Reduction of armaments will never by itself accomplish this pur- 
pose. If we draw the lion’s teeth and then steal his food, he will 
fight with his claws. The only power which can abolish warfare is a 
concerted control, or super-government having the power to coerce 
each national government to abstain from violating the rights of 
other nations. ‘The final definition of these rights must rest with 
an international tribunal backed by the strength of the concerted 
government to enforce its decisions. An opportunity to aid in 
establishing such a super-national control was recently forfeited by 
the government of the United States through the rationalized, 
self-seeking conservatism characteristic of crowd-publics. 

A few words should be added concerning social behavior in the 
work of law-making bodies. Assemblies have the value of permit- 
ting the representatives of various interests to meet and exchange 
opinions. On the other hand such bodies, like all co-acting audi- 
ence-groups, are capable of being readily converted into crowds. 
Facilitation of emotional response, impression of universality, and 
the conformity attitude, especially with regard to party opinion, 


402 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


operate in no small degree. These factors no doubt contribute fa 
the intolerance and narrowness of some of our local and nationa}! 
assemblies, as shown in prohibitive statutes, restriction of free 
speech, and provincial foreign policy. Such crowd influences are 
doubly unfortunate because the principle of delegated government 
demands independence of thought on the part of each repre- 
sentative. Influences of this type could be reduced by entrust- 
ing greater power to small, well-chosen committees. Even if this 
policy should arouse a cry of ‘autocracy,’ the situation would be no 
worse than the sectional crewd control and log-rolling existing at 
present. Another means of diminishing crowd factors in assem- 
blies is the reduction of ‘oratory’ and other forms of persuasive 
appeal to a minimum. Finally, we should not overlook the social 
subvaluent characteristic of thought processes carried on in the 
presence of the group (p. 273). While discussion is indispensable | 
for obtaining the broadest point of view (p. 289), it is equally 
necessary to have a period of solitary reflection before deciding 
upon abstruse questions. The solution indicated would therefore 
be to have the vote taken from Congressmen in their private 
offices, after a period of solitary thought has followed open debate. 
Such a procedure would also dispel the somewhat irrational attitude 
of conformity which we found in judgments given in the presence 
of others who were judging the same issue (p. 277). 

b. Hducation. The school is preéminently the institution for 
socializing the individual. Modern education strives to find the 
original interests of the child, and to build upon these a superstruc- 
ture of knowledge and skill. Simultaneously with this, education 
must bring about a conditioning of these approaching and with- 
drawing tendencies by the laws and customs of society, and must 
modify their efferent expression along lines which are socially 
constructive. The range of fundamental drives available for such 
educational control is broader than that upon which legal control is 
based; for education builds upon the approaching as well as the 
withdrawing reactions. In this work the school merely continues 
the earlier and vitally necessary training inthe home. The school 
therefore should be an institution, not merely for endowing the 
individual with abstract knowledge, but for so modifying his 


~ SOCIAL BEHAVIOR IN RELATION TO SOCIETY 403 


responses of avoidance, hunger, and love that they shall serve as 
means to codperative social living. 

The aim of socialization deserves fuller recognition than it hag 
yet received in the administration of education. Training to 
become a citizen is no less imperative than the acquisition of 
knowledge and vocational habits. Students should be given 
systematic instruction in the afferent aspect of social behavior. 
Teaching the significance of tones, gestures, facial expressions, and 
mannerisms is of considerable social importance, since their ap- 
preciation is fundamental for the development of sympathy and 
tact. The child should be taught to respond to physiognomy, bear- 
ing, and other indications of personality in his associates and in 
adults. The desirable in human character can thus be quickly 
recognized, and discriminating responses established. Older chil- 
dren and adolescents are greatly influenced through some chosen 
ideal, it may be a parent or any older person, or even an histori- 
cal character. Toward the behavior of this ideal their fondness 
and submission renders them highly suggestible.! Personal con- 
trols of this type offer opportunities for the establishment of traits 
and attitudes of the highest social value. 

The classroom itself affords a valuable setting for the inculca- 
tion of moral attitudes. The submission and conformity of the 
individual in the co-acting group is here brought into play. Truths 
imparted receive added weight through the perception of their 
effect upon the other students; and this effect is further reinforced 
by circularity (p. 301). The primary groups within the school also 
afford the milieu necessary for the development of the social self 
(pp. 286, 333). 

The school curriculum can profitably be made more social in 
content. This may be accomplished, first, through emphasizing 
humanistic studies, such as history, literature, and the social 
sciences, and secondly, through laying stress upon the social 
application of facts learned. In the higher vocations the latter 
method is exemplified by the teaching of social hygiene in the 
medical curriculum or the application of jurisprudence to social 


1 This susceptibility to adult suggestion we have previously referred to in dis- 
cussing both suggestibility (p. 249) and identification (p. 367, footnote). 


404 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


welfare. The occurrence of the good man in the socially deplorable 
business would be rendered less common through the influence of 
such education (Smith). Finally, the political obligations of each 
prospective voter should be provided for by a definite course of 
training. 

Inasmuch as children are taught in social groups, the laws of 
social behavior have an important bearing upon the teaching 
method. Teachers are becoming more and more impressed by the 
possibilities of the face-to-face relations. Recitation now involves 
more discussion and interchange of ideas than formerly. Classes 
are sometimes subdivided into small discussion groups. In some 
colleges the inauguration of a tutorial system serves the same pur- 
pose. The modern teacher is more than a mere monitor for keeping 
the student fixed upon the right course; she serves as an interlocu- 
tor by whose aid the student acquires a deeper understanding of 
the lesson (Mead). The chief benefits to be derived from this 
method are increased incentive for thought, heightened interest, 
development of self-expressive personality traits, discovery of new 
facts and viewpoints through discussion, and training in social 
values and desirable forms of behavior. | 

The co-working situation of the class room with its response to 
contributory stimulations from other pupils is no less significant 
than the face-to-face relation (cf. Chapter XI). There is usually 
a facilitation of movement in the direction of the instruction given. 
Students work more energetically when working in groups. For 
some pupils, however, the classroom environment may prove dis- 
tracting. Rivalry may be employed, but with careful attention to 
its variable effects on students of different ages, ability, and tem- 
perament, and in relation to quality of performance and type of 
occupation. Since social facilitation has a distinctly lower value 
in the more complex intellectual occupations, this type of work may 
well be done without the presence of co-workers. On account of 
the subvaluent for thinking done in the co-acting group, it is impor- 
tant to assign some problems for the student to think out when 
alone. Through suggesting details of this sort social psychology 
can render a distinct service to educational method. 

c. Religion. Religious control, like governmental, is, in its 


SOCIAL BEHAVIOR IN RELATION TO SOCIETY 405 


primitive form, a control of the inhibitory or withdrawing responses 
of individuals. In some branches of the Christian faith there still 
remain traces of control by fear, either fear of physical torment 
in Hell or of loss of divine salvation. Separation from ‘Grace’ 
or excommunication, brings with it an intolerable loneliness and 
banishment from social as well as divine approval. The experience 
of being ‘lost’ is perhaps a renewal of the childhood feeling upon 
being estranged from the loving parent. Conviction of sin and 
lurid warnings of future damnation, methods which flourished in 
the days of Wesley, still form a part of emotional religions and 
revivals. 

But the Christian religion offers positive appeals of an equally 
powerful nature. In the very versatility of its controls there seems 
to le the secret of the ascendance of Christianity over all other 
faiths in western civilization. The appeal of love is perhaps the 
dominant note. All who seek comfort from the world may find 1% 
in the fatherhood and brotherhood of the deity. Thwarted love 
interests and sex conflicts (such as those described in Chapter XIV) 
may obtain a kind of introverted resolution through a ‘ spiritualiza- 
tion’ of the love, and fixation upon a Being of divine and therefore 
sexless nature. Celibacy of the clergy both in early and modern 
times, and austere religious teachings regarding sex life, are two of 
the many indications of this process. Ritual, hymnology, prayer, 
and scriptures are rich in symbols of the personal love theme carried 
out on a plane of exalted imagination. 

Religion also offers a solace for oppression, for worldly limita- 
tion, and for other species of inferiority. The Christian faith is 
preéminently the religion of the humble. ‘Many mansions’ are in 
store for the poor disciple. The Beatitudes are the apotheosis of 
worldly humility and distress, the glory of the future life being the 
imaginal compensation. In the altar service of the revival the 
prostrate penitent is fervently exhorted to rely upon the vicarious 
atonement of the Savior. The crucified Christ is pointed out as the 
one upon whom the sins of the world have been laid. Vividly 
imagined, this picture offers a ready opportunity for placing upon 
another the sense of guilt and worthlessness carried by the penitent. 
Christ is not only punished for our sin, but he assumes our guilt, 


406 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


thereby letting us go morally as well as physically free. It is 
necessary only to ‘believe on Him’ (that is, to believe in this divine 
assumption of man’s iniquity). The moral inferiority is thus 
projected upon another, and relief is obtained from the conflict 
(cf. p. 368). 

The majority of persons controlled by these specifically religious 
appeals are probably of the introverted type (pp. 116, 362). They 
are the tender minded, seeking in the imaginatively constructed 
reality of the Divine Order a release of thwarted tendencies. The 
church appeal is, however, broader than the purely religious appeal. 
The congregation is a brotherhood; and the bonds of sympathy and 
social participation are strong in the fellowship of religious worship. 
Opportunities are offered also for the development of the social 
self, and for the pleasures of sociability in face-to-face groups. It 
is thus that the church attracts and controls many of the more 
extroverted type. 

In congregating for religious worship there lurks the possibility, 
often realized, of the formation of a crowd. The emotionality of 
the penitent seeking salvation as well as the ecstasies of those who 
have found it are, in revival services, facilitating stimulations of 
great power. Suggestions take effect in the formation of attitudes 
(conviction of sin) and in their release (coming forward for salva- 
tion). The influence of the more suggestible in being the first to 
start the movement is of great importance. Periods of prayer and 
religious services are often observed in order to ‘prepare’ for the 
advent of a great evangelist into a town or city. These activities 
have the psychological effect of establishing attitudes of profound 
and expectant submission toward the coming apostle (first aspect 
of suggestion). With such preparation the excesses characteristic 
of crowd phenomena are an easily predicted sequel.! 

It is an open question whether the appeals of divine love and 
imaginal compensation will not always be vital elements in reli- 
gious control. They are perhaps a necessary and desirable sphere 
of release for the introverted personality. On the other hand the 
progress of the church as an institution of social control is to be 


1 For a detailed account of the crowd factors in religion the student should consult 
F. M. Davenport: Primitive Traits in Religious Revivals. 


SOCIAL BEHAVIOR IN RELATION TO SOCIETY 407 


sought rather from its social than from its religious development. 
Other-worldliness and the redemption dogma are being quietly 
ignored by the more progressive members of the modern clergy. 
Such as these have the welfare of humanity rather than the glory 
of God at heart. The abolishment of creed and of the symbolism 
of personal love and salvation would of course weaken the religious 
significance of the control. Yet the loss in imaginal comfort to 
the ‘tender-minded’ could be compensated by a gain in socializa- 
tion. And perhaps the control of individuals through an ethical 
code and an altruistic love for fellow man would be of higher ulti- 
mate value to the human race than the centering of that love upon 
a transcendent personality. 


SocIAL BEHAVIOR AND CONTROL IN THE ECONOMIC SPHERE 


Social Behavior in Commercial Attitudes. Credit and Panic. 
The pursuits of manufacture and exchange offer a field for the 
study of special social attitudes. The good name or prestige of a 
business firm, though usually thought of as an attribute of the firm 
itself, is really an attitude common to a large number of patrons 
and citizens. It represents their readiness to deal with that com- 
pany;and is built up by careful advertising and honest dealing, and 
strengthened in the public by the impression of universality, until 
it becomes a salable asset known as ‘good-will.’ This control over 
commercial attitudes we shall speak of as economic prestige. 

Credit is a similar social attitude. It consists in the neuro- 
muscular setting of business men to trust the individual or firm 
concerned. ‘This attitude of others toward one’s self is automatic- 
ally established by discharging one’s debts, and is rapidly dissem- 
inated through rumored reputation and inquiry. Since credit is 
merely an attitude in others, and not a fixed personality trait in 
the individual, it is subject to sudden alteration. It is conditioned 
not only by the character of the debtor, but by the general state of 
the market, in itself largely a psychological phenomenon. The 
heightening of credit attitudes leads to the financial ‘boom’; their 
lowering precipitates the crisis and panic. The sequence is usually 
as follows. An era of prosperity brings a rapid development of 
business enterprise. Large ventures are undertaken for the financ- 


408 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


ing of which credit is freely extended. Wages and prices rise; and 
for every actual dollar in hand there are involved in transactions 
many dollars on paper secured only by the attitude of credit. The 
number and magnitude of these transactions exaggerates the im- 
pression of universal prosperity (ability to meet credit obligations) 
and with it the credit attitude beyond the point justified by actual 
conditions. Speculation is encouraged. ‘Thereupon a few reckless 
ventures fail; and with the news of these failures each creditor 
having large loans at stake becomes uneasy. The rumor now be- 
comes one of impending depression; and the universality attitude 
works in the direction of reducing the willingness to give credit. 
Credit is withdrawn, businesses liquidate, wages and prices fall, 
and failures increase. The crisis rumor may be partially an expres- 
sion of a wish on the part of those to whom a drop in prices would be 
an economic relief. Thus the phenomena of credit inflation and de- 
pression, while starting in actual economic conditions, achieve their 
impetus mainly through rumor and the impression of universality. 
Social Control and Exploitation in Business. The aim of the. 
business man is to increase his business; that is, to induce people 
to buy his product or service. The very nature therefore of busi- 
ness implies a ceaseless and varied endeavor toward social control. 
The salesman and promoter employ the art of oral suggestion, 
enforcing it by assuming an ascendant, face-to-face attitude and 
by thrusting their ‘prospects’ into the submissive réle. Person- 
ality traits thus attain great importance in the selection of selling 
personnel and in the social contacts involved in selling. 
Advertising is a form of control which has assumed gigantic and 
wasteful proportions in modern business. A more socialized ethics 
than that which the business class has evolved is necessary to curb 
this growing evil. Every form of appeal is employed in order to 
coerce individuals to buy. Protection from injury or impending 
disaster, sex, humor, hunger, pleasures of the palate, love of wife 
and children, the social self attitude, caste, social conformity, 
patriotism, and even love and respect for one’s mother are all 
played upon to induce the purchase attitude and fill the coffers of 
the profiteer.1 These appeals are conditioning stimuli for the 


1 Direct appeals to sex desire are often used to attract attention to advertise- 


SOCIAL BEHAVIOR IN RELATION TO SOCIETY 409 


arousal of prepotent responses in a manner conducive, not to the 
socialization or efficiency of the consumer, but to the gain of a 
limited class of commercial men. Human nature is thoroughly 
exploited. 

Advertisers do not limit themselves to control through the fun- 
damental activities. They capitalize many other laws of social 
behavior. The buyer is controlled by verbal and pictorial sugges- 
tion. His submissive and conforming attitude is evoked through 
creating an impression that a large number (which to the unthink- 
ing individual means ‘every one’) is buying the product. Sugges- 
tion is further increased through quotations from individuals in 
authority, or through social and financial prestige. Attitudes of 
compensation for inferiority in physique, education, wealth, and 
social status are freely exploited.! 

Such advertising involves not only unjustifiable exploitation of 
the human drives, but artificial stimulation of demand, wasteful 
establishment of consumptive ideals, and competition in extrava- 
gant styles and luxuries. Discontent and envy among the poorer 
classes are a further result of these enticing but expensive appeals. 
It is true, of course, that not all advertising merits the above criti- 
cisms. Some firms do not advertise to stimulate demand or to 
arouse approaching responses by irrelevant appeals; but are content 
merely to state the essential merits and price of their products. 
General culture and comfort are promoted by this class of adver- 
tising. Adsthetic improvements have also been made (although 
the landscape is still disfigured by bill-boards). This finer sense of 
social values is, however, not yet shared by the majority of business 
houses. 

Economic institutions exert further social control through the 
agencies of journalism and art. Newspaper propaganda, paid for 
by business interests, often controls public opinion (cf. p. 308). 
Standards are set for literature, drama, moving pictures, and music 


ments of wearing apparel and other items much less relevant. ‘‘ You furnish the 
girl; we’ll furnish the home” is a sign flaunted by a certain furniture store. ‘‘The 
kind of candy father used to buy to make mother happy,”’ is the essence of an in- 
scription circulated by a well-known confectionery firm in order to capture Mother’s 
Day sentiment. 

1 Advertisements of prescriptions guaranteed to take the kink out of colored 
people’s hair are among the most flagrant examples the writer has seen. 


410 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


by the producers and publishers who know ‘what the public wants’ 
(and consequently what it will be willing to pay for). In these 
fields appeals to the controlling responses, not for cultural but for 
commercial ends, restricts the sphere of individual enjoyment and 
profit. As long as the tired seeker of recreation can be diverted by 
the vulgar humor of vaudeville, the covert sexuality of the farce, or 
the open sex appeal of the burlesque, and as long as he can identify 
himself with the iuxury of the social life he envies on the cinemato- 
graph screen, he will have little incentive for learning to enjoy true 
esthetic appeals conveyed through the same media. Spurious 
standards of art are thus established, and then reinforced through 
the impression that every one is attending and talking about these 
productions. The commercialized control of the economic and 
cultural activities of the individual retards education, checks inde- 
pendence of thought, heightens crowd influence, destroys art, sets 
false goals to endeavor, and cheapens and exploits the best things 
in life. It is especially deplorable that while business employs all 
the drives (both approaching and withdrawing) for social control, 
government, the institution most deserving of this prerogative for 
social ends, has scarcely advanced beyond the use of conditioned 
fear responses. 

From these considerations there emerges the mission of the 
economic genius with the welfare of society at heart. Capitalists 
and financiers are men of power in every community. Success in 
business brings success in the leadership of civic and social reforms 
and of public enterprises. The common people subscribe to a ‘ 
cause if it is endorsed by the financial leaders; economic prestige 
brings personal prestige. There rests upon men of business an 
opportunity and a responsibility for socializing the power which 
they exert in society at large. | 

Industrial Phases: Behavior in Co-working Groups. The work 
of industry, like that of government, education, and religion, is 
conducted in groups. Industrial groups, composed for example of 
factory and office employees, are definitely limited to the co-acting 
type. The laws of behavior in response to the stimulations from 
co-workers find in these groups a ready application. We may ex- 
pect social facilitation with its resulting social increment. Effects 


SOCIAL BEHAVIOR IN RELATION TO SOCIETY 411 


upon quantity and quality of output will be found to vary with the 
type of work, the size of the group, the closeness of the operatives 
to one another, differences of ability and temperament among the 
workers, and other conditions as described in Chapter XI. The 
incentive of rivalry may be effectively used to a certain point, more 
especially if quality is not important. Rivalry combines with the 
economic incentive under bonus and piece-work systems of pay- 
ment. The use of these contributory social stimulations to increase 
productivity is a form of social control no less potent than the con- 
trol of the consumer through advertising. Where exercised without 
regard for the welfare of the employee such controls merit even 
sterner criticism than those of the commercial sphere. 

Working groups are converted into crowds by happenings which 
release emotional and withdrawing and struggling reactions. Bad 
working-conditions, underpay, fatigue, monotony, and continual 
fear of unemployment are sufficient preparation for the arousal of 
panic among industrial workers. When a few of the weaker suc- 
cumb the sight of the evil feared acts as a suggestion, facilitating 
the spread of weakness, terror, and general collapse of morale. 
Concerted struggle responses, as in strike violence, illustrate an- 
other phase of industrial crowd facilitation. Crowds of this sort 
were discussed in an earlier chapter (pp. 294, 310). 

Industrial Conflict. The recent wave of industrial conflict in 
this country provides instructive material for the student of social 
behavior. The full reason for this epidemic of strikes and labor 
agitation is by no means clear. The condition of laborers and 
trade-workers has been on the whole better in recent years than 
ever before. The war brought an era of high wages and better 
living conditions which seem to have remained fairly stable ever 
since. Psychological causes, other than those resulting from the 
oppression of the worker, must be sought to explain the prevailing 
unrest. The rise of unions and the principle of collective bargain- 
ing have given laborers a power which they have never before felt. 
This actual power of unions is increased psychologically through 
the impression of universality (consciousness in each worker of the 
strength of his organization). With the impression of large numbers 
_ there comes also the belief in the supreme justice of demands made 


412 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


by these great bodies. Control through these crowd mechanisms 
has been widely exercised by agitators both in assembled crowds 
and through radical literature. 

Another cause seems equally significant in modern industrial 
conflict. Labor unions are not only weapons for concerted eco- 
nomic struggle; they are defenses organized against the imputation 
of inferiority. Under the influence of the Russian revolution, a 
movement growing out of age-old class distinction and oppression 
of the proletariat, American laborers sought to relieve their minds 
of the unpleasant consciousness of inferiority. This they did by 
projecting upon the capitalistic class the charge of oppression and 
the intent to keep them (the workers) in a state of social and eco- 
nomic slavery. It is true, of course, that their charge of unfair 
distribution of wealth is partly justified. But the sweeping and 
exaggerated claims made by radical leaders show that the economic 
drive is not the basic motive. Thwarting of the domestic and 
economic life is a rationalized cause for class hatred. It is more 
satisfactory to the I.W.W. member to ascribe his humble status to 
the injustice of capital than to his personal incompetence. He 
must hate capitalists accordingly, and must organize a concerted 
movement against them. 

Various other straws point in the same direction. Coupled with 
the outcry against inequalities in the award of profits is the asser- 
tion that one man is entitled to as great a share as another. Labor 
as a whole is indispensable. It has great power as well as dignity. 
Each laborer should therefore participate equally with the capital- 
ist and manager. By arguments of this sort individual differ- 
ences of education, native ability, and enterprise are glossed over. 
Another indication of inferiority conflict is the attempt to equalize 
the status of labor with that of professional and executive work. 
The trades mechanic asserts that the doctor or lawyer ‘gets paid 
for his brains’ rather than for his time; so why should not he 
demand the same? He implies that, since brains are the basis of 
the claim to salary, there should be equal remuneration in the two 
eases. The fact that brains may differ in value is not allowed to 
enter the discussion. Regulations also of unions regarding ap- 
prenticeship aim toward the elevation of the trade in question. 


SOCIAL BEHAVIOR IN RELATION TO SOCIETY 413 


The rule that a helper must always accompany the expert me- 
chanic, while no doubt serving objectively useful purposes, also 
increases the self-esteem of the expert. Like the professional man 
he too must have his assistant. There has recently arisen a some- 
what affected independence in the skilled and domestic trades 
regarding wages, hours, and readiness to serve. This attitude is a 
part of the general protest against possible imputation of inferior 
social status. It is reinforced and directed toward social controi 
through the crowd factors in trade unionism. 

What is the remedy for this unfortunate situation? The cure 
for all conflict lies in insight. The manual worker must realize 
that labor does not have to be protected against the slurs of those 
who do not have to work, but that it has by ats own merit sufficient 
proof against such slurs. Nature has not made men equal in 
ability. Some merit greater remuneration than others because 
they make possible such rewards by rendering a rarer and more 
vital service to society, a service which can be given only by high 
capacity together with professional training. Further than this 
fact no inferiority exists in the status of the working man; and 
certainly no disgrace attaches to that status. Industrial workers 
must be brought to face these facts squarely. They must realize — 
that no one is charging them with inferiority except themselves; and 
further, that much of their outcry against ‘economic oppression’ 
is a futile attempt to ward off this self-originated accusation and to 
escape the facts. If the worker is thus fated to remain at a modest 
economic and vocational level, vicarious compensations should be 
sought in avocational interests, wise employment of leisure and 
pleasures of home life. It is true that such compensations would 
require more favorable hours of work and better wages than some 
employers are willing to give. This, therefore, is the obligation 
which rests upon the capitalist and industrial manager. Employ- 
ers must assume their share of the problem by enabling the worker 
to find outlets in useful and pleasurable channels for the drives 
which are thwarted by his limited vocational status. 

Owners, directors, and managers cannot escape their duty in the 
resolution of the conflict of inferiority in the worker’s mind. Huge 
profits, displays of wealth, emphasis upon differences of education 


414 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


and culture as though these were the natural heritage of the rich, al] 
tend toward increasing both the worker’s feeling of inferiority and 
the hatred through which his envy is rationalized. To abolish 
provocation for this caste feeling would be one of the greatest serv- 
ices which the capitalist and employer could render to the cause of 
industrial harmony. 

But a more basic adjustment, a real change of attitude in in- 
dustry, is necessary before lasting harmony can be secured. There 
must be a partial abandonment of the diminishing returns principle 
upon which business is largely based. Instead of calculating the 
wages and benefits to be given the employees upon the basis of the 
vrofitableness of such measures to the firm, the basis must be the 
welfare of the human beings concerned. Interests of profit must 
be tempered by regard for the needs of the workers. This does not 
mean a socialistic control of industry; but merely a socialization of 
individual control. 

To state the matter in another way, big business should be 
administered with two purposes instead of one. These two pur- 
poses are profit making and social adjustment. Neither of them 
should be sacrificed wholly to the other, but both should be kept in 
view. There is no argument to justify unlimited acquisition of 
wealth or unrestricted return for capital or ability. Laissez faire, 
right to buy in the lowest market and sell in the highest, privilege 
of employing, paying and discharging as one pleases, are not natural 
and sacred rights of mankind. They are merely useful assumptions 
which may become rationalizations for greed. The capitalist 
stresses the justice of his scheme just as the socialist preaches the 
justice of the confiscation of capital. In the same manner both 
sides in the late war prayed to the same God, and each demanded 
from him the right of victory. There is no abstract or absolute 
Right which can be evoked to justify either side. The immediate 
personal needs of human beings sweep aside these rationalized 
fictions. Power for social control brings with it the obligation to 
exercise that power wisely and well. Corporations, therefore, 
which control the livelihood and destinies of thousands must face 
the responsibility of so ordering that control as to satisfy the needs 
of human life and bring contentment to their workers. 


SOCIAL BEHAVIOR IN RELATION TO SOCIETY 415 


We may summarize under four principles the basic requirements 
for a truly democratic social order. These are: (1) a fair chance 
for all; (2) reward according to value of the service rendered (a 
principle involving inevitable inequalities of reward); (3) the 
abolishment of inferiority attitude and envy among the members 
of the humbler vocations; and (4) the recognition by business and 
industry that their power for social control renders obligatory the 
adjustment of that control to the prepotent drives and psychologi- 
cal needs of their employees. 


SociAL CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 


The Concept of Social Heredity. In discussing social unity and 
control we have been concerned chiefly with problems of contem- 
porary social organization. The unity of society through time, or 
historical continuity from the past to the present, is another field of 
inquiry in social science. Here belong the stabilizing habits of past 
generations transmitted as customs, folkways, and laws. The 
continuity and development of the institutions of control also form 
a part of this study. These traditional safeguards of the indi- 
vidual’s needs have given society a stable and lasting character. 
Another heritage binding the present to the past is the body of 
transmitted culture embraced in science, arts, inventions, politics, 
literature, and philosophy. The acquisition of this knowledge from 
the elders affords to each generation valuable tools for the dis- 
covery of further knowledge. Hence, among peoples fortunate 
enough to produce geniuses originally or to acquire the beginnings 
of culture through contact with other peoples, cultural development 
has proceeded at a fairly geometrical rate. 

These two sets of transmitted influences, the laws or mores and 
the intellectual and material culture, have been figuratively but 
aptly included under the term ‘social inheritance,’ or ‘social he- 
redity.’ The importance of this concept is shown by considering 
the total inadequacy of the biological inheritance (the innate reac- 
tions of the new-born infant described in Chapter III) for adjust- 
ing the individual to his present environment. Human behavior 
would rest in an inconceivably primitive stage if these innate reflex 
mechanisms were not conditioned and modified in youth through 


416 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


the accumulated experience of past generations. By responding 
to present social stimuli conveying this experience the youth steps 
with seven league boots over the entire cultural history of mankind, 
and arrives at maturity a socialized twentieth-century man. 

The Social Character of the Individual’s Thinking. The stability 
of human society is best appreciated when we realize that thought 
itself has its origin in social contacts. Concepts, or symbol re- 
actions (p. 197), the essential tools of thinking, have evolved 
through language and have therefore a social origin. A word had 
its original use as a means of representing an object to another, and 
controlling another’s behavior with reference to that object (cf. pp. 
187-88). To the hearer it was originally a stimulus to assume an 
attitude for reacting to the object denoted in compliance with the 
intent of the speaker and in conformity with the attitudes of others 
toward the same stimulus. The word thus evokes a response to the 
represented object in its social setting (Mead). This fact gives to 
meaning itself a fundamental social significance. 

Concepts are therefore social in character: they denote or repre- 
sent objects common to all members of the group. The attitudes 
of response to these concepts (meaning) are moreover identical 
among all the group members. ‘Times, places, customs, heroes, 
natural processes, occasions for sentiment, and many other matters 
form common objects around which center the similar responses of 
all the members of the group.! Conformity of response further- 
more standardizes the usage of concepts and renders them resistant 
to rapid change. This stabilization accounts for the difficulty of 
establishing reforms of spelling or of systems of measure (Peterson). 
In the broader aspects also of thought we find an inseparable social 
significance. In order to comprehend a question in all of its bear- 
ings we must study the history of social discussion which has 
centered about it up to the present time (Ayers). 


1 Cf. Smith and Guthrie: General Psychology in Terms of Behavior, ch. 7. Such 
‘institutionalized objects’ and the common reactions toward them Professor Kantor 
regards as the main field of study for social psychology. This view, though sug- 
gestive, is, in the writer’s opinion, too narrow. It presents the communal aspects of 
human action; but it unduly neglects the great field of behavior in which another 
person (rather than a common object) is the essential stimulus. (See J. R. Kantor: 
**An Essay Toward an Institutional Conception of Social Psychology,” American 
Journal of Sociology, 1921-22, xxvu1, 611-27; 758-79; also, ‘‘How is a Science of 
Social Psychology Possible?”’ Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychol- 
ogy, 1922, xv11, 62-78.) 


SOCIAL BEHAVIOR IN RELATION TO SOCIETY 417 


The social nature of thinking has engaged the attention of phi- 
losophers, who have pointed out its profound significance for the 
theory of knowledge. The validity of human knowledge for 
ascertaining ultimate truth is conditioned by the social character 
of the instruments of knowledge. Reality is seen from the stand- 
point of human society. As Professor Ames has expressed it, 
“Consciousness is related to the order of nature in and through the 
social order.”’! This identity between the social attribute and 
reality in thinking is illustrated by the confusion existing in primi- 
tive minds between the name of a thing (social characterization) 
and the thing itself. A peasant is said to have remarked that the 
hardest thing for him to understand about astronomy was how they 
were able to find out what the names of the stars were! 

In the infant as in the human race the development of thought is, 
through language, inseparably connected with stimulation from 
the social group. So long as the baby cannot use words he has but 
slight possibility of noting the essential, common elements of various 
situations; for words are symbols by means of which such abstrac- 
tion 1s carried on. Language calls attention to these common ele- 
ments by assigning names to them.?. A word ‘fixes’ a workable 
concept for use in future analysis and generalization. It furnishes 
a handle by which to grasp the essentials of any new situation. 
The acquisition of concepts within the group thus gives the child a 
foothold for climbing the heights of knowledge which are his social 
inheritance. 

We may summarize the réle of language as a vehicle for social 
continuity in the following statements: (1) Language makes pos- 
sible the accumulation and recording of stabilizing and cultural 
tradition from generation to generation. (2) It gives a social 
aspect to meaning and to human knowledge through the commu- 
nity of behavior which it evokes toward the denoted objects. (3) It 
serves as a stimulus for controlling and modifying the individual’s 


1 **Social Consciousness and its Object,’’ Psychological Bulletin, 1911, v111, 407-16. 

2 For example, the writer’s child having seen a box turned over, and having been 
told that it was ‘upside-down,’ was later found lying on his back in his crib with feet 
in the air, remarking that he was ‘‘side-down in bed.”’ The previous use of the 
term had called his attention to an abstracted situation, namely, a position which any 
object might assume. The social environment, through language, had thus given 
him a new concept to think with. 


418 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


behavior through learning in accordance with the social inheritance. 
And (4) it equips the individual with the tools of thinking. 

Social Behavior in Discovery and Invention. The continuity of 
society in time does not require the transmission of ancestral hab- 
its in rigid, unalterable form. With changing environment, with 
increase of knowledge, and with the labor of geniuses there occurs 
a gradual change in the social order. The chief instrumentalities 
for this change are scientific discoveries and inventions. Through 
these a broader vision of man and nature is obtained, and needs are 
fulfilled upon a more efficient level. 

The interweaving of the social influence into human reasoning, 
while it gives solidarity and permanence to the group, produces 
also a fixity of thought habits and resistance to change. Attitudes 
of conformity further reinforce this conservative tendency. ‘The 
inventor and the discoverer, however, are more plastic in their 
thought responses than other men. They cast aside traditional 
impediments and conventional ways of thinking. They stand 
alone in the detachment from social influence from which they ap- 
proach their problems.! Stimuli evoke from them responses often 
quite at variance with the customary mode of human reaction. 
This fact is well illustrated by the invention of the cotton gin. 
Cotton producers had for a long time despaired of being able to 
produce a machine that would ‘extract the seeds from the cotton.’ 
It remained for a northern inventor, unfamiliar with cotton manu- 
facture, and therefore unhampered by fixed habits of thought, to 
think of a contrivance to take the cotton out of the seeds. 

While we are stressing the individuality of thought in the genius, 
it must not be forgotten that a social background of culture is 
absolutely necessary as a basis and starting point for his work. 
Few inventions are unique discoveries; most of them are perfections 
of previous discoveries. The steam’ engine has a history which 
extends from the second century B.c. to the present time. Watt 
was merely an outstanding figure among the many contributors to 
its development. The course of invention is similar to that of 


1TIn the act itself of thinking we have also seen that solitude is necessary for the 
highest attainment. Thinking carried out in a social group partakes of conversa- 
tional expansiveness and shows a subvaluent in quality (pp. 273-74). 


SOCIAL BEHAVIOR IN RELATION TO SOCIETY 419 


discussion (p. 289). The product of one inventor’s work is a 
stimulus which evokes a response in another. Unlike the case of 
discussion, however, the behavior which produces the stimulus may 
be widely separated in time and space from the response evoked. 
This response, as in discussion, is neither a mere duplication of the 
earlier work nor a wholly new production; it is a new turn given to 
the inventor’s thought by the product of an earlier inventor’s genius. 
A modification is discovered which better adapts the original inven- 
tion to the need which set both thinkers working. Without the 
stimulation of the earlier invention this particular turn of thought 
might never have been produced. 

There have been pointed out by Professor Creighton three as- 
pects from which social influences may be seen to have deter- 
mined scientific thinking. First, individual problems of any 
magnitude are also social problems. Universal human need sets 
the thinker to work. Secondly, stimulation of one individual by 
the behavior or the work of another (as described above) is of 
fundamental value. Various alternatives arise from the sugges- 
tions of various individuals, or from different points of view repre- 
senting the opinions of others, assumed by the thinker at different 
times. ‘Thirdly, the discovery must be phrased in language, and 
thus made susceptible of verification by others. Social confirma- 
tion is necessary to establish its validity. 

Leadership. Social change, as we have just seen, results from 
the products of the inventive, scientific, and artistic genius of 
special individuals. It results also from another type of personal 
agency, namely leadership. Leadership produces social change, 
not through contributions to knowledge or material culture, but 
through the immediate social behavior of the leader. Leadership, 
according to our present usage, means the direct, face-to-face con- 
tact between leader and followers: it is persona! social control. 
The promoter and organizer are leaders par excellence, for they 
compel others to carry out their suggestions. Persons of great 
social wisdom or inventive power often lack the ability to control 
others for the execution of their plans. For this reason we must 
distinguish between intellectual eminence and leadership. We 
shall use the term ‘leadership’ to mean the phenomenon of control 


420) SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


of the followers by the leader, rather than the personal trait, or 
traits, of the individual who leads. The latter will be discussed in 
a separate section. 

The most important factor in the rise of a leader is personal 
prestige. This, like economic prestige, is a phenomenon existing 
not in the person himself, but in the attitudes of others toward him. 
An illustration will make the matter clear. Suppose we go to a 
theater and witness the work of a talented young actor. Our 
emotions are stirred, and we carry away the impression that this 
man thoroughly understands his art; but it has not occurred to us 
that he is in any sense great. The next day our glance falls upon a 
placard in a shop window announcing the appearance of so-and-so 
(the actor we have seen) who is “now considered America’s Fore- 
most Tragedian.’’ Our former judgment is speedily reinforced by 
an impression of universality. We imagine the entire public to be 
talking about the ‘new star’ and accepting him with acclaim. He 
is no longer merely a good actor in our opinion, but a great actor. 
Attitudes of this type contribute to the fame and power of the 
leader. ‘The impression of universality through the press or rumor 
strengthens the belief in the superlative gifts which he is supposed 
to possess; and all who hear or read become submissive toward what- 
ever he may do or say. We may speak of this phenomenon as per- 
sonality-prestige to distinguish it from the ‘economic prestige’ of 
business firms. ‘The whole propaganda may of course be false, as 
is frequently the case in political leadership. Prestige lies rather in 
the social attitudes of those surrounding the person than in his own 
character. 

Symbolic devices add to the prestige attitude of followers toward 
their leader. The honorary title, the degree, the “shoulder straps’ 
of the army officer, and the crown and scepter of kings are examples 
of such symbolism. These objects represent power; they also estab- 
lish a transfer (conditioning) of the attitude usually evoked toward 
the power symbolized to the person who displays the symbols. 
The private is taught that in saluting the officer he is saluting the 
majesty of the American People. The prestige of the officer as an 
individual is greatly increased by exacting this form of salutation. 

Control through leadership is based largely upon the suggestion ; 


SOCIAL BEHAVIOR IN RELATION TO SOCIETY © 421 


process. Some leaders are merely ‘crowd exponents,’ who seize 
upon motives and attitudes already prepared in all, and use their 
personality-prestige to reinforce suggestions releasing these atti- 
tudes. Others are leaders in a more fundamental sense. They 
build up attitudes in the public which they lead, and educate their 
followers to adopt a course for the ultimate social good rather than 
for the immediate release of prepotent drives. The process re- 
quires patience, endurance, and greatness of mind, traits which are 
of higher worth than adventitious prestige of personality. Such 
‘group builders’ make use of all three phases of the suggestion 
process (ef. Chapter X). 

In leadership, as in all suggestion processes, it is necessary that 
all the inhibitions blocking the acceptance of the suggestion be 
overcome. Leadership thus knows no half-way stage: it is a 
matter of ‘all or none.’ While the public is with the leader it 
follows slavishly his every direction. His character is regarded as 
without flaw. He is the ideal. Such blind leader-worship has 
yielded grotesque results. This was the case, for example, in the 
election to the mayoralty of a great city of a favorite of the hour 
who had previously borne a prison record. When a few adherents 
begin to question the action of the leader his decline is precipitous. 
His suggestions fail to quell the antagonistic attitudes: therefore 
his power is lost. 

Since leaders usually secure their power through suggestion and 
crowd control, rather than through reason, one may question 
whether leadership is wholly desirable. It would doubtless be 
better if we could moderate its all-or-none character and introduce 
discriminating action among the followers. This change would, 
however, greatly restrict the power of the leader. It would also 
require a considerable campaign of education. People are more 
readily persuaded to follow as one of a crowd under a leader than 
to labor separately and constructively for some social end. As 
Professor Steiner has indicated, the rule by persuasive leaders who 
capitalize the mechanisms of crowd-influence stands in sharp con- 
trast to the enlightened coédrdination of individual effort in com- 
munity welfare.! While the latter method may be the more 


1**Community Organization and the Crowd Spirit,” Journal of Social REE Ey 


422 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


desirable, it is more remote from present realization. For the 
present we should perhaps be willing to use the inferior means; 
that is, crowd leadership, for the sake of the ends to be 
gained. 

Differences of ascendance, intelligence, social participation, and 
drive for control will probably always tend to produce leadership. 
Some fulfill their destinies in leading, others in following. Still an- 
other fact may be cited in favor of personal leadership. Whereas 
government is still based upon the negative or avoiding-response 
type of control, civic leadership employs the positive, approaching 
drives of human behavior as a means of achieving its ends. 

The Personality of the Leader. ‘Turning now to the qualities 
which characterize the leader, we find the trait of ascendance to be 
of paramount importance. Unless the leader assumes an ascend- 
ant, dominating rdéle, leadership in the sense here defined is im- 
possible. Men must be made to adopt a submissive attitude before 
they can be controlled by personal suggestion. The leader must 
be endowed in their minds with that personality-prestige described 
in the preceding section. Ascendance of manner is usually com- 
bined with physical power. Tallness of stature, though not always 
necessary, is of great service to leaders. It is true, however, that 
many leaders have been small or frail men. Lack of physical size 
is sometimes a direct basis for the development of compensatory 
traits of great energy and endurance. Other traits valuable to 
leaders are high motility (rapid and energetic reactions), tonus 
shown in gesture and ring of the voice (cf. p. 219), erect, aggressive 
carriage, tenacity, face-to-face mode of address, and the reinforce- 
ment of energy flowing from a fairly high emotional level. Feeling 
and outward action are, however, under perfect control; they are 
governed by a certain restraint which gives the impression of an 
unlimited reserve of power behind them. The true leader never 
gives the appearance of playing his last card. The characteristics 
described in this paragraph were probably in the mind of Emerson 
when he wrote that the highest greatness does not need works to 
reveal it, but is “ self-evident.” 


1923, 1, 221-26. The reader will find in this article a number of instructive examples 
of crowd control and its exploitation for the sake of community enterprise. 


SOCIAL BEHAVIOR IN RELATION TO SOCIETY 423 


Allied with the appearance of reserve power is the impression 
that there are intellectual resources or plans of action in the leader’s 
mind which are not comprehended by the ordinary man. This air 
of inscrutability increases submission of attitude through the awe 
of the unknown and the veneration of genius. There must, how- 
ever, be set up many points of contact between the leader and his 
followers. The apparent contradiction may be explained by say- 
ing that while the leader is expansive regarding the field of action 
which he dominates, he is reclusive concerning his personal life 
and underlying plans and motives. High intelligence is necessary 
for the constructive type of leadership. Even the demagogue 
must present the appearance of having greater knowledge of the 
situation than that possessed by the common man. 

The true leader also stands high in the group of traits described 
under sociality (Chapter V). He is keenly susceptible to social 
stimulation, and controls his constituents largely through his under- 
standing of their natures. His ascendance is moderated by tact 
and true zeal for the social welfare. Social participation is one of 
his strongest interests, although in mingling with and controlling 
the throng he holds his own private life somewhat aloof. Character 
in the ablest leaders is usually of a high order. The leader’s con- 
sciousness of social self is both strong and elevated. 

One of the central traits of the constructive leader is his drive. 
He is truly appreciated only in action; he leads 7n some cause. The 
project for which he stands is likely to be the key-note of his entire 
personality. Upon this he focalizes all his energy and ability. For 
this reason many leaders appear to be narrow in their intensity. 
This is especially true of revolutionary leaders such as Cromwell 
and Samuel Adams, and upon a lower plane, Robespierre, Alexan- 
der Dowie, and Carrie Nation. In such persons compensation for 
inferiority, moral inadequacy, or other defense attitudes, may be 
the causal factor behind their leadership in a particular issue (pp. 
373-74). High intelligence, ascendance, and motility sometimes 
accompany these factors of conflict and projection. Most crusade 
leadership is of this radical type. It may, of course, be productive 
of good if the drive of the leader allies itself with some objectively 
needed social change. For most constructive enterprises, however, 


424 ~ SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


and for social crises there is required a leader having a more sanely 
balanced and objective motivation. 

Popular Movements. A faction headed by a leader is usually a 
heterogeneous crowd or public. Many participants are probably 
actuated by the same constructive drive or projected conflict as the 
leader himself. Others join for different reasons, partly because, 
as Martin points out, the crowd-principles are framed in sufficiently 
general terms to be accepted as the goal of many and diverse 
motives. Unlike in origin, the drives of the multitude converge 
upon a single course of actron proposed by the leader. A large 
number of the followers of radical leadership are not individuals of 
radical personality. Their interest may have been won by the true 
merits of the proposed change. Nearly all popular movements are 
syntheses of diverse drives, conflicts, and sentiments in the public 
which participates. The leader evokes concerted action and gives 
definite aim to these individual forces. Social movements thus bear 
the stamp of both the genius and the personal bias of their leaders. 


LINES OF FutTuRE DEVELOPMENT 


Social Progress as the Well-Being of the Individual. Our 
outlined survey of social behavior in its relation to social phe- 
nomena is now completed. In conclusion there remain to be 
considered a few questions of a broad, ethical nature. What im- 
provements, we may ask, may be hoped for within the social order; 
and how may they be brought about? Many theories of social 
progress have been advanced. Most of them are conceived from 
the sociological point of view, that is, as improvements in the 
structure, organization, and controls of society as such. There has 
been postulated a super-organic evolution, working, not through 
morphological changes, but through human intelligence and culture, 
and advancing toward the goal of the perfect society. Several 
difficulties are encountered in this notion of the progress of society 
asa whole. First, the a priori principle of super-organic evolution 
and natural selection in groups as wholes is hypothetical, and at 
best very limited in modern life. Society is not necessarily pro- 
gressing in a fixed direction or toward a definite goal, but is chang- 
ing, now this way, now that, according to the laws of human be- 


SOCIAL BEHAVIOR IN RELATION TO SOCIETY 425 


havior interacting with environmental and personal agencies. A 
second objection to this notion of social progress is that we lack a 
standard for determining what the ideal society should be. Would 
not the perfect type of social order differ for every people and 
every age? Since we have no experience upon which to pattern 
our ideal of society as a whole, this ideal must necessarily remain a 
mere postulate. 

We can, however, judge the social order from the standpoint of 
its wnternal excellence, that is, from the perfection of the adjust- 
ments secured by the individuals who compose it. The good soci- 
ety is thus to be conceived as that which is good for its members. 
Its merit lies solely in their happiness. In the first chapter of this 
book we observed that the true psychological and organic entity is 
the individual, not the social group. We may now add that the 
unit of progress is not society as a whole, but again the individual. 
Social progress is merely an inexact term for the enhancement of 
individual welfare. 

What. then, is meant by individual welfare? In its broadest 
aspect this question has challenged philosophic thought since 
Socrates; and we cannot hope to solve it fully here. Some attempt, 
however, may be made to define this ‘highest good’ from a prac- 
tical and scientific viewpoint. Our thesis can perhaps be best 
presented through antithesis. The highest aim of life is not the 
achievement of an ideal of perfection. It is not the conquest of the 
‘Absolute’ over the finite and conditional, nor of ‘Reason’ over 
the so-called baser desires. It is not even the state of perfect satis- 
faction of every want. Attainments of this sort would bring human 
behavior to a static and inert condition, quite at variance with the 
fundamental laws of life. The drive behind accomplishment has 
always been the need to fulfill some prepotent demand not satisfied 
within the present environment. Maladjustment and struggle will 
probably continue to be the fountainhead of progress as long as 
the human race exists. Perfection of adjustment would therefore 
destroy the very stuff of which progress is made. ‘There is no 
escape from this venerable paradox. We are forced to recognize 
that the highest happiness lies not in the goal achieved, but in the 
perpetual sequence of struggle and achievement. 


426 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


Life is essentially a process of disturbing and restoring equilib- 
rium, of need and fulfillment. As derived drives, or interests, 
multiply,and diversify, the struggle for adjustment becomes a 
problem of ever-increasing complexity, and success in the struggle 
brings a richness and variety of satisfactions not experienced in 
the more primitive stages. The Summum Bonum lies not in an 
ultimate attainment, but in these very cycles of effort and success, 
new effort and further success, repeating themselves endlessly at 
ever newer and more intricate levels throughout life. Human 
progress is thus a process, eternally moving. Its current runs in 
the stream of life itself. The notion that it implies an ultimate 
and static goal is a philosophic fiction. 

The aim of life, moreover, is not one but many. ‘There are, first, 
the processes of adjustment of the drives which are fundamental 
in human behavior. Upon these are based a multitude of habits, 
or derived drives, all demanding satisfaction through use. ‘Tran- 
scending the bare essentials of physical existence, these drives 
pervade and enrich the great spheres of esthetic, religious, in- 
tellectual, and social development. All of these interests finally 
crave fulfillment. Abilities of all sorts, native and acquired, also 
present a claim for their realization in the tasks of life. Growth 
and learning produce an increasing complexity in the pattern, a 
complexity which demands an intricate and enlightened mode of 
adjustment. The best living, as in the old Greek view, consists in 
the fullest exercise of this behavior equipment in the struggles and 
satisfactions of life. 

Our conception of progress is therefore to be individual rather 
than collective, dynamic in aim rather than static, a struggle re- 
warded by tentative adjustment rather than perfect and final 
adjustment. It is a process, biological and mechanistic. It is 
the exercise of a plurality of living functions, rather than the pur- 
suit of a single fixed and transcendental goal. 


Summary: Social Behavior in Relation to Progress. Progress is / 


therefore in the fullest sense an increased success in living. It 
means that one is to be faced with problems of ever-increasing 
complexity, but problems which one has the power to solve, and 
which in the solving yield a wider and richer range of approaching 


SOCIAL BEHAVIOR IN RELATION TO SOCIETY 427 


responses and enjoyments. Conflicts which diminish our power to 
solve these problems must be removed by effective resolution. A 
final common path must be discovered which releases in modified 
form both the socialized habit and the primitive drive which op- 
poses it. Justice is required for all phases of human nature if our 
functional ideal of progress is to be realized. 

A nice balance of socialization and adjustment is therefore re- 
quired within the individual. Release must be accorded to all the 
prepotent reactions. At the same time, this release must be so 
modified by early social environment and by control through social 
institutions that it does not obstruct the release of the same re- 
sponses in others. Wholesome expression of the vital activities in 
each individual must work hand in hand with the socialization of 
his behavior for the sake of others. The progress of the individual, 
however, must not be thwarted by an over-socialized or socialistic 
control of each by all. Though drives be socially modified they 
must still operate in a field of fair competition in which differences 
of ability and industry receive their reward. 

Among the derived drives or habits acquired early in life and 
operating almost with the force of innate reactions, the drives for 
social contact and approval stand out conspicuously. The presence 
of others has conditioned not only our withdrawing reaction (moral 
behavior), but also our pleasurable, approaching responses. We 
have learned to love society for itself. Fostering this type of de- 
velopment contributes richly to the life of the individual; for he 
lives in a sense in the pleasures and adjustments of others as well 
asin hisown. Primary sociability groups and a socialized plan of 
education are means which are useful toward this end. Personal 
control, conversation, suggestion, sympathy, and humor are among 
the processes which may be used to inculcate traits of sociability. 
The social drives should be directed early toward the fixation of 
desirable traits of character. For the socially inclined, incentives 
may be readily discovered for establishing approved habits as well 
as deterrents from conduct which meets with social disapproval. 

The danger of over-development of the social drives through 
childhood training must also be recognized. Love which is fixated 
_ too strongly upon the parent may thwart the normal expression of 


428 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


the sex drive in maturity. Exaggerated submission to elders or 
to religious teaching has.an equally unfavorable effect upon the 
struggle responses. Over-socialization within the family produees 
weak, subdued, and emotionally unstable personalities. Rapport 
of the child with the parent should offer a means for the training of 
capacities and the assimilation of desirable character traits. Yet 
this must be done without forming attachments so strong as to 
lead to serious conflict in mature life. 

The individual’s attitude toward reality and toward the social 
sphere may be made an asset in his progressive adjustments. 
Were every human being to acquire insight, and to see himself as 
he truly is, projected inadequacies, leading to destructive social 
conflicts, would be abolished. Constructive compensatory effort 
would become the rule. A false or deluded ideal of self should not 
hide from the individual his true nature. The desire to establish’ 
attitudes of social approval toward one’s self is a spur to the 
highest self-development. But this is only true provided the drive 
is to merit as well as to attain the esteem of others. Honesty with’ 
one’s self concerning one’s traits, abilities, and position should be 
inculeated by special training in home and school. The possession 
of insight is a prerequisite for harmonious social adjustment. 

The response to social stimulation in the group and crowd is also’ 
significant for the theory of individual well-being. Social facilita- 
tion may be used to increase codperative achievement instead of 
being left to the devices of the orator. The impression of univer- 
sality and attitude of conformity have a higher mission than the 
spread of propaganda and crowd hatreds; they may be employed to 
reinforce ethical conduct and social standards chosen wisely and 
for the good of all. It is imperative that the press and other agents 
of publicity cease to foster the belief that people are universally 
interested in wasteful fashions, sentimentalities, hysterical hatreds, 
fears, scandals, and murders. ‘There is need, instead, of estab- 
lishing the belief that socialized and progressive attitudes are becom- 
ing universal and therefore imperative for the individual. 

Socialized freedom for life adjustments may be promoted by 
emancipating the individual’s moral standards from crowd in-— 
fluence. Broad and successful living forbids us to rationalize our’ 


SOCIAL BEHAVIOR IN RELATION TO SOCIETY 429 


private cheatings and hostilities into acts of social justice through 
the support of a crowd whose members all desire the same excuse. 
The truly moral man does not require such self-deception. For 
him the right is identical with the welfare of all, not with the 
desire of his particular faction. Public opinion and standards of 
thought and conduct are in need of similar emancipation. We 
must live our lives to the satisfaction of our own ideals, with pro- 
found respect for the rights of others, but without regard for their 
prejudices and crowd-like intolerance. Only with clear insight 
and unfettered by crowd-control can we fully realize our possibili- 
ties for successful living. 

Correction of abuses in the social institutions and in the sex 
relationship is a further means of releasing the capacities for a well- 
rounded hfe. Economic controls should be made to relinquish 
their exploitation of prepotent drives and conflicts for private gain. 
Business interests must cease to prey upon human suggestibility 
and debauch both popular ideals and art. Workers must be freed 
from the stigma and the self-accusation of inferior social caste. 
There is needed also the recognition of the moral independence of 
the growing girl and the release of woman from her dwarfing sub- 
jugation to a male code of rationalized chivalry. The institution 
of government can be made an affair of popular social participation, 
rather than an agency for inculcating fear and repressing vital 
tendencies. For religion there are greater possibilities of social 
service than the pampering of weakness and the control of the 
individual through attitudes of moral inferiority and thwarted 
sexual desire. The church can be made an instrument for the 
amelioration of social adjustments rather than a means of escape 
from them. And finally, through the socialization of the school, 
educational aims, methods, and curricula can be turned to the 
service of progressive living. 

In all of these ways social behavior and the social inheritance can 
be brought into the service of more adequate adjustment. The 
individual, through such reforms, will be assisted in carrying on the 
advancing cycle of problem and solution, of need and fulfillment. 
He will be enabled, moreover, to carry it on in coéperation with his 
fellows, and through the needs and satisfactions of the social life 


430 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 


itself. But this is not all. Social continuity teaches us that the 
social behavior and adjustments of one generation are, if successful, 
handed on to posterity as useful rules of living. We thus live on 
in the habit systems of succeeding generations in proportion to the 
value of our contribution to the social order. The stimulations 
which our behavior gives to others are perpetuated in a vital tradi- 
tion for the guidance of the ages to come. Life is enriched not 
only through the scope of one’s own adjustments, but through the 
influence of those adjustments re-embodied in the lives of others. 
Progress which is the achievement of the individual becomes the 
heritage of the ages. 


REFERENCES 


Social Unity, Groups, Community, Social Classes: 

Ellwood, C. A., An Introduction to Social Psychology, chs. 2, 4, 5. 

Cooley, C. H., Social Organization, parts 1, Iv. 

Minsterberg, H., Psychology, General and Applied, chs. 16, 17, 19. 

Bogardus, E. 8., Essentials of Social Psychology (2d ed.), chs. 11-13. 

Boodin, J. E., “The Unit of Civilization,” International Journal of Ethics, 
1920, xxx, 142-59. 

Wright, H. W., ‘“The Basis of Human Association,” Journal of Philosophy, 
Psychology, and Scientific Methods, 1920, xvu1, 421-30. 

Steiner, J. F. (A series of articles on community organization), Journal of 
Social Forces, 1922-23, 1, 11-18; 102-08; 221-26. 

Douglass, H. P., The Little Town. 

Groves, E. R., Rural Problems of Today. 


The Psychology of Race and Nationality: 
Le Bon, G., The Psychology of Peoples. 
Fouillée; A. Equisse psychologique des peuples européens. Paris. Alcan, 
1914. 
Brigham, C. C., A Study of American Intelligence. 
Shepherd, W. R.., ‘“The Psychology of the Latin American,” Journal of Race 
Development, 1919, rx, 268-82. 
Tolfree, A. G., “‘The Russian Character,” Aélantic Monthly, 1918, cxx1, 
596-600. 
Ellis, G. W., ‘The Psychology of American Race Prejudice,” Journal of 
Race Development, v, 297-315. 
Thomas, W. I., ‘‘The Psychology of Race-Prejudice,’’ American Journal of 
Sociology, 1904, 1x, 593-611. 
“Race Psychology: Standpoint and Questionnaire with Particular 
Reference to the Immigrant and the Negro,’ American Journal of Sociol- 
ogy, 1912, xv, 725-75. 





SOCIAL BEHAVIOR IN RELATION TO SOCIETY 431 


Pillsbury, W. B., The Psychology of Nationality and Internationalism. 

McDougall, W., The Group Mind. 

Partridge, G. E., The Psychology of Nations. 

Hocking, W. E., Morale and its Enemies, chs. 3, 6, 10, 12. 

Brown, H. C., “Social Psychology and the Problem of a Higher National- 
ity,” International Journal of Ethics, 1917-18, xxvut, 19-30. 

Gault, R. H., Social Psychology, chs. 4, 5, 10, 11. 


Psychological Theories of the Nature of Society: 

Ellwood, C. A., Introduction to Social Psychology, ch. 14. 

Tarde, G., The Laws of Imitation (translated). 

Le Dantec, F., L’égoisme, base de toute société. Paris. E. Flammarion, 1912. 

Hirst, E. W., Self and Neighbor. 

Northcott, C. H., “The Sociological Theories of Franklin H. Giddings,” 
American Journal of Sociology, 1918, xxiv, 1-23. 

Giddings, F. H., “ Pluralistic Behavior,” American Journal of Sociology, 1920, 
xxv, 385-404; 539-61. 

Davis, M. W., Psychological Interpretations of Society. 


Unorganized Social Controls (General) : 

Gault, R. H., Social Psychology, ch. 8. 

Dewey, J.. Human Nature and Conduct, part I. 

Ross, E. A., Social Psychology, chs. 4-16. 

Patrick, G. T. W., “The Psychology of Crazes,’’ Popular Science Monthly, 
XVIII, 285-94. 

Bogardus, E. 8., Essentials of Social Psychology (2d ed.), chs. 7, 8. 

Ginsberg, M., The Psychology of Society, chs. 7, 8, 10. 

Anonymous, “‘War-time Prosecutions and Mob Violence Involving the 
Rights of Free Speech, Free Press, and Peaceful Assemblage.” Nationa: 
Civil Liberties Bureau, New York. 


Public Opinion: 

Cooley, C. H., Social Organization, part 11. 

Shepard, W. J., ‘Public Opinion,’ American Journal of Sociology, 1909-10, 
Xv, 32-60. 

Ross, E. A., Soctal Psychology, ch. 22. 

Sageret, J., ‘‘L’Opinion,”’ Revue Philosophique, 1918, Lxxxv1, 19-88. 

Yarros, V. 8., ‘‘The Press and Public Opinion,” American Journal of Sociol- 
ogy, 1899-1900, v, 372-82. 

Cobb, F. I., ‘“‘ Public Opinion.” Senate Document, no. 175 (66th Congress, 2d 
session). Govt. Printing Office, Washington. 


Social Organization and Control (General) : 
Wallas, G., The Great Society. 
Cooley, C. H., Social Organization, part v. 
Ross, E. A., Social Control. 
Baldwin, J. M., The Individual and Society. | 
Williams, J. M., Principles of Social Psychology. 
Edman, I., Human Traits and their Social Significance, part 11. 


432 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY — 


Social Control through Government: 
Rivers, W. H. R., Psychology and Politics. 
Wallas, G., Human Nature in Politics. 
Martin, E. D., The Behavior of Crowds, 7-10. 
Cooley, C. H., Soczal Organization, part 11. 
Follett, M. P., The New State. 
“Community is a Process,’”’ Philosophical Review, 1919, xxvut, 576-88. 
Ginsberg, M., The Psychology of Society, ch. 11. 
Kern, R. R., ‘‘The Supervision of the Social Order,” American Journal of 
Soctology, 1918-19, xxiv, 260-88; 423-53. 
Le Bon, G., The Psychology of Revolution. 
Haynes, G. E., ‘Race Riots in Relation to Democracy,”’ Survey, August 9, 
1919, 697-99. 





Social Control through Education: 
Snedden, D., Educational Sociology. 
Smith, W. R., An Introduction to Educational Sociology. 

“The Sociological Aspects of our Educational Aims,” American 
Journal of Sociology, 1918, xxiv, 81-95. 

Dewey, John, The School and Society. 

“The Réle of Social Heredity in Education,” American Journal of 
Sociology, 1919, xxiv, 566-80. 

Lull, H. G., “Socializing School Procedure,” American Journal of Sociology, 
1919, xxiv, 681-91. 

Mead, G. H., “The Psychology of Social Consciousness Implied in Instruc- 
tion,’’ Science, N.S., 1910, xxx1, 688-93. 

Keatinge, M. W., Suggestion in Education. 








Social Control through Religion: 
Ellwood, C. A., The Reconstruction of Religion. 
McComas, H. C., The Psychology of Religious Sects. 
Davenport, F. M., Primitive Traits in Religious Revivals. 
Mecklin, J. M., “The Passing of the Saint,’”’ American Journal of Sociology, 
1919, xxiv, 353-72. 


Social Continuity and Change: 
Ellwood, C. A., Introduction to Social Psychology, chs. 7, 8. 
Edman, I., Human Traits and their Social Significance, ch. 11. 
Sumner, W. G., Folkways. 
Kidd, B., The Science of Power. 
Ogburn, W. F., Social Change. 


The Social Character of Thinking: 
Mead, G. H., “A Behavioristic Account of the Significant Symbol,” Journal 
of Philosophy, 1922, x1x, 157-63. 
“Social Consciousness and the Consciousness of Meaning,” Psycho- 
logical Bulletin, 1910, vi1, 397-405. 
“What Social Objects must Psychology Presuppose?” Journal of 
Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods, 1910, vit, 174-80. 








SOCIAL BEHAVIOR IN RELATION TO SOCIETY 433 


“The Mechanism of Social Consciousness,” Journal of Philosophy, 
Psychology, and Scientific Methods, 1912, tx, 401-06. 

Creighton, J. E., ““The Social Nature of Thinking,” Philosophical Review, 
1918, xxvir, 274-95. 

Peterson, J., “The Functioning of Ideas in Social Groups,’’ Psychological 
Review, 1918, xxv, 214-26. 

Pintner, R., “Community of Ideas,” Psychological Review, 1918, xxv, 402- 
10. 

Ayers, C. E., “The Epistemological Significance of Social Psychology,”’ 
Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods, 1918, xv, 35-44. 





The Psychology of Leadership and Invention: 

Leopold, L., Prestige: A Psychological Study of Social Estimates. 

Terman, L. M., “The Psychology and Pedagogy of Leadership,” Pedagogical 
Seminary, 1904, x1, 413-51. 

Gault, R. H., Social Psychology, ch. 9. 

Cooley, C. H., Human Nature and the Social Order, ch. 9. 

Baldwin, J. M., Social and Ethical Interpretations, chs. 3-5. 

Bogardus, E. 8., Essentials of Social Psychology (2d ed.), chs. 9, 19. 

Harlow, R. V., “A Psychological Study of Samuel Adams,” Psychoanalytic 
Review, 1922, rx, 418-28. 

Taussig, F. W., Inventors and Money-Makers. 

Royce, J., ‘The Psychology of Invention,” Psychological Review, 1898, v, 
113-14. 

Haines, T. H., ‘‘The Cross-Breeding of Ideas as a Factor in Invention,” 
Mental Hygiene, 1922, v1, 83-92. 


The Theory of Social Progress: 
Ellwood, C. A., Introduction to Social Psychology, ch. 13. 
Todd, A. J., Theories of Social Progress. 
Miinsterberg, H., Psychology and Social Sanity. 
Patrick, G. T. W., The Psychology of Social Reconstruction. 
Dewey, J.,. Human Nature and Conduct, part Iv. 
Bernard, L. L., ‘““The Conditions of Social Progress,’ American Journal of 
Sociology, 1922, xxvii, 21-48. 
Kempf, E. J., The Autonomic Functions and the Personality, part Iv. 


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INDEX 


Adjustments, and sex conflict in fam- 
ily life, 345-67; based on difference 
of structure, 154-55; between broth- 
ers and sisters, 365; between hus- 
band and wife, 348-53; between par- 
ents and children, 353-54; race and 
racial, 386-88. 

Adrenal glands, excited by sympa- 
thetic impulses, 88. 

Adrenin, in relation to sympathetic 
impulses, 88. 

Advertising, appeals to sex in, 408 n.; 
as a form of social control, 408-09. 

Afferent modification, of sensitive zone 
reflexes, 68-69; of sex reaction in 
pigeons, 71; of sexual reflexes, 70- 
72 

Aggregation, human, no single theory 
of, 391; origin of, 389; two types of, 
260. 

Aggressiveness, measurement of, 135. 

Allied reflexes, description of, 37-39. 

Allport, G. W., average deviation in 
rating subjective aspects, 129; free 
word association, 134; measurement 
of ascendance, 134; negative corre- 
lation between radicalism and in- 
sight, 372 n.; self-rating of personal- 
ity, 129; with Allport, F. H., types 
in field of self-expression, 138. 

Ambivalence, defense against parent 
fixation, 358. 

Ames, relation of consciousness to na- 
ture, 417. 

Anger, adjustments in, 341-45; atti- 
tudes recognized in, 95; importance 
of wit and humor as outlet for, 344; 
inhibition of, through sex activities, 
349; introversion of, 342 n.; ration- 
alized, 344-45; response, three types 
of, in Richardson’s studies, 342. 

Antagonistic reflexes, description of, 
37-39; self-control based upon, 60. 


Apes, and monkeys, social behavior of, 
160-63. 

Aphasia, nature of, 30. . 

“ Appetition,’ explanation of term, 
62. 

Approaching responses, 61-63; for- 
mula applicable to, 62-63; modifica- 
tion of, 63. 

Articulate speech, formation of, 177- 
78. 

Articulation, random, 181-83. 

Ascendance, and submission, traits 
of self-expression, 119-21; genetic 
phase of, 120; illustrations of, 120- 
21; in the leader, 422; leading condi- 
tions of, 119-20; measurement of, 
134-35; relation of, to yielding re- 
sponse, 61; and submission between 
brothers and sisters, 365; and sub- 
mission, In face-to-face groups, 286; 
and submission, in rivalry, 281, 282. 

Ascendant-submissive relation, among 
pigeons, 160; effect of muscle forms 
on, 220; in friendships, 367. 

Association, areas in cortex, 29; influ- 
ence of co-acting group on speed of, 
270-72. 

Attention, influence 
group upon, 262-70. 

Attitudes, allied and antagonistic 
responses in release of, 246; forma- 
tion of, 244-45; instance of forma- 
tion and release of, 247; suggestion 
in formation of, 245-46; sugges- 
tion in release of, 246-47; toward 
women, 345-48; ways in which sug- 
gestion controls bodily, 245. 

Audience, relation of speaker to, 303; 
social behavior in, 301-03. 

Autonomic interests, as drives in 
learning, 63-64; relation to ‘de- 
rived drives,’ 65-66. 

Autonomic and cerebro-spinal system, 


of co-acting 


436 


INDEX 


diagram showing relations of neu-| Brain, parts of, 25-30; vertical median 


rons in, 34; diagram suggesting in- 
terrelations between, 36. 

Autonomic system, 31-37 ; control of fa- 
cial expressions by, 212; cranial divi- 
sion of, 32; cranio-sacral division of, 
35; diagram of more important dis- 
tributions of, 87; function of, 23; 
relation to affective quality of emo- 
tions, 86; relation of, to cerebro- 
spinal system, 35-37; sacral divi- 
sion of, 35; sympathetic portion of, 
32-35; three divisions of, 32-35. 

Auto-rivalry, 282. 

Average deviation, in rating of person- 
ality, 128, 129. 

Aversions, rationalization of, 
345. 

Avoiding responses, biological func- 
tion of, 61. 

Axone, and dendrite, subsequent to 
birth, 45; described, 20-21. 

Axone terminations in the spinal cord, 
24. 

Ayers, history of social discussion, 
416. 


344, 


Baldwin, child’s consciousness of other 
selves, 331; on imitation, 239; on 
suggestion, 242. 

Behavior, adaptive function of, 17-18; 
compound reflexes in, 37-40; defin- 
ition and nature of symbol in terms 
of, 55-56; defined, 17, 147; essential 
formula for, 1; in social psychology, 
11-12; involved by social stimulus 
in two ways, 148; physiological 
basis of human, 17-41; reflex are the 
functional unit of, 18; social and 
non-social, 3-4; sociological aspects 
of animal, 163-67. See also Social 
behavior. 

Behavior viewpoint, advance in psy- 
chology due to, 3. 

Blanton, earliest used consonants, 181. 

Bodily control, potency of spoken 
language in, 243-44. 

Boodin, J. E., on the community, 
384. 


section of, 27. 

Breed, F.S., and Shepard, J. F., exper- 
iments in pecking response of chicks, 
45 n., 46; interpretation of pecking 
responses different from that of, 
47 n. 

Burtt, H. E., accuracy of judgment 
after discussion, 290 n. 

Business, social control and exploita- 
tion in, 408-10. 


Cannon, energizing effects of emotion, 
97; on adrenin, 86; sympathetic 
ganglia as protective barriers, 90. 

Caste, and social class, 384-86. 

Cattell, J. M., average deviation in rat- 
ing subjective aspects, 129. 

Cerebellum, nature and function of, 
26. 

Cerebral hemispheres, description of, 
26-27. 

Cerebro-spinal system, 23, 31; and 
autonomic system, diagram of inter- 
relations between, 36, 62, 84; and’ 
autonomic system, diagram showing 
relations of neurons in, 34; relation 
of, to autonomic system, 35-37. 

Chain reflex, nature of, 39. 

Character, in relation to personality, 
124-25; measurement of, 135-36; 
physiognomy as an indication of, 
220. 

Child-parent fixation, personal and 
social significance of, 361-64; uni- 
versality of, 361-62. 

Christianity, appeal of love in, 405. 

Circular reflex, nature of, 39. 

City life, effect upon social behavior, 
383. 

Class, occupational distinctions of, 
385-86. 

Class system, comparison of, in Eng- 
land and America, 385. 

Classroom, co-working relation in, 404; 
face-to-face relation in, 404; moral 
attitudes in, 403; rivalry in, 404. 

Coefficients of correlation, 131-32. 

Commensalism, meaning of, 155. 


INDEX 


Commercial attitudes, social behavior 
in, 407-08. 

Community, social behavior in relation 
to, 384. 

Comparison, influence of co-working 
group on judgments of, 274-78. 

Compensation, as a trait of self- 
expression, 111-15; combined with 
rationalization, 113-15; criteria for 
true traits of, 115; frequency of oc- 
currence, 113-14; in kind, 112; ten- 
dency to over-correction in, 114; two 
general forms of, 112-13; vicarious 
types of, 113. 

Competition, between groups, 282. 
Compound reflexes, diagram showing 
types of, 38; in behavior, 37-40. 
Concealment, relation to withdrawal 

reflex, 54. 

Concepts, social nature of, 416. 

Conditioned reflex, nature of, 39-40; 
significance of, 40. See also Condi- 
tioned response. 

Conditioned response, in custom, 394— 
95, 395 n.; in development of lan- 
guage, 183-87; in development of so- 
cial self, 331; in emotional reaction, 
96-97 ; in evoking love emotion, 356- 
57; in imitation, 240; in origin of 
language, 194-95; in parental love, 
74; in social control, 392; in social 
facilitation, 284; in social stimuli, 
76; in suggestion, 247-48; relation 
to approaching responses, 62. 

Conditioning, of sensitive zone re- 
sponses, 357. 

Conflict, between egoistic drives and 
social standards, 374-76; between 
parents and children, Freudian con- 
ception of, 354-55; revolution as an 
overt, 399; socialization a force in 
all covert, 377, 378, 379; sociological 
aspects of adjustment of, 374-79; 
subject of individual, tabu for so- 
ciety, 377 n.; symptom of sociali- 
zation or degeneracy, 377-79. 

Conflicts, between egoistic drives and 
group traditions, 376; covert, in hos- 
tility between groups, 377; main pre- 


437 


potent drives in major, 341; major, 
and their social adjustment, 341. 

Conformity, and submission in crowds, 
298, 300; in the community, 384. 

Conklin, ‘foster-child’ fantasy, 364, 
365. 

‘Conscience,’ and consciousness of so- 
cial self, 327. 

Consciousness, in social psychology, 
11-12; relation to biological need, 2, 
2 n.; value of in study of behavior, 
oO. 

Conservatism, of crowd man, 304-05; 
two definitions of, 304. 

Consonants, chart showing classifica- 
tion of English, 178; formation of, 
177-78; table showing classification 
of English, 178. 

‘Contagion,’ 296-98. 

Convention, social conformity in, 394; 
unorganized form of social control, 
394. 

Conversation, and discussion, 288- 
90; emotional tension in, 321 7.; ex- 
pansion and control through, 288— 
89; imperfect form of social control, 
392. 

Conversationalist, qualities of good, 
290. 

Cooley, “looking-glass self,’’ 325. 

Codéperation, among animals, 165, 166. 

Corpus striatum, description of, 28. 

Correlation, coefficients of, 131-32; of 
personality tests, 131; of ratings in 
field of self-expression, 1388-39, 138 
n.; of traits of personality, 137-39. 

Cortex, 26; areas of, 28-30; contribu- 
tions of, to social behavior, 31; func- 
tions of, 28-30; relation of, to pre- 
potent reflexes, 55-56; relation of 
thalamus to, 28. 

Craig, W., attack on Darwin’s expres- 
sional theory, 212 n.; on defensory 
character of fighting, 58 n., 59 n. 

Cranio-sacral system, division of auto- 
nomic, 35;pleasant emotions brought 
about by, 89;related to pleasant emo- 
tions, 86-87; relation to facial ex- 
pressions, 212. 


438 


Craze, unorganized form of social con- 
trol, 393, 394. 

Credit, and panic, 407-08. 

Creighton, J. E., social influences de- 
termining scientific thinking, 419. 
Crile, explanation of laughter, 255 n. 
Cortical activity, in determining suc- 
cessful responses, 55-56; in social 

behavior, 30-31. 

Crowd, allied and antagonistic re- 
sponses in, 309-12; and co-acting 
group, distinction between, 292; and 
face-to-face group, distinction be- 
tween, 292; and hypnotism, 304; as 
strugyle group, 294; attitude of self- 
importance in, 316; attitudes of, and 
public opinion, 308-09; attitudinal 
and imaginal factors in behavior of 
individual in, 305-09; conditioned 
circular reflex in emotion of, 297 n.; 
conservatism of man of, 304-05; con- 
version of industrial group into, 411; 
distinguished from group, 260; effect 
of flattery on member of, 316 7.; 
egotism fostered by , in community, 
384; formation of, in religious wor- 
ship, 406; hatred of, 314-15; hunger 
reaction in, 293; impression of uni- 
versality in, 305-07; individual as 
raison d’étre of, 295-96; individual 
factors neglected in theories of, 295- 
96; influence of, in revolution, 400; 
intolerance of, 315; law-making bod- 
ies readily converted into, 401; Mar- 
tin’s principles of behavior of, 314— 
17; mechanisms for release of pre- 
potent reactions in, 309-17; mental 
imagery in, 306; moral consciousness 
of man in, 312-13; personal identity 
in, 312 n.; prepotent reactions as ba- 
sis of phenomena of, 293-96; release 
and heightening of individual reac- 
tions in, 296-305; resolution of indi- 
vidual conflicts in, 309-12; response 
to social stimulation in, 292-318; sit- 
uation of, described, 292; social con- 
trol through, 397-98; social facilita- 
tion in, 298-300; social projection in, 
306-08; spatial factors and circular- 


INDEX 


ity in, 301-03; submission and con- 
formity in, 298, 300, 304; suggestion 
and suggestion consciousness in, 303- 
04; summary of behavior of, 317-18; 
summary of explanation of excite- 
ment of, 299; two objections to social 
facilitation theory, 299-300; with- 
drawal reaction in, 293. 

Crewd ethics, in vocational and frater- 
nal groups, 313-14; instance of, 
314 n. 

Crowd mind, objections to theories of, 
4-5, 

Custom, conditioned response in, 394- 
95, 395 n.; habit explanation for en- 
forcing of, 394; unorganized form of 
social control, 394—95. 


Darwin, examination of direct effects of 
nervous system, 212; examination of 
principle of antithesis, 212-13; exam- 
ination of principle of serviceable as- 
sociated habits, 213-14; Expression of 
Emotionin Man and Animals, 225 n. ; 
minetic theory implied in expres- 
sional theory of, 215 n.; reinterpre- 
tation of expressional theory of, 211— 
15; three principles of facial expres- 
sion, 210-11. 

Davenport, F. M., instance of forma- 
tion and release of attitude, 247; 
Primitive Traits in Religious Revivals, 
406 n. 

Dendrites, and axones, subsequent to 
birth, 45; described, 20-21; in the 
spinal cord, 24. 

Discovery, and invention, social be- 
havior in, 418-19. 

Discussion, and conversation, 288-90; 
constructive results through, 289; 
Miinsterberg and Burtt on accuracy 
of judgment after, 290 n. 

Downey, June, correlations in self- 
expression, 139; on inhibition, 106; 
testing scale of personality traits, 
132-33. 

Drive, central trait of the leader, 423; 
definition of, 109; egoistic or un- 
socialized, 310; example a source of, 


INDEX 


110; illustrated in Stlas Marner, 
110 n.; physiology of, 109; socialized, 
311; trait of self-expression, 109- 
11. 

Drives, conflicts between social stand- 
ards and egoistic, 374-76; con- 
flicts between group traditions and 
egoistic, 376; egoistic origin of, 
338 n.; enumeration of more com- 
mon, 111; fads and crazes based 
upon, 393; in origin of language, 
197; in primary groups, 286-88; 
prepotent, in major conflicts, 341; 
prepotent, in various crowds, 293- 
94; socialized and unsocialized, 338; 
solutions to thwarted, 111-12; spe- 
cial ability in formation of, 110; 
- warfare caused by thwarting of pre- 
potent, 401. 


Economic prestige, 407. 
Economics, social behavior and con- 
trol in sphere of, 407-15. 

Edipus, and Electra complexes, 361. 

Education, fuller recognition of social- 
ization in, 403; social control 
through, 402-04. 

Effector, response activity of, 17; de- 
scription of, 19, 20. 

‘Ego-Alter,’ theories of society, 389- 
90. 

Ejective consciousness, importance of, 
332. 

‘Ejective stage,’ in development of 
social self, 331, 331 n.; reaching of, 
302 N. 

Electra, and Edipus complexes, 361. 

Ellwood, ‘ psychological sociology,’ 11. 

Emotion, affective aspect of, 85; con- 
trol of, as a social problem, 97-98; 
danger of social suppression of, 98; 
energizing effects of, 97; nature of, 
84-85; of fear, sensations experi- 
enced in, 84-85; physiology of feel- 
ing and, 86-88; theory of feeling 
and, 89-94. 

Emotional attitude, test of, 133. 

Emotional level, three dimensions of, 
107-08. 


439 


Emotional reactions, differentiation of, 
91-93. 

Emotional response, social condition- 
ing of, 96-97. 

Emotional states, complex, in social 
behavior, 94-96; undifferentiated in 
new-born baby, 93. 

Emotions, among animals, 165; classifi- 
cation of, 85-86; conditions favoring 
arousal of unpleasant, 93-94; craniv- 
sacral system related to, 85-87; dif- 
ferentiating factor in, 85-86; effect of 
somatic postures in differentiating, 
92-93; introspective comparison of 
pleasant and unpleasant, 90; latency 
of unpleasant, 91; mixture of pleas- 
ant and unpleasant in, 95; prelimi- 
nary statement of theory of, 90; ‘pro- 
topathetic’ state of, 93; relation of 
autonomic system to affective qual- 
ity of, 86; statement of differentiat- 
ing factor in theory of, 91-92; sym- 
pathetic division determines un- 
pleasant, 86-87, 89. 

Erogenous zones, 68, 69. 

Espinas, Les Sociétés animales, 10 n. 

Esprit de corps, 283. 

Expansion, measurement of, 135. 

Expressions, genetic aspects and ex- 
tremes of sensitivity to bodily, 221- 
22; sensitivity of children to emo- 
tional and bodily, 222 n.; sketch 
showing elementary affective, 203; 
stimulus value of bodily, 221-30; 
through posture and physiognomy, 
219-21. See also Facial expression 
and Minetic expression. 

Exteroceptors, description of, 18. 

Extremes, avoidance of, in presence of 
group, 278. 

Extroversion, as a trait of self-expres- 
sion, 115-17; distinction between 
extraversion and, 117 n.; nature of, 
ee: 


Face, language of, 203-08. 

Facial expression, acquired functions 
of, 212; analysis of complex emo- 
tions in, 95 n.; Anger Group, 205-06; 


440 


Attitudinal Group, 208; chart giving 
synopsis of, 209; control of, by auto- 
nomic, 212; Darwin’s three principles 
of, 210-11; differences in ability to 
name, 226-30; Disgust Group, 206- 
07; dynamic and bodily compo- 
nents of, 208-10; effect of analysts in 
naming, 226-28; effect of tmetating in 
naming, 229; effect of reacting to sit- 
uations in naming, 228-29; experi- 
ments in reading, 222-30; general 
aspects of, 230; genetic aspects and 
extremes of sensitivity to, 221-22; 
methods used in identifying, 225- 
26; original functions of, 211; Pain- 
Grief Group, 204-05; pleasant and 
unpleasant, 203-04; Pleasure Group, 
207-08; principle of antithesis in, 2115; 
principle of direct action of nervous 
system in, 211; principle of service- 
able associated habits in, 210-11; rein- 
terpretation of Darwin’s theory of, 
211-15; relation of cranio-sacral and 
sympathetic divisions to, 212; six 
elementary roots of, 204; stimulus 
value of, 221-30; Surprise-Fear 
Group, 205; table showing effect of 
knowing how to analyze upon iden- 
tification of, 227; table showing or- 
der of identifiability of, 224; test, 
223; theory of, 210-19; three main 
questions in reading, 222-23. 

Facial muscles, description of, 200-03; 
diagram of, 201; expressive function 
of, 201-03; regional classes of, 200. 

Fad, unorganized form of social con- 
trol, 393-94. 

Familial behavior, sex and sensitive 
zone reactions in, 73-75. 

Family, as origin of society, 163-65; 
double function of hfe of, 3538; na- 
ture of love in, 354; sex conflict and 
adjustments in life of, 345-67. 

Fashion, impression of universality in, 
393; social conformity in, 393; unor- 
ganized form of social control, 392- 
93. 

Fear, effect upon flow of blood, 88; rec- 
ognized in what attitudes, 95; sensa- 


INDEX 


tions experienced *, emotion of, 84— 
85. 

Feeling, and emotion, theory of, 89- 
94; physiciogy of emotion and, 86- 
88. 


Feigning, among animals, 158-59. 

Feleky, Antoinette, identification of 
facial expressions, 224 n. 

Feminism, and psychological freedom, 
346. 

Fernald, G. G., measurement of char- 
acter, 135-36; test of capacity for 
achievement, 133. 

Fernald, W. E., personality of mental 
defectives, 127. 

Fighting, defensory character of, 58 n., 
o9 n. 

Fighting reactions, extension of stim- 
uli of, 59-60. 

Fixation, classes exhibiting parent, 
362-63; explanation of term, 356; of 
child’s love on parent of opposite 
sex, 360; personal and social signifi- 
cance of child-parent, 361-64. 

Flight, motor development of with- 
drawing reflex, 53. 

Follett, personal interest in govern- 
ment, 398. 

Fosbroke, G. E., Character Reading 
through Analysis of the Features, 
221 n. 

Freud, Sigmund, theory of laughter, 
255-57; significance of covert con- 
flicts, 338. 

Freudian theory, of conflict between 
parents and children, 354-55; re- 
statement of, 355-61. 

Friends, and associates, selection of, 
365-67; sex attraction in selection 
of, 365-66. 

Friendship, affection and social re- 
sponsiveness in, 366-67; ascendant- 
submissive relation in, 367; evok- 
ing of love habits by conditioning 
elements in, 366 n.; love impulse in, 
366; opposites of type in, 367; sig- 
nificance of motility in, 367. 

Fundamental Activities, conclusions 
regarding, 79-82; gregariousness 1 


INDEX 


development of, 77-78; imitation in 
development of, 76-77; origin of, 
42-43; reflexes involved in, 49-70; 
social factors in development of, 76- 
79, 81-82. 


Garner, language of apes, 161. 

Gault, R. H., image of self in primary 
groups, 333. 

Gesture, and vocal expression in human 
development, 189-98; as basis for 
origin of language, 190-91; graphic, 
in relation to infantile and primitive 
language, 191-93; graphic, instances 
of, 191 n.; three kinds of, 190. 

Gesture language, in infants, 178-79. 

Giddings, theory of society, 390. 

Glands, functions of, 19-20. 

Government, control of outside ene- 
mies through, 401; radicalism in re- 
lation to, 399; social control through, 
398-402; withdrawal reaction in re- 
lation to, 398. 

Greed, as an unsocialized trait, 340. 

‘Gregarious instinct,’ fallacies in the- 
ory of, 77-78. 

Gregariousness, habit an explanation 
of, 78; in development of fundamen- 
tal activities, 77-78. 

Griffith, C. R., effect of social stimuli on 
progress of classroom student, 302. 

Group, ascendance and submission in 
face-to-face, 286; avoidance of ex- 
tremes in presence of, 278; chart 
showing influence of co-working on 
attention and mental work, 268; 
chart showing influence of co-work- 
ing on speed of association, 271; co- 
acting and face-to-face, 260-61; 
comparison of influence of, on slow 
and on fast workers, 279; conflict 
between egoistic drives and social 
standards in, 374-76; conflicts be- 
tween egoistic drives and traditions 
of, 376; definition of, 260; denoting 
collection of individuals, 260 n.; 
diagram showing influence of co- 
acting on judgments of pleasantness 
and unpleasantness, 276; diagram 


441 


showing influence of co-acting on 
judgments of weight, 277; diagram 
showing influence of co-working on 
thought, 273; distinction between 
crowd and co-acting, 292; distinc- 
tion between crowd and _ face-to- 
face, 292; distinguished from crowd, 
260; fallacies, Freudian varieties 
of, 375 n.; influence of co-acting, 
261-85; F. H. Allport’s experiments, 
265-70; influence of co-acting in 
classroom, 404; Mayer’s tests, 262— 
63; Meumann’s experiments, 265; 
multiplication test, 267; influence 
of co-acting, on association, 270- 
72; influence of co-acting, on atten- 
tion and mental work, 262-70; in- 
fluence of co-acting, on judgment of 
odors, 274-76; influence of co-act- 
ing, on judgments of weight, 276- 
77; influence of co-acting, results 
of Allport’s tests, 267-70; influence 
of co-acting, reversible perspective 
test of attention, 266-67; influence 
of co-acting, Schmidt’s tests, 263- 
64; influence of co-acting, summary 
of experimental study of, 284-85; 
influence of co-acting, upon individ- 
ual’s movements, 261-62; influence 
of co-acting, vowel cancellation 
test, 266; influence of co-working, on 
judgments of comparison, 274-78; 
influence of co-working on thought, 
272-74; influence of face-to-face, 
285-90; influence of face-to-face in 
classroom, 404; nature of face-to- 
face, 285-86; primary, 286, 286 n.; 
primary, in relation to social be- 
havior, 384; primary, in small- 
town life, 383; reaction-getting 
habit in face-to-face, 287; social 
consciousness in co-working, 279; 
social control in face-to-face, 392; 
submission in presence of, 277; su- 
periority ascribed to a fiction, 385; 
thought hampered in co-working, 
274, 274 n. 

Group fallacy, biological forms of, 
9-11; psychological forms of, 4-9. 


442 


‘Group Mind,’ 8-9; objective idealists 
supporters of, 9 n. 

Groups, behavior in co-working, 410- 
11; social control, participation, and 
sex as drives in primary, 286-88. 

Groves, E. R., isolation of farm life, 
382. 

Guthrie, and Smith, perversion of 
exhibitionism, 287 n. 


Habit, acquisition through lowering of 
synaptic resistances, 63; an expla- 
nation of gregariousness, 78; expla- 
nation for enforcing of custom, 394; 
formation of, in relation to native 
endowment, 101; of manipulation, 
interpretation of, 66; prepotency in, 
65-66, 80. 

Habit systems, enumeration of im- 
portant, 80. 

Habits, an explanation of behavior, 
43; explanation of, 18; maternal and 
paternal, 75; of activity and passiv- 
ity, 61; pleasurable, based upon sen- 
sitive zone reactions, 68-69; relation 
of, to original reflexes, 538-54; sys- 
tems of, a source of personality, 101. 

Haggerty, word association test, 346. 

Hall, G. S., love rewards of woman, 
B51: 

Heck, W. H., “Comparative Tests 
of Home Work and School Work,” 
264 n. 

Hirst, E. W., theory of society, 389-90. 

Hollingworth, H. L., average devia- 
tion in personality rating, 129; self- 
rating of personality, 129; Vocational 
Psychology, 128 n. 

Hollingworth, L. §., ‘‘Echolalia in Idi- 
ots,” 186 n. 

Hormone secretions, from cells of Ley- 
dig, 69. 

Humor, stimulation of sensitive zones 
basis of, 255; submissiveness essen- 
tial in, 255; suddenness in, 253; the 
incongruous in, 252-254; types of, 
252-53. 

Humphrey, enforcing of custom, 394— 
95. 


INDEX 


Hunger, relation of sensitive zones to, 
67-68. 

Hunger reactions, 61-67; in crowds, 
293; opposition to, leads to struggle, 
60; the learning process in, 63. 

Hunger reflexes, development of, 64- 
65; relation to those of sex, 65. 

Hunter, F. T., theory of sex reactions, 
70 n. 

Hunter, W.S., on alteration of purpose 
of instincts, 67 n. 

Hyperkinesis, distinguished from im- 
pulsion and inhibition, 106. 

Hyperkinetic nature, description of, 
106. 

Hypnosis, as example of language con- 
trol, 243-44; effect of verbal sugges- 
tion illustrated by, 244. 

Hypnotism, and the crowd, 304. 

Hypocrisy, in social standards, 376. 


Ibsen, Pillars of Society, 327. 

Identification, examples of, 367 n. 

Imitation, analysis of acts to which 
term is applied, 239-42; and learn- 
ing, 77; conditioned responses in, 
240; description of uniformities of 
behavior, 242; in development of 
fundamental activities, 76-77; inex- 
actness of term, 239; lack of specofic 
instinctiwe tendencies to, 239-40; no 
general instinctive drive to, 241-42; 
not a method of motor learning, 
241; reaction to same stimulis cause 
of, 241; theory of society, 390-91. 

Impulsion, and inhibition, deduced 
from handwriting reaction, 132 n.; 
distinguished from hyperkinesis, 106. 

Individual, as unit in social behavior, 
139-41; raison d’étre of crowd, 295- 
96; release and heightening of reac- 
tions of, in crowd, 296-305; social 
psychology as science of, 4; the true 
organism, 10; the unit of progress, 
425. 

Individual behavior, social psychology 
as science of, 1-13. 

Individual differences, in facilitation, 
278-79. 


INDEX 


Induced Emotion, theory of, 296-98. 

Industrial conflict, 411-15; remedies 
for, 413-15. 

Industrial group, conversion into 
crowd, 411; social behavior in, 410, 
411. 

Infant, diagram of development of lan- 
guage habits in, 184; gesture lan- 
guage in, 178-79. 

Inferiority conflict, 368-74; as basis of 
revolution, 399; illustrated by news- 
paper clipping, 371; in economic 
sphere, 372-73; in intellectual sphere, 
369-72; in moral sphere, 373-74; in 
worker’s mind, 413-14; labor unions 
in relation to, 412; nature of, 368- 
69; projection in, 368, 368 n.; radical- 
ism an example of, 372-73; reform- 
ism a type of, 373-74; relief through 
religion, 405-06; types of, 369-74. 

Inhibition, and impulsion, deduced 
from handwriting reaction, 132 n.; 
distinguished from hypokinesis, 106. 

Insects, social behavior of, 155-57. 

Insight, advantages of, 118-19; as a 
trait of self-expression, 117-19; ra- 
tionalized motives an obstacle to, 
117-18. 

Instinct, an explanation of behavior, 
42-43; criteria of, 43-44; distinction 
between prepotent habits and, 80- 
81; need of genetic study in deter- 
mination of, 48-49; theory of behav- 
ior, weaknesses of, 81. 

Intelligence, and sociality, relation be- 
tween in intercorrelation of traits, 
137; as a trait of personality, 104- 
05; constructive imagination a fea- 
ture of, 104-05; definition of, 104; 
general adaptability a trait of, 105; 
motility a trait of, 105-07; nature 
of, 104-05; self-rating of personality 
and, 129-30; soundness of judgment 
a trait of, 105; special abilities in in- 
dividual, 105; symbol responses made 
possible by, 104. 

Interjectional theory, of origin of lan- 
guage, 193. 

Interoceptors, description of, 18. 


443, 


Introversion, advantages of, 116-17; 
as a trait of self-expression, 115-17; 
nature of, 116; parent fixation lead- 
ing cause of, 362; testing of, by free 
word association, 134. 

Invention, and discovery, social be- 
havior in, 418, 419. 


James, William, ‘ tender-minded’ class, 
362. 

James-Lange theory of emotion, 85, 
212: 

Jealousy, among brothers and sisters, 
365; basis of man’s, 347. 
Judgment, social influence 

276 n. 


upon, 


Kant, theory of humor, 253. 

Kantor, J. R., ‘institutionalized ob- 
jects,’ 416 n. 

Kempf, intelligence among monkeys, 
162-63; word association test, 346. 

Kent, free word association, 134. 

Kern, election of government officials, 
399. 

Kohs, ethical discrimination, 135. 


Labor unions, impression of universal- 
ity in, 411; in relation to inferiority 
conflict, 412. 

Langfeld, H. S., studies in facial ex- 
pressions, 223, 225. 

Language, among apes, 161; as vehicle 
for social continuity, 417-18; condi- 
tioned response in origin of, 194-95; 
conditioning of, by objects and sit- 
uations, 186-88; development of, 
181-88; development of response to, 
188-89; development of social con- 
trol through, 187-88; fixation of 
circular responses in development 
of, 182-83, 183 n.; function of ear- 
vocal reflexes in origin of, 194; ges- 
ture theory of origin of, 190-91; 
graphic gesture in relation to in- 
fantile and primitive, 191-93; ‘im- 
itation’ in development of, 183-86; 
in social union, 391; infantile and 
primitive, 189-90; interjectional 


444 


theory of origin of, 193: of the face, 
203-08; onomatopoetic theory of 
origin of, 193; original, among chil- 
dren, 195 n.; random articulation in 
development of, 181-83; rival the- 
ory of development of, 186 n.; social 
basis and value of, 196-98; social be- 
havior account of origin of, 193-95; 
social control in origin of, 193-94, 
197; potency of in bodily control, 
243-44; Stage 1 in development of, 
181-83; Stage 2 in development of, 
183-86; Stage 3 in development of, 
186-88; written, 195-96. : 

Language control, automatic nature 
of, 243-44. 

Language habits, diagram of develop- 
ment of, in infant, 184. 

Laryngeal tones, production of, 174- 
75; pitch and intensity of, 175-76. 
Larynx, description of, 172-74; dia- 
gram of, as seen from above, 173; 
diagrammatic view of, 172; effect 
of diameter of, on voices of males 
and females, 175 n.; functions of, 
174-77; laryngoscopic views of, 

174; vocal expression by, 179-81. 

Laughter, a social phenomenon, 257- 

58; as release of inhibited emotion, 

255-57; as release of pain, 254; cir- 

cularly conditioned responses in, 

258 n.; Freudian theory of, 255-57; 

Freudian theory of release through, 

341 n.; genetic origin of, 252-55; 

of crowd, three causes underlying, 

258; proportional to size of group, 

258. 

Law-making bodies, social behavior 
in work of, 401-02. 

Leader, ascendance in, 422; as ‘crowd 
exponent,’ 421; drive a _ central 
trait of, 423; high motility valuable 
to, 422; inscrutability of, 423; per- 
sonality of, 422-24. 

Leadership, advantages of personal, 
422; control through, based on 

_ process of suggestion, 420-21; in- 

| tellectual eminence and, 419; over- 
coming inhibitions in, 421; personal 


INDEX 


prestige in, 420; social change 
through, 419-22. 

Le Bon, G., conception of crowd, 295; 
gap between superior and inferior 
races, 386; The Crowd, 295 n. 

Le Dantec, theory of society, 389-90. 

Learning, and imitation, 77; and sex 
reactions, 75; automatic interests 
as drives in, 63-64; the guide in nor- 
mal mating, 72; versus maturation, 
47-48. 

Learning process, social and non-social 
objects distinguished by, 78. 

Leydig, secretions from cells of, 69. 

Life, highest aims of, 425-26. 

Lipps, theory of humor, 253. 

Love, appeal of, in Christianity, 405; 
customs guarding against fixation 
between parent and child, 360 n.; 
development of, from sensitive zone 
responses, 356-58; distinction be- 
tween love based upon sensitive 
zone responses and mature, 356; fix- 
ation of child’s, on parent of opposite 
sex, 360; of adults, predominantly 
sexual, 359-60; of child for parent, 
355-58; of parent for child, 358; in 
what attitudes recognized, 95. 

Love impulse, in friendship, 366. 

Lower forms of life, social behavior of, 
154-55. 

Lynching, an example of mob rule, 
396-97. 


Manipulation, interpretation of habit 
of, 66. 

Marital disharmony, causes of, 349-53. 

Marston, W. M., blood pressure of 
women, 346; researches in negro 
question, 386. 

Martin, E. D., antidotes for covert 
conflict, 378; defense reaction in in- 
tellectual inferiority, 370 n.; presence 
of crowds in revolution, 399-400; 
principles of crowd behavior, 314— 
17; The Behavior of Crowds, 314, 
378 n. 

Maturation, of instincts, in lower ani- 
mals, 48 n.; versus learning, 47-48. 


INDEX 


Maturation hypothesis, explanation 
of, 44; significance of pecking expe- 
riment in relation to, 45-47. 

Mayer, August, mental work alone 
and in groups, 262-63. 

McDougall, An Introduction to Social 
Psychology, 52 n.; complex emotions, 
95 n.; imitation in infants, 239 n.; 
“intellectualizing of an instinct,” 
58 n.; laughter a release of pain, 255; 
national consciousness, 388; on sug- 
gestion, 242; reinterpretation of the- 
ory of induced emotion of, 297 n.; 
sympathetic induction of emotions, 
296; The Group Mind, 296 n.; theory 
of sympathy, 234-35. 

McGonigal, J. P., on immobility, 61 n. 

Mead, “conversation of attitudes,” 
149; function of the teacher, 404; re- 
sponse evoked by word, 416. 

Measurement, of aggressiveness, 135; 
of ascendance, 134; of character, 
135-36; of expansion, 135; of person- 
ality, 126-41; of personality, by 
handwriting reaction, 132; of person- 
ality, by judgment of associates, 126- 
30; of personality, by rating meth- 
ods, 127-30; of personality, by sys- 
tematic questionnaire methods, 126, 
127; of personality, by testing meth- 
ods, 130-37; of personality, meth- 
ods of classified, 126-41. See also 
Tests. 

Medulla, description of, 25-26. 

Mental work, influence of co-acting 
group upon, 262-70. 

‘Metaphysical Absolutes,’ 389. 

Meumann, rote memory in group and 
alone, 265; social facilitation an atti- 
tude of over-compensation, 284. 

Mid-brain, description and function of, 
26. 

Mimetic expression, effect of language 
responses in, 218; part played by 
neural setting in, 217; theory of, 
216-18. 

Mimetic responses, 
215-16. 

Mind, collective, or class, 5-8. 


description of, 


445 


Mob rule, essence of, 397; lynching an 
example of, 397; unorganized form 
of social control, 396-98. 

Moede, W., experiments upon rivalry, 
280, 281, 282. 

Monkeys, and apes, social behavior of, 
160-63. 

Moore, H. T., comparison of conversa- 
tions of men and of women, 346; 
measurement of aggressiveness, 135; 
on suggestion, 250. 

Moral attitudes, inculcation of, in 
classroom, 403. 

Moral consciousness, of crowd man, 
312-13. 

Motility, as a trait of intelligence, 105- 
07; factors involved in, 105-07; sig- 
nificance of, in friendship, 367; skill 
as a trait of, 106; style a trait of, 
106-07; tenacity a trait of, 106; pat- 
terns of traits of, 132-33. 

Motor area, 28-29; diagram of, in left. 
cerebral hemisphere, 29. 

Miinsterberg, accuracy of judgment 
after discussion, 290 n.; on sugges- 
tion, 242; Psychology, General and 
Applied, 10 n. 

Muscle tonus, as social stimulus, 219- 
20; importance of, in army officers, 
219 n. See also Tonicity. 

Muscles, functions of, 19. 

Myerson, detection of ethical tenden- 
cies, 136. 


National consciousness, McDougall’s 
conception of, 388; Pillsbury’s con- 
ception of, 388 n.; nature of, 388. 

Nationality, psychology of, 388. 

Native endowment, a source of person- 
ality, 100; relation to habit forma- 
tion, 101. 

Need, as a biological maladjustment, 
1; as a conscious lack, 2; relation of 
consciousness to biological, 2, 2 n. 

Negro question, 386-87. 

Nerve cells, functions of, 17. 

Nerve impulse, probable nature of, 21. 

Nervous system, autonomic portion of, 
31-37; cerebro-spinal portion of, 31; 


4.46 


developmental growth subsequent 
to birth, 45; main subdivisions of, 
23-24. 

Neuron, description of, 17, 20-21; dia- 
gram of, 20; diagram showing rela- 
tions of, in cerebro-spinal and auto- 
nomic systems, 34; post-ganglionic, 
39; pre-ganglionie, 35. 

Newspapers, exploitation of impression 
of universality by, 308-09. 

Nicknames, use of, to release animos- 
ity, 340, 340 n. 

Non-social stimulus, definition of, 148. 

Norsworthy, N., average deviation in 
rating subjective aspects, 129. 


Objective idealists, supporters of group 
mind theory, 9 n. 

Odors, influence of co-acting group on 
judgment of, 274-76. 

Onomatopoetic theory, of origin of lan- 
guage, 193. 

Organization, social, 391-407. 

Organs of speech, 169-72; diagram 
showing general view of, 171. 


Parent-child relation, 362-65. See also 
Fixation. 

Participation, as drive wm _ primary 
group, 286-88. 

Pecking experiment, 45-47. 

Perrin, affection and social responsive- 
ness in friendship, 366-67; physical 
appeal in selection of friends, 366. 

Perry, R. B., feeling of participant in 
ceremony of retreat, 334-35. 

Personality, adjustments of traits of, 
368-74; among monkeys, 163; aver- 
age deviation in rating of, 128-29; 
causes of variability in rating of, 
128 n.; character in relation to, 124— 
25; correlation of traits of, 137-39; 
individual basis of, 100-01; intelli- 
gence as a trait of, 104-05; largely a 
social fact, 99-100; measurement of, 
126-41; measurement of, by hand- 
writing reaction, 132; measurement 
of, by judgment of associates, 126- 
30; measurement of, by rating meth- 


INDEX 


ods, 127-30; measurement of, by 
systematic questionnaire methods, 
126-27; measurement of, by testing 
methods, 130-37; methods of meas- 
urement of, classified, 126; native- 
physical endowment a source of, 100; 
negative correlation between radi- 
calism and insight in ratings of, 372; 
observation of physiognomy in meas- 
urement of, 220-21; patterns of mo- 
tility traits revealed by tests of, 132, 
133; requirements for accurate rat- 
ing of, 130; self-rating of intelligence 
and, 129-30; self-rating of intelli- 
gence and, compared with rating by 
others, 129; sociality as a trait of, 
122-25; strong and weak types of, 
139; style one of most complex traits 
of, 107; systems of habits a source 
of, 101; table listing foundations of, 
102; table listing traits of, 103; tem- 
perament as a trait of, 107-08; types 
of, 137-39. 

Personality-prestige, 420. 

Perversions, resulting from lack of sex 
training, 72. 

Peterson, J., reforms of spelling, 416. 

Physiognomy, as an indication of 
character, 220; expression through, 
219-21. 

Piderit, mimetic theory of, 215. 

Pigeons, ascendance and submissive- 
ness among, 160; sex recognition 
among, 160; social behavior of, 159- 
60. 

Pillsbury, W. B., conception of ‘na- 
tional mind,’ 388 n.; illusions of uni- 
versality, 308 n.; The Psychology of 
Nationalism and Internationalism, 
308 n., 388 Nn. 

Pleasantness, and unpleasantness, dia- 
eram showing influence of group on, 
276. 

‘Pluralistie Behavior,’ 390-91. 

Polarity, law of, in social contact, 160. 

‘Polarization,’ 303 n. 

Polymorphism, social behavior deter 
mined by, 155. 

Pons, nature and function of, 26. 


INDEX 


Popular movements, 424. 

Population, social behavior in relation 
to, 882-84. 

Porteus, 8. D., personality of mental 
defectives, 127. 

Post-natal development, of structure, 
44-47, 

Posture, as social stimulus, 219-20; 
expression through, 219-21. 

Prepotent habits, 65-66, 80; distinc- 

' tion between instincts and, 80-81. 

Prepotent reactions, mechanisms for 
release of, in crowds, 309-17. 

Prepotent reflexes, in complete sexual 
reaction, 69-70; original basis of 
drives, 109. 

Prepotent responses, in development 
of social self, 330. 

Pressey, 8. L., investigation of traits 
of temperament, 1383-34. 

Preyer, imitation in infants, 239 n. 

Prohibition, example of detrimental so- 
cial change, 400. 

Projection, in inferiority complex, 368, 
368 n.; of psychoanalysis, 308. 

Proprioceptors, description of, 18. 

‘Protopathetic’ emotions, 93; in devel- 
opment of social self, 330. 

Psychology, present standpoint in, 1-3. 

Public opinion, crowd attitudes and, 
308-09; impression of universality 
in, 396; unorganized form of social 
control, 395-96. 


Questionnaire, measurement of per- 
sonality by systematic, 126-27; self- 
study by, 127. 


Rabaud, E., L’Instinct Maternal chez 
les mammiferes, 74 n. 

Race, and racial adjustments, 386-88; 
comparison of intelligence of black 
with white, 386 n.; superiority of 
white, 386; the negro question, 386- 
87. 

Radicalism, a type of inferiority com- 
plex, 372-73; compared to conserva- 
tism. 373; in relation to government, 
399. 


447 


Rating, measurement of personality by 
methods of, 127-30; measurement of 
personality by ranking method of, 
128; measurement of personality by 
scoring method of, 127-28; of person- 
ality, by army method of, 127; of 
personality, average deviation in, 
128-29; causes of variability in, 
128 n.; comparison of self-rating 
with rating by others, 129; of person- 
ality, requirements for accurate, 130; 
correlation of, in field of self-expres- 
sion, 138-39. 

Reaction, meaning of, 1. 

Reaction-getting habit, illustrations 
of, 287. 

Reactions, erogenous zones in sex, 69; 
hunger, 61-67; resemblance of sex, to 
ticklishness, 68; sensitive zone, 67— 
69; sensitive zone and hunger in bill- 
ing of pigeons, 68 n.; sex, 69-76; the 
learning process in hunger, 63. See 
also Reflexes. 

Ream, M. J., motility traits in friend- 
ship, 367; test of social participation, 
137. 

Receptors, enumeration of, 
stimulation of, 17. 

Reed, Ruth, Changing Conceptions of 
the Maternal Instinct, 74 n. 

Reflex, afferent development of strug- 
gle, 59-60; afferent modifications of 
rejection, 57; chain, nature of, 39; 
circular, nature of, 39; conditioned 
circular in crowd emotion, 297 n.; 
conditioned, nature of, 39-40; devel- 
opment of, by conditioned response, 
52,56; efferent aspect of rejection, 58; 
efferent modifications of withdraw- 
ing, 53-56; flight a motor develop- 
ment of withdrawing, 53; rejection, 
56-58; social influence upon struggle, 
60-61; struggle, 58-61; use of term, 
Al. 

Reflex are conduction, 22-23. 

Reflexes, afferent modification of sensi- 
tive zone, 68-69; afferent modifica- 
tion of sexual, 70-72; afferent modi- 
fications of withdrawing, 51-53; al- 


18-19; 


448 


lied and antagonistic, 37-39; com- 
pound, diagram showing types of, 38; 
circular, in development of language, 
182-83; compound, in behavior, 37— 
40; ear-vocal, evoked by speech of 
others, 183; explanation of, 18; fixat- 
ing of ear-vocal, 183; function of ear- 
vocal in origin of language, 194; hu- 
man hunger, development of, 64-65; 
in fundamental activities, 49-70; 
laws of modification of prepotent, 56; 
need for efferent modification of sex- 
ual, 73; original sexual, 69, 70; pleas- 
urable habits based upon sensitive 
zone, 68-69; prepotent, general 
character of, 49; prepotent, impor- 
tant classes of, 50; process by which 
efferent modifications of, are effected, 
54-56; relation of cortax to prepo- 
tent, 55-56; relation of habit to orig- 
inal, 53-54; relation of sex and hun- 
ger, 65; self-control based upon an- 
tagonistic, 60; skilled performances 
modifications of original, 65 n.; start- 
ing and withdrawing, 50-56; with- 
drawing observed in birds and mam- 
mals, 51 n. 

Reformism, a type of inferiority con- 
flict, 373-74. 

Rejection reflex, 56-58; afferent modi- 
fications of, 57; efferent aspect of, 
58; in chimpanzees, 161, 161 n. 

Religion, crowd factors in, 406; inferi- 
ority conflict in relation to, 405-06; 
social control through, 404-07. 

Response, conditions favoring sympa- 
thetic, 236-37; development of reflex 
by conditioned, 52, 56; meaning of, 
17, 17 n.; of infant to tickling, 67; re- 
lation of conditioned to approaching 
responses, 62; symbol as an actual, 
56 n.; theory of conditioned emo- 
tional, 235-36; yielding, 61. 

Responses, allied and antagonistic, in 
crowds, 309-12; allied and antago- 
nistic in release of attitudes, 246; 
approaching, 61—63; biological func- 
tion of avoiding, 61; conditioned 
circular in imitation, 240; cortical 


INDEX 


activity determines successful, 55— 
56; description of mimetic, 215-16; 
fundamental, used in social control, 
392; formula applicable to approach- 
ing, 62-63; modification of ap- 
proaching, 63; suggestion in increase 
of released, 247-48; term more exact 
than reflex, 41; theory of inheritance 
of adaptive, 517., 527. See also 
Reflexes. 

Revolution, as an overt conflict, 399; 
factors determining, 399; influence 
of crowd in, 400. 

Richardson, R. F., consciousness in 
anger, 342; The Psychology and Peda- 
gogy of Anger, 91 n. 

Rivalry, effect of ascendance and sub- 
mission in, 281-82; effects of, 280- 
82; emotion of; similar to anger, 283; 
in classroom, 404; in Mayer’s test, 
263 n.; influence of, on work of indi- 
viduals, 264; leveling tendency of, 
281; Moede’s experiments upon, 280— 
81; nature of, 262; physiological basis 
of, 283-84; Triplett’s - experiment 
upon, 280. 

Rolando, fissure of, 26. 

Romanes, Mental Evolution in Man, 
195 n.; understanding of language, 
189 n. 

Rosanoff, free word association, 134. 

Ross, E. A., effect of craze, 394; on im- 
itation, 239. 

Ruckmick, C. A., identification of fa- 
cial expressions, 224 7., 225. 

Rumor, unorganized form of social 
control, 395. 

Rural life, effect of, upon social behav- 
ior, 382-83. 


Schmidt, F., work done at home and in 
schoolroom, 264, 264 n., 265. 

School curriculum, need for social con- 
tent in, 403-04. 

Scott, W. D., crowd building devices, 
300-01, 301 7.; effect of mental im- 
agery In crowds, 306. 

Self-display, in conflict with modesty, 
340. 


INDEX 


Self-expression, as a trait of personal- 
ity, 108-22; ascendance submission 
relation a trait of, 119-21; compensa- 
tion a trait of, 111-15; correlation of 
ratings in field of, 188-39; drive a 
trait of, 109-11; expansion — reclu- 
sion relation a trait of, 121-22; ex- 
troversion — introversion traits of, 
115-17; high correlation in field of, 
138 n.; insight a trait of, 117-19. 

Self-rating, of personality and intelli- 
gence, 129-380. 

Sensations, experienced in emotion of 
fear, 84-85. 

Sensitive zone reactions, 67-69, 68 n.; 
in familial behavior, 73-75. 

Sensitive zone reflexes, afferent modifi- 
cation of, 68-69; pleasurable habits 
based upon, 68-69. 

Sensitive zone responses, conditioning 
of, 357; welded with sexual response, 
357; development of child’s love 
from, 356-58; distinction between 
love based upon, and mature love, 
356. 

Sensitive zones, Freudian interpreta- 
tion of, 68; relation to hunger and 
sex, 67-68; stimulation of, basis of 
humor, 255. 

Sensory areas, 28-29; diagram of, in 
left cerebral hemisphere, 29. 

Sex, activities, inhibition of anger 
through, 349; as determinant of sug- 
gestion, 249; as drive in primary 
group, 286-88; in familial behavior, 
73-75; relation of sensitive zones to, 
67-68. 

Sex adjustment, substitutions for, in- 
adequate, 350. 

Sex attraction, 70-72; in selection of 
friends and associates, 365-66. 

Sex conflict, and adjustments in family 
life, 345-67. 

Sex desire, appeals to, in advertising, 
408 n.; woman’s control through ap- 
peal to, 351. 

Sex differences, 345-48. 

Sex drive, introversion of, in family 
life, 350; of woman in the home, 347; 


449 


as basis for man’s varied progress, 
347. 

Sex jealousy, in women, 352. 

Sex life, introversion of, in girls, 345. 

Sex reactions, 69-76; afferent modifica- 
tion of, in pigeons, 71; and learning, 
75; erogenous zones in, 69; resem- 
blance to ticklishness, 68. 

Sex recognition, among pigeons, 160. 

Sex reflexes, related to hunger, 65. 

Sex restraint, value of, in married life, - 
353. 

Sex responses, original stimulus for, 
69. 

Sex stimulation, result of lack in ani- 
mals of internal, 74 n. 

Sex stimulus, internal nature of origi- 
nal, 69-70; periodic evidence of, in 
animals, 70. 

Sex training, importance of pre-adoles- 
cent years for, 73 n.; necessity for, 
72; perversions resulting from inade- 
quate, 72; problem of, 72-73. 

Sex words, used by monkeys, 161-62. 

Sexual activities, late development of 
effectors operating in, 45. 

Sexual maladjustment, chronic jeal- 
ousy indication of, 352. 

Sexual reactions, prepotent reflexes in 
complete, 69-70. 

Sexual reflexes, afferent modification 
of, 70-72; need for efferent modifica- 
tion of, 73. 

Sexual responses, conditioning of, 357; 
welded with sensitive zone re- 
sponses, 357. 

Sherrington, experiments upon the 
‘spinal dog,’ 49; The Integrative Ac- 
tion of the Nervous System, 49 n. 

Shepard, J. F., and Breed, F.8., experi- 
ments in pecking response of chicks, 
45 n., 46, 47 n. 

Small town, effect upon social behay- 
ior, 383. 

Smith and Guthrie, General Psycholog’y 
in Terms of Behavior, 185 n.; perver- 
sion of exhibitionism, 287 n. 

Social adjustments, 336-79; major con- 
flicts and their, 341. 


450 


Soeial aggregates, 382-88. 

Social attitudes, and social conscious- 
ness, 320-35; based on behavior of 
others toward us, 324-25; building 
up of, in others toward us, 325, 325 n., 
326; general, 320-21; of others 
toward us, maintaining, 326-29; 
self-expressive, 322-23; toward spe- 
cific groups, 321-22; toward specific 
persons, 323-24. 

Social behavior, and control in econo- 
mic sphere, 407-15; as basis for ori- 
gin of language, 193-95; character of, 
148; circular character peculiar to, 
3 n.; complex emotional states in, 
94-96; conflict and adjustment in, 
336-38; contributory social stimu- 
lation in linear and circular, 151-52; 
controlling and self-adapting, 153- 
54; cortical activity in, 30-31; defini- 

_tion of, 148; determined by polymor- 
phism, 155; diagram of circular, 150; 
diagram of contributory social stim- 
ulation in circular, 152; diagram of 
contributory social stimulation in lin- 
ear, 151; diagram of linear, 149; di- 
rect social stimulation in linear and 
circular, 151; effect of city life upon, 
583; effect of rural life upon, 382-83; 
effect of small town upon, 383; func- 
tion of primary group in, 3843 in ani- 
mals, 154-67; in audience, 301—03; in 
commercial attitudes, 407-08; in co- 
working groups, 410-11; in discoy- 

ery and invention, 418-19; in indus- 
trial groups, 410-11; in relation to 
community, 384; in relation to popu- 
Jation, 382-84; in relation to progress, 
426-30; in relation to society, 382- 
439; in work of law-making bodies, 
401-02; individual as unit in, 139- 
41; laws of, in relation to teaching 
method, 404; linear and circular, 
148-50; nature and development of, 
147-67; of apes and monkeys, 160- 
63; of human beings, two classes of, 
169; of insects, 155-57; of lower 
forms of life, 154—55; of pigeons, 159- 
60; of vertebrates, 157-59; person- 


INDEX 


ality a result of, 100; place of, in so- 
cial sciences, 382; use of term ‘self- 
adapting,’ 153 n. 

Social censorship, 375. 

Social change, through leadership, 
419-22. 

Social class, and caste, 384-86; sub- 
missiveness in relation to, 385. 

Social conflict, in boasting, 340-41; in 
greed, 340; in self-display, 340; overt 
and covert, 336-37. 

Social conformity, attitude of, 278; in 
convention, 394; in fashion, 393. 
Social consciousness, and social atti- 

tudes, 320-35; and social self, genetic 
development of, 330-33; definition 
of, 329; general aspects of, 333-35; 
in co-working group, 279; nature of, 
329-30; recognition of, in this book, 
12; typical forms of, 330. 
Social contact, law of polarity in, 160. 
Social continuity, and change, 415-24; 
language as vehicle for, 417-18. 
Social control, advertising a form of, 
408-09; and behavior in economic 
sphere, 407-15; and exploitation, in 
business, 408-10; as drive in origin 
of language, 197; as drive in primary 
groups, 286-88; conditioned re- 
sponses in, 392; conversation imper- 
fect form of, 392; fundamental re- 
sponses used in, 392; in face-to-face 
group, 392; in the origin of language, 
193-94; nature of, 391-92; sugges- 
tion a form of, 392; through 
crowds, 397; through government, 
398-402; through institutions, 398- 
407; through religion, 404-07. 
Social control, unorganized forms of, 
392-98; convention, 394; custom, 
394-95; fad and craze, 393-94; fash- 
ion, 392-93; mob rule, 396-98; pub- 
lic opinion, 395-96; rumor, 395. 
Social decrement, use of term, 263. 
Social disapproval, influence of, 311. 
Social evolution, unknown among in- 
fra-human animals, 166. 
Social facilitation, 248, 261-62; condi- 
tioned response in, 284; enhanced by 


INDEX 


similarity of nervous structure, 391; 
individual differences in, 278-79; in- 
fluence of, on work of individuals, 
264; origin and spread of, in crowds, 
300-01; physiological basis of, 283- 
84. 

Social factors, in development of fun- 
damental activities, 76-79, 81-82. 
Social habits, preferred to ‘social in- 

stincts,’ 78. 

Social heredity, concept of, 415-16. 

Social increment, use of term, 263. 

Social inheritance, among animals, 166. 

Social Mind, conclusions regarding, 9. 

Social objects, types of reactions to, 
233. 

Social order, organization and control 
in, 391-407. 

Social participation, test of, 136-37. 

Social progress, as well-being of indi- 
vidual, 424-26; super-organic evolu- 
tion as theory of, 424. 

Social projection, in the community, 
384; in the crowd, 306-08. 

Social psychology, and sociology, 10—- 
11; as science of individual behavior 
and consciousness, 1-13; as science 
of the individual, 4; behavior and 
consciousness in, 11-12; definition of, 
12, 382; plan of treatment in this 
book, 13; province of, 3. 

Social sciences, place of social behavior 
in, 382. 

Social self, 324-25; and social con- 
sciousness, genetic development of, 
330-33; conditioned response in de- 
velopment of, 331; coalescence with 
real self, 333; ‘ejective stage’ in de- 
velopment of, 331, 331 n.; in the 

community, 384; social self, loss of 
control of, 326, 327; origin of, 326; 
prepotent responses in development 
of, 330; protopathetic emotion in de- 
velopment of, 330; sympathy in de- 
velopment of, 331. 

Social situations, complex, 260-61. 

Social stimulation, elementary forms of 
response to, 233-58; forms of, 169; 
230-31; response to, in crowd, 292- 


451 
318; response to, in the group, 260- 
90 


Social stimuli, diagram of contributory 
in circular social behavior, 152; di- 
rect and contributory, 150-52; mus- 
cle tonus and posture as, 219-20; ta- 
ble classifying, 170. 

Social stimulus, definition of, 147; dia- 
gram of contributory in linear social 
behavior, 151; two ways of involving 
behavior, 148. 

Social subvaluents, use of term, 263. 

Social supervaluents, use of term, 263. 

Sociality, aggressive self-seeking a 
trait of, 124; and intelligence, rela- 
tion between in intercorrelation of 
traits, 137; as a trait of personality, 
122-25; character a trait of, 124-25; 
heart of negro question, 386; self- 
seeking a trait of, 123-24; social par- 
ticipation a trait of, 124; socializa- 
tion a trait of, 123; susceptibility to 
social stimulation a trait of, 122-23. 

Socialization, a goal involving conflict, 
378-79; evils of society not neces- 
sary accompaniments of, 378; force 
in all covert conflict, 377; fuller rec- 
ognition of, in education, 403. 

Society, imitation and sympathy the- 
ories of, 390-91; nature of, 389-90; 
social behavior in relation to, 382- 
430; theory of, 389-91; two opposed 
conceptions of, 389-90. 

Sociology, and social psychology, 10— 
bs 

Somatic postures, effect of, in differen- 
tiating emotions, 92-93. 

Somatic region, 31; and visceral re- 
gions, interconnection between, 35- 
36; avoiding responses mainly in, 
61-62. 

Spaulding, E. R., personality question- 
naire, 127.7 

Spinal cord, and spinal nerves, struc- 
ture and functions of, 24-25; dia- 
gram of cross-section through, 24. 

Starting reflex, 50-56. 

Steiner, rule by persuasive leaders, 
421. 


452 


Stern, on suggestion, 242. 

Stimuli, social and non-social, defini- 
tions of, 147-48. 

Stimulus, meaning of, 17, 17 n.; trans- 
fer, 65-67. 

tructure, adjustments based on differ- 
ence of, 154-55; post-natal develop- 
ment of, 44-47. 

Struggle conflict, 341-45. 

Struggle inhibition, types of, 342-44. 

Struggle reflex, 58-61; afferent devel- 
opment of, 59-60; relation to rejec- 
tion and withdrawal, 58. 

Struggle response, expression of, in 
crowd, 294, 310; introversion of, 
341-42. 

Sublimation, discussion of theory of, 
75-76. 

Submission, and ascendance between 
brothers and sisters, 365; and con- 
formity in crowds, 298, 300; in face- 
to-face groups, 286; in presence of 
group, 2773 in rivalry, 281-82; origin 
of, 120; relation to yielding response, 
61. 

Submissiveness, in crowds, 304; in re- 
lation to social class, 385; relation to 
suggestion, 249. 

Suggestion, and suggestion conscious- 
ness in crowd, 303-04; conditioned 
response in, 248-49; conditions fa- 
voring, 249-51 ; control through lead- 
ership based on, 420-21; defined as a 
control of attitude, 244-45; devices 
for making effective, 250-51; effect of 
verbal, illustrated by hypnosis, 244; 
final definition of, 251—52; form of so- 
cial control, 392; mechanism produc- 
ing, 243-44; illustration of all three 
effects of, 248; illustrations of open- 
ness to, 249 n.; in formation of atti- 
tudes, 245-46; in increase of released 
responses, 247—48; in release of atti- 
tudes, 246-47; influence of majority 
opinion, 250, 250 n.; relation of sub- 
missiveness to, 249; sex as determi- 
nant of, 249; two extremes in suscep- 
tibility to, 250; various definitions 
of, 242. 


INDEX 


Symbiosis, meaning of, 154. 

Symbol, as an actual response, 56 7.3; 
definition and nature of, in terms of 
behavior, 55-56. 

Symbol responses, intelligence makes 
possible, 104. 

Sympathetic impulses, adrenal glands 
excited by, 88. 

Sympathetic induction, objections to 
theory of, 296-97. 

Sympathetic response, conditions fa- 
voring, 236-37. 

Sympathetic system, 32-35; diagram 
of, 33; related to unpleasant emo- 
tions, 86-87, 89; relation to facial 
expressions, 212. 

Sympathy, accompanying love emo- 
tion in some cases of, 237 n.; con- 
ditioned emotional response in ex- 
plaining, 235-36; objections to Mc- 
Dougall’s theory of, 234-35; social 
significance of, 237-39; in develop- 
ment of social self, 331; mechanism 
of, 234-36, 236 n.; theory of society, 
390-91; theory of ‘sympathetic in- 
duction of emotions,’ 234-35; usual 
definition of, 234. 

Synapse, properties of, 22-23. 

Synge, The Playboy of the Western 
World, 325 n. 


Tarde, on imitation, 239; theory of so- 
ciety, 390. 

Telepathy, hypothesis of, 11 n. 

Temperament, as a trait of personal- 
ity, 107-08; traits of, tested, 133-34. 

Terman, L. M., development of intel- 
lectually precocious child, 138. 

Test, of capacity for achievement, 133; 
of emotional attitude, 133; of intro- 
version, by free word association, 
134; of social participation, 136-37. 
See also Measurement. 

Testing methods, measurement of per- 
sonahty by, 1380-37. 

Tests of personality, correlation of, 
131; patterns of motility traits re- 
vealed by, 1382-33; standardization 
of, 131; verification of results of ..131. 


INDEX 


Thalamus, description and function 
of, 28. 

Thinking, conventional, cast aside in 
discovery and invention, 418; neces- 
sity for solitude in, 418 n.; social 
character of individual’s, 416-18; so- 
cial influences determining scientific, 
419; stimulation from social group, 
417. 

Thought, behavioristic interpreta- 
tions of, 56 n.; influence of co-work- 
ing group on quality of, 272-74. 

Tickling, explanation of, 252. 

Tongue, in speech, description and 
function of, 177. 

Tonicity, social effects of, 219-20. See 
also Muscle tonus. 

Tonus, meaning of, 32. 

Traits of personality, selection of, 101; 
table listing, 103; use of term, 99. 
Triplett, experiment upon rivalry, 280; 
influence of group on speed, 262. 

Trotter, “voice of the herd,” 76. 


Universality, impression of, and social 
projection in crowds, 307; conscious- 
ness of kind elementary form of, 391; 
exploited, 308; in credit and panie, 

. 408; in crowds, 305-06; in establish- 
ing personality-prestige, 420; in fash- 
ion, 393; in labor unions, 411; in na- 
tional consciousness, 388; in public 
opinion, 396. 

Unsocialized reactions, clues to inhib- 
ited, 338-41. 


Vertebrates, social behavior of, 157— 
59. 

Visceral region, 31; part played by, in 
approaching responses, 62. 

Visceral and somatic regions, intercon- 
nection between, 35-36. 

Vocal expression, and gesture in hu- 
man development, 189-98; genetic 
development of, 178-89; physiologi- 


453 


cal basis of, 169-78; pre-linguistic 
or laryngeal stage of, 179-81. 
Vowels, formation of, 176-77. 


Warfare, problem of, 401. 

Washburn, possession of ejective con- 
sciousness, 332. 

Watson, J. B., Psychology from the 
Standpoint of a Behaviorist, 50 n., 
Snip (4 ne 

Webb, ratings of school and college 
students, 137-38. 

Weight, influence of group on judg- 
ments of, 276-77; diagram showing, 
20s 

Wells, F. L., “balancing factors,” 113, 
350; free word association, 134; per- 
sonality questionnaire, 127. 

Wembridge, E. R., Work with Socially 
Maladjusted Girls, 73 n. 

Whitman, C. O., The Behavior of Pig- 
eons, 68 n., 70 n., 71. 

Willey, and Herskovits, ‘“Servitude 
and Progress,” 367 n. 

Withdrawing reaction, among mon- 
keys, 162; in crowd, 293; in relation 
to government, 398. 

Withrawing reflex, 50-56; afferent 
modifications of, 51-53; efferent 
modifications of, 53-56; observa- 
tions of, in birds and mammals, 
51 n. 

Women, attitudes toward, 345-48. 

Woodworth, R. 8., on importance of 
special abilities, 110 n.; ‘Yes’ and 
‘No’ questionnaire, 127. 

Word association, testing of introver- 
sion by, 134. 

Wundt, mimetic theory of, 215. 


Yielding response, 61, 61 n. 
Young, care of, among animals, 163- 
64. 


Zangwill, Plaster Saints, 327. 


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